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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to examine the causes of ideological moderation in the South African 
party system in the post-1994 period. Previous research stresses the non-left-right feature of politics 
and when it recognises the centrist feature of major parties and moderation of the party system, the 
causes of the latter are unexplained. The deficiency in previous research is that moderation and 
limited left-right disagreements as fundamental causes of broader political dynamics are overlooked 
— moderate systems foster political consensus and democratic stability. In this study I critically 
examine three theoretical causal variables that account for moderation: the electoral system, the 
electorate,  and  the  dominant  party.  This  study  relies  on  a  measurement  of  party  system 
fragmentation,  and  voter  and  party  system  polarisation,  as  well  as  an  intensive  qualitative 
assessment of the ANC. The evidence is based on a number of nationally representative surveys that 
measure public opinion; interviews with political party leaders and representatives, and officials 
from labour and business; and document analysis. The finding is that the ANC as the dominant 
party is the main driver of moderation in the party system. Coupled with electoral dominance, the 
centripetal, non-dogmatic, pragmatic and flexible tendencies that characterise the ANC permit the 
party to induce and stabilise party system moderation. This study: develops a causal framework for 
understanding moderation; builds on previous research about the centrism of major parties and the 
moderation of the party system (both quantitatively and qualitatively); departs from the argument 
about the fragmented and rightist nature of the opposition bloc and the race-based approach to the 
electorate; and extends the debate about the ANC by arguing that left-right movement occurs within 
centrist terrain, and that the party is not an amorphous or client entity but a clearly defined one. I 
also  add  to:  the  growing  body  of  knowledge  that  finds  no  necessary  connection  between 
proportionalism, extremist party positioning and polarisation; the idea that party system polarisation 
is less reflective of voter polarisation; and concur with previous research that argues that the role of 
a pivotal centre party is critical for the party system. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 The topic under study 
This study investigates the determinants of left-right polarisation in the national party system of 
South Africa in the post-1994 period. Causes behind party system polarisation constitute a central 
topic in broader literature on political polarisation (Sartori, 1976; Hetherington, 2009; Layman et al, 
2006;  Curini  and  Hino,  2012).  This  is  precisely  because  of  the  negative  effects  commonly 
associated with highly polarised party systems (Downs, 1957; Sartori, 1976; Powell, 1982; Lijphart, 
1977).  Party  system ‘polarisation’ refers  to  the  extent  to  which major  parties  are  ideologically 
distinct  (Sartori,  1976;  Dalton,  2008).  The  degree  of  polarisation  leads  to  two  main  types  of 
systems: a moderate and a polarised party system. The former reflects a small ideological difference 
between major parties who converge to one side of the left-right spectrum, including the centre 
space; by contrast, the latter system reflects a large ideological distance between major parties who 
occupy opposed positions on the extremes of the spectrum. 
Fundamental  theoretical  explanations  for  the  causes  of  moderation  and  polarisation  can  be 
grouped into three perspectives. First, the fragmentation-institutionalist explanation locates causes 
within electoral laws and party system fragmentation: proportional systems generally produce a 
large number of parties which cause polarisation; plurality systems tend to produce a small number 
of parties which cause moderation. Second, the sociological approach puts forward that the nature 
of  voter  preferences,  whether  centrist  or  extremist,  influences  the  direction  of  ideological 
competition amongst parties: when voters are on one side of the left-right spectrum, including the 
centre, major parties are only moderately different from each other; when voters are poles apart on 
the spectrum, parties mirror this and are also polarised. Third, the party-centric explanation posits 
that political parties matter for the state and process of polarisation: low polarisation is consequent 
of  major  parties  deciding  to  occupy  one  side  of  the  left-centre-right  space;  meanwhile,  high 
polarisation is consequent of major parties occupying diametrically opposed ideologies. These are 
considered central factors in influencing the degree of polarisation. It  is clear that the output is 
either moderation (low polarisation) or polarisation. These three theoretical strands form the basis 
of this research enquiry: it acts as a causal framework to assess the determinants of moderation in 
the South African case. 
The main research question is: what are the causes of moderation within the South African party 
system? I examine the party system in the democratic period (1994 to 2014). The argument about a 
state of low polarisation in South Africa is arrived at by a literature review which shows broad 
scholarly consensus on the centrism of major parties and moderation of the party system, and is 
undergirded by a systematic measurement of polarisation within the system. Both the qualitative 
literature-informed  assessment  and  quantitative  measurement  reveal  a  centrist  position  for  the 
African  National  Congress  (ANC)  and  Democratic  Alliance  (DA)  (the  two  main  parties),  and 
substantially  low  levels  of  polarisation  in  the  party  system.  I  mainly  consider  the  electorally 
dominant party, the ANC, which has achieved consecutive majorities since 1994. I also critically 
engage with the polarising aspect coming from the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a radical left 
party, and determine what this means for a moderate party system. In brief, the intention of this 
study is to explain the causes of moderation in the party system.
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1.2 Problem identification and background
The background informing the research problem emerges from a fundamental scholarly gap within 
broader South African party system literature. Existing research on the South African party system 
predominantly focuses on voting behaviour and the degree of openness of the electoral market; race 
and issue-based politicisation (where the former is seen as the main cleavage line far surpassing the 
latter); and the numerical aspect of the party system (the level of fragmentation or lack thereof), that 
is the dominant party system and also its relationship with democracy (Johnson, 1996; Friedman, 
2005; Ferree, 2006; Mattes et al,  1995; Hoeane, 2009; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999b; Southall, 
2014b). However, in comparison, the component of ideological polarisation in the party system is 
given  significantly  little  systematic  attention.  Studies  that  concentrate  on  the  left-right  element 
mainly assess the ideological base of major parties which are regarded as moderate (either left of 
centre or right of centre); and as a result, the character of the party system is considered one of low 
ideological polarisation (Schrire, 2001; Booysen, 2005; Mattes, 2002). Yet, the determinants of such 
systemic  positions  are  unexplained;  what  causes  the  system as  a  whole  to  assume a  moderate 
character in the first place is insufficiently attended to. Although implicit explanations surface in the 
literature (especially the role of  the ANC in intra-party pluralism),  what  may well  be assumed 
knowledge  about  the  causes  of  moderation  in  the  party  system  actually  deserves  deliberate 
analytical attention. Also, by assuming certain factors, especially a single factor, neglects assessing 
the matter within a comprehensive framework.
In a related manner, concerns about polarisation are identified in the literature but a systematic 
starting point to discuss these issues are largely absent. This issue relates to recent concerns about 
the state of polarisation. The emergence of the EFF (the third largest party) in the 2014 national 
election  is  predicted  to  increase  polarisation  in  the  party  system.  The  party  is  considered  an 
important radicalising element because of its extreme leftwing orientation that is likely to induce the 
ANC toward a more responsive posture as it deals with a new challenger (Southall, 2014b; de Jager, 
2015). Without understanding the causes of low polarisation, it becomes difficult to assess imminent 
alterations in the state of affairs. To date there has been no critical investigation into whether radical 
parties like the EFF can cause change in the left-right dynamics of the party system. 
Beside emanating from the state of low polarisation, this research topic largely emerges from an 
empirical  puzzle.  South  Africa  is  a  unique  situation  because  intuitively  one  would  expect 
polarisation  and  political  conflict  given  high  levels  of  poverty,  unemployment  and  economic 
inequality;  incentives  for  extremist  party  positioning  and  ideological  differentiation  under 
proportional electoral laws; radicalised public rhetoric that advances socialism, the overthrow of 
capitalism,  and  hinges  toward  anti-racial  reconciliation;  and  social  protests  around  services, 
unemployment, housing and wages. There are justifiable grounds for radicalised policy proposals 
and ideologically-based politics. But despite this, the party system has remained moderate. There 
has been little scholarly attention devoted to clarifying this dilemma, and thus, a crucial question 
remains improperly investigated: why is the party system moderate despite justifiable grounds for 
extremism?
This study intends to fill the scholarly gap and attempts to explain the empirical paradox by 
examining the state of low polarisation and centrism in the South African party system.
1.3 Rationale and significance
The rationale of this study is a concern with the significance that moderate and polarised systems 
have for democratic stability and social order. “The study of ideological polarisation is an important 
topic in research ranging from behavioural-level to institutional studies of politics” (Clark, 2009: 
146). Aside from other components that are used to study the party system, polarisation has come to 
occupy centre stage. Since the 1970s there has been “a new valuation of the ideological dimension” 
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undergirding parties and party systems (von Beyme, 1985: 259). Sartori (1976) firmly argues for the 
relevance of the ideological position of relevant parties in the system. According to Sartori and 
Downs (1957), the nature of ideological dispersion is an important indicator in providing a deep and 
rich understanding of the way party systems operate. “Therefore, measures such as parliamentary 
seat share and other indicators of explicit political strength need to be complemented by indicators 
related to political ideology” (Pardos-Prado and Dinas, 2010: 763). 
To be more specific about this scholarly connection between major parties and ideologies, the 
left-right  positions  parties  take  and  the  consequent  levels  of  party  system  polarisation  have 
fundamental implications for democracy. High ideological polarisation, affected by the electoral 
success  of  extremist  parties,  strains  political  consensus,  fosters  political  violence,  affects  the 
stability of democracy and is associated with democratic breakdown and collapse (Sartori, 1976; 
Downs, 1957; Valenzuela, 1978; Sani and Sartori, 1983; Powell, 1982; Mainwaring, 1999; Dalton, 
2008). Although there is no overwhelming scepticism of polarised systems — since some argue that 
positive effects may actually be associated with systems that have high ideological competition and 
large policy distances amongst major parties (such as ideological voting, increased voter turnout, 
and ‘partisan sorting’) — a predominant perspective is one that emphasises negative consequences 
for  broader  politics  and  society  (Hetherington,  2001;  Lachat,  2008;  Dalton  and  Tanaka,  2007; 
Wang, 2014; Sorensen, 2014). 
Recent research goes beyond the extreme effect of polarisation (democratic collapse) but still 
finds strong negative consequences.  For instance, there is a significant relationship between the 
percentage of left-right extremists in a party system and the level of protests in a nation (Dalton et 
al,  2009;  Powell,  1986).  Others  associate  polarisation  with  legislative  gridlock,  unsuccessful 
economic  performance,  and  an  unpredictable  policy  environment  (Jones,  2001;  Frye,  2010). 
Esteban and Ray (1994: 820) succinctly puts it  that “the phenomenon of polarisation is closely 
linked to the generation of tensions, to the possibilities of articulated rebellion and revolt, and to the 
existence of social unrest in general”. In the end, stability of party systems are more a function of 
polarisation  than  any  other  factor  (Dalton,  2008).  This  suggests  that  elite-based,  party  system 
polarisation is a significant contributor to social and political instability. 
For a long time scholars have suggested that the level of party system fragmentation (that is, the 
number of parties in the system) adversely affects democracy, and is the number one determinant of 
party and voter behaviour. However, this view is challenged. An alternative explanation suggests 
that it is actually the ideological positions of major parties, not the number of parties, that produce 
negative effects. A strong argument has been put by Dalton (2008) who argues that most of the 
effects of party systems, such as the representation of social cleavages and voter turnout, can be 
traced to the ideological distance amongst relevant parties in the system. This argument does not 
discount the importance of the number of parties in the system but argues that the effects attributed 
to  this  phenomenon are  actually  a  consequence of  polarisation.  To restate,  Sartori  (2005:  283) 
makes the point that the number of parties on its own does not affect the stability of government, 
but only when coupled with the ideological position of relevant parties.
Moderate party systems, on the other hand, are considered highly beneficial for the success and 
consolidation of democracy and social stability. This is especially the case when relevant parties are 
in the centre, occupying the moderate political space. Stable and consensus-style politics may also 
exist when major parties are on the same ideological axis, not necessarily on the centre; either on 
the extreme right or extreme left. However, it is more common to equate the virtues of moderation 
with  centrism  and  non-extremism.  Moderate  polities  are  conducive  to  political  and  social 
consensus, and stable and effective government (Downs, 1957). The Chilean party system of 1973 
is used as a contrastive case. High level of polarisation is argued to have caused the system to 
become unworkable, eventually collapsing democracy (Sartori, 2005; Scully, 1992). 
The dominance of the centre and little or no oscillation between extremist poles, are considered 
massive contributors to legislative productivity and efficiency, successful economic performance, 
and a stable and predicable policy environment. A centrist party system plays a mediating role and 
holds the balance between extremist parties; it continuously fosters moderation within society and 
 3
contributes to the general health of democracy (Scully, 1992). Thus, much of political life hinges on 
the level of ideological difference amongst major parties. Polarisation is not simply an extension of 
political jargon but it has real empirical significance.
Given that South Africa is a stable democracy and a party system with a centrist dominant party, 
understanding the ideological composition of the party system and the degree of polarisation are 
important in subsequently recognising the contributing factors to stability. Not only is this topic 
relevant for understanding why major parties in South Africa occupy similar centrist positions, it is 
also a tool to assess the necessary factors that have the potential to effect change or stability in the 
ideological makeup of the party system. To be clear, this study focuses on examining the causes and 
determinants,  instead  of  the  effects,  of  moderation  within  the  South  African  party  system  — 
although it recognises the beneficial consequences of moderation in general politics. 
1.4 Methodology and research design 
This  research  is  case-oriented  and  focuses  on  both  cause-effect  and  causal  mechanisms  logic. 
Selection is based on the dependent variable (low left-right polarisation or ideological moderation) 
and independent variables. It is justifiable to focus on the dependent variable since this research 
emerges  from an  empirical  paradox  whereby  the  outcome of  interest  (moderation  in  the  party 
system) is widely acknowledged. When there is a research puzzle and when the outcome is known, 
it becomes difficult to ignore effects and simply focus on causes. However, I avoid giving exclusive 
attention to the outcome. Important theoretical factors that are hypothesised to cause moderation are 
considered;  independent  variables  encompassed  in  this  research  include:  fragmentation  and 
electoral systems, the electorate, and the major political party. 
There are two main reasons for embedding this research in a theoretical context and considering 
relevant causal variables. First, I intend to arrive at a comprehensive, plausible and non-spurious 
framework for the determinants of moderation in the South African party system. This means that I 
seek to minimise the problem of some other relevant variable explaining the phenomenon. Second, 
a secondary intention of this research is to add to debates in broader polarisation literature. While a 
single-country case cannot be considered representative of the population of interest, it adds to the 
accumulation of knowledge and sheds light on controversial and thorny points in the literature. 
I rely on primary and secondary data to meet the objectives of this research. I also make use of a 
multi-method  research  design  that  allows  for  corroboration,  thus  increasing  the  validity  of  the 
findings.  This  consists  of  (a)  interviews  with  party  leaders  and  officials;  representatives  from 
business, SACP, COSATU and NEDLAC; (b) survey data from various nationally representative 
surveys, between 1982 and 2016 (Afrobarometer, CSES, EPOP, IDASA, SASAS, WVS); and (c) 
document and content analysis, especially to analyse data on the dominant party (the ANC). 
Also,  I  use a mixture of  qualitative and quantitative analysis.  Since the latter  is  particularly 
useful for establishing the presence or absence of correlations through statistical means, it suits the 
objective of this project which is to establish a causal framework for moderation in South Africa. 
However, numerical data is not available on all hypothesised causes, especially on the dominant 
party. In this regard, I rely mainly on qualitative assessments to interpret the effect the ANC has on 
the party system and whether (and how) it contributes to moderation of the system. Qualitative 
analysis is also employed in other sections to determine stimulating factors behind correlations, and 
this follows a thematic approach. In broad terms, the main approach to analysis involves the search 
for general patterns, convergence and non-convergence within and amongst data sets. 
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1.5 Contributions and limitations
Three main reasons inform the scholarly contribution of this research. First, this analysis aims to 
contribute to the literature by presenting a systematic and rigorous framework for understanding the 
causes  of  moderation  in  the  South  African  party  system.  Also,  given  that  the  study  does  not 
emphasise a single causal factor but theoretically relevant ones, it provides a deep, rich and fuller 
understanding  of  the  causes.  Understanding  the  causes  assists  in  pointing  out  chief  agents  or 
institutions which hold the power to alter the ideological makeup and direction of the party system. 
Also, having a systematic framework provides a useful reference point to discuss left-right party 
system  change,  including  the  process  leading  up  to  polarisation.  Second,  I  contribute  in  a 
quantitative way by using existing survey data,  reconstituting it,  placing it  within a  theoretical 
context and a structure of exposition, and deriving statistical findings from it. Third, I add to the 
literature on theoretical causes of extremist party positioning and polarisation. The findings from the 
South African case have relevance to broader debates about electoral systems, voters and dominant 
parties.  In  this  way,  I  add  to  the  chain  of  reasoning  to  offer  more  insight  into  these  largely 
controversial and unresolved issues. In brief, I find that proportionalism and voters do not account 
for moderation, instead, much lies with the dominant party. 
Fourth, I contribute on a number of levels to the South African literature. This includes adding to 
the debate about (a) the ideologically fragmented and rightist nature of opposition parties. I find that 
the opposition bloc is less fragmented than is often argued and occupies the same space, and former 
rightwing parties have moved to the centre-left — including the DA. I add to the debate about (b) 
issue-based and non-policy voting. While the race-based aspect is often argued to dominate voting 
behaviour, this research finds that voters themselves and party representatives hardly cite identity-
based reasons for party support. This study finds that voters have left and right tendencies and are 
divided on general and salient economic issues,  the median voter is centrist  and moderate,  and 
voters are engaged in indirect policy voting based on party promises and deliverables. I argue that 
an increase in policy voting depends on party politicisation of issues and programmes, alleviation of 
poverty and class migration, and increase in education and literacy. I also contribute to the literature 
about  (c)  the  left-right,  and  more  particularly,  centrist  nature  of  voters  and  parties.  I  add  a 
quantitative element to the observation that parties are centrist and the party system is moderate. In 
addition, I extend the literature by (d) offering a more distinctive argument that the ANC is neither 
left nor right but largely centrist, and is not an amorphous undefined political entity.   
The following factors constitute the limitations of this study. First, this research is based on the 
assumption that parties can be positioned along a unidimensional left-right continuum, and voter 
positions on general and economic issues can also be identified in this manner. The downside of this 
is that by focusing on the economic dimension, I do not consider other left-right dimensions such as 
political, social and cultural — although not all issues are reducible to left-right terms. Second, a 
comprehensive assessment of social polarisation on non-ideological matters is not within the ambit 
of  this  research  project.  By  restricting  the  analysis  to  the  phenomenon  of  moderation,  I 
consequently  do  not  account  for  polarisation  in  broader  society.  Third,  the  absence  of  a 
representative,  large-n  research  design  implies  that  the  ability  of  this  research  to  contribute  to 
broader hypothesised causes of  polarisation is  limited.  It  can only provide tentative arguments, 
dependent on the South African case, rather than robust generalisations. 
1.6 Structure of the dissertation 
This study proceeds as follows.  Chapter 2 begins with a schematic theoretical  overview of the 
concept of polarisation. This includes a discussion about centre and pragmatic parties, extremist and 
ideological parties, and an explanation of the overall definition of moderation (low polarisation) 
adopted in this research. Then, I delineate the causes of polarisation and moderation as specified by 
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major theoretical schools. This encompasses the following perspectives: (a) fractionalisation (the 
number of parties), (b) institutionalist (electoral systems), (c) sociological (voters), and (d) parties 
(major parties). This is followed by a tabulation of the overall causal framework considered in this 
research. 
Chapter 3 introduces the literature on the South African party system. This section outlines the 
skewed focus  on the  study of  polarisation,  possible  origins  for  the  deficiency,  and issue-based 
politics.  A discussion  follows  about  the  empirical  paradox  motivating  this  research.  Lastly,  it 
presents the scholarly argument about moderation in the South African party system; this includes a 
literature-based examination of the economic policy positions of the ANC, DA and EFF. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the methodological platform of the analysis. Three broad areas constitute 
this section. First, I start by outlining the research question and subsidiary questions, and the aims 
and  objectives  of  the  research.  I  then  discuss  the  basis  of  case  selection  and  the  causal  logic 
employed,  and  outline  theoretical  hypotheses.  Second,  data  collection  methods  and  analysis 
techniques are discussed. This covers the interview, survey and document collection methods; and 
qualitative and quantitative analysis. Third, the systematic measure of party system fragmentation, 
voter and party system polarisation is examined. Here, I outline and justify selected formulae; and 
discuss the left-right and economic cleavage focus of this analysis. 
The next three chapters form the data collection and analysis sections of this research. Chapter 5 
examines fragmentation and electoral laws. It first discusses the apartheid plurality electoral system 
and then focuses attention on the main determinants that inform the transition to a proportional 
electoral system. Second, I focus on analysing the patterns of fragmentation in the democratic party 
system (1994  to  2014)  and  subsequently  compare  this  with  the  period  of  white  minority  and 
apartheid rule (1910 to 1989). Here, I rely on the fragmentation measure to gauge the effective 
number of parties; the main purpose of this is to understand whether electoral laws influence the 
number of parties in the system. Third, I discuss party system polarisation in the democratic period. 
This includes a quantitative measure of individual party positions and a measure of party system 
polarisation.  In  this  section  I  also  link  the  findings  to  existing  research.  Finally,  this  section 
concludes with a critical analysis about whether fragmentation/electoral systems are connected with 
polarisation. 
Chapter 6 deals with the electorate.  It  first  sets out citizen self-placement on the ideological 
scale, discusses the left-centre-right distribution of general citizen preferences and the moderate-
extremist  character of the median voter.  Second, I  focus specifically on the left-right economic 
preferences of voters — this broadly includes privatisation and state ownership, income inequality 
and government intervention,  responsibility for individual  welfare,  and property rights.  Third,  I 
attempt to map voter positions by identifying the left-right, moderate-polarised direction from the 
discussed data. Fourth, this is followed by a critical analysis of perceptions of party differences, 
policy  voting,  perceived  most  important  issues,  and  the  causes  of  non-ideological/non-policy 
voting. Lastly, I examine the element of social influence on the party system by correlating voter 
and party system polarisation. I also discuss how these findings fit into existing literature. 
The  final  data  analysis  section,  Chapter  7,  considers  the  dominant  party.  I  analyse 
macroeconomic policies of the ANC from 1994 to 2012; directional policy moves from left to right; 
centrist positioning of the ANC; the party’s relationship with the SACP (as the main ideological 
force within the ‘tripartite alliance’) and the basis of it (both historically and in the contemporary 
period); the ANC’s embrace of a hybrid economic model, including the statutory body NEDLAC, 
that encircles both labour and business; polarisation and the resurgence of the centre; and the ANC’s 
self-definition  and  non-ideological  dynamism.  This  section  concludes  by  discussing  the  ANC’s 
effects  on  the  party  system.  All  this  assists  in  qualitatively  determining  the  left-right,  centrist-
extremist position of the party.
Chapter 8 forms the conclusion of this analysis. It essentially presents a brief overview of the 
research  project  (including  the  purpose  of  the  study,  research  question,  objectives,  problem 
identification and background, rationale, and research design); the principal finding of the study; 
sets outs the causes of moderation in the South African party system; and discusses implications of 
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the research for the literature and highlights points for future research. The main finding of this 
research  is  that  both  institutional  factors  and  the  electorate,  although  in  some  cases  acting  as 
influential agents, are not causes of moderation. Instead, constraining polarisation and stabilising 
moderation has more to do with the dominant party’s individual centrist orientation. 
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Chapter 2: Party System Polarisation: Definition and 
Causes
What  is  polarisation?  How  is  party  system  polarisation  different  from  generic  notions  of 
polarisation? What are the causes of polarised party systems? This chapter seeks to answer these 
questions by discussing the literature on party system polarisation.  It  essentially establishes the 
guiding theoretical framework upon which this study is based. First, I examine the meaning of party 
system polarisation and moderation, discussing centrist and pragmatic parties, and extremist and 
ideological parties.  Second, I  discuss the main theoretical causes attributed to the phenomenon. 
These include fractionalisation, electoral systems, voter preferences, and political parties.
2.1 Defining party system polarisation
Polarisation as a generic definition is a division of opinions, attitudes and preferences, where people 
and institutions are divided into opposing camps, each supporting a particular position on an issue. 
The extent to which groups are separated on fundamental issues in society reflects the level of 
polarisation:  it  signifies  whether  a  society  is  polarised  (high  polarisation)  or  moderate  (low 
polarisation). The term ‘polarisation’ is borrowed by the social and political sciences largely from 
the physical and natural sciences. In the latter fields, ‘polarisation’ comes from the term ‘polarity’ or 
‘polarities’ which denotes a number of phenomena occurring at distinct ‘poles’. 
In  the  social  sciences,  there  are  different  areas  in  which one can study the  phenomenon of 
polarisation. A distinction is made between political polarisation and social polarisation. Political 
polarisation refers to political institutions and actors such as parties and candidates; meanwhile, 
social polarisation refers to the belief systems of people in various social groups and deals with the 
degree of  polarisation in  the social  world,  leading to  terms such as  ‘racial  polarisation’,  ‘class 
polarisation’ or ‘ethnic polarisation’ (Baldassarri and Bearman, 2007). Since political polarisation is 
relatively  broad,  referring  to  individual  political  actors  (presidents  or  ministers)  or  political 
institutions (parliament, police, judiciary), party or party system polarisation, although sitting within 
political polarisation, makes specific reference to political parties within a two-party, multiparty or 
dominant party system (Pedersen, 1979). In the present research, I refer to this type of polarisation. 
What, then, is ‘party system polarisation’? It refers to “the degree of ideological differentiation 
among  political  parties  in  a  system”;  that  is,  the  policy  distance  that  separates  parties  which 
determines how much polarisation there is in the party system (Dalton, 2008: 900, emphasis added; 
Bartolini and Mair, 2007). In political science, the study of polarisation embraces polarised and 
moderate polities. The degree of polarisation denotes whether a party system has a moderate or 
polarised ideological character. Main contributors to the concept define polarisation as ideological 
distance, as outlined below: 
• Ideological  polarisation  exists  when  there  is  ideological  distance  instead  of 
ideological proximity—where ideological distance refers to “the overall spread of the 
ideological spectrum of any given polity” (Sartori, 2005: 111). 
• When polarisation exists, “parties will remain poles apart in ideology”—located at 
the extremes of the ideological space (Downs, 1957: 118).
Ideology  denotes  the  opinions  or  policies  of  the  political  elite  that  centre  around  some  core 
philosophical outlook such as liberalism or conservatism. Party system polarisation mainly focuses 
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upon programmatic differences between parties which relates to some ideological doctrine. Party 
system polarisation is not only the study of the ideological basis of parties and the party system but 
the  ideological  distance  between parties.  Ideological  spread is  most  commonly  interpreted  and 
measured using the left-right political spectrum. Ware (1996) suggests that parties are not just ‘left’ 
or ‘right’ but there are varying degrees of ideological intensity between parties, such as far left or 
far right, and knowing how far apart these parties are from each other indicates to what extent the 
system is polarised. The ideological basis forms a major part of understanding ideological distance 
between parties.
Polarisation usually involves the study of ‘relevant parties’, that is, the major competitors in the 
party system in terms of vote or seat share. This points to the power structure operating within the 
system. Thus, polarisation is the ideological separation amongst relevant parties (Sartori, 2005: 
107).  Considering  parties  who  are  relevant  comes  from  the  argument  that  only  parties  with 1
significant vote or seat share can command change in the ideological balance of the party system, 
making minor parties somewhat irrelevant and the study of the major parties’ position-taking highly 
appropriate to gauge the nature of the party system. 
Characterising an entire party system as either moderate or polarised is considered acceptable 
practice.  While  individual  parties  take  on  particular  ideological  positions,  which  can  either  be 
centrist or extremist, when major parties are clustered on one side of the political spectrum, such as 
the centre-right or far right, the party system is regarded as moderate. In brief, ideological positions 
of parties and their relative strength indicate the degree of polarisation in the whole party system, 
and therefore, the degree of polarisation clearly shows whether the party system is more inclined 
towards moderation or polarisation. The centre or extremist position of each major party attributes a 
particular character to the party system.
In general, there are two types of party systems based on the ideological criterion: moderate and 
polarised systems. A moderate system is one where relevant parties are structured around the centre 
of the ideological spectrum and are not poles apart in their ideology; meanwhile, a polarised system 
is one in which the programmatic positions of relevant parties are very far apart (Kitschelt et al, 
2010: 17). There are however two distinct parts to this: scholars like Sartori associate moderation 
with the centre, while those like Dalton (2008) take it to mean occupation of one ideological bloc. 
First,  systems  demonstrating  low  polarisation  or  moderation  are  characterised  by  ‘centripetal’ 
competition where major parties compete for the centre of the ideological spectrum, and systems 
that  are  polarised  reflect  ‘centrifugal’  competition  where  major  parties  are  centre-fleeing  and 
compete for the political extremes (Sartori, 1976). 
Second,  low polarisation does  not  necessarily  signify  centripetal  competition since when all 
parties occupy the same side of the spectrum, polarisation is low. This means that relevant parties 
could  be  located  at  one  extremity  and  the  system is  considered  minimally  polarised  precisely 
because there is little competition between two extremes. Thus, moderate systems mean relevant 
parties occupy one side of the spectrum, whether the centre or extremist space. High polarisation is 
less  confusing  as  it  simply  occurs  when  parties  are  poles  apart  on  the  ideological  continuum. 
Evidence of polarisation can be seen when parties move further apart and diverge in their ideologies 
and take up clearly distinct and opposite positions, resulting in “sharper divisions and more intense 
conflicts”  between  parties  (Hetherington,  2009:  413).  Clustering  towards  the  ideological  poles 
implies that the political centre becomes a wasteland (Hetherington, 2009).
The definition of party system polarisation, then, encompasses four main notions: (a) Difference: 
the  dissimilarity  and  distance  between  parties  in  their  ideologies,  policies  or  programmes—
assuming that political parties take stands or positions on societal issues that can be located on a 
traditional  left-right  ideological  spectrum;  and  that  no  matter  how  similar  parties  are,  some 
difference can be deduced albeit how minimal that might be (the study of ideological difference).  2
(b) Relevance:  considering parties that are relevant in terms of the power structure of the party 
system, in vote or seat share, such competitors can either gain sufficient seats to govern alone or act 
as a coalition in government (the study of relevant parties). (c) Direction: parties take a particular 
position on issues that follow a distinct direction; in ideological terms it falls within a left-right 
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scale. Parties can either espouse a more leftwing or rightwing orientation in their policy outlook (the 
study of left-right direction). (d) Strength: while parties can be identified on the left-right, they also 
assume a particular degree of ‘intensity’ on their positions; this can be centre or radical, moderate or 
extreme (the study of polarities) (Sartori, 1976). Establishing these features indicate how much the 
party system is polarised. 
This  study  attempts  to  formulate  a  systematic  definition  of  polarisation  and  moderation  by 
coupling the above analysis with the centrism-extremism and pragmatic-ideological characterisation 
of parties. It is important to note that although I employ the common definition of polarisation, as 
the  level  of  ideological  differentiation  amongst  relevant  parties,  I  connect  it  to  general  party 
features. Sartori (1976) was one of the pioneers to systematically examine features of polarised and 
moderate systems. Although his analysis mainly establishes features for polarised party systems, I 
add to some of the components he described for moderate systems by linking it to general party 
literature.  What  is  lacking  in  polarisation  literature  is  a  more  systematic  attempt  to  define  the 
features of moderate party systems. I  do not claim that this is  a novel contribution but it  does 
attempt to offer  a more formal definitional  analysis  of  polarisation and moderation which goes 
beyond the general definitional use of the term as the degree of ideological distance between parties. 
By drawing broadly from party system literature, I examine the role of (a) the centre and pragmatic 
parties, and (b) the extreme and ideological parties. In so doing, the following section seeks to 
connect  literature  on  the  ideological  dimension  of  parties  to  the  concept  of  polarisation  and 
moderation. 
2.1.1 The centre and moderation 
Moderation is observed by the movement of parties closer to centrist or moderate ground (Nice, 
1984). Centre-based parties share a critical similarity, which is distinguishable from non-centrist or 
extremist  parties:  moderation (Hazan,  1997;  Keman,  1994).  A widespread view of  the political 
‘centre’  describes  it  as  an  ideological  position  of  moderation,  in  comparison  to  the  political 
‘extreme’ which represents more radical positions along some political spectrum such as the far left 
or far right (Wagner, 2012; Cox, 1990). Duverger (1954: 215, emphasis added) describes the centre 
as a “geometrical spot at which the moderates of opposed tendencies meet: moderates of the Right 
and  moderates  of  the  Left”.  The  centre,  then,  is  thought  to  lie  between  fundamental  political 
alternatives (Scully, 1992). To be clear, I employ a definition of the centre as directly opposed to 
extremes. I am not referring to a concept of the centre as a relative point somewhere between, for 
instance, two far right parties — this is a generic point and not directly linked to discussions about 
‘moderation’ and  ‘extremism’.  In  other  words,  a  more  conventional  definition  of  the  centre, 
especially  within  polarisation  studies,  is  understood  as  a  moderating  point  between  political 
extremes. This means that while there may be less of an ‘objective centre’ party, the centre is not 
simply a relative position but has a degree of conceptual sturdiness to stand on its own. 
When the main parties are centrist, such parties avoid taking up ‘clear-water’ or distinct policies 
but  closely  resemble  each  other  on  fundamental  issues  (Downs,  1957).  Downs  argues  that 
resemblance of party positions does not mean that parties are identical but indicates that they are 
less programmatic and ideological and are oriented toward more pragmatic politics. 
Sartori  (1976:  134)  states  that  the  centre  or  centripetal  drives  “are  precisely  the moderating 
drives”. Daalder (2011: 160, 148) and Scully (1992) say that centre parties play a ‘mediating role’. 
A strong  centre  party  does  not  offset  convergence  or  discourage  centrality;  centre  parties  use 
counter-polarisation tactics and adopt centripetal tendencies, not allowing other parties to assume 
the same position, thus thwarting any gains made by the extreme poles (Hazan, 1997). Moreover, 
when  the  centre  party  successfully  combats  centrifugal  competition  and  remains  firmly  in  the 
centre, extremist competitors recognise that there is little role for them outside of the centre party 
(Green-Pedersen, 2004). This process results in the system being moderated by the centre.
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Scully  (1992:  11)  makes  an  important  differentiation  between  a  ‘positional  centre’ and  a 
‘programmatic centre’ where the former leads to moderation and the latter, only makes a minuscule 
contribution to moderation given its emphasis on doctrinal ‘centrist’ positions. He argues, 
A positional center party is one that takes an intermediate, compromise position with respect to 
the extreme poles along the predominant axis of political conflict. Its leadership is motivated 
primarily toward the goal of gaining access to the state and maintaining power. In contrast, a 
programmatic  center  party  is  substantively  committed  to  a  specific  set  of  policies  and  a 
particular outcome along the principal axis of cleavage on which it is unwilling or unable to 
compromise.  Its  leaders  are  primarily  interested  in  using  the  state  to  reach  specific 
programmatic goals. 
It is a distinction between vote-seeking centrist parties and ideological centrist parties. The latter 
means centre parties are far from devoid of a clear ideological stand. It is not a mere amalgamation 
of left-right views. This description argues against the view that depicts the centre as an amorphous 
entity, continuously squeezed and torn asunder by the left and right centrifugal forces, as advanced 
by Duverger (1954) (Scully, 1992; Hazan, 1997). 
Not all centre parties produce a moderate system. Ideological centrist parties are seen by some as 
harmful  to  the  party  system,  much  like  non-centrist,  extremist  parties.  Using  the  case  of  the 
Christian  Democrats  in  Chile  in  the  1950s,  Scully  (1992)  argues  that  this  party,  acting  as  an 
ideologically-based centre party, rejected the views of the left and right and proposed its own way 
and was unwilling to cooperate and arbitrate between opposite poles. This rigidity, he argues, led to 
the failure to hold the extremes together and contributed to the polarisation and paralysis of Chilean 
politics in the 1960s and 1970s, which in the end saw a military coup in 1973. 
The  main  assumption  is  that  centrist  parties  that  advocate  a  left-right  policy  mix  are  more 
flexible than those who articulate a distinct centrist doctrine; the latter are seen as holding fast to 
doctrines  and  unwilling  to  compromise.  Thus,  the  presence  of  a  ‘centre  party’  does  not 
automatically contribute to moderation in the party system.
By contrast, vote-seeking centrist parties who are less committed to some ideological position 
have a predominantly “temperate, consensus-oriented” nature; they act as “broker[s] between the 
extremes to hold the party system together” (Hazan, 1997: 166; Scully, 1992: 9). This makes the 
system  relatively  non-extremist  and  moderate  (Coppedge,  1998).  The  presence  of  a  non-
programmatic centre in plural societies, with deep social and cultural cleavages, enables political 
stability (Scully, 1992). In societies that are highly segmented, “government proceeds by Proporz, a 
deliberate depolarization of issues” (Daalder,  1984: 101).  This perspective says that  “there is  a 
logical force working for moderation in electoral competition” (Daalder, 1984: 95).
Literature reflects another conditional aspect on the centre: the physical occupation of the centre. 
Sartori  (1976)  predicts  that  the  existence  of  a  centre  impinge  on  polarisation  and  centrifugal 
tendencies — referring to ‘moderate-induced’ polarisation (Hazan, 1997: 158). For Sartori (2005: 
119, 312), when “the central area of the political system is out of competition”, the existence of a 
centre party, it “discourages centrality, i.e., the centripetal drives of the political system”; this is 
because the “the leverage acquired by a centre pole” encourages greater competition from extremist 
parties. This, however, occurs when there are diametrically opposed extremes (polarised systems) 
and also an occupied centre, especially given a dominant centrist party. When the centre area is 
occupied,  there  is  little  competition  for  it  and  parties  are  forced  to  compete  for  the  extremes. 
Moreover,  Sartori’s  logic  says  that  a  centre  party  that  seeks  to  outdo left-right  competitors  by 
capturing their voters, through the politicisation of voter fears related to the presence of extremist 
parties, and further occupy the centre space, will contribute to centrifugal competition, forcing its 
opponents to move further out towards the extremes. As this process occurs, the extremists try to 
attack and squeeze the centre party,  leaving the latter  to respond with increased attacks on the 
extremes. Nagel and Wlezien (2010: 303) argue that an occupied centre “is the main source of 
perverse and counter-productive effects” as the left and right try to squeeze out the centre. This 
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dynamic competition between the centre and the extremes is believed to increase polarisation in the 
party system; it becomes more radical as parties capitalise on increased political dissension. 
This view of centre-induced polarisation is widely criticised. Scholars like Maor (1997), Daalder 
(2011: 160) and Scully (1992: 8) argue that as long as there are votes in the political centre, parties 
should go after these votes and employ “centripetal electoral tactics”. In such contexts, there is no 
compelling reason why centrist or non-centrist parties should not invariably occupy the centre if 
there  are  indeed  centre  electoral  tastes.  Daalder  (1984)  shows  that  in  the  case  of  Italy  and 
Netherlands, left and right parties compete for the centre and this contributes to centripetal drives. 
More  importantly,  under  conditions  of  a  ‘pivotal  centre  party’—a ‘pivotal’ party  according  to 
Keman (1994) is a relevant party in terms of vote or seat share such as a dominant party—the 
occupation of the centre will have a strong centripetal effect. Since the centre party is strong in 
electoral terms, forming a majority either to the left or to the right of it is unrealistic. This pushes 
office-seeking parties on a coalitional path which moderates these parties (Green-Pedersen, 2004: 
324; Arter, 2015). In summation, this school posits that the presence of centrist voters encourage 
vote-seeking  parties  to  compete  for  these  voters,  and  the  presence  of  a  pivotal  centrist  party 
encourages opposition parties to enter into coalition with it; consequently adding to moderation of 
the party system despite the occupation of the centre. 
A moderate system, then, can be seen as a condition that reflects a unimodal distribution where 
parties  occupy  the  centre  political  space,  merging  left-right  views  or  taking  a  distinct  centrist 
doctrine, and importantly, are willing to comprise with diverse segments. When major parties are 
clustered in the centre there is less ideological distance in the system and the extreme poles are 
usually competition ground for minor parties. 
2.1.2 Ideological versus pragmatic parties 
The  fundamental  characteristic  of  polarisation  in  party  systems  can  be  interpreted  using  the 
‘ideological-pragmatic’  continuum  which  is  a  way  to  see  whether  parties  are  more  or  less 
ideological and to establish the general saliency of ideology in the party system (Almond, 1960; 
LaPalombara  and  Weiner,  1966;  Wright,  1967;  Blondel,  1969;  Sartori,  1976).  ‘Ideology’ and 
‘pragmatism’ can  be  defined  in  contrast  to  each  other.  According  to  Sartori  (2005:  69),  the 
‘ideological  continuum’ “goes  from  the  extreme  of  ideological  fanaticism  and  future-oriented 
principledness to the opposite extreme of sheer practicalism and pragmatism”. Each category is 
composed of unique characteristics and political styles, making an ideological party clearly distinct 
from a pragmatic party. The latter resembles much of the vote-seeking centre party. 
Verba (1965) expands on this and argues that a distinction can be made between open-closed, 
implicit-explicit and expressive-instrumental political beliefs. On the one hand, open, implicit and 
instrumental  political  beliefs  characterise  a  pragmatic  political  style  because  it  generates 
compromise  and  bargaining,  flexible  political  values  where  such  values  are  open  to  question, 
encourages the conduct of loose political activity without continuous reference to ideology, and 
defines politics as a process rather than an achievement of a specific end. On the other hand, closed, 
explicit  and  expressive  political  beliefs  denote  an  ideological  political  style  because  it  reflects 
rigidity, unquestionable political values, high ideological competition where policies are discredited 
and  labelled  in  accordance  with  ideological  precepts,  and  politics  becomes  a  means  to  some 
predetermined end—as such “great political inflexibility” exists within this system (Verba, 1965: 
544-9). 
Adding  to  this,  Blondel  (1969:  70-6,  79–84,  103–11)  defines  a  pragmatic  party  as  more 
‘bargaining-oriented’. While it is “not a goal-oriented party aiming at a novel state of mankind”, an 
ideological party is ‘value-oriented’, engaging in “imposed development” dictated by a particular 
future vision of politics and society. Sartori (2005: 154, 199, emphasis added) states that pragmatic 
systems  can  be  described  as  least  ideological:  it  “is  nothing  but  a  state  of  low affect,  of  low 
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temperature  of  ideologism”;  in  ideological  polities  by  contrast,  “words  are  weapons,  and 
inflationary wordings play a major role in shaping the course of the polarised systems”. The general 
picture is that the more politics abides by ideologically-based goal-setting, it is heading towards 
polarisation whereas bargaining-based politics paves the road for moderation. 
Pragmatic  parties  may  actually  engage  in  a  “drastic  reduction  of  the  party’s  ideological 
baggage”, due to (a) a low degree of ideological cohesiveness, leaving the party with an ambiguous 
ideological  character  that  is  attuned  to  ‘natural’ than  ‘imposed’ development  and  subject  to 
modification;  and  (b)  greater  political  and  social  pluralism,  and  flexibility,  making  the 
organisational character of these parties open to sub-group autonomy, possessing absorptive than 
exclusionary  tendencies,  and  where  the  party-in-the-electorate  focuses  upon  social  inclusion 
(Kirchheimer, 1966: 190; Sartori, 2005: 201-2; Blondel, 1969). One crucial aspect missing from this 
description of the pragmatic party is (c) its vote-seeking motivations. Pragmatic parties share close 
resemblance with the ‘catch-all’ party. Kirchheimer (1966), who coined the concept and argued that 
Western European parties were transforming from mass-based to catch-all parties, described the 
catch-all  party  as  highly  skilful  in  gaining  votes  and  winning  elections.  This  is  because  it 
deemphasises a specific social class in favour of securing access to a variety of interest groups and 
recruiting voters at large (Kirchheimer, 1966: 190). 
So,  given its  broad-based appeal  and social  inclusion strategies,  catch-all  parties  perform as 
electoral machines. Wolinetz (2002: 146) and Gunther and Diamond (2003: 184-5) sum it up by 
describing catch-all parties as “pluralistic and tolerant”; these parties espouse an “overwhelmingly 
electoral orientation” and are “highly opportunistic [and] vote-seeking” — their overriding purpose 
“is to maximise votes, win elections and govern” by aggregating a wide variety of social interests. 
Thus, if parties demonstrate that their aim is “to win the votes of as many voter groups as possible 
and to represent their interests in the state” and show that “[p]olitics is more a matter of getting the 
best possible out of a given situation than of stubbornly sticking to principles”, the party has a 
pragmatic political style (Wright, 1967: 386). 
Given the state of a reduction in ‘ideological baggage’ and low ideological cohesiveness, (d) 
party competition occurs around non-policy issues. Actions of the leadership are “judged from the 
viewpoint of their contribution to the efficiency of the entire social system rather than identification 
with the goals of their particular organization” (Kirchheimer, 1966: 190). Party performance and 
effectiveness  is  one  aspect  in  the  equation.  Bland  ideology  importantly  translates  into  parties 
emphasising the personal attributes of their leaders, years of experience, historical legacy or other 
non-policy  issues.  This  implies  that  there  is  a  lack  of  intense  ideologically-based  inter-party 
competition, where words are based more on non-policy than ideological matters. 
Contrary to Kirchheimer (1966), there might not be a drastic reduction of the pragmatic party’s 
ideological history or its mass membership base. In fact, the pragmatic party may possess a clear 
ideological direction, have a distinct programmatic orientation and retain a mass-based focus but the 
nature of the party’s competition, its expression of policies, its public declarations, its belief systems 
and outreach to a variety of social segments may neither revolve around strict adherence to an 
ideological vision or programmatic commitment nor dedication to an unchanging social support 
base. Particularly on the area of ideology, although pragmatic parties are not absent of ideological 
parameters and a distinct vision of society, strict devotion to ideology is less valued than immediate 
political and social compromises and electoral gains. This would imply some form of incoherent 
ideology since the catch-all party may say one thing in one phase of government and another thing 
in some other phase—such variability demonstrates its non-ideological commitment. 
Ideological parties are far from being ideologically unambitious; instead, ideology is prime and 
hegemonic, and policies and programmes are clearly defined and articulated. An ideological party is 
(a) a ‘principled’ party in which ideology is salient, where there is a general unwillingness amongst 
party elites to compromise on party principles and more adherence to party goals irrespective of 
electoral consequences. Wright (1967: 386) puts it that if elites explicitly show evidence that their 
party “should always stand fast to its goals and principles, even if this should lead to a loss of 
votes”, it is an ideological party. Whereas pragmatic parties are less ideologically rigid and defeat 
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challengers through flexibility by being willing to move or extend its ideological position to that of 
its challenger, ideological parties are so strict that it is difficult to move across the political space 
and there could be severe consequences (such as electoral losses and intra-party tensions) if it does 
choose to assume another space (Kollman et al, 1992: 932).
Programmatic parties resemble the ideological party since they have a “distinct, consistent and 
coherent programmatic or ideological agenda”, incorporate those appeals in its electoral campaigns 
and in the legislature, and engage in sharper definitions of party platform (Gunther and Diamond, 
2003: 187). Programmatic proposals tend to align to a political doctrine or a mix of views about the 
social. This does not necessarily mean that such parties are highly ideological. Ideological parties 
follow  a  more  strict  trajectory:  they  are  guided  by  a  coherent  set  of  policy  proposals  and  a 
commitment to political action. 
In addition, programmatic parties have (b) a more limited social and organisational basis of party 
support.  Given  the  emphasis  on  policy  and  programme,  these  parties  seek  to  mobilise  a  core 
constituency rather than to enlarge their support across the preference spectrum, and intra-party 
composition is usually homogenous — there is little or no room within the party for variance in 
norms  and  party  policy  (Wright,  1967).  Winning  elections  is  a  rather  secondary  though  not 
insignificant focus: the main concern is to win elections “with a [voter positional] platform that is 
spatially close to their ideal [policy] platform” and to pursue programmatic and ideological goals 
optimally (Kollman et al, 1992: 931). Put differently, voter ideology should match party ideology.
(c) Systems with a strong culture of inter-party policy distinctions tend to experience higher 
ideological contestation. Inter-party competition is centred upon winning programmes, alternative 
proposals,  and  ideologically-directed  policy  implementation.  Parties  challenge  each  other  by 
picking  upon political  perspectives  and  the  virtues  and  limits  of  specific  positions.  Leadership 
charisma, party legacy and performance may be somewhat irrelevant, considering the hegemony of 
doctrines, ideas and ideology. To use Sartori’s (2005: 199) phrase in the opposite, systems with 
ideological parties are a state of high affect, of high temperature of ideologism. 
Thus, the trajectory of party platforms and vision can be classified as pragmatic or ideological. 
We can deduce that a pragmatic political style is inherent in catch-all parties who seek ideological 
flexibility and natural development rather than strict adherence to an ideological course, prioritise 
vote-seeking  motivations;  and  employ  political  strategies  based  on  pluralism,  compromise  and 
bargaining, and non-policy platforms. Ideological parties are best described as programmatic, value-
oriented and ideologically rigid, who are unwilling to compromise and bargain on matters relating 
to party political beliefs; use politics as a means to a predetermined and imposed end; appeal to a 
select social segment who endorse the party’s ideological proposals rather than broad-based, all-
embracing social support; are outwardly expressive and articulate about policy and programmes; 
and the chief strategy is to discredit opponents on matters of ideology and policy.
2.1.3 Overall definition
From the definitional exploration in this section, the meaning taken in this research of the two 
concepts is illustrated in Table 2.1. It is clear from the analysis that the features of moderation seem 
more  complicated  than  polarisation.  On the  one  hand there  is  a  kind  of  ‘centrist  moderation’, 
dominated  by  centripetal  drives  and  centre-occupation.  On  the  other  hand  there  is  ‘extremist 
moderation’ (although this is a contradiction of terms), represented by major parties occupying the 
same side of the extremist spectrum such as far right or far left. In both cases there is ‘moderation’ 
or low polarisation but it is clear that the direction and strength is ambiguous: it can be centrist or 
extremist. In this research, I employ both the approach to low polarisation as (a) the presence of 
major  centre-based,  pragmatic  parties,  and  (b)  major  parties  occupying  the  same  side  of  the 
ideological spectrum (left or right). 
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2.2 Causes of polarisation 
One perplexing issue is  the significant  variations that  exist  in  the patterns of  polarisation even 
though party systems exist in the same geographical region and the level of fragmentation is similar 
(Dalton and Tanaka, 2007). The other concerning matter is the increasing polarisation in what was 
initially  thought  of  as  moderate-inducing  electoral  systems  because  of  its  two-party,  plurality 
feature (Hare and Poole, 2014; Hetherington, 2009). Such developments heightened interest in the 
examination of  the  determinants  of  polarisation.  The causal  conditions  behind distinct  political 
outcomes,  both nationally  or  across  party  systems,  have become a  pertinent  object  of  research 
enquiry where the aim is to provide systematic explanations for the origins of polarisation. Guiding 
research questions on this matter ask what drives polarisation, why some party systems moderate 
and others polarised, and what explains periods of polarisation and depolarisation in party systems.
Various propositions have been put forward to explain the phenomena. To be sure, the study of 
causes behind highly polarised systems receive more attention than the causal dynamics behind 
moderate systems. This is because much of polarisation literature emerges from highly polarised 
contexts  like  America.  Polarisation  is  often  thought  to  have  much  more  negative  effects  than 
moderate systems. 
Causal explanations have, however, been put forward for moderation, albeit, not to the same 
extent as  polarisation. Once causal variables have been identified, scholars debate the utility of a 
comprehensive approach to party system polarisation. Some argue that one determinant is sufficient 
to account for patterns of polarisation. Others posit that a single factor is insufficient, “a larger menu 
of potential explanatory variables should be considered” to better understand the determinants of 
polarisation (Curini and Hino, 2012: 462). Party polarisation has numerous causes. This section 
examines four main theoretical perspectives: fractionalisation, electoral systems, the sociological, 
and political parties. 
2.2.1 Fractionalisation perspective
Party system fractionalisation refers to the counting of the number of parties in a party system. This 
is  one  of  the  most  widely  examined  properties  of  the  party  system  particularly  since  the 
popularisation of this method by Duverger (1954). This is not simply the counting of all the parties 
in the system but considering the ‘effective number of parties’, that is, the relevant parties in the 
party system—the “effective number of parties weights the number of parties by their size, so that 
small parties count less than large parties” (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Laakso and Taagepera, 
1979; Dalton and Anderson, 2011: 11). Positing that the number of parties affect the level of party 
system  polarisation,  this  approach  associates  polarisation  with  a  large  number  of  parties  and 
moderation with a small number of parties. 
Sartori’s (1976) analysis is firmly embedded in this approach. For Sartori, a small number of 
parties or ‘limited pluralism’ leads to moderation where parties converge to the centre; by contrast, 
a large number of parties or ‘extreme pluralism’ follows polarisation where parties spread across the 
ideological spectrum. Downs’ (1957) articulated this idea when he argued that more parties create 
more room for polarisation as parties try to distinguish themselves from each other to win votes, 
whereas less parties tend compete for the median voter rather than specific constituencies, and in 
trying to compete for broad-based support, parties become centrist and moderate. For both Downs 
and Sartori,  two-party systems and systems with fewer than five parties reflect moderation and 
multiparty systems or systems with more than five parties reflect polarisation. 
Fractionalisation is criticised for being an insufficient explanatory theory of party polarisation. 
Empirical investigations contradict the theoretical assumptions made by Sartori and Downs. Many 
scholars disagree with the conceptualisation that party fractionalisation causes party polarisation. 
For instance, Seferiades (1986), in analysing the Greek party system, shows that the party system 
 
has a small number of parties but is highly polarised. Seferiades attributes polarisation to factors 
other than the number of parties, such as the presence of extremist factions. In the Brazilian case, 
the  party  system has  a  large  number  of  parties  but  modest  levels  of  polarisation  (Dalton  and 
Anderson,  2011).  Similarly,  for  other  scholars,  polarisation  does  not  depend  on  and  is  not 
significantly related to the number of legislative parties but can be studied independently (Dalton, 
2008; Dalton and Anderson, 2011; Wang, 2014). Empirical research by Wang (2014) finds that low 
polarisation can be found in highly fragmented party systems and high polarisation can be found in 
non-fragmented systems. Thus, the relationship between fractionalisation and polarisation is not 
straightforward.
The discussion on party system fractionalisation is closely related to electoral systems, since 
some argue that  electoral  systems actually  determine the  level  of  fractionalisation within  party 
systems. To be sure, however, some scholars do not associate party system fractionalisation with 
electoral systems, but argue that the increase or decrease in the number of parties in a party system 
is due to sociological variables, mainly salient political cleavages within society. Essentially, what 
influences the number of parties in the system is heavily debated: schools are divided between the 
institutionalist approach and the sociological approach. Within party system polarisation literature, 
electoral systems gain arguably more prominence as a causal factor behind polarisation levels than 
party system fractionalisation on its own. This school makes an explicit linkage between electoral 
systems and fractionalisation, seeing both variables as inextricable.
2.2.2 Institutionalist perspective 
Polarisation is argued to be a consequence of political institutions that is more specifically identified 
with electoral systems. Plurality and proportional electoral systems are grouped as the two major 
types  of  systems  and  each  is  believed  to  affect  patterns  of  polarisation,  leading  to  different 
outcomes. Forming what is known as the institutionalist  approach of party systems, this school 
holds that electoral laws influence the number of parties in a party system, where the number of 
parties in turn determine the representation of social cleavages and preferences, which resultantly 
affects the degree of polarisation in the party system. To recapitulate, electoral systems and party 
fractionalisation are interrelated but are also importantly distinct—a plurality system can have more 
than two parties and a proportional system can have two parties. In general,  however, electoral 
systems are argued to control the number of parties in a party system. Popularised by Duverger 
(1954) and became known as ‘Duverger’s law’, this school posits that plurality systems reflect two-
party systems whereas proportional systems reflect multiparty systems (Riker, 1976).  The theory of 3
electoral  systems  became  highly  influential  amongst  many  scholars  who  began  to  argue  that 
electoral laws correlate with various negative and positive political dynamics, within party systems 
and the democratic regime in general (Rae, 1971; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Lijphart, 1994; 
Cox, 1997).
The number of parties in the system is considered a strong element behind ideological position-
taking. Electoral rules structure parties’ position-taking opportunities which are either moderate or 
extreme.  In  proportional  systems,  polarisation is  more likely  since such electoral  rules  provide 
incentives  for  parties  to  take  extremist  positions.  By  contrast,  in  plurality  systems  or  non-
proportional systems, parties have an incentive to converge to the centre. This addition of party 
position-taking being affected by electoral rules largely developed out of the work of Downs (1957: 
115)  who  amplified  Duverger’s  ideas,  arguing  that  in  two-party  systems,  parties  “deliberately 
change their platforms so that they resemble one another; whereas parties in a multi-party system 
try to remain as ideologically distinct from each other as possible.” 
The winner-takes-all outcome of a plurality electoral structure tends to narrow the field to two 
competing parties, thus “the usual two-party pressure to converge”, as parties try to draw support 
from voters of all classes, interests and segments (Downs, 1957: 128; Key, 1942: 224-231). On the 
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other hand, where proportional representation exists, “the minimum amount of support necessary to 
keep a party going is much smaller than in a plurality system; so a multiparty system is encouraged” 
(Downs, 1957: 124). Parties need to win only a small percentage of the total vote and may succeed 
in placing some of their members in government; because of these electoral rules, parties are not 
pressurised to appeal to a wide range of voters and viewpoints. Downs (1957: 134) states that “any 
attempt to widen it [support base] soon causes a collision with another party”, where “no party in a 
multiparty system has much incentive to spread out” but the only incentive remains to challenge 
each other ideologically. Thus, Downs (1957: 126-7, 138) says parties in multiparty systems “will 
strive  to  distinguish  themselves  ideologically  from each other  and maintain  the  purity  of  their 
positions” and as such “differentiate their platforms more sharply”. Sartori (1976) follows this line 
of logic and posits that the more parties in a system, the more extremist or centrifugal patterns the 
system displays. Plurality systems, then, mitigate polarisation whereas proportional systems foster 
it.
Empirical  investigations  have  since  tested  this  theory.  The  argument  that  proportional-
fragmented systems are  more polarised than plurality-unfragmented is  faced with  contradictory 
empirical  evidence.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  shown  that,  as  predicted  by  theoretical  claims, 
proportional  systems  actually  produce  extremist  clustering  by  supporting  greater  ideological 
dispersion, while plurality systems encourage moderate and centrist clustering (Dow, 2010). On the 
other hand, some find neither a connection between proportional systems and extremist positioning 
nor  a  clear  relationship  between  plurality  systems  and  moderate  positioning  (Grofman,  2004; 
Ezrow,  2008;  Dalton,  2008).  The  latter  group  of  scholars  argue  that  there  is  no  evidence  that 
extremism increases under proportional systems; such systems do not necessarily foster extremist 
policy, and little evidence suggests that it increases with an increase in the number of parties. Ezrow 
(2008: 480) finds that proportional systems “may actually motivate greater policy moderation by 
political  parties”.  There  are  periods  where  plurality  systems  experience  dispersion  and  where 
proportional systems experience moderation. Cases like the US, which is a plurality system, reflects 
high polarisation: parties take ideologically distinct positions across the entire ideological spectrum; 
in the British plurality system, polarisation actually increased under Thatcher; and other cases such 
as Philippines, Peru and Mexico, all proportional systems, indicate moderate polarisation (Dalton, 
2008; Ezrow, 2010; Paddock, 1992). 
Hence,  even  plurality  systems  show  signs  of  polarisation  and  extremist  positioning,  and 
proportional  systems  show signs  of  depolarisation  and  centrist  clustering.  The  empirical  cases 
“point to difficulties that arise when generalising about the effects of electoral systems on party 
positioning.  Electoral  rules  have  remained  constant,  but  average  party  extremism has  changed 
dramatically”  (Ezrow,  2010:  452).  In  other  words,  although  electoral  systems  are  constant, 
polarisation levels vary (Dalton, 2008). The latter line of thought is becoming highly influential 
amongst  party  system scholars  and  the  classical  theoretical  argument  is  gradually  diluting  and 
becoming less popular. 
In  the  face  of  such  contradictory  findings,  one  must  conclude  that  there  is  no  necessary 
connection  between  electoral  systems  and  ideological  polarisation  and  neither  is  party 
fractionalisation  a  sufficient  indicator  (Ezrow,  2010).  The  long-held  assumption  that  electoral 
institutions  shape  party  systems  can  no  longer  be  simplistically  applied;  empirical  evidence 
suggests  that  the effects  of  electoral  institutions on political  outcomes remain at  best  complex. 
There is no clear causal relation between electoral systems, fractionalisation and polarisation. Thus, 
we are directed to alternative explanations for the causes of polarisation and moderation.
2.2.3 Sociological perspective
Non-institutional approaches to polarisation and moderation emphasise the importance of electoral 
preference distribution in affecting the degree of party system polarisation—this is the sociological, 
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‘socio-structuralist’ or cleavage-based perspective (Loomes, 2012: 3). The particular composition of 
voter preferences, a variable outside and independent of direct political institutions, is believed to 
affect party position-taking, patterns of party competition and party system polarisation. “Popular 
accounts increasingly suggest that increases in party polarisation reflect a growing polarisation of 
the broader society” (Layman et al, 2006: 93). That is, when voters are poles apart on salient issues, 
major parties also tend to adopt dissimilar and radical positions. The sociological account draws on 
the work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) who puts forward that party systems mirror social cleavages 
since voter preferences determine party policies.  Briefly put, this approach argues that party system 4
(political-elite level) polarisation and moderation is, by and large, influenced by social conditions, 
particularly the preferences and issue preoccupations of the electorate (social-voter level). 
Scholars like Jacobson (2003) argue that there is a close connection between voter ideology and 
party ideology. According to this theory, parties that are or become left, right, liberal or conservative
—or any other ideologically-relevant cleavage category — have causal roots that can be traced to a 
particular constituency or segment of society. In this perspective, parties have traditionally been 
seen as responding to and rarely shaping social tensions and voter preferences (Seferiades, 1986). 
Advancing the view of ‘parties as dependent actors’ that are deeply rooted in their social base, the 
sociological  perspective argues that  “parties  are  subject  to  the whims of  the electorate  and are 
largely dependent on voters for their survival; parties have only a minimal independent role to play” 
(Loomes,  2012:  5-6).  Alternatively  put,  parties  are  agents  of  specific social  groups  rather  than 
autonomous actors and play a passive rather than active role in positional determination; in this 
way, parties shift their ideology or policy platforms in response to voter preferences (Adams et al, 
2004). 
Some scenarios indicate this relationship. On the one side, a majority who prefer moderate to an 
extremist positions will influence parties to move toward the centre. Also, if there is a considerable 
portion of voters at any one side of the spectrum, major parties will converge to that side, making 
the system moderate (given that  this might be on the extremist  bloc,  it  is  considered moderate 
because competition between the extremes are absent).  On the other side,  if  voters are equally 
divided along the extremes, parties will vacate the centre and seek to represent this social division, 
thus the party system will reflect polarisation. 
Voter  motivations  and  preoccupations  about  politics  play  a  major  role  in  the  nature  and 
development  of  mass  opinion.  The  study  of  the  ideological  nature  of  the  electorate  is  usually 
divided into two broad categories. Voters might be motivated by (a) ideological and policy-based 
issues, where they demonstrate left-right, liberal-conservative, democratic-authoritarian positional 
orientations on salient matters in society; or (b) non-policy factors like social demographics (race, 
income, religion, language, education), party image (representation, trust, confidence), government 
performance  (retrospective  and  future),  elite  characteristics  (demographics  or  charisma  of 
candidates),  and  partisanship  (closeness  to  parties)  (Curini  and  Hino,  2012).  This  assists  in 
determining whether mass opinion falls within an ideological or non-ideological, and subsequently 
moderate or polarised, category. Each determinant has a different effect on the party system. It is 
believed that when policy and ideological issues inform how voters cast their ballots,  the party 
system is polarised; by contrast, when voters are preoccupied with matters other than policy and 
ideology, the party system is moderate (Dalton and Tanaka, 2007). In the end, the nature of the voter 
spectrum has an important say in the positions and issues parties choose to politicise and assume, 
contributing to the parallel development of the overall ideological character of the party system. 
In  general,  the  sociological  perspective,  although offering  a  causal  variable  to  party  system 
polarisation, has two main problems. First, mass opinion does not necessarily underlie or affect 
political polarisation (Layman et al, 2006; Hetherington, 2009). There is a debate about which came 
first:  mass  or  elite  polarisation.  Scholars  like  Jacobson  (2000:  26)  argue  that  the  relationship 
between mass and elite polarisation “is inherently interactive”. Others are however of the view that 
elite  polarisation usually causes changes in mass opinion,  since parties are actively engaged in 
shaping voter preferences, but changes in mass opinion rarely affect elite polarisation. On the latter 
point, Hetherington (2009: 422) suggests that “changes on the mass level are best thought of as 
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reinforcing  changes  on  the  elite  level  rather  than  causing  it”.  In  other  terms,  elites  are  more 
influential in determining party system polarisation than the social. The argument that mass opinion 
does not affect polarisation to a significant extent comes from the belief that parties actually create 
and impose on social tensions. Factors such as inter-party competition or other emanating from the 
non-social context determine the intensity parties attach to social issues rather than mass opinion 
(Seferiades, 1986).
Second,  on  the  point  that  increasing  polarisation  at  the  mass  level  causes  party  system 
polarisation, in the first place there appears to be little supporting evidence for the idea that the 
electorate is becoming increasingly polarised. Though elite polarisation may in fact increase, it is 
not necessary that mass polarisation will  undergo the same process. Voters are actually seen as 
taking moderate positions in many democracies, both established and young (Dalton and Tanaka, 
2007; Hetherington, 2009).  Scholars of democratic theory point to a concerning representation gap, 5
which is an electoral  disconnect between the average voter position and the positions of major 
parties. Ideological congruence, as predicted by Downs who argues that parties will converge to the 
position of the median voter (also known as the ‘proximity model’), does not stand when there is a 
gap between voters and their  representatives (Powell,  2009).  In some cases voters are near the 
centre and prefer a mix of left-right issues but major parties are more toward the extremes (Dalton 
and Tanaka, 2007). Put differently, the social exhibits more moderation than is naturally assumed. 
In  conclusion,  the  movement  to  one  or  another  side  of  the  politico-ideological  spectrum is 
considered a given: parties inevitability respond to and are at the mercy of mass opinion. However, 
it appears that position-taking decisions rest with parties. Elite influence, social moderation and the 
representation gap directly challenge the sociological perspective that elevates voter influence on 
the party system. It implies that parties and political elites are making decisions that are independent 
of mass opinion, hence voters have less of an overriding influence. So, evolution or constancy in 
mass opinion does not automatically translate into evolution or constancy in party positions. From 
the  problematisation  of  the  sociological  view,  it  is  expected  that  a  positive  linear  relationship 
between (a) voter and party ideology and (b) voter polarisation and party system polarisation is 
unlikely.
2.2.4 Party-centric perspective
While  the  critique  of  the  sociological  approach  gives  credit  to  parties,  causal  propositions 
emanating from the theory of party system fractionalisation and electoral systems ignore the role 
played by parties. Individual parties are formative in the polarisation process. The ‘party-centric’ 
view of polarisation posits that parties and their leaders matter, chiefly because they form a major 
component in the decision-making matrix; how they compete (centre or radical drives) and what 
they  choose  to  emphasise  (left-right  ideological  or  pragmatic  issues)  impacts  the  party  system 
(Blais, 2011; Loomes, 2012: 1). Parties are viewed as independent forces in the process of party 
system  change,  including  polarisation,  where  parties  can  initiate  or  hinder  change,  essentially 
“moulding the environments in which they compete” (Smith, 1989: 355; Mair, 1993: 130; Muller, 
2002). Thus, the state of polarisation may originate from the actions of parties themselves.  6
In its entirety the party-centric approach focuses upon the viewpoints of individual party leaders, 
intra-party dynamics,  organisational discipline, broader party strategies,  and the dominant party. 
This research focuses on the latter. 
Scholars observe the effects of party dominance on the level of party system polarisation. In the 
case  of  a  dominant  centrist  party  or  a  pivotal  centre  party—a party  “is  dominant  in  that  it  is 
[electorally] significantly stronger than the others” because of this it  becomes a highly relevant 
party in the party system—significant incentives exist for moderation of the party system (Hazan, 
1995; Greene, 2008; Pempel, 1990; Green-Pedersen, 2004; Keman, 1994; Sartori, 1976: 193). The 
elements  of  pragmatism  and  centrism,  discussed  in  Section  2.1,  describes  much  of  the 
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characteristics of the dominant party. In the main, the argument is that dominant parties contribute 
to depolarisation of the party system and society. When the largest electoral party is located in the 
centre, the system displays centrist clustering with little or no extremist parties having the power to 
change the balance of competition. The opposite is the presence of an extremist dominant party that 
would contribute to polarisation, where minority centre or moderate parties have little chance of 
electoral success. Pempel (1990) sums it  up that dominant parties have the ability to shape the 
ideological or policy profile of the country. Most scholarly claims revolve around the argument that 
dominant party systems tend to reflect moderation than polarisation.
This theoretical proposition does not explain what in the first place causes the dominant party to 
take  a  centrist  position.  Pursuing  an  explanatory  account,  Spiess  (2009)  puts  forward  that 
moderation is often due to the two main factors that are largely located with the dominant party: (a) 
social inclusion and (b) organisational cohesion. This makes the dominant party accommodative, 
integrationist, conciliatory, catch-all and coalitional. There are also the (c) narrowing of extremism 
and (d) performance advantages that dominant parties bring along. 
First, existing as a catch-all entity, the dominant party avoids narrow and sectional appeals by 
using  ‘selective  mobilisation’  and  ‘entrepreneurship’  in  the  electoral  market  to  shape  voter 
preferences in their favour to maintain party dominance (Spiess, 2009). Arian and Barnes (1974: 
603) state that the “dominant party assures its continued success by effectively spreading out among 
many social strata rather than concentrating on only one; it mobilises support from all sectors of 
society  by  mobilising  groups  and  issues  from  a  broad  spectrum.”  Political  representation  is 
extended to a variety of competing groups “both within and outside the framework of the ruling 
party  itself”  (Kaufman,  1999:  175).  These  parties  find  substantial  interest  in  consensus  and 
accommodation as their drive is not primarily geared toward ideological commitments or policy-
seeking motives but  toward vote-maximisation.  In other terms,  the central  aim is  keeping their 
dominant position and preventing major political challengers from upsetting the balance of power, 
and in so doing, parties respond to voter preferences from across the preference spectrum (Greene 
and Ibarra-Rueda, 2014; Downs, 1957). Thus, for the dominant party, deemphasising doctrines and 
focusing on votes, broadens and maximises its support base and captures the median voter . 
Second,  social  inclusion  also  exists  within  the  party,  either  by  bringing  in  other  parties  or 
including  extra-parliamentary  groups  within  its  ranks.  Dominant  parties  “aren’t  monolithic 
structures but coalitions of individuals and sub-party groups with diverse attitudes, interests and 
ambitions”;  they  are  willing  to  work  with  ideologically  diverse  groups  (Boucek  2012:  35). 
Incentives  of  power  sharing  which  dominant  parties  offer  to  potential  partners,  contribute  to 
moderation of the dominant party itself.  Given that inclusive coalition tendencies often involve 
compromise of party positions and movement to the centre, they constitute a moderating factor. 
They prioritise the skill of being able to adapt by compromising and sharing power to overcome 
deep intra-party disagreements (Friedman and Wong, 2008). Such compromise is often in the form 
of a culture of open debate and tolerance which prevents party breakdown. This rests upon the party 
not being stuck to rigid ideological positions. It  gives the dominant party a flexible and elastic 
character  where  it  has  the  ability  to  change relatively  easily  in  response  to  changing electoral 
circumstances compared to more ideologically committed parties (Pempel, 1982; Arian and Barnes, 
1974; Boucek, 2012).
Third,  for  Arian and Barnes (1974:  602,  emphasis  added),  organisational  “cohesion emerges 
from the mutual desire to share the fruits of power, a desire sufficiently strong to hold extreme 
demands  in  check  and  to  moderate  potentially  disintegrative  tendencies”.  Put  otherwise,  the 
strategic  decision  to  share  power,  especially  within  its  ranks,  is  a  factor  muting  ideological 
extremism. Also, by occupying an expanded and flexible ideological terrain, and by attracting voters 
and stakeholders from various segments of society, dominant parties make it increasingly difficult 
for the opposition to pose clear ideological alternatives (Jesudason, 1999).  In this environment, 
opposition parties  “are reduced to a role of  carping and sniping rather  than that  of  developing 
immediate alternatives” (Arian and Barnes, 1974: 599). This subsequently reduces the potential for 
radicalism. 
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The effect of this is not only seen in the party system but by including diverse segments of 
society within the dominant party and portraying the party as ‘a party of consensus’, it depoliticises 
salient social divisions within society and shapes voter preferences away from a polarised stance 
(Kothari,  1969;  Spiess,  2009;  Pretorius,  2000;  Greene and Ibarra-Rueda,  2014).  Pempel  (1990) 
shows how dominant parties can facilitate stability: aside from entrenching democratic institutions, 
they can marginalise political extremes and fuse ethnic differences, thus creating a platform for both 
political and social compromise. 
Fourth, beside the integrationist, pragmatic and extremist-reducing effects of party dominance 
there  is  also  effective  performance  in  government  that  grants  the  dominant  party  ‘positional 
advantages’ (Dunleavy, 2010). It can deny a significant section of the ideological space to its major 
challengers by threatening to take its voters. This is because the dominant party has a ‘protected 
core’ of voters who will vote for the party wherever it positions itself on the political spectrum—
this makes the opposition unable to adopt and stand by ‘clear-water’ strategies (Dunleavy, 2010: 23, 
41).  Performance is advantageous for the dominant party — there is little incentive to compete 7
ideologically since a majority of voters endorse the party, electoral strategies then are based upon 
issues of past record in government, expectations of future performance, competency and charisma 
of leaders, and issues of honesty and trust (Ezrow, 2008). In the end, these parties affect voting 
behaviour,  often  in  a  non-ideological  direction  since  it  dynamically  participates  in  deliberately 
shaping electoral tastes and strategically prevents opposition parties from offering clear ideological 
or policy-based alternatives. 
Consequent of this analysis, inclusive tendencies, resisting rigid ideological positions, sharing 
power  internally,  focusing  on  performance  politics,  and  having  a  protected  ideological  space, 
enables  dominant  parties  to  maintain  a  centrist  position  which  resultantly  contributes  to  low 
polarisation of the party system. “Indeed, dominant parties exert so much power that, in most cases, 
they mould their societies and set the parameters of party competition” (Greene and Ibarra-Rueda, 
2014: 33). Arian and Barnes (1974: 601) add that it “controls not only the status quo but also the 
pace of change”. This is equivalent to saying that dominant parties have a large capacity to alter and 
stabilise the levels of polarisation in the party system.
2.2.5 Overall causal framework
A summary  of  this  discussion  is  outlined  in  Table  2.2.  From this  analysis,  the  institutionalist 
argument  based  on  electoral  systems  reduce  the  complex  relationships  of  party  systems  and 
underestimates the role of parties in shaping the degree of polarisation with party systems. Theory 
claims that the dominant party, because of its emphasis, moderates the party system independent of 
electoral  systems.  Within  the  dominant  party,  maximum focus  is  placed upon social  pluralism, 
accommodation  and  integration;  decentralising  power,  co-optation  and  power  sharing;  broad 
internal  participation,  open  debate  and  organisational  tolerance;  and  non-policy  issues  like 
performance policies. This suggests that their influence may override both the influence of electoral 
systems  and  mass  opinion.  Although  the  dominant  party  seems  to  outweigh  the  strengths  of 
alternative causes of polarisation, this research will look at all causes outlined here to provide a 
complete explanatory analysis of the determinants of moderation in the South African case. 
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Notes
 The threshold for what constitutes relevance is debated. There is no universally accepted number for what 1
constitutes relevance of a party in terms of vote or seat share (in percentage). However, what is known is that 
the ‘strength in seats’ is considered more acceptable and avoids complications that could emerge when we 
rely on electoral strength in terms of vote share (Sartori, 2005: 107). Sartori (2005: 107) elaborates that in 
general there is a threshold for what not to count. For instance, if a threshold of 5 per cent is established, all 
parties below this percentage will be discounted as irrelevant (a criterion of irrelevance), although we want to 
be careful not to make serious omissions, further lowing the threshold means ore irrelevant parties will be 
included in the analysis. So, the relevance of a party is a function of the distribution of political power 
essentially within the legislature. But parliamentary strength is not the only measure, added to this is whether 
a party has the potential to alter the direction of competition of the party system through showing either 
‘blackmail’ or ‘coalition’ potential—threatening the party to exit the coalition if its policies are not put at the 
forefront  of  the political  agenda or  being so important  that  the party gaining a  plurality  cannot  form a 
majority coalition without that particular party especially if its on a similar ideological bloc as the main party 
(Sartori, 2005: 108). 
 The left-right ideological spectrum is a common tool used to measure and gauge party positions. It  is 2
almost universal in its application for political scientists across different countries (see McDonald et al, 2007; 
Gabel and Huber, 2000). Most democratic countries are argued to have a left-right cleavage, despite the 
complexities amongst parties across nations (see Budge et al, 1987; Janda, 1993). One main advantage of 
this traditional spectrum is its usefulness in comparative politics, where party positions can be compared 
across similar or different cases.  Second, combining numerous issues into a single continuum  is  helpful 
instead of having various positions for parties on single-issue areas—for instance,  such as having party 
positions on gay issues or religious tolerance, social welfare or private enterprise; one can have a parties 
position on conservative matters and socio-economic matters, and on a ‘liberal-conservative’ scale if the left-
right does not make sense in a particular political context. The utility of the spectrum has its fair share of 
contestation, like many aspects within political sciences. Since then, calls for modification of the left-right 
spectrum has arisen where scholars propose that the spectrum should be country-specific (to check what is 
‘left’ and what is ‘right’ within a country, avoiding generic application which might led to misleading results) 
yet theory-specific—an inductive and deductive logic—so that it can be accurately applied to the country 
under study as well as generalised and used in comparative studies (see Jahn 2011, 2014). 
 Duverger (1954: 217) states that "the simple majority, single ballot system favors the two-party system." 3
 This was especially since class, linguistic and religious issues dominated the cleavage structure of Western 4
European party systems prior to the rise of post-materialist issues in the late 1960’s (Inglehart, 1990).
 Research findings emanating from Dalton and Tanaka (2007) show that voters place themselves near to the 5
centre in countries like Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand. 
 Since the 1970s, the importance of party strategies has become a pertinent research area, such interest grew 6
out  of  the  political  and social  developments  that  surrounded established parties,  particularly  in  Western 
Europe—where  the  party  system  experienced  increased  electoral  volatility,  partisan  dealignment, 
fragmentation and declining electoral turnout—which led parties to adjust their strategies in response to a 
changed landscape (Loomes, 2012; Mair, 1997). This implies that party strategies have systemic impact. 
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 Also, when the party faces a challenge, depending on the extent of any threat from the opposition and the 7
degree to which the ideological space is becoming crowded, the dominant party can choose to converge on 
the position of the median voter or to diverge and move to the extremes (Greene, 2008; Dunleavy, 2010). 
When faced with a significant threat, the dominant party appeals to the median voter and will also reach to 
more extremists social groups to undercut support for the opposition but its mainstream position still remains 
chiefly centrist  (given other  motivations  like  vote-maximisation,  social  and intra-party  pluralism,  it  still 
remains uncommitted to ideological rigidity). This implies that the party chooses its ideological makeup 
more than the influence of the opposition. 
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Chapter 3: Moderation in the South African Party System - 
A Literature Review
What is the state of polarisation in the South African party system? Is the system moderate or 
polarised? What is the left-right direction of major parties? Are these parties centrist or extremist? Is 
the  party  system  becoming  polarised?  Does  the  Economic  Freedom  Fighters  (EFF)  have  the 
potential to change the level of polarisation in the system? This chapter uses existing research to 
answer these questions. It is primarily a literature review of the South African party system. It tries 
to establish the existence of ideological similarities or differences between contemporary political 
parties, and the direction and strength of their positions. 
First,  I  examine the gaps in the study of left-right polarisation in the South African context, 
potential  reasons  for  such  gaps,  causes  for  moderation  emanating  from previous  research,  and 
discuss issue-based and non-policy-based politics. Second, the empirical paradox underlying this 
research  enquiry  will  be  explained.  Third,  a  literature-based  examination  of  the  ideological 
character of major political parties will be conducted; this includes the ANC, DA and EFF. 
3.1 Gaps in the study of polarisation in South Africa 
3.1.1 Skewed scholarly focus 
This  section  examines  previous  scholarship  on  polarisation  in  the  South  African  party  system. 
Before I examine previous work I look at research on the South African party system in general. 
This shows that scholarly interest is skewed toward certain aspects of the party system while other 
areas are ignored. The party system in South Africa has received attention both in the apartheid and 
democratic era. Notable studies include Stadler (1970), Lipson (1959), Trapido (1966), Woodward 
(1977), Johnston (1994), Mattes et al (1995), Botha (1996), and Lodge (2006). Over the last two 
decades most attention has been placed upon the numerical criterion of the dominant party system 
and how the dominant party, the ANC, interacts with democracy, engages in inter-party competition 
and deals with intra-party conflict (Southall, 2005; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999b; Southern, 2011; 
Langfield, 2014; Lanegran, 2001). In addition, a lot of attention is directed toward the electoral 
market  and the cleavage structure.  Here scholars investigate voting behaviour and partisanship. 
Many argue that it is dominated by race and strong partisanship (Johnson, 1996; Habib and Taylor, 
2001; Friedman, 2005; Ferree, 2006; Hoeane, 2009; Anyangwe, 2012; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009). 
By contrast, little consideration is given to the aspect of ideological or left-right polarisation in the 
party system. 
There is a shortage of scholarly attention on polarisation in South Africa. A general consensus 
exists that major parties in the country assume moderate than radical positions, such as ‘centre-left’ 
and ‘centre-right’ parties (Schrire, 2001; Booysen, 2005; Sadie 2006; Southall, 2014a). Although 
little work exists on party positioning, especially the systematic measurement of party ideology and 
polarisation, there is even less work on the causal factors behind party positioning and ideological 
differentiation in the country. It is the latter issue that concerns this research; although major parties 
are considered ideologically centrist and exist within a state of low polarisation, the reasons for such 
dynamics are poorly investigated—there is little systematic examination of the underlying structure 
of ideological difference in the South African party system. 
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One of  the contributing factors  to  this  scholarly deficit  possibly rests  in  the nature of  party 
system competition. Scholars argue that party debate is mostly about racial and technical issues 
rather than ideological or left-right issues (Schrire, 2001; Booysen, 1999). Some go as far as to 
suggest that the left-right ideological spectrum makes little sense, is simplistic and misleading when 
applied to the South African context (Butler, 2004; Petlane, 2009). An ardent exponent of this view 
is Friedman (2015) who states that “left, right and center are not useful terms when we analyse 
much of our [South African] politics…politics here…is about [racial] identities”. Schrire (2001: 
141) makes the argument that “South African politics is not, therefore, structured around ideology 
(left-centre-right) or class interests”. For these scholars, party competition is stuck in a race-based 
arena, where parties emphasise identity issues in electoral campaigns and party debate, and voters 
vote based on identity issues rather than for parties who are closest to their policy or ideological 
preference. Even more, opposition parties offer little by way of policy-based alternatives that are 
able to successfully convince voters. Parties are unable to vigorously articulate “substantive policy 
agendas as alternatives” to the ANC (Lanegran, 2001: 87). 
Relatedly, inter-party debate is said to revolve around adversarial and technical matters. It  is 
observed that South African parties increasingly focus their criticisms not on the ideological or 
policy differences between themselves and the dominant party but instead on the contrasts they 
perceive  in  respect  of  governance,  political  competence,  integrity  and  tolerance  for  dissent 
(Langfield,  2014; Booysen,  1999).  Similarly,  Southall  (1998: 468) states that  opposition parties 
resort  to  criticism  based  on  ‘pragmatic  grounds’  such  as  “challenging  the  lack  of  overall 
performance, failure to deliver services, and the reluctance to recognise and root out corruption”. 
The observed weakness of  ideological  competition between parties  possibly pushed scholars  to 
focus upon racial cleavages and other non-policy factors rather than examine ideological politics 
within the party system. 
Scholars acknowledge that the party system contains important lines of ideological division and 
note that the South African party system has a low degree of ideological polarisation. I will examine 
some implicit explanations in the literature. One school of thought emphasises that moderation can 
be found in the dominant party itself. Since the ANC represents a diversity of ideological views 
within it, this has subsequently moderated and neutralised radical tendencies. 
The ANC is not a monolithic party. It is described as a ‘broad church’ which contains multiple 
ideologies. These include the SACP’s socialist inclinations, COSATU’s pro-worker interests, and 
other interests (Southall, 2005; Booysen, 2012). Alliance politics is commonly seen as grounds for 
conflict  between competing  ideological  sections.  It  is  essentially  a  “site  of  struggle  between a 
variety of ideological persuasions” and “we find that vigorous (often vicious) debates and scraps 
take place between different components” (Southall, 2005: 66). “[K]ey policy debates” in South 
Africa take place within the alliance “rather than outside the party in parliament” (Southall, 2005: 
75). Thus, it appears that the ANC’s inclusion of various groups, prevents ideological differences 
from occurring outside the party. This resonates with the causal explanation of the dominant party 
in broader party system literature—that focuses on intra-party pluralism.
First, although this explanation is an indicator of moderation, what is left unexplained is why the 
ANC has not moved into a radical direction and what has contributed to the centrist resilience of the 
party. Second, and more important, a univariate factorial analysis of low polarisation is insufficient. 
Concentrating on a single causal variable, that is, the dominant party and its alliance partners, opens 
the door for a spurious connection in which some other relevant causal variable may be neglected or 
ignored. Thus, considering theoretically relevant factors in broader party system literature leads to a 
comprehensive, non-spurious, accurate and plausible interpretation of the causal factors of centrism 
and low left-right differentiation in the South African party system. 
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3.1.2 Issue-based politics 
Despite  the  weakness  of  ideological  competition,  scholars  recognise  that  issue-based  debate  in 
South Africa is gaining ground. This perspective challenges the view that the racial and non-policy 
dimension are the only features structuring party competition; parties and voters are beginning to 
point  to  matters  of  policy  and  issues  (Eldridge  and  Seekings,  1996;  Mattes  et  al,  1999a; 
Ramutsindela, 2002; Habib and Taylor, 2001; Ndletyana and Maaba, 2010). First, the preeminence 
of race in scholarly discourse underestimates the significance of “the strategies and campaigns of 
the major political parties” (Eldridge and Seekings, 1996: 519).  This suggests that parties offer 
issue-based positions to voters and compete based on policy content rather than racial exchange 
alone. The ANC in particular fought a generally positive, issue-based election since 1994 (Butler, 
2014). For instance, in 1994 the party “conscientiously fought the contest as an ‘issue’ election”: it 
“focused on the policies…[it] promised to implement if elected” (Mattes, et al 1996: 127; Lodge, 
1994: 41; Eldridge and Seekings, 1996: 519). Scholars go as far as to argue that the party often 
presents the electorate with detailed policy programmes incomparable to the alternatives offered by 
other parties (Lodge, 1994; Butler, 2014). For Lodge (1994: 32), in the 1994 election, “[n]o other 
party provided a similarly specific set of prescriptions or a manifesto” which was carefully tailored 
and well-researched to meet public perceptions. Butler (2014) similarly shares the view that the 
ANC’s policy proposals are driven by its unmatched research capacity in public opinions. 
This trend continued and in the 2009 campaign the party presented a positive image “focusing on 
the strengths of its own policy positions and the character of its senior leadership rather than on 
denigrating the opposition” (Butler, 2009: 66). In addition, although the ANC entered in the 2014 
election as being “out of touch with its historic constituency among the poor especially”, the party 
chose to present a good news story of the economy since 1994 which was essentially a backward 
looking campaign (Southall, 2014: 9; Butler, 2014). There is an obvious mix here between policy 
and  non-policy  issues:  the  former  refers  to  specific  programmatic  proposals  and  the  latter  to 
performance politics. It is evident, however, that issue-based politics is not foreign to the major 
party  and  thus  the  politicisation  of  issues,  policies  and  programmes  is  likely  to  feed  into  the 
electorate level. 
Second, there is an important element of rational and policy-based voting that is left out of the 
picture when race takes precedence in electoral analysis. What is assumed is a “crude view of voters 
who  mechanically  record  their  race  on  the  ballot  papers  rather  than  exercise  any 
discretion”  (Eldridge  and Seekings,  1996:  518).  It  perpetuates  an  image of  an  unsophisticated, 
irrational  voting  population  that  vote  because  of  deep  racial-historical  affiliation.  By  contrast, 
studies show that the electorate is sophisticated and engages more discerningly with issues than 
what is commonly presented. Voters are “not blindly loyal to their parties” but instead, “significant 
sections  of  the  electorate  make  rational  choices  during  elections,  and  decide  on  the  basis  of 
information available to them to choose which party most closely represent their material and other 
interests” (Ferree, 2006: 804; Habib and Naidu, 2006: 81; Mattes et al, 1999b; Cohen, 2009; Mattes 
and Piombo, 2001; Ngoma, 2014). This pertains to non-identity issues, and is inclusive of policy 
and non-policy factors.  According to these scholars,  voters make decisions also on the basis of 
class, party image, and government performance (Mattes et al, 1999b; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009; 
Southall, 2014b: 7). 
There is also a policy-based argument emanating from specific evidence of programmatic voting, 
that is, voting for party programmes and related offerings. Since 1994, voters in certain parts of the 
country (like the North West and Western Cape) have proven to be “active agents who actually 
interpret and evaluate campaigns as well as other politically relevant stimuli” (Africa, 2010: 25). 
Voters vote for parties because of their policies: the choice of ANC, for instance, rests in the belief 
that the quality of life improved since 1994 (with the access to basic services) and that the party has 
the best policies to bring about social progress (Africa, 2010; Khosa, 1999; Ramutsindela, 2002; 
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Rule,  2000).  Hence,  voters  feel  that  the ANC adopts  policies  that  support  the improvement  of 
material conditions.
Race-based voting in South Africa is concerning for “the development of a properly competitive 
multiparty system” (Johnson, 1996: 319). Proponents of the identity-based approach to voting argue 
that  race  is  a  primary  factor  and  usually  hold  that  a  racially  bifurcated  electorate  has  adverse 
consequences for democracy. For them it means that there is very little chance for the opposition to 
win office, and limited opportunity to hold the ruling party accountable based on matters of policy 
and performance; they argue that parties, in particular, need to move away from racial politicking to 
policy-based competition (Spence, 1999; Giliomee et al, 2001; Lodge, 2002; Langfield, 2014). For 
scholars like Southall (2001: 22) and Maylam (2001), the way forward for democracy in South 
Africa “lies in transition to an issue-oriented and ideologically based politics in which racial and 
ethnic  affinities  play  a  backstage  role”.  Opposition  parties  should  focus  on  “building  up  a 
substantial  electoral  threat  based  on  substantial  policy  and  ideological  differences”  (van  Zyl 
Slabbert, 1999: 215). In sum, on one hand, the dissatisfaction with race-based politics has resulted 
in a widespread call  for issue-based voting and party competition; on the other hand, available 
evidence shows that politics is moving in such a direction.
This research intends to contribute to this controversy. I  seek to find out whether or not the 
ideological dimension is gaining ground, especially at the level of the electorate. I also set out to 
examine the non-policy dimension within the electorate. 
3.2 The empirical paradox 
There are a number of factors that intuitively leads one to expect a polarised dynamic of political 
conflict. First, the presence of major racial and class inequalities should have polarised the party 
system around radical  economic ideologies.  Segregationist  and apartheid policies  produced two 
major cleavages in South Africa: the white-black racial cleavage and the poor-rich class cleavage; 
this research concentrates on the latter cleavage. Contemporary class divisions in South Africa are 
deeply rooted in the labour policies implemented under apartheid which were racially driven than 
class-motivated.  Racial labour legislation led to a big prosperity gap between whites and blacks. 1
One of the most significant processes was the splitting of the labour force into two strata: white 
workers  “with  skilled  or  supervisory  roles,  opportunities  for  advancement,  high  wages,  and 
relatively good living conditions”, and black workers who were “devoid of the means to exercise 
skilled or supervisory roles,  poorly paid,  and subjected to harsh living conditions” (Thompson, 
2000: 112). As class cleavages began to develop, “class never transcended race” as a means of 
group allegiance (Welsh, 1971: 243). This labour division continues in the post-apartheid period, 
where a majority of the black population live in poor or relatively poor conditions with only a small 
portion of prosperous blacks, while a majority of the white population remain relatively prosperous 
(van Rooyen, 1994; Maylam, 2001). 
Second, the proportional representation (PR) electoral system in South Africa is expected to give 
rise to polarisation. While most of the literature focuses on PR systems as encouraging consensus 
politics, and plurality systems as leading to a more majoritarian and adversarial politics (Lijphart, 
1994), there are also prominent discussions about the expectation that a PR system leads to greater 
variation in ideological preferences. Given that proportional laws enable maximum diversity in the 
legislature, it encourages parties to target “a niche sector instead of making moderate and inclusive 
appeals” (Davies, 2004: 306; Powell, 1982; Sartori, 1976; Downs, 1957; Dow, 2010). In so doing, 
parties, including major parties, are attracted to take up positions on the ideological fringes, thereby 
polarising the party system. The plurality system incentivises parties to come to the centre to attract 
the median voter. This is because the system encourages pluralities or majorities, and parties may be 
unable to survive on sectional appeals. In contrast, the PR system incentivises parties to assume 
ideologically distinct positions to attract minority sections of the electorate. This is because the 
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system does not require parties to gain a plurality of votes — only a small percentage is enough to 
gain political  representation.  Yet,  South Africa’s  major  parties,  especially  the  ANC, are  largely 
moderate, despite proportionality (Gouws and Mitchell, 2005). In South Africa, the initial spread 
under a PR system is one of limited ideological diversity, and the ANC as a majority party appears 
to be contributing to a converging dynamic. It is not necessary for PR systems to lead to diversity, 
but it can produce convergence (Grofman, 2004). (Chapter 5 provides a detailed discussion on the 
issue of moderation under proportional electoral rules.)
Third, the political landscape is far from absent of radicalised rhetoric. Instead, more often than 
not, public comments made by salient political groups are steeped in radical notions of progress and 
social relations. On one side is the ANC’s relations with the SACP, the radical left organisation. 
While the SACP supports a socialist transition and the overthrow of capitalism, the ANC has not 
subscribed to the same position (Wolmarans, 2012; Butler, 2009). Although the ruling party talks of 
‘radical economic transformation’, it is not in a socialist sense but refers to racial socioeconomic 
redress and alleviating poverty, inequality and unemployment within a context that supports social 
democracy and capitalism. On the other side there are entities like the EFF who call for radical 
socialism and make statement that challenge racial reconciliation between blacks and whites (de 
Jager,  2015).  This  is  indicative  of  radicalised  sentiments  and  the  presence  of  immoderate 
sympathisers. 
Lastly,  South  Africa  is  often  depicted  as  the  ‘protest  capital  of  the  world’ — a  site  of  the 
‘rebellion of the poor’ — where protests occur around issues of service delivery, land crisis, wages 
and corruption (Mail and Guardian, 2012; Lekaba and Sekhejane, 2016; UNESCO, 2016; Seekings 
and Nattrass, 2015). Research has since justified this argument with empirical evidence. According 
to research commissioned by the Institute for Security Studies, and the Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation,  “South Africa remains the most protest-rich country in the world. 
Protest is not just escalating, it is becoming more confrontational [and endemic]” (Timeslive, 14 
June 2016). Given that people are active in demonstrating dissatisfaction and are also violent in 
doing so, South Africa is certainly not a peaceful country that is ‘moderate’ in all dimensions. Social 
protests reveal an evident radical element in the citizenry. 
Given structural  economic disparities,  the PR’s incentive for  extremist  party positioning and 
polarisation, radicalised public rhetoric, and social protests, it is perplexing why major parties have 
failed to adopt far left and radical socialist policies that endorse the radical implementation of social 
equality and other issues — which would naturally appeal to the poor and more radical political 
groups. It  appears that the race-class character of South Africa, the PR incentive, radical social 
groups, and protests (the social and institutional influence) provide insufficient incentive for such 
ideological pursuits — given that major parties are broadly centrist. The South African party system 
exhibits low polarisation: major parties are particularly moderate on policies and programmes. The 
aim of this research is to explain this paradox by identifying and examining principal factors that 
account for the moderation of the party system.
3.3 Party positions: The ANC, DA and EFF
Scholars argue that the policy distance between the ANC and the DA is of a left-right nature where 
the ANC takes a centre-left position and the DA a centre-right position. While opposition parties are 
fragmented,  amongst  others,  along  ideological  lines—where  the  party  system  contains 
‘ideologically diverse’ parties—Africanist and radical parties remain marginal in the party system 
while major parties are broadly centrist (Southall, 1998: 466, 1997: 11; Lanegran, 2001; Schrire, 
2001; Booysen, 1999, 2005; Sarakinsky, 2001; Mattes, 2002; Zulu, 2012; Southall, 2014a). Much of 
this  argument  emanates  from the  socioeconomic  cleavage  and  the  positions  parties  assume on 
salient economic issues. From qualitative assessments, scholars converge on the point that the party 
system has a low degree of ideological polarisation (moderation), since major parties occupy the 
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centre space. One interesting element in the literature that pertains to the study of polarisation, 
discusses possible changing dynamics of the ideological nature of the party system. The presence of 
the radical left party, the EFF, as the third largest party to emerge after the 2014 general election, is 
argued to  contribute  to  future  changes in  the left-right  direction of  the  party  system (Southall, 
2014b). In this section, I examine the ideological character of the ANC and the DA on economic 
issues, and also outline the argument of the EFF’s potentially polarising role.   
3.3.1 The ANC: The dominant party
First, the ANC is often characterised as a social democratic, centre-left party. The party itself uses 
this label to describe its ideological orientation. The ANC has sought since its inception in 1912 a 
cross-class  alliance  for  national  democracy,  but  in  the  post-1940s  it  demonstrated  a  certain 
orientation to the left and the working class. According to Lodge (2004), the workers’ element in the 
ANC had an important impact on the party’s values and ideas (Lodge, 2004). This was embodied in 
the Freedom Charter of 1955 — which became a pivotal policy document. In this document, “the 
ANC embraced a programme that envisaged substantive social reform, including the expansion of 
public ownership and land redistribution” (Lodge, 2004: 166). 
However,  “[t]hroughout  its  [pre-1994]  history  the  ANC…studiously  avoided  adopting  rigid 
ideological  stances  that  were  either  race-based  or  class-oriented”  but  focused  on  activism and 
resistance to apartheid (Maylam, 2001: 111; Marx, 1992: 239). When the party took office in 1994, 
its  ideological  direction  on  economic  policy  was  anything  but  radical.  The  ANC  embraced  a 
minimalist  liberal  conception  of  democracy and privileged the  capitalist  status  quo despite  the 
party’s  “long  history  of  association  with  more  radical  notions  of  mass  participatory  and  non-
capitalist  democracy”  (Mckinley,  2001:  184).  As  early  on  as  Mandela’s  presidency,  the  ANC 
pronounced at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange that it is a party based on ‘market principles’. The 
speech,  delivered  by  Mandela,  contained  no  reference  to  nationalisation  of  resources  or  other 
radical  socialist  elements  (Lodge,  1994).  In  core  ANC  policies  like  the  Reconstruction  and 
Development Policy (RDP) (a policy initiated by the ANC as the first macroeconomic policy of 
democratic South Africa), nationalisation was mentioned but was categorised as a possible option 
for the future rather than an immediate objective (Lodge, 1994). In other terms, the ANC seemed to 
sideline radical socialist notions of economic management. 
The RDP merged development and economic growth (Wolmarans, 2012; Blumenfeld, 1999). It 
represented a “careful balance between the ‘growth through redistribution’ policies advocated by 
the left and the emphasis on growth as the harbingers of redistribution in more orthodox economic 
analysis” (Lodge, 2002: 22). The policy was designed to secure basic social and economic needs of 
workers and the poor, and improve the substantive quality of life for people (Mckinley, 2001). In 
all, the RDP represented a ‘semi-socialist’ project (Schlemmer, 1999: 296). Even the ANC’s policy 
to provide low-cost housing, in which public funds were used to underwrite private loans to low-
income buyers and later to directly subsidise the poor, was not a plan for massive expansion of state 
housing;  this  further  served  to  indicate  that  the  ANC  was  not  heading  in  the  direction  of  a 
radicalised interventionist state (Lodge, 1994). 
Economic  developmental  policies  amounted  to  a  moderate  left  programme  of  limited  state 
intervention. In fact, the party maintains a mixed economic position supporting labour and a pro-
poor agenda “within the confines of capitalism and the free market” (Booysen,  2009: 97).  The 
ANC’s election campaigns have always been left-leaning. Since 1994 the party has set manifestos 
with a pro-poor agenda but with a moderate and “anti-populist flavour” that also supported capital 
(Butler, 2014: 44). Core policy definers have not followed communist planning nor unfettered free 
market  mechanisms.  The  ANC  places  limits  on  capitalism  and  embraces  state-interventionist 
policies of redistribution but shies away from radical socialism (Koelble, 1999). In essence, the 
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party’s economic policies fall in the category of moderation as the chief means to transform society 
(Lodge, 2002). 
Second, even when the party shifted to the right in 1996, some scholars argue it retained a mixed 
ideological stance while others purport that it represented a neoliberal shift. The latter saw GEAR as 
a  ‘paradigm  shift’,  an  ideological  u-turn  in  a  business-friendly  direction  (Southall,  2009:  2; 
Blumenfeld, 1999: 43; Webster, 2001; Piper, 2004). Mbeki, who pioneered the policy, displayed 
greater sensitivity to free-market policies than his predecessor, Mandela (Evans, 1999). This move 
received criticism “for being a shift towards the sort of neoliberal policy heterodoxy that prevails 
throughout  much  of  the  world”  (Calland,  1999:  5).  It  articulated  deregulation,  liberalisation, 
privatisation and represented the government’s acceptance of market-imposed criteria where the 
state  became  a  marginal  than  primary  facilitator  of  growth  and  development  (Spence,  1999; 
Blumenfeld, 1999; Evans, 1999; van Zyl Slabbert, 1999; Mckinley, 2001).
Scholars argue that the policy signalled an ideological defeat for those on the left in the ANC. 
Some SACP members rejected it because it was “indicative of a rightward shift”, and it placed 
“capitalist accumulation at the centre of growth and development, as opposed to the prioritisation of 
basic  needs  and  redistribution  in  the  RDP”  (Mckinley,  2001:  191).  COSATU,  in  particular, 
developed  an  “increasingly  articulate  critique  of  South  Africa’s  ‘neo-liberal’  capitalist 
trajectory” (Southall,  2014b:  15).  The shift  led  some to  proclaim that  (a)  the  ANC abandoned 
socialist policies in order to satisfy internal and domestic capital, and that the ANC leadership were 
“no longer ‘socialist’-oriented” (Uys, 1999: 28; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999a: 345). This reading is 
not inconsistent with claims that (b) the 2004 election campaign revealed the ANC’s “return to the 
left  ground  it  occupied  in  1994”  where  it  avoided  subjecting  itself  to  a  ‘neoliberal  tone’ and 
contrasted itself with more rightist parties like the DA and IFP (Piper, 2004: 100). 
Others, however, debate that the ANC ‘returned’ to left ground since it never abandoned it in the 
first place. While a clear rightward policy was in place, the ANC maintained its commitment to and 
implementation of leftist policies, in particular, social welfare. Scholars point out that during the 
implementation of GEAR, public spending on the social welfare, which accounts for more than half 
of the government’s expenditure, actually increased (Seekings, 2005). “What is remarkable...is the 
retention and expansion of the state’s commitment to welfare” (Lodge, 2004: 171). The resilience of 
the welfare element demonstrates the unceasing attention the party devoted to the vulnerable and 
poor while embracing and expanding the opportunities for the business sector. In addition, “[i]t 
makes more sense to view the massive expansion of welfare provision...as an effect of the ANC’s 
incorporation  of  the  countryside  into  its  political  domain”  in  which  the  party  is  “becoming 
increasingly rural” (Lodge, 2004: 170-2). It appears that the ANC’s constituency proved to be a key 
factor in the party’s continuation of welfare policies. 
Even during this shift, the party expressed in the 1999 campaign that the poor must be cared for 
by the generosity of those well-off; it made a defence that it did not lose touch with the poor and did 
not scrap its welfare system (Lodge, 1999). In this way, although GEAR was the ANC’s policy of 
choice, the 1999 election saw the annihilation of leftwing opposition parties due to the “ANC’s 
occupation of much of both the centre and moderate left of the political spectrum” (Booysen, 1999: 
249). This effectively continued in subsequent campaigns, especially in 2004, where the party “was 
situated significantly to the left  of those of the main opposition parties...the ANC differentiated 
itself very effectively from its opponents” by focusing on the poor, unemployed and working class 
(Piper,  2004:  110).  Similarly,  the  party’s  2009  manifesto  indicated  moderate  and  anti-populist 
economic policy — the ANC did not veer into the far left but kept centrist ground (Butler, 2009).
Third, the ANC’s embrace of leftist political entities under the banner of the tripartite alliance 
(the alliance between the ANC, SACP and COSATU) leads it to project itself as supportive of a 
revolutionary  transformation  process;  although  it  does  not  explicitly  articulate  the  SACP’s 
endorsement of a transition to a socialist system (Lodge, 2004). The ANC “regularly and ritually 
presented its pragmatic centrism in revolutionary terms in order to solidify its alliance with the 
SACP and COSATU” (Southall, 2014b: 15). For instance, the party’s 2014 manifesto stood as a 
“confusing conflation of conservative and radical proposals” where the party said it began a new 
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phase of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) which was in the form of the second transition 
encapsulated under the National Development Plan (NDP) (Butler, 2014: 51). One main discourse 
in the ANC is the NDR which refers to the pursuit  of national democratic revolution, a theory 
premised upon the eventual achievement of socialism. This idea owes much to the party’s allies. 
“Since the 1960s, the SACP provided the ANC with much of its ideological direction, effectively 
embedding the need for a national democratic revolution” (Wolmarans, 2012: 109). For the SACP, 
the NDR will move South Africa towards a full socialist revolution.
Yet, the ANC holds a different interpretation of the socialist path. An analysis of the ANC’s own 
documents indicates that there is no explicit link between the NDR and a pure socialist agenda 
(Wolmarans,  2012).  This  suggests  that  the  ANC’s  take  on  the  NDR  is  significantly  moderate 
compared to the SACP’s interpretation. For the party, the NDR simply serves as a policy outlook 
designed to rectify the injustices of  the past  and correct  the skewed distribution of wealth and 
income. This attaches itself to a particular conception of the state as articulated by the ANC: the 
‘developmental state’. The idea of a development state refers to the need to shift to a more active 
role by government and involves a greater role for the state in investment and production that goes 
beyond macroeconomic management (Southall, 2009). 
Furthermore, the party uses the NDR as a rhetorical political word game to solidify the alliance 
and prevent a breakup, and to maintain its support amongst the poor and working class; the party’s 
own view is that a radical version of the NDR is unrealistic and unimplementable (Southall, 2014a). 
Despite the political rhetoric of radical transformation following a predetermined socialist path, the 
reality remains that “[t]oday the ANC presides over a robust capitalist democracy” and senior ANC 
leaders enjoy close connections with the business sector; in addition, moderate economic policies 
are firmly in place (Lodge, 2004: 167; Butler, 2014). Given this reality, the key division in the party 
has been between conservative or rightwing members in the ANC, who are inspired by the party’s 
historical  commitment to capitalism, and left  members in the alliance who strongly oppose the 
consolidation  of  a  capitalist  state  —  these  ideological  tensions  were  particularly  acute  under 
Mbeki’s presidency (Lodge, 2002, 2004). 
Although alliance partners were initially unable to effect policy change in a left direction, they 
were  later  considered  influential.  On  the  one  hand,  GEAR produced  sharp  conflict  within  the 
alliance where for the first time since 1994 alliance partners openly criticised the ANC (Mckinley, 
2001). However, the alliance eventually backed GEAR. The support of the policy unequivocally 
suggested that the left was ineffective in its ability to influence policy and create leftward pressure 
for redistributive policies (Habib and Taylor, 2001; Webster, 2001). On the other hand, despite their 
support, the alliance waged a decade long war of attrition against Mbeki’s rightwing socioeconomic 
policies; they felt more and more marginalised under his government (Butler, 2009; Southall, 2009). 
The left-backed ANC camp began to express support for Zuma who was seen as the best chance 
since RDP “to sway policy in more pro-worker, pro-poor directions” (Booysen, 2009: 91; Butler, 
2009; Southall, 2009). 
Yet, this was contained within a moderate platform. Upon Zuma’s rise to power, the business 
sector was concerned about a ‘leftward surge’ in ANC policy; however, the 2009 ANC manifesto 
promised ‘continuity’ in the mixed economy sense and also ‘change’ to a more ‘active state’ that 
favoured balanced growth (Southall, 2009). Thus, the embrace of left policies occurred on centre-
left ground. From this analysis, it can be argued that the ANC’s connection with left partners does 
not by itself entail radicalisation of socioeconomic policies. In fact, since 1994, it appears that the 
party has shown a repeated pattern of ideological and policy-based moderation. 
In summary, from this literature assessment it appears that (a) the ANC’s inclusion of leftwing 
groups have not been enough to cause radicalisation of party policy; (b) socioeconomic policies and 
programmes rest on a social democratic, centre-left foundation, with moderate state intervention 
and welfare  policies;  and (c)  the  party  embraces  capitalism in  practice.  The ANC can also  be 
described as a party that indulges in the rhetoric of the transition to a socialist state in order to retain 
its alliance with left partners, and gain support from the majority of the black electorate who are 
poor and working class; but at the root the party remains committed to moderate economic policies. 
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Briefly stated: neither did its interest in capitalism represent a steadfast shift to the right nor did its 
association with the left signify radical leftism. The objective of this research is to further examine 
the ANC’s economic policies, its relationship with the left, and in what ways (if any) it contributes 
to low polarisation. 
3.3.2 The DA: The main opposition party
The DA is often characterised as a “traditionally liberal” party (Simon, 1999: 95). It was described 
as “increasingly conservative” in the 1990s due to the strong support it held for the government’s 
GEAR policy, its ‘fight back’ campaign of 1999 where it supported liberal democracy and the need 
for oversight of the ruling party; and its racial tinge where the party represented white and other 
minority communities (Simon, 1999: 95). There is broad consensus on the view that the DA “is a 
liberal party, yet more neoliberal than the ANC”; and a party that is “clearly right leaning” and “to 
the right of the ANC” (Booysen, 2005: 132, 143; Schrire, 2001: 141; Piper, 2004; Southall and 
Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014). The rightwing conception of the DA emerges from its support for free-
market liberal policies and opposition to race-based redress measures. It is a commonly ascribed 
label, even amongst political parties. For instance, when the DA and IFP entered an alliance during 
the 2004 election campaign, the ANC viewed it as a ‘right-wing’ coalition since both parties shared 
a neoliberal, capitalist outlook (Lodge, 2005; Welsh, 1999). 
Since 1994, the party has often marketed itself as fighting for an ‘open opportunity society’, 
making the link between ‘opportunity,  effort  and ability’ (Jolobe,  2009: 141).  For the DA, this 
encourages economic growth and job creation in a ‘caring society’ that will provide better housing 
and improve quality health care (Jolobe, 2009). What propels this characterisation is its ostensibly 
colour-blind liberal approach to race, and its non-convergence with ANC’s racial equity and state 
interventionist policies. The party argues that the state cannot undo the wrongs of the past but a 
market-oriented system “will maximise growth rates and thus in time reduce the overall levels of 
poverty and inequality” (Schrire, 2001: 139). The former party leader, Tony Leon argued that “it is 
immoral and impractical to...[take] steps that will again entrench race as the central determinant of 
life chances in South Africa” (Mare, 2001: 95). “We thus have a clear conflict between the liberal 
view of politics as an instrumental process designed to influence society only at the margins [the 
DA], and the view of the political as part of a much larger historical mission [the ANC]” (Schrire, 
2001: 139). According to the ANC, the DA’s “brand of right-wing liberalism is a clever way of 
protecting white privilege and racism” (Mare, 2001: 96). 
Movement  leftward,  in  the sense of  approving state  interventionism in the economy,  and to 
embrace some race-based element has been occurring within the DA. Former DA parliamentary 
leader, Lindiwe Mazibuko, took the step to endorse Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), though 
the  party  ultimately  voted  against  it.  Some  accepted  “the  need  for  using  race  as  a  factor  in 
employment decisions” (Mattes, 2014: 184). Mattes (2014: 184) calls this “a significant shift in DA 
ideology”. It is clear that there are internal disputes within the party about these policies. More 
conservative rightwing sections say that “any endorsement of race-based policies” amount “to a 
desertion of liberal principles” (Southall, 2014b: 14). Zille responded to this by arguing that there is 
a  need  for  “interventionist  policies  if  historical  racial  inequalities  were  to  be  overcome”  (in 
Southall, 2014b: 14). However she opposes race-based forms of intervention. 
Scholars have, however, argued that there is (a) a major disconnect between the DA’s ideological 
position and voter preferences. While Zille claimed to be taking the party in a social democratic 
direction, “its commitment to business-friendly economic policies...lacked appeal to the broad mass 
of  black  South  Africans,  who  looked  for  vigorous  state  action  to  improve  their 
livelihoods” (Southall,  2014b:  14).  The main argument  is  that  there  is  the need for  the DA to 
reinvent itself to become relevant to the black electorate (Jolobe, 2009). Nijzink (2001: 66) observes 
that the DA “seems to focus on issues that are less important for the majority of voters”. On the one 
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side, the DA capitalises on political issues of the ruling party to gain support, arguing that it is the 
protector of the constitution and the guardian of liberal democracy; by contrast, the ANC devotes 
more  attention  to  issues  of  poverty  and  unemployment,  presenting  their  policies  on  a  social 
democratic and moderate leftist platform in favour of the poor and the growing black middle-class 
(Kotze, 2001). A DA strategist stated that the party “had failed to demonstrate care for the concerns 
of the African electorate and that it showed insufficient emotional intensity in articulating these 
concerns” (Jolobe, 2009: 136). The DA needs to convince blacks that the party “can be a vehicle for 
their interests too” (Kotze, 2001: 129).
Scholars also argue that there is (b) a major contradiction in the party’s ideological position. 
Although the party has made moves in a leftist direction, particularly in the area of social welfare, it 
has been met with policy ambiguities. Booysen (2005: 132) shows that during the 2004 campaign, 
“its policy solutions were overwhelmingly free-market, which constituted a policy environment that 
was essentially incompatible with the party’s proposal for a Basic Income Grant”. The DA’s 2004 
manifesto spoke of economic policies that would create jobs by unleashing the private sector and 
boosting growth, a basic income grant of R110 per month for those living in poverty and without 
access to another grant, speeding privatisation, increased police offices, fighting corruption, free 
antiretrovirals, and improved education (Booysen, 2005). Although the party “wished upon itself 
the label of social democrat”, it veered into conservative policies and hence displayed “a mixed bag 
of orientations” (Booysen, 2005: 143). In essence, the “incongruous ideological positioning” of the 
party is “unviable because they do not offer policies that would enable them to attract a significant 
electoral constituency”, such as those similar to the ANC’s RDP policy (Booysen, 2005: 143; Habib 
and Taylor, 2001: 216). Scholars argue that it is necessary for the DA to mirror the leftist, RDP-style 
of the ANC. 
In  summary,  the  main  argument  is  that  the  DA’s  rightwing  economic  policy  commitments 
undermine its own viability and growth. If the party continues to challenge the ANC on the centre-
right it will not make inroads into the majority of the electorate. Simultaneously holding onto liberal 
free-market  policies  and  promoting  social  welfare,  is  considered  an  ideological  contradiction. 
Moreover, that the DA must transform its policies toward a social democratic direction to appeal to 
the vast majority of the poor, is not a suggestion toward radicalisation of socioeconomic policies. 
Scholars  suggest  that  the  DA should  shape  itself  similar  to  the  ANC’s  RDP policy  which  is 
overwhelmingly moderate left.  The debate about the DA’s ideological transformation involves a 
proposed change from a centre-right to a centre-left orientation.
Although there may be policy changes within the DA towards a less ambiguous position, the 
purpose of this chapter is to see whether major parties are centre or extremist; it does not seek to 
explain ideological developments to the present. Also, this research broadly focuses on the ANC as 
the major party in the system. 
3.3.3 The EFF: A potential polarising agent
Scholars have recently pointed to the possible changing nature of ideological polarisation. Southall 
(2014b: 19) questions “the [future] shape of the party system” and how the EFF, being the third 
largest party, could influence it. The EFF is ideologically closer to, but more radical than, the ANC. 
First,  in the past,  ideological and policy debate is widely argued to have emanated from extra-
parliamentary forces, within the tripartite alliance, rather than from within parliament (Maylam, 
2001: 115; Mckinley, 2001; Mills, 1999; Piper, 2004). Webster (2001: 272) goes as far as to state 
that the nature of political debate inside the alliance is “more significant for the future of democracy 
in  South  Africa  than  those  taking  place  in  parliament”.  However,  while  most  leftist  criticism 
emerged from within the ANC, some scholars have recently claimed that such criticism will  in 
future  come  from  parliamentary  forces  like  the  EFF  (Southall  and  Schulz-Herzenberg,  2014). 
Scholars suspect that the ANC’s response to EFF’s leftward criticism will cause the ruling party to 
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shift more left. Second, another implication from scholarly debate is that being a radical left party, 
the EFF could possibly influence the left-right direction of competition and increase polarisation 
within the party system. This implies that the future of democracy may lie more with parliamentary 
parties than the ANC’s alliance partners. 
The  EFF  defines  itself  using  an  array  of  terminology  such  as  ‘radical’,  ‘socialist’,  ‘left’, 
‘revolutionary’ and ‘anti-capitalist’. The first group define the party as clearly leftwing due to its 
socialist orientation toward economic issues (Pithouse, 2013; Booysen, 2015), the second group see 
it as rightwing because of its racial rhetoric and anti-white stance (Friedman, 2014a), and the third 
group believe the party  has  a  contradictory ideological  stance — “all  kinds of  everything”,  “a 
hodge-podge of ideological and political strains” (Robinson, 2014: 77; Fakir, 2013; Drew, 2015). 
This section analyses the first group since it pertains to the economic cleavage — which is the main 
concern of this research. 
The attainment of political freedom in 1994, the EFF argues, is a formal matter but what is more 
fundamental is the lack of ‘economic freedom’. This is not a free market or centre-right ideological 
framework which the party makes reference to but a radical socialist definition of freedom. Its anti-
capitalist stance is captured in the party’s statement that “capital dominates the world economy” and 
carries a negative potential “to undermine all efforts to build a better life for all people” (EFF, 2013: 
11). The party not only challenges economic globalisation and South Africa’s dependency on the 
global economy whose major beneficiaries are corporations and individuals, but places itself firmly 
in the socialism of Marx. 
Proceeding  from  a  ‘Marxist-Leninist’  tradition,  the  party’s  main  focus  is  “economic 
emancipation” which is intended to “fundamentally transform the South African economy” (EFF, 
2013: 8). Their primary target constituency is the working class, particularly the black majority, 
where the party considers itself a ‘vanguard’ of class struggle, a “mass organisation leading the 
revolutionary masses in the fight against the capitalist class enemy” (EFF, 2014: 2). Those who 
constitute the core of the party’s emancipation agenda are those who do not own the ‘means of 
production’; they include the: youth, homeless, rural and urban poor including informal settlement 
dwellers, unemployed and underemployed, and discriminated and undermined professionals. 
Together with a Marxist characterisation of society and support for the working class, the party 
states that capitalism in South Africa places certain racial groups at certain points of the economy 
and is dependent on the ‘exploitation’ of poor labourers whose survival is dependent on ‘selling 
their labour to capitalists’. The EFF’s anti-free-market commitment and working class appeal is 
articulated as follows: 
The basic programme of the EFF is the complete overthrow of the neoliberal anti-black state as 
well as the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes; the establishment of the dictatorship of 
the people in place of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the triumph of socialism over 
capitalism. 
(EFF, 2014: 2)
Our indignation at the continued economic domination of the people of South Africa and the 
extreme exploitation of the black working class explains where we come from, where we are, 
what our mission is, what our character is,  and what is to be done to emancipate the black 
people of South Africa, the working class in particular, from economic bondage 
(EFF, 2013: 1)
One of the party’s chief messages is nationalisation. Continued economic dominance of “private 
corporations, particularly in the natural and mineral resources sector” should “be discontinued in 
order to stimulate state-led and aided industrial development” (EFF, 2013: 1). The party broadly 
supports nationalisation; state takeover of land without compensation; 60 per cent state ownership 
of mines, banks and other key sectors; state-owned enterprises under workers control; the doubling 
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of social grants and salaries of public servants; and vigorous pursuit of BEE and AA. The EFF 
believes that the state should be “in command and in control of the commanding heights of South 
Africa’s economy” (EFF, 2013: 7). Not only does the party propose to nationalise key economic 
sectors but also direct state intervention toward regulating, limiting and abolishing foreign control 
and ownership of strategic sectors of the South African economy (EFF, 2013: 15). According to the 
party, these “are not dogma but ideological instruments that will guarantee our movement political 
and economic victory over the bourgeoisie” (Shivambu, 2014: 99).
Bringing radical socialism and anti-capitalism to the forefront of ideological debate and inciting 
new levels of policy-based in the party system is one matter. The other is the imminence of left-
right competition and polarisation in the system. On the latter point, it is important to examine the 
concept  of  ‘party  system  change’.  It  is  a  situation  which  “occurs  when  a  party  system  is 
transformed from one class or type of party system into another” (Mair, 1997: 51-2). Party systems 
are passive and “changes only through the forces acting on it”; such forces are the political parties 
that are part of the party system (Smith, 1989: 355). One of the aspects of party system change is 
ideological change, which is observed by alterations in the degree of ideological distance between 
parties. Party system change in the South African case would be, for instance, from moderate to 
polarised (Sartori, 1976). It also pertains to left-right competition, taking the form of change from 
one ideological bloc to another (from a centre bloc to a far left bloc) (Mair, 1997).
Previous research shows the fate of radical left parties in South Africa. Since 1994, the South 
African party system included far left parties who, no different from the EFF, supported radical 
socialism and challenged neoliberal policies. These parties included the Pan-Africanist Congress 
(PAC), the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO), and the African People’s Congress (APC) 
who all gained enough electoral support to represent their constituencies in parliament. However, 
one major commonality between these parties is poor electoral performance. Since 1994, far left 
parties gained an average of less than three per cent of the vote. Moreover, AZAPO was outflanked 
in the 2014 national election and gained no parliamentary representation, the PAC has continually 
faced internal organisational contestations around party leadership, and the APC has shown signs of 
support for the ANC. According to scholars like Schrire (2001), radical left parties have remained 
marginal in the party system. It might be that the EFF also falls in this category (Robinson, 2014; 
Booysen, 2015; Southall, 2014b). 
It is indubitable that from the party self-postulation of the overthrow of capitalism, the socialist 
replacement and proletarian dictatorship, it is nothing less than a radical left party. Moreover, its 
support of nationalisation and control of key economic sectors, the promotion of state ownership of 
property,  the  expansion  of  the  welfare  state,  protected  industrialisation,  and  its  attitude  toward 
liberalised markets is further indicative of the party’s radical economic interventionism. Political 
moderation and pragmatism seem to fall far from the party. It  seems unable to accept differing 
political beliefs and the idea that no one has a monopoly over truth; instead, the party embraces a 
highly rigid ideological position, especially on economic matters (de Jager, 2015). In addition, the 
literature analysis shows that the EFF may be unlikely to affect ideological change in the party 
system,  given  the  unpopularity  of  former  far  left  parties  amongst  the  electorate.  This  research 
intends to further explore the EFF as a ‘polarising’ element, and whether this will contribute to 
increased ideological difference in the party system.
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Notes
 The  apartheid  government’s  aim  was  to  protect  white  domination  in  industries  by  devising  policies 1
favouring white labour interests. As the process of industrialisation occurred, industries developed and the 
wage-based economy grew. Class was deeply associated with race because the poor class, often the black 
population, were barred from gaining an economically prosperous life. The government set wage limits for 
black  workers,  limited  their  educational  opportunities,  and  prohibited  the  ownership  of  profit-making 
industries by the black business class. Industrialisation led to high levels of labour migration, particularly 
since the discovery of diamonds and gold in the late 1800s, blacks began moving into white-dominated areas 
to work. Owners used cheap labour from the African reserves to sustain the developing mining industry. As 
the wage-based economy gradually developed, blacks remained dispossessed and exploited. 
The earliest racial labour law was the Mines and Works (or ‘Colour Bar’) Act of 1911, which introduced a 
statutory colour bar in the economy and the principle of job reservation to protect skilled and semi-skilled 
white workers from black competition. It ensured that “African workers remained a peasant proletariat with 
one foot in the Reserves” (or the ‘homelands’ which were severely underdeveloped conditions) (Davenport, 
1977: 366). In addition, the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 meant that white employees could negotiate 
with employers for improved working conditions and wages while Africans were debarred from bargaining 
power and denied of the right to organise under trade unions. The Wage Act of 1925, designed to assist 
unskilled, poor white workers by keeping black workers under conditions and wages that suited whites, 
restricted black workers to the necessities of life. The apartheid government was driven by the belief that the 
black man was inferior, barbaric and undeveloped, and thus needed a wage that suited such characteristics. 
This was clearly echoed when Prime Minister, J. B. M. Hertzog stated that the system was discriminating in 
favour of “persons whose standard of living conforms to the standard generally recognised as tolerable from 
the usual European standpoint”, “persons whose aim is restricted to the bare requirements of the necessities 
of life as understood by barbarous and undeveloped peoples” (Thompson, 2000: 168).
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Chapter 4: Methodology
The methodological platform of this research is undergirded by various analytical approaches and 
strong theoretical claims emanating from party system polarisation literature. In this section, the 
methodological grounds of this study will be established. First, I outline the research question and 
subsidiary questions, and the research aims and objectives. Second, I situate the study as a case 
method, which involves looking into the specificities of the single-country approach and outlining 
the strategy for case selection. Third, the causal logic of this research will be outlined and defended, 
and hypotheses emanating from the theory will be set out. Fourth, I elaborate on the data collection 
and analysis techniques employed in the course of the research. Lastly, I set out the formulae used 
to  measure  fragmentation,  party  system  polarisation  and  voter  polarisation.  This  section  also 
explains the use of the left-right scale and the particular cleavage dimension that this research is 
restricted to. 
4.1 Research question and subsidiary questions 
The guiding question of this research is: What are the determinants of ideological moderation (low 
left-right  polarisation)  in  the  South  African  party  system,  in  the  democratic  period  (1994  to 
present)? The following subsidiary questions are directly applied to the South African case and are 
thematically arranged: 
(a) Does  the  proportional  electoral  system  lead  to  low  polarisation?  Does  low  fragmentation 
account for moderation? What is the nature of the relationship between proportionalism, low 
fragmentation and moderation? 
(b) What is the left-right preference distribution of the electorate on economic issues? Where is the 
median  voter  positioned  on  the  left-right  spectrum?  Are  voters  policy-oriented?  Do  voter 
preferences influence party system moderation?
(c) What is the role of the dominant party in fostering moderation? What is the ANC’s ideological 
character  and  left-centre-right  position?  Does  the  ANC  influence  moderation  of  the  entire 
system? What is the relationship between party dominance and party system moderation?
(d) Can the state of low polarisation in the party system be explained by a univariate or multivariate 
cause? What is the overall causal framework for party system moderation? 
4.2 Research aims and objectives 
The aim of this research is to explore, understand, explain and describe the causes of left-right 
moderation in the South African party system.  The following objectives allow me to achieve this 1
aim:
(a) Identify the main theoretical causes of party system polarisation to produce a comprehensive 
and theoretically-sound platform to explore the causes in the South African context, and outline 
the hypotheses. 
(b) Unravel and discuss the state of polarisation in the South African party system by using existing 
literature and previous studies on party positioning and ideological differences amongst major 
parties.
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(c) Apply hypotheses to, and test it in, the South African case by collecting and analysing data on 
the major causes (fragmentation, electoral systems, voters and the dominant party). 
(d) Systematically measure, using appropriate formulae, (i) party system fragmentation, (ii) party 
positions and polarisation, and (iii) voter positions and polarisation. 
(e) Establish  correlations  between  (i)  fragmentation,  the  electoral  system  and  party  system 
polarisation; (ii) voter polarisation and party system polarisation; and (iii) the dominant party 
and party system polarisation. 
(f) Construct a causal framework from the empirical findings for the causes of low polarisation in 
the South African party system. 
4.3 Case selection 
This research is based on case selection on the dependent and independent variable, which are as 
follows:
(a) Dependent variable
• Moderation in the South African party system
(b) Independent variables
• Party system fragmentation/electoral system
• Voter preferences 
• The major political party 
By focusing on selection on the independent variable, it often clashes with the core motivation of 
research: to explain the occurrence of the dependent variable, the political outcome in question 
(King et al, 1994; Kaarbo and Beasley, 1999). “[S]electing on the dependent variable is often an 
outgrowth of an empirical puzzle” (Barakso et al, 2014: 182). It becomes difficult to ignore the 
dependent variable and simply focus on independent variables, especially when existing research 
attests to a well-known outcome of interest. 
Also, a major drawback of selecting on the independent variable alone is that if the value of the 
dependent variable is already known, independent variables may be chosen in such a way that it 
matches up with the known value of the dependent variable (Halperin and Heath, 2012). Thus, it is 
justifiable and sensible to focus on the dependent variable, which in my case is low polarisation in 
the South African party system; and the empirical puzzle of moderate policies and programmes 
(especially  socioeconomic)  despite  intense  socioeconomic  inequalities,  PR  electoral  incentives, 
radicalised public rhetoric, and social protests. 
However, I also consider independent variables. By focusing on the outcome of interest alone, it 
risks leaving important causal or explanatory variables unaccounted (Geddes, 1990). One is able to 
knock down a selection error by controlling for theoretically important factors (Halperin and Heath, 
2012). Some argue that the independent variable should take greater priority in the research design. 
“Of course, in practice, we often cannot help but know what value the dependent variable takes for 
each of our cases, but the important thing is that this knowledge should not influence our selection 
decisions” (Halperin and Health, 2012: 215). 
Yet, the problem of selection bias does not come from explicit selection or knowledge of the 
dependent variable but from neglecting and not controlling for important independent variables. 
Thus, I argue that regardless of whether one selects his or her cases based on the independent or 
dependent variable, it is important that the selected cases allow for sufficient representation of both 
variables. Since research originates from an empirical puzzle, the outcome of interest cannot be 
avoided; moreover, important causal variables should be included in the case to ensure plausible 
and non-spurious inferences. To reduce the possibility of false inferences, implausible findings and 
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a spurious connection, I account for important underlying factor, as theoretically purported, that 
accounts for low polarisation. This includes the party system fragmentation, the electoral system, 
voter preference distribution, and political parties. In sum, the choice of the South African case is 
based upon (a) the outcome of interest: moderation, emerging from an empirical puzzle, and (b) the 
presence of theoretically relevant independent variables.
4.4 Causal logic and theoretical hypotheses 
First,  case  studies  are  argued  to  best  suit  descriptive  (causal  mechanisms)  than  causal  (causal 
effects) inferences. The latter is often grounded in large-n research and theory testing since the goal 
is to make broad inferences, and focuses on empirical evidence for an X:Y relationship (Gerring, 
2004).  It investigates the effect on Y for the presence or absence of X, establishes correlations, and 2
uncovers the presence of significant variables and relationships. By contrast, descriptive inferences 
involve in-depth analysis, and is usually grounded in small-n studies and theory generation. It looks 
into  “what  connects  a  purported  X  to  a  particular  Y”,  “a  pathway  from X to  Y”,  “rather  than 
revealing the average strength of a factor that causes an effect” (Gerring, 2004: 349, 2007: 43; 
Blatter, 2008: 69).  3
One of the major strengths of the case method is ‘rich description’ (Geertz, 1973). It allows for 
particularist and “context-dependent” information to be collected from one case “in considerable 
depth” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 221; Hammersley and Gomm, 2000: 3).  “[C]ase studies can use more and 4
more diverse indicators for representing a theoretical concept and for securing the internal validity 
of causal inferences and/or theoretical interpretations for these cases” (Blatter,  2008: 69). Thus, 
single-country studies produce conclusions that are better informed by contextual specificities and 
provide  tremendous  insight  about  case-based  correlations  and  underlying  factors  behind 
relationships.  Meanwhile,  large-n  studies  are  argued  to  sacrifice  and  dilute  in-depth  analysis 
(Creswell, 2007). 
Gerring (2004: 341, 2007: 44), like many other scholars, subscribes to the view that the case 
study  method  “is  correctly  understood  as  a  particular  way  of  defining  cases,  not…a  way  of 
modelling causal relations”; since it “is difficult to arrive at a reliable estimate of causal effects 
across a population of cases by looking at only a single case”. Abercrombie et al (1984: 34) simply 
puts it that “a case study cannot provide reliable information about the broader class”. Thus, given 
the absence of a large-n focus, the limited generalisability, external validity and representativeness 
that comes from focusing on a single case, the method is used less to uncover what but more to 
uncover how and why the independent causes the dependent variable (the causal mechanism behind 
established correlations); it is also particularly strong for generating theory, and is less strong for 
making wider causal inferences about theory (Van Evera, 1997: 55; Flyvbjerg, 2006).  According to 5
this argument, testing theory seems purposeless since a theory cannot be validated or refuted on the 
basis of one case which is “a single example of a larger phenomenon” because the sample is far 
from the population mean (Gerring, 2007: 42). 
However, “[t]his does not mean that case study research is not concerned with causal questions, 
but  it  usually  takes  the  descriptive–interpretive  elements  more  seriously”  (Blatter,  2008:  68-9). 
Although this usually applies to situations that intend on making broad inferences from a single 
case study, it is less problematic when the primary goal is to establish a cause-effect relationship 
within the case itself, that is, not to test but generate theory as a way to explore a case.
The goal of this research is to make causal inferences for low polarisation in the South African 
party system by using preexisting theories as a causal framework, and is not mainly for making 
generalisable  propositions  for  the  entire  population  of  moderate  party  systems,  proportional 
electoral  systems,  low  fragmented  systems,  moderate  voters,  and  dominant  party  systems.  In 
addition, this research not only specifies case-based correlations but also explores the reasons for 
how and  why these  causes  influence  moderation.  Moreover,  the  strict  dichotomy that  emerges 
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within the debate about theory testing and theory building may not be applicable to every research 
design. For instance, the intention of this research is not chiefly inductive as I use existing theories 
and apply a theoretical causal framework to the case of South Africa. Thus, using theory may not be 
for  the prime purpose of  theory testing since it  can be employed in a case-based method as a 
theoretical framework to guide case-based causation. 
Second, case studies can, however, be used to test propositions or hypotheses albeit to a limited 
extent.  It  is  argued that a single-country study can be a rigorous test  for an established theory. 
Popper’s  (1959) ‘falsification’ notion puts  forward that  one observation of  a  single black swan 
would falsify the propositions that ‘all swans are white’; and for Flyvbjerg (2006), one observation 
can indeed provide for theory testing as much as large-n studies do. Context-specific knowledge 
enables understanding of the universal strength or limitation of theoretical predictions, and it also 
enables discussion on the circumstances under which a theory might or might not apply (Smaling, 
1987). In addition, “[t]hat knowledge cannot be formally generalised does not mean that it cannot 
enter  into  the  collective  process  of  knowledge  accumulation  in  a  given  field  or  in  a 
society” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 227). In brief, the single case yields important benefits for broader theory 
and its evidence adds to an incremental understanding of theories. 
The case method can claim some form of generalisability since it is “not idiosyncratic accounts, 
but because they illuminate more general issues” and may possibly pave the way for theoretical 
innovation (Stark and Torrence, 2005: 34). The generalisations that emerge out of case research are 
at  best  contingent,  deterministic  and  tentative  (that  say  “if  circumstances  A  then  outcome O”) 
(George and Smoke, 1974: 96; George and Bennett, 2005: 30; Donmoyer, 1990). In sum, I take the 
position that it is undeniable that some kind of insight, however limited that generalisable capacity 
might be, can be generated from a case study.
Similar to an aforementioned point, an important step to ensure a measure of validity is to situate 
the study in a theoretical context. According to Blatter (2008: 71), the quality of a case study does 
not necessarily depend on providing causal mechanisms but “on a skilful use of empirical evidence 
for  making  a  convincing  argument  within  a  scholarly  discourse  that  consists  of  competing  or 
complementary theories”. This is done by using a broad theoretical framework which provides a 
comprehensive perspective of the case and, more importantly, allows one to rule out possible rival 
or  alternative  independent  variables  that  might  have  influenced  the  outcome—this  “enable[s] 
stronger  causal  inferences”  (Shavelson  and  Towne,  2002:  109).  In  brief,  paying  attention  to 
theoretically relevant explanatory variables (those that are hypothesised as crucial to explaining the 
observed outcome) and applying it to the case, increases the validity of the study (Creswell, 2007; 
Landman, 2008).  6
A secondary goal of this research is to use the case study to shed light on the applicability of 
theoretical propositions in broader party system polarisation literature. Although generalisability is 
not the primary goal of this research, it is implausible to suggest that one should have no interest in 
elaborating on broader inferences since in the end, cases find life in a wider theoretical context. I 
intend to contribute in some way to theoretical debate by adding evidence for the existence of a 
clear or ambiguous theoretical relationship. In essence, although firm, strong and robust inferences 
are limited and tentative conclusions are plausible. While this research uses South Africa as the 
single case, the findings should not be ruled out or unlinked to broader theory.
Third,  I  specify  the  theory  under  investigation,  and  state  the  expectation  and  predication 
emerging from theoretical schools (hypotheses) about what I should observe in the case and what I 
should  observe  if  it  is  false  (Van  Evera,  1997).  In  the  previous  chapter,  I  outlined  the  main 
theoretical  schools  which  account  for  the  outcome  of  polarisation  and  moderation.  The  main 
hypothesised relationships emerging out of the three main schools (I include fragmentation and 
electoral systems as one school),  that will be applied to the South African party system, are as 
follows:
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(a) The institutionalist perspective
• Hypothesis a: Different levels of party system fragmentation and different electoral systems 
have varied effects on the degree of party system polarisation. 
• Hypothesis  a1:  Low  party  system  fragmentation  (often  found  in  two-party  systems)  is 
conducive to moderate polarisation and centripetal competition (moderation). 
• Hypothesis  a2:  High  party  system  fragmentation  (often  found  in  multiparty  systems)  is 
conducive to high polarisation and centrifugal competition (polarisation). 
(b) The sociological perspective 
• Hypothesis  b:  Voter  positions  and  polarisation  affect  party  positions  and  party  system 
polarisation—parties respond to social divisions and shift their ideology in response to shifting 
voter preferences, and the party system reflects divisions at the social-electorate level. 
• Hypothesis b1: If the median voter is centrist and voters are not polarised, parties will shift their 
positions toward the centre,  and the party system will  reflect low ideological differentiation 
(moderation). 
• Hypothesis b2: If the median voter is extremist and voters are polarised, parties will shift their 
positions toward the extremes, and the party system will reflect high ideological differentiation 
(polarisation).
(c) The party-centric perspective 
• Hypothesis c: Party system polarisation is dependent upon the ideological character of political 
parties.  
• Hypothesis  c1:  Parties  facilitate  ideological  similarities  or  low polarisation within the party 
system when electorally relevant parties occupy the same side of the political spectrum, and are 
in the centre (moderation). 
• Hypothesis c2: Parties facilitate ideological differentiation or high polarisation within the party 
system when electorally relevant parties occupy separate sides of the political spectrum, and are 
on the extremes (polarisation).
4.5 Data collection and analysis
This research relies on primary and secondary data collection. By using multiple forms of data 
(interviews, surveys and document analysis) validity and reliability of the findings are established; it 
also helps to minimise subjectivity bias.  Essentially,  it  provides for corroboration and stronger 7
substantiation of constructs: “[w]hen a pattern from one data source is corroborated by the evidence 
from another, the finding is stronger and better grounded” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 541; Creswell, 2007). 
Subsequently,  it  allows  for  convergent  data,  that  is,  multiple  data  sources  leading  to  similar 
conclusions; and ‘a chain of evidence’ (Yin, 1981: 63). By corroborating data, I strengthen claims 
about underlying causes and relationships.
4.5.1 Interviews
I conducted a number of interviews with party leaders and party officials.  Interview-based research 8
is  advantageous because it  sheds light  on puzzling questions and respondents  can provide rich 
information on this. In addition, direct statements from interviewees “are more valuable in terms of 
impact and credibility” especially when compared to indirect methods of data collection (Matthews 
and Ross, 2010; Lilleker, 2003; Rathbun, 2008: 693). This method is useful for this research which 
focuses on developing an explanatory framework for the moderate ideological nature of the South 
African party system. It  is  most  beneficial  for  two main reasons:  it  allows me to interact  with 
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parties, as one of the main representatives of the electorate, to better understand voter preference 
distribution; and to unearth the reasons for centrist and mixed positions of the ANC. 
To  identify  potential  respondents  I  used  snowballing  sampling  which  is  used  when  “the 
researcher  may not  be aware,  at  the outset,  of  all  the relevant  players  involved” (Barbour  and 
Schostak, 2005: 44; Mosley, 2013).  However, the technique is bias because the researcher becomes 9
trapped in a network of people who see the world through the same lens. Hence, I also employed 
purposive  sampling where  I  identified potential  interviewees  because  of  their  unique  ability  to 
provide  rich  responses  to  the  phenomenon (Bleich  and  Pekkanen,  2013;  Rathbun,  2008:  688). 
Interviewees were recruited through email and phone invitations—email invitations included the 
participant information sheet, consent form and the ethics protocol number. The information sheet 
and consent form sent to interviewees were similar to one used to invite parties (see Appendix E to 
G for the participant information sheet, consent form and ethics clearance certificate). 
One of the major problems I encountered during the data collection stage was the low response 
rate.  Many of those identified as best placed for providing rich responses were unavailable. I tried 10
to minimise non-response by continuously prompting potential interviewees and using convenience 
but purposive sampling in the event of individuals becoming unavailable.  However, even the latter 11
were unavailable or in most cases were unable to be contacted.  12
Interviews on the (a) proportional electoral system included party leaders and officials. I also 
interviewed individuals  who were  present  during  CODESA,  MPNP and  CA deliberations;  this 
included: Frank Madlalose, Ken Andrew, Kenneth Meshoe, Pieter Mulder, Roelf Meyer, and Tony 
Leon. This attributes a degree of reliability to the findings, especially those pertaining to the reasons 
motivating the transition from the plurality to the proportional system. Interviews on the (b) voters 
also included party leaders and officials; it was broadly representative of those parties in parliament 
as at the 2014 general election, this included: the ACDP, AIC, ANC, APC, COPE, DA, EFF, FFP, 
IFP, NFP, PAC and the UDM. These parties are able to offer reliable information about the left-right 
distribution of the electorate and the moderate-extremist character of citizens; the presence of policy 
and  non-policy  voting;  causes  behind  the  moderate  or  extremist  character  of  voters;  and  the 
connection between party policy and voter preoccupations. 
Interviews  that  focused  on  the  (c)  ANC included  former  ANC members,  alliances  partners 
(SACP and COSATU), NEDLAC representatives, and those representing business. The response 
rate for the ANC was particularly low; I only managed to interview one former senior official: 
Frank Chikane. I interviewed a couple of individuals from the SACP (Alex Mashilo and Jeremy 
Cronin) and COSATU (Patrick Craven, William Madisha and Zakhele Cele). I  also interviewed 
Saki Macozama, the President of Business Leadership South Africa and a former ANC MP. 
While  I  focus  on  the  SACP,  COSATU and  the  business  sector  to  ascertain  the  ideological 
character  of  the  ANC,  I  find  that  including  the  statutory  bargaining  institution,  NEDLAC,  is 
particularly  beneficial.  Since  NEDLAC  is  a  body  that  helps  to  develop  consensus  around 
socioeconomic issues, is a place for national dialogue amongst salient stakeholders, and seeks to 
avoid  the  unilateral  determination  of  economic  policy;  it  allows  me  to  broadly  uncover  the 
government’s,  and by extension the ANC’s, relationship with and attitude towards business and 
labour,  and the general  left-right  posturing of  the party.  Senior  officials  within NEDLAC, who 
observe the bargaining process, are able to provide reliable information on this. I interviewed two 
former  Executive  Directors  (Phillip  Dexter  and  Herbert  Mhkize)  of  NEDLAC and  the  current 
Executive Director (Madoda Vilakazi). A multi-sectoral interview approach on the ANC helps me to 
corroborate results and minimise the error that came through non-responses from the side of the 
ANC. 
A total of 26 interviews were conducted, as outlined in Table 4.1 and 4.2. I initially targeted 50+ 
interviews but the non-response rate of participants meant that there was not much progress to get 
more individuals that were capable of providing rich responses to the questions. This was the case 
for the ANC, SACP, COSATU and organised business. Given that interviews were wide-ranging 
and included a diversity of representatives, it minimised skewed data from non-responses (Bleich 
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and Pekkanen, 2013). Interviews were conducted mainly by phone—they were recorded and then 
transcribed.13
Interviews followed a semi-structured format, where I asked questions appropriate for each party 
(see Appendix A to D for questions).  I relied on a structured format because the main objective 14
was to compare responses across a range of interviews; a completely open-ended format cannot do 
this  (Ayres,  2008;  Firmin,  2008;  Rathbun,  2008).  It  means  that  respondents  “are  given  equal 
opportunities to provide data across the same research constructs” (Firmin, 2008: 837; Leech, 2002: 
667). By ensuring stability of the measure, the reliability of the data is increased (Matthews and 
Ross, 2010). Also, questions were guided by theoretical topics, and this also enhances the content 
and construct  validity of the data (Qu and Dumay, 2011: 246; Matthews and Ross,  2010: 221; 
Morgan and Guevara, 2008; Wilson and Sapsford, 2006).
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Table 4.1 Interviews conducted on the electoral system and voters
Respondent Description Date
Alfred Mphontshane Former MP of the IFP 8 September 2016
Bantu Holomisa Leader of the UDM 2 September 2016
Bheki Gumbi Acting national chairperson of the NFP 27 September 2016
Dave Steward Chief of staff in the Office of F. W. de Klerk from 1992-94 23 September 2016
Frank Madlalose Headed the IFP delegation to CODESA 26 September 2016
Godrich Gardee MP in the EFF’s parliamentary caucus 26 September 2016
Jonathan Moakes Head of policy at the DA 8 September 2016
Ken Andrew Former head of policy at the DA and part of the CA 26 September 2016
Kenneth Meshoe Leader of the ACDP and part of the CA 21 September 2016
Luthando Mbinda Leader of the PAC 27 September 2016
Mandla Galo Leader of the AIC 23 September 2016
Mosiuoa Lekota Leader of COPE 20 September 2016
Pieter Mulder Leader of the FFP and part of CODESA and the MPNP 20 September 2016
Roelf Meyer Chief negotiator for the NP during the 
transition talks 19 October 2016
Themba Godi Leader of the APC 22 September 2016
Tony Leon Former leader of the DA and part of 
CODESA and the MPNP 14 September 2016
N 16
4.5.2 Surveys
Given the scepticism about the empirical data produced using interviews, especially advanced by 
positivists,  that  denounce it  as  subjective  interpretations,  I  enhance the  validity  of  the  data  by 
corroborating it with survey information.  This mainly pertains to the preference distribution of the 15
electorate. This includes both general and salient economic issues that are either on or can be placed 
on a left-right scale. A range of surveys that focus on voter perceptions and public opinions were 
examined from 1982 to 2016. This includes Afrobarometer, CSES, EPOP, IDASA, SASAS and 
WVS surveys. No particular survey is given more prominence over others. Instead, surveys are 
primarily selected based on their questions. In some cases surveys ask commensurate questions 
(with only minor terminological differences or a different scale) in different years; I rely on multiple 
surveys to draw data for one question. And from this, longitudinal data on particular questions can 
be obtained. 
In most cases survey data is reconstituted to reflect certain categories. The data in its original 
form does not add value to this study unless when attached to particular categories. Beside plotting 
mean and standard deviation measures, I draw out (a) left-right bloc competition in the electorate; 
and use the (b) 10-point scale on economic issues in two ways. Surveys that use the 10-point scale 
asks citizens to select 1 and 10 for total agreement on two different statements. For instance, on the 
issue of privatisation, surveys took 1 as total agreement with the statement that private ownership of 
business  and  industry  should  be  increased,  and  10  as  total  agreement  with  the  statement  that 
government ownership of business and industry should be increased. First, I merged categories 1, 2, 
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Table 4.2 Interviews conducted on the ANC
Respondent Description Date
Alex Mashilo SACP spokesperson 25 October 2016
Frank Chikane Former director general in the Presidency 9 November 2016
Herbert Mhkize Former executive director of NEDLAC 24 October 2016
Jeremy Cronin Deputy secretary general SACP and deputy minister of public works 13 October 2016
Madoda Vilakazi Executive director of NEDLAC 16 November 2016
Patrick Craven Former spokesperson of COSATU 1 November 2016
Phillip Dexter Former executive director of NEDLAC 21 October 2016
Saki Macozama President of Business Leadership South Africa and former ANC MP 14 November 2016
William Madisha Former President of COSATU 28 September 2016
Zakhele Cele Secretariat Coordinator COSATU 21 October 2016
N 10
9, 10 as ‘strongly agree’; 3, 4, 7, 8 as ‘agree’ or ‘somewhat agree’; and 5 and 6 as ‘don’t agree with 
either’ or ‘in-between’. 
Second, although some surveys simply ask respondents to agree or disagree with a statement, the 
use of a 10-point scale suggests that it is possible to measure intensity of choice. In this way, I 
plotted these results on a 10-point left-right scale. The following categories were assigned on top of 
the categories above: far-right (1.00), far-left (-1.00) (strongly agree); centre-right (0.50), centre-left 
(-0.50) (agree/somewhat agree); centre (0.0) (don’t agree with either/in-between). Finally, I use this 
reconstituted data to derive a set of statistical findings such as voter mean positions, polarisation and 
correlation coefficients. 
These surveys use (a) a sampling methodology that permit country-wide generalisations. Beside 
the large number of participates that are often proportionate to the population size (as Table 4.3 
shows),  surveys  are  based  on  a  nationally  representative  random  sample  that  considers  all 
demographic groups and geographic areas in the country, and are further stratified according to 
other criteria.  It is most common for the sample to be stratified according to salient elements like 16
province, rural-urban, racial group, age, gender, education, and income. Data taken from between 
1982 to 1993, mainly from WVS, contained a population of interest which was all adults (18+) in 
South Africa (it was not exclusive to the white population) and was nationally representative. 
Since the sample size and methodology of these surveys are representative of the universe from 
which  it  was  selected  (according  to  the  voting  population,  geographical  and  demographic 
representation), it allows for results to be projected to the universe: the South African electorate and 
the broader population. In addition, most of them provide (b) replicated modules, periodic and time-
series data on the country’s changing social attitudes. In sum, these surveys constitute a highly 
useful resource that provides reliable and credible information on social perceptions and enable 
valid country-wide inferences.
4.5.3 Document collection
The major strength of document collection is that documents contain large amounts of information 
which assist in qualitative research enquiry. They are static and present a snapshot of a particular 
time; documents enable assessment of the immediate and changing context (Matthews and Ross, 
2010: 278; Stark and Torrence, 2005). I primarily use this method to provide a descriptive and 
explanatory discussion of the ANC and assess whether it contributes to low polarisation of the party 
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Table 4.3 Surveys, 1982 to 2016
Survey N range
Afrobarometer 2 200 to 2 400
CSES 1 200
EPOP 2 672
IDASA 2 406 to 3 500
SASAS 2 744 to 5 734
WVS 1 596 to 3 531
system.  It  is  also  beneficial  for  validity  because  it  helps  to  compare  derived patterns  with  the 
interview data. 
One limitation of the method is that it is subject to interpretation and subjective bias since one 
cannot exactly know the meaning of the content. To prevent this, I use thematic analysis, that is, 
collecting documents on the same topic, and analysing it within the theme; I also refer back to the 
literature on the topics. This increases validity of the document  collection and analysis. 
The  type  of  content  used  in  this  study  include:  (a)  macroeconomic  policies  and  (b)  party 
documents.  First,  I  analysed  economic  policy  from  1994  to  2012,  this  encompassed  of  the 
Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP); Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR); 
Accelerated  and  Shared  Growth  (ASGISA);  New  Growth  Path  (NGP);  and  the  National 
Development Plan (NDP). Second, numerous ANC documents were examined, this consisted of: 
national  consultative  conference  reports,  national  conference  addresses,  national  executive 
committee statements and NEC Bulletin, president’s political reports, discussion documents, reports 
on tripartite alliance summits, Mayibuye, ANC Today, and Umrabulo. Most of the content is sourced 
from the ANC’s historical archives website, parliamentary and government online repositories, and 
other historical archival channels. 
Sampling  validity  is  enhanced  because  this  research  considers  the  document  collection 
representative of the ANC, it is not a collection of a single type of content (Lederman, 1991). Data 
collection is also reliable because it uses credible documents and reports, especially from trusted 
online sites and channels.
4.5.4 Data analysis 
A mixture  of  qualitative  and quantitative  analysis  is  used in  this  research;  each one best  suits 
different sections. The main benefit of qualitative research, as a more ‘word-centred’ approach, is 
that it  provides for more detailed analysis of complex patterns (Creswell,  2007; Gerring, 2007; 
Travis,  1999).  Qualitative analysis is most appropriate for discussing, especially from interview 
data, the proportional electoral system and the rationale for adopting the system, the preference 
distribution of  voters,  and the  ANC (this  includes  explaining the  party’s  position on economic 
policies, its relationship with the SACP, and its understanding of global economic dynamics and the 
business enterprise).  Here, results cannot be translated into a statistical score. 17
Quantitative analysis is used for two sections of this research: the proportional system and the 
electorate. On the former, I use formulae to establish party system fragmentation, party left-right 
positions, and party system polarisation. On the latter, I focus on extrapolating survey data using 
graphical and statistical interpretation of results—in most cases it is in the form of mean estimates 
and  measures  of  standard  deviation—I  also  measure  voter  polarisation.  In  brief,  quantitative 
analysis focuses on mean and standard deviation estimates, and correlation coefficients. This was 
calculated either by hand or computed using Apple’s Numbers and Microsoft’s Excel. 
The process of analysis involved, first, identification of patterns and general tendencies in the 
data (Kalof et al, 2008; Van Evera, 1997). Data was often divided into themes to ensure comparison, 
validity  and  reliability—this  was  especially  the  case  for  content  analysis  which  systematically 
classified sentences and phrases into meaningful themes (Krippendorff, 1980, 2004).  During the 18
data collection process, the following major categories or themes emerged:
(a) Electoral system: proportional representation 
• Plurality electoral laws
• British, Westminster model 
• Winner-takes-all effect, first-past-the-post 
• Consensus, negotiations
• Minorities, empowerment, fear
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• Accommodation, inclusion, representation, fairness 
• Peace, political stability, conflict, violence, unrest, civil war
• Unity, racial reconciliation
• Voter registration, districts, constituencies, procedure, closed-list, democratisation 
• Global shifts, group rights
• Party positions, left-right placement
• Party system fragmentation, number of parties, relevant parties, seat share 
(b) The South African electorate
• Type of voter (ideological, non-ideological or other)
• Left-right self-placement, political scale, citizen placement of parties 
• Moderate, centrist, radical, extremist voters
• Reasons for particular voter characterisation 
• Key voter concerns, voter preoccupation, priority issues, most important concerns
• Government intervention and management, state ownership, government-run economy
• Market intervention and management, private ownership, market-run economy
• Income equality, income differences
• State-led land repossession, land seizure and confiscation, property rights, security of tenure
• Political interest, policy understanding, issue-voting, importance and complexity of politics
• Competitive politics, policy choices, party differences
(c) The dominant party: The ANC
• Party economic policies: RDP, GEAR, ASGISA, NGP, NDP
• Radical economic transformation, developmental state, NDR, Freedom Charter
• Government’s attitude toward and relations with business and labour 
• SACP’s attitude toward the ANC’s economic policies 
• Business’s perspective of the ANC’s economic policies
• Ideology, rigidity, pragmatism, capitalism, neoliberalism, communism, socialism, revolution
• ANC’s centre-leftism and moderation, social democracy, mixed economy
• ANC discrediting communism, the ultra-left
• Partnership, alliance, coalition, unity, political freedom, apartheid 
• Open debate, tolerance, organisational discipline
• A new world, globalised capitalism, free-market economy 
• Intra-party pluralism, accommodation, inclusion, mass party, broad church, multi-class
• Nationalisation, land redistribution, property rights 
I relied on hand-coding due to the small-n of documents and to avoid some of pitfalls that often 
burden computer-assisted qualitative software (Hopkins and King,  2010;  Grimmer and Stewart, 
2013). Interpretative validity was enhanced by looking for points of agreement and disagreements, 
especially in interview data (Mosley, 2013; Mikhaylov et al, 2012; Klingemann et al, 2006).
Collected  data  was  analysed,  second,  by  comparing  the  empirical  findings  with  initially 
stipulated  theoretical  relationships  to  see  if  there  is  a  match  between  the  empirical  and  the 
theoretical (Yin, 2013: 324). In other terms, “reporting is oriented towards theoretical explanations 
of  the  action  and contributing  to  social  theory”  (Stark  and Torrence,  2005:  34).  This  included 
searching  for  convergence  and  non-convergence  in  relation  to  theory.  Third,  I  also  focus  on 
obtaining  causal  strength:  the  magnitude  and  consistency  of  X’s  effect  on  Y  across  the  cases 
(Gerring, 2007: 54). According to Gerring (2007), that A, B, C are present is sufficient to establish 
them as independent causal variables for the case in question.
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4.6 Measuring fragmentation and polarisation 
4.6.1 Fragmentation
The standard measure of the ‘Effective Number of Parties’ (ENP) is used. It measures the levels of 
fragmentation that exists within the party system. The formula is a derivative of the party system 
fractionalisation/fragmentation index put forward by Rae (1971). I use a reformulated version of 
Rae’s index as proposed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979): the Laakso-Taagerera index—I refer to it 
as the ‘Fragmentation Index’ (FI) and it is used interchangeably with the ENP. The chief strength of 
the FI is that it counts parties in the legislature by weighting them by their relative strength in terms 
of vote or seat share so that one can gauge the ‘effective’ or ‘relevant’ number of parties in the 
system, and it discounts the relevance of small parties (Dalton, 2008). The formula is computed as 
follows, as stated in Dalton (2008: 917):
where i represents the individual party.
Although this is an inverse of the Herfindahl index, a correlation between this and the Laakso-
Taagerera index reveal an r = .92, which implies that they are interchangeable measures (Dalton, 
2008). For the measure of fragmentation, I use seat share because electoral results for the apartheid 
period were mainly in the form of seats won—this enables me to compare both the apartheid and 
democratic levels of party system fragmentation—and I am interested in those parties who gain 
formal representation in the legislature.
The  FI  does  not  have  a  prescribed  range  since  the  score  is  limited  by  the  party  system.  A 
hypothetical FI score of 8 implies there is more or less 8 parties (although not necessarily 8 since 8 
parties would have to equally share in the vote), a value of 2 implies that between 1 to 3, gain a 
significant vote share. In general, however, according to scholars like Sartori (1976), more than 5 
parties implies a fragmented system; while inline with two-party theory, less than 3 parties produce 
a system with low fragmentation. 
Also, one cannot have an FI that is bigger than the actual number of parties in the legislature. In 
South Africa, the mean number of actual parties from 1994 to 2014 is 12 which means the ENP 
would not exceed greater than 12. Thus, the ENP score can be compared with the actual number of 
parties to gauge whether the score is indicative of low or high fragmentation.
4.6.2 Party positions
A measure of party system polarisation depends on two things: party left-right positions and party 
vote share. For the former, I rely on a unidimensional numerical left-right scale (RILE index)—I 
refer to this as the ‘Ideological Index’ (ID)—which is a manifesto-based approach to measuring 
party  positions.  As  there  are  limited  sources  of  a  systematic  measure  of  the  ideological 
characterisation of South African parties, I use a data base generated by my Master’s dissertation 
which relies on the RILE index (Rohanlall, 2014). Moreover, surveys have not consistently asked 
citizens to place parties on the continuum (citizen placement of parties constitutes an important 
measure of party positions and party system polarisation), thus, citizen placement of parties cannot 
be relied upon.   19
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The main strength of the measure is that it provides a good rendition of where parties stand in a 
particular  point  in time and its  position in relation to other  parties,  it  also allows one to track 
changes in party positions (Budge and Meyer, 2013). 
The number of  statements,  deduced from manifestos,  pertaining to the left  and right  side is 
summed. The final score is, according to Budge (2013):
RILE Index = (Right - Left) / (Right + Left)
It yields an index of -1.00 to +1.00 where - refers to left emphases and + to right emphases.  I 20
further employ the following scale: 
Using this latter index assists in comparing party positions to voter positions from citizen self-
placement data. The -1 to 1 scale is similar to the measure used by surveys that measure voter 
positions — it often employs an eleven-point scale, 0 to 10: where 0 is far left or communist, 5 is 
centre, and 10 is far right or conservative.
However,  the  controversy  around  the  measure  is  that  it  (a)  summarises  numerous  policy 
categories into one unidimensional scale, and (b) pertains to saliency of statements. On the first 
matter, for scholars like Jahn (2011), it is not always theoretically or methodologically consistent to 
merge categories like social, political and economic as it distorts the overall left-right score for a 
party (for instance, where a party emphases more right elements in the economic and more left 
elements on the social and political, the score is skewed to the left). In this sense, I focus on one 
domain: the economic. In other terms, my study is restricted to the economic cleavage dimension. 
On the second matter, it is possible to gauge whether a party is radical or moderate on the left-right 
by adding a qualitative element. Table 4.5 outlines the economic elements and the scale attached to 
it. Given that my research is based on a small-n, it is possible to compare the saliency delivered by 
the RILE with specific manifesto statements to place parties within a centrist-extremist scale.
One of the basic assumptions of this research is that party systems can be spatially mapped on a 
left-right continuum. I concur with the criticisms of using a single dimension; which states that 
politics  is  too complex to assign one dimension,  especially  since salient  cleavage may revolve 
around race, ethnicity and religion and may even be unrelated to the left-right descriptions (Stokes, 
1963). As Sigelman and Yough (1978: 356) posited, “many salient issues are not reducible to left-
right  terms”  and by  focusing  on  ‘left-right’ party  positions  and polarisation,  one  ignores  other 
potentially polarising political and social issues in society. However, a comprehensive assessment 
of political disagreements, differences and conflicts is not the objective of this research; my analysis 
is restricted to party positions and party system polarisation in the economic dimension which can 
be placed on the classic left-right continuum. 
Although ‘left-right’ means something different in every context, in South Africa it is a well-used 
political jargon in intra- and inter-party debate.  It  mostly refers to the socioeconomic cleavage, 
where parties use terms such as ‘left’ and ‘right’ to differentiate themselves from other parties on 
salient economic issues. If parties themselves use this dimension and given that this politicisation is 
frequently associated with the economic domain, it is reasonable to make use of a single left-right 
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Table 4.4 Left-Right scale by strength
Far left Moderate left Centre Moderate right Far right
-0.50 to -1.00 -0.01 to -0.49 0 0.01 to 0.49 0.50 to 1.00
dimension when analysing party system polarisation in South Africa. Thus, it is justifiable to focus 
on this spectrum. 
4.6.3 Polarisation
4.6.3.1 Party system polarisation 
What the RILE index does is to assume that parties are ranked according to their ideological base, 
this however does not make assumptions about their relative size. Thus, there is a different measure 
for party system polarisation The ‘Polarisation Index’ (PI) consists of plotting left-right scores for 
parties against  their  share of  votes—the value on the left-right  is  weighted on the basis  of  the 
electoral strength of parties (Taylor and Herman, 1971; Sigelman and Yough, 1978; Ersson and 
Lane,  1982;  Dalton  and  Anderson,  2011;  Lachat,  2008;  Sorensen,  2014).  So,  “[f]or  any  party 
system, the measurement of polarisation consists of plotting each party’s left-right score against its 
share of votes in a national election” (Sigelman and Yough, 1978: 357). The PI enables one to 
calculate the value of ideological difference for the whole party system; it is essentially “how party 
system profiles can be generated and translated into quantitative scores” (Sigelman and Yough, 
1978: 357). 
 52
Table 4.5 Left-Right scale on economic issues
Left emphases Right emphases
Market mechanisms (opposed) (state intervention, 
taxation, public spending) 
(centre-left)
Market mechanisms (capital, private sector, 
entrepreneurship, business investment) 
(centre-right)
Market libertarianism (opposed) (state planning, 
state ownership, nationalisation) 
(far left)
Market libertarianism (free-market, efficiency, 
privatisation, downsizing) 
(far right)
Private property (opposed) (common ownership) (far 
left)
Private property, security of tenure 
(centre-right)
Social welfare (relative equality) 
(centre-left)
Social welfare (opposed) (relative inequality) 
(far right)
Redistribution of wealth (income equality, 
progressive tax) 
(centre-left)
Redistribution of wealth (opposed) (income 
inequality, reduced tax) 
(far right)
Affirmative Action (modest structural quotas) 
(centre-left)
Affirmative Action (opposed) (equal opportunity, 
merit, hard work) 
(far right)
Mixed economy (private-public partnership, 
government-business-labour nexus) 
(centre-left)
I use Taylor and Herman’s (1971: 34) index which is represented as, as stated in Lachat (2008: 
691): 
where 𝑤j is the vote share of party j, pj is the position of party j on the left-right scale, and p is the 
weighted average position on this scale (as shown in the second part of the formula). 
For left-right positions, I use scores generated by the RILE index. I also focus on vote share, 
unlike Taylor and Herman (1971) who measure support by percentage of seats, because using the 
percentage of votes minimises the distorting effects of electoral systems—which tend to distort the 
distribution of popular support (Sigelman and Yough, 1978: 366). 
The PI uses a scale of 0 to 1, where 0 is unpolarised (all parties are on the same position on the 
left-right spectrum) and 1 means highly polarised (all parties are divided on the two extremes of the 
left-right spectrum, with both opposite party groups having the same vote share).  The highest 21
possible polarisation score, 1, would be seen when one party has 50% of support and is located on 
the extreme left pole and the other party also has 50% but is on the extreme right pole. The least 
possible polarisation, 0, would be seen when one party or many relevant parties occupy a single 
position anywhere on the left-right continuum (Sigelman and Yough, 1978: 357).
The main alternative to this is an unweighted measure of party system polarisation. The two 
formulae from Sigelman and Yough (1978: 357) (unweighted measure) and Lachat (2008: 691) 
(weighted measure) are derivatives from Taylor and Herman (1971: 34) and includes party vote 
share as a major variable. Having the latter as a variable ensures that larger parties have a greater 
relevance on the PI index as compared to smaller parties. When compiling the variance, Lachat did 
not use the party system mean of left-right scores as per Taylor and Herman but rather carried out a 
weighted average of the left-right scores, thus introducing the vote share element twice. This entails 
that  larger  parties  have an added relevance on the  final  PI  index relative  to  smaller  parties.  A 
correlation score between the two methods yields an r  = .83. This means that the two methods 
produce relatively similar results. However, Lachat’s formula was preferred because of the added 
relevance he accords to major parties: it better reflects system dynamics where larger parties have a 
bigger influence on party system polarisation.
4.6.3.2 Voter polarisation 
First, to gauge the left-right positions of citizens, I use survey data that includes questions about 
citizen self-placement on the political scale. This scale provides for an estimate of voter direction 
and strength. In other words, whether voters are more leftist, rightist or centrist; and whether they 
are moderate or radical on this scale. From this, the position of the median voter can be identified. 
Surveys also ask citizens to locate major parties on this scale.  22
On voter self-positioning, according to Inglehart (1990), most citizens in most nations can locate 
themselves  on  the  left-right  scale,  irrespective  of  whether  the  polity  falls  under  an  advanced 
democracy. Nonetheless, the main problem with using citizen self-placement data is that citizens, 
when questioned about left and right positions, respond based on country-specific discourse where 
in such contexts the meaning of left-right varies, and also individuals have different interpretations 
of the scale (Powell, 2009).   There is an obvious lack of political sophistication on the part of the 23
voter  who might be ignorant,  subject  to stereotypes or  engage in non-ideological  issues.  So,  if 
citizens place themselves and parties,  the ‘true’ position might  never be known (Powell,  2009; 
Dalton, 2008). 
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However,  it  can  be  assumed  that  (a)  voters  are  neither  completely  ignorant  nor  highly 
sophisticated  about  the  scale;  (b)  less  informed  citizens  can  truthfully  choose  ‘don’t  know’, 
‘neutral’, ‘haven’t heard of the left-right’ or ‘non-politically aligned’—this minimises inaccuracies 
in the median voter  position;  and (c)  survey information provides an unparalleled,  reliable and 
indispensable source of information about voter left-right positions—especially when there is no 
alternative measure (Granberg and Brown, 1992; Dalton and Tanaka, 2007).  
Since citizens may have varied interpretation of the left-right scale, I corroborate self-placement 
data with specific data on citizen positions on economic issues. The major advantage of this is that 
each citizen interprets his or her position on a specific economic issue.  Since questions do not 
directly pertain to a left-right scale, it uses a ten-point scale (that for instance refers to 1 as more 
government intervention and 10 as more market intervention); this scale can be translated into a 
left-centre-right scale (especially given that economic issues can be easily located on an ideological 
continuum). This rests on the assumption that citizens are capable of interpreting their positions on 
salient economic matters relative to South Africa. 
Second, it is less conventional to measure voter polarisation but this is not impossible. Given that 
one of the major objectives of this research is to compare party system polarisation with voter 
polarisation to deduce if a relationship exists between the two, it is important to measure the latter. 
There is obviously one problem: while voter left-right positions can be easily obtained, there is no 
seat or vote share for voters; they are obviously not like parties whose seat share can be inputed in 
the party system polarisation index. According to Taylor and Herman (1971: 34), who popularised 
the formula for ideological difference between parties and uses a single left-right dimension, the PI 
is a “usual variance statistic”: it is a measure of the variance of the left-right score of each party 
relative to the average or weighted average of the party system left-right score. This means that one 
has to remove the seat-vote share element and focus on voter polarisation as a measure of standard 
deviation  (Ezrow  et  al,  2013).  From  this,  the  distance  between  voters  can  be  identified,  and 
compared to party system polarisation. I corroborate voter polarisation from self-placement data 
and voter polarisation from economic issues data to gain an overall sense of voter polarisation in 
South Africa. 
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Notes
 Exploratory analysis is “well suited for studying a substantive area about which little is known in order to 1
describe phenomena in detail” (Kalof et al, 2008: 83). Explanatory analysis seeks to explain patterns related 
to the phenomena, this often means examining causal relationships and is a (dis-)confirmatory factor analysis 
designed to test hypotheses (Onwuegbuzie and Hitchcock, 2015; Yin, 2013). Descriptive analysis offer a 
descriptive account of the outcome of interest, it involves what and how questions, somewhat merging cause 
effect and causal mechanisms.
 Y refers to the dependent variable, which is the effect. X is the independent variable, which is the cause. The 2
‘causal’ or ‘treatment’ variable is the variable that could plausibly be the cause of the outcome (Herron and 
Quinn, 2014). Two types of causal estimation exist when one is examining causal effects: effects of causes 
and causes of effects (Holland, 1986; Gerring, 2007). The ‘effects of causes’ particularly concerns a situation 
where the outcome is being explained together with the independent variables—such as what is the effect of 
a proportional electoral system, a centrist dominant party, and a moderate electorate on the party system? 
This extensively explores the implication produced for the wider social and political system. The ‘causes of 
effects’,  by contrast,  prioritises  a  causal  than an effect  analysis—such as what  causes a  moderate party 
system,  how does  a  centrist  party,  a  propositional  electoral  system,  and a  moderate  electorate  decrease 
polarisation?
 Proponents of causal mechanisms criticise large-n, causal-effect research, for the lack of understanding it 3
generates on the causal mechanisms behind the proposed causal relationship, since it does not ‘connect’ or 
‘join  the  dots’  between  an  X:Y,  causal-effect  relationship;  and  the  ‘thin’,  reductionist  and  simplistic 
connections it makes (George and Bennett, 2005; Brady and Collier, 2004). These scholars argue that case 
studies  focusing  on  causal  mechanisms  allows  one  to  “peer  into  the  box  of  causality  to  locate  the 
intermediate factors  lying between some structural  cause and its  purported effect”  (Gerring,  2007:  103, 
emphasis added).
 Depth can be understood as the “detail, richness, completeness, wholeness” of the information (Gerring, 4
2007: 49; Blatter, 2008: 69). 
 A critical trade-off for the case method is that by focusing on internal validity, external validity is sacrificed. 5
By limiting the number  of  cases,  the  method is  more intensive than extensive and hence sacrifices  the 
capacity to make broad generalisations and inferences for a wider population (Lijphart,  1971; Landman, 
2008). As such, the method is viewed by some with extreme circumspection as an inferior research method. 
‘External validity’ is the capacity of a study to make generalisations about a broader population, sometimes 
universal  generalisations;  ‘internal  validity’ is  the  credibility  of  inferences  concerning the  causal  effect, 
mechanisms and relationships under investigation. ‘Generalisability’ and ‘representativeness’ refer to “the 
degree to which causal relationships evidenced by that single unit may be assumed to be true for a larger set 
of  (unstudied)  units”  (Gerring,  2004:  348).  In  sum,  unlike  positivist  methods  that  aspire  toward 
generalisation, based on large-n studies that are probabilistic or randomly selected samples, cases studies are 
limited in its capacity to generalise beyond the respective case. 
 In so doing, it helps to militate against the problem of having too many inferences and too few observations 6
(King et al, 1994).
 Multiple methods and data are essentially used to address the same question, to corroborate findings, and to 7
show that “those findings are unlikely to be the result of measurement biases” (Vanderstoep and Johnston, 
2009: 179; Bloor et al, 2002: 12). In the end, it increases confidence in the research findings. 
 An interview is a conversation between the researcher and the participant and is one of the main data 8
collection methods used by social scientists. 
 Snowballing is  also valuable because people are more likely to respond through referrals  (Bleich and 9
Pekkanen, 2013). 
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 See Lilleker (2003) and Locander et al (1976) for the problem of low response rate. 10
 During the process of convenience sample, I ensured that those who are available still met the criteria for 11
selection (deMarrais, 2004).
 Numerous calls to Luthuli House (ANC’s head office) were largely unproductive, people were unable to 12
provide contact details for individuals especially those who previously worked for the ANC. Alternative 
avenues such as searches on the internet also yielded very little information. 
 First,  data collection over the phone is a popular method as it  allows for information to be collected 13
quickly (Kalof et al, 2008). It is advised that the phone interview be short to avoid fatigue of the participant 
(Kalof et al, 2008). The use of voice and video calling software like Skype or Zoom is becoming popular for 
modern researchers, however the only challenge is participants’ access to fast internet and knowledge of how 
to  use  the  software  (Deakin  and  Wakefield,  2014).  Second,  on  the  recording  and  transcribing,  voice 
recordings are able to enhance the reliability of the findings and as such I ensured that the voice quality was 
free from distortions and was clear; I also transcribed the material to avoid any criticism directed towards the 
accuracy of the findings (Bleich and Pekkanen, 2013; Walliman, 2001). 
 Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher “to explore with the participant different aspects of the 14
social phenomenon” and to elaborate on it (Matthews and Ross, 2010: 224). Having a relatively structured 
format with a rigorous design produces more engagement from interviewees (deMarrais, 2004: 67).
 The subjectivity is argued to contribute to the “unreliable, impressionistic, and not objective” element in 15
interview research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: 12). See Rathbun (2008) and Mosley (2013) for multi-method 
data  collection;  deMarrais  (2004)  and  Thody  (2006)  for  problems  like  lengthy  and  general  interview 
questions; 
 In  the case of  IDASA surveys,  the task team used a  multi-stage,  area stratified probability  sampling 16
methodology. This was stratified by province, population group and community size (metro, city, large town, 
small town, village and rural)—metropolitan areas were stratified into ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ settlements to 
ensure good representation. Afrobarometer Rounds employed a similar method. CSES Module 3, similar to 
IDASA and Afrobarometer surveys, based itself on census-enumerated geographical areas that encompass 
primary  sampling  units;  and  a  random,  nationally  representative,  stratified,  probability  cluster  sample 
proportionate to the population size. Under the auspices of the HSRC, both EPOP and SASAS surveys were 
also a stratified random nationally representative sample; the same applies for WVS waves. 
 “Qualitative  studies  often  weave  together  extensive  quotes,  detailed  descriptions  and  a  researcher’s 17
observations  of  the  subject  matter  to  tell  a  story about  an event,  phenomenon or  set  of  experiences  or 
behaviours ” (Kalof et al, 2008: 82). 
 “Content analysis is a technique used to analyse texts, whether written, spoken or visual” (Kalof et al, 18
2008: 105; Stone et al, 1966: 5). It is a well-known method in political science. Validity is often increased by 
developing themes and codes which are linked to theory. For Poole and Folger (1981: 477) a coding scheme 
“is essentially a translation device that allows investigators to place utterances into theoretical categories”. 
Moreover,  content  analysis,  especially,  requires  face  or  practical  validity  where  “the  coding  system  is 
logically consistent and the categories clearly defined” (Folger et al, 1984: 137).
 I spatially mapped party positions from 1994 to 2009, I further added 2014 to the analysis—these years are 19
based on election manifestos emerging from general elections. 
 Characterising parties in terms of their standing on the left-right continuum is often related to a positive-20
negative scale, the positive indicates the right,  the negative indicates the left (Janda, 1970, 1975; Dodd, 
1974).
 In all, large parties at the centre or on any one side of the scale generates low polarisation but if there are a 21
number of large parties at the left-right extremes it produces a high polarisation (Dalton and Tanaka, 2007).
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 On voter positioning of parties, it should not be confused with questions on party identification—which 22
involves how close one feels to a party, seeking to measure the strength of party loyalty and predict average 
levels of electoral volatility—this specifically relates to ideological identification and placement on a left-
right ideological scale (Lewis-Beck and Chlarson, 2002). 
 For the purposes of cross-national studies, it becomes an appropriate research strategy to avoid absolute or 23
thick meanings of what constitutes the left-right scale but to employ loose categories that have room to be 
country-specific, yet theoretically relevant (Jahn, 2011).
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Chapter 5: Moderation and Centre-Positioning under 
Proportional Electoral Laws
This chapter examines whether the South African electoral system is a causal determinant of party 
system moderation. It first discusses the transition from plurality to proportional representation (PR) 
and assesses the underlying motivations for the adoption of the latter. Here, much of the decision to 
adopt PR rested with the ANC’s commitment to compromise and desire for political stability which 
largely facilitated the moderation that  went  behind the PR decision.  Second,  it  interrogates the 
theoretical claim that the proportional electoral system produces a highly fragmented party system, 
that is, a large number of competing parties; and extremist party positioning and a highly polarised 
party system. It also critically assesses the claim that centrist occupation fosters extremism and 
polarisation.  Third,  a  final  discussion  of  the  relationship  between  the  electoral  system  and 
polarisation forms the last part of the analysis. This chapter relies on interview data, document and 
manifesto  analysis;  and  systematically  measures  party  system  fragmentation,  party  left-right 
positions,  and  party  system  polarisation.  The  main  finding  is  that  the  phenomenon  of  low 
polarisation is unrelated to the electoral system. A more plausible causal determinant appears to be 
the  presence  of  the  dominant  party,  the  ANC,  in  constraining  the  emergence  of  party  system 
polarisation, perpetuating low levels of fragmentation, stabilising the centrist makeup of the system, 
and pulling opposition parties to the centre. 
5.1 The plurality system, 1910 - 1989 
5.1.1 The British transplant with modifications 
The two party and the dominant party system was a tradition since the Union of South Africa was 
established in 1910. Prior to the Union, each former colony, that is the Boer republics and the 
British colonies, had their own political systems in which the affairs of government were conducted. 
The 1910 constitution not only created a political system that placed non-whites in a subordinate 
position, where both white and Afrikaner groups opposed conceding political and civil freedoms to 
black South Africans, but also established a ‘modern’ unitary political form of government (Venter 
and  van  Vuuren,  1987).  Delegates  agreed  upon  the  British  Westminster  political  system.  This 
system included parliamentary supremacy and government,  a bicameral  parliamentary structure, 
and a plurality electoral system. The political system “was an authentic Westminster transplant”: it 
was  from  the  British  that  South  Africa  derived  its  initial  political  attitudes  and  government 
structures; the political system was largely “an artificial creation of its colonial heritage” (Boulle, 
1994: 10; Vosloo, 1979). The party system which began to develop in Britain after the civil war of 
the seventieth century was exported elsewhere by the nineteenth century to countries like Australia, 
New  Zealand,  Canada  and  South  Africa  (Lipson,  1959).  The  establishment  of  the  Union 
“represented a major historic event in the development of the [South African] party system” (Botha, 
1996: 210). 
The first South African parliament emerged after the general election in 1915. The method of 
apportionment to parties was styled after the Westminster-type, Anglo-American winner-takes-all 
plurality structure which derived from the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system.  The South 1
African  electoral  system  “has  always  been  modelled  on  the  Westminster  precedent  of  single-
member constituencies operating according to the plurality principle” (Boulle, 1984: 77; 1994). The 
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constituency system rests  upon an individualist  approach to politics where voters in designated 
districts elects an individual candidate to represent them in the legislature. The winner-takes-all 
mechanism comes to the fore when the candidate or party who wins the most votes — that is, 
pluralities  which  are  not  necessarily  majorities  — in  each  constituency  becomes  the  district’s 
representative in the national parliament; and the party with the majority of legislative members are 
then able to form a government. Thus, the first point of accountability, albeit to the white electorate, 
was the individual who held seats of power not the political party they belonged to. 
However, one of the most significant variations from the British model was the limited franchise 
and unrepresentative legislature; it was a whites-only parliament which was hardly considered a 
parliamentary democracy (Reynolds, 1994; Sisk, 1995; Boulle, 1994). But South Africa’s affinity to 
the ‘pseudo Westminster constitutional system’ began to change. The major constitutional change 
was in 1961 that  moved South Africa from the status of a Union to a Republic.  However,  the 
institutional structure of 1961 closely followed that of the Union, keeping the Westminster model 
firmly  in  place  (Vosloo,  1979).  The  legitimacy  crisis,  that  emerged  from  excluding  the  black 
majority  from  government,  influenced  the  apartheid  state  to  incorporate  the  plurality  and 
heterogeneous nature of social groups into the political system. When political rights were granted 
to blacks in the homelands — through the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, the Promotion of Bantu 
Self-Government  Act  of  1959,  and  the  Bantu  Homelands  Constitution  Act  of  1971  —  direct 
representation was still absent in the white-based national parliament. Despite changes, in the late 
1970s, the South African political system was criticised because it reflected an artificial system that 
failed to incorporate different population groups into a unitary system (Vosloo, 1979). Therefore, 
the chief political question in the 1980s centred upon movement away from a pseudo Westminster 
model to more democracy and pluralism. 
In  1983  the  government  adopted  a  new  constitution  that  made  provisions  for  a  tricameral 
parliamentary system in which two population groups were incorporated in the national structure: 
coloureds and indians, together with whites. The problem with this solution was that non-white and 
white groups were in separate houses of parliament and functioned only as junior members with 
limited powers. In other words, despite the changes, the system still favoured the dominance of 
whites  who  maintained  a  monopoly  over  national  affairs  (Boulle,  1994).  Separate  legislative 
structures,  differential  access  to  power,  focus  on  intra-group  structures,  and  the  preclusion  of 
formation of a unitary system implied that democracy “now pertained more within a group context, 
with due recognition of traditional political cultures” (Venter and van Vuuren, 1987: 29; Boulle, 
1984:  217;  Marais,  1989).  The  deviation  from  the  Westminster  model  to  incorporate  a 
consociational  and  power-sharing  framework  did  not  constitute  a  national  assembly  in  the 
democratic sense and could not give direct expression to the will of a nationally inclusive electorate. 
5.1.2 The winner-takes-all effect
Notwithstanding severe problems with an institutionalised system of limited franchise, the plurality 
electoral system came with its own problems for the white government. A main problem was that 
the  system  benefitted  only  major  parties.  Since  the  Union,  South  Africa  did  not  adopt  any 
proportional mechanisms such as multi-member constituencies that could provide representation to 
small parties. Indeed, similar political consequences to those of its British counterparts occurred 
where one of the major weakness of the plurality system was that the white parliament constantly 
experienced vote-seat share distortions. This meant that a party with a minority of votes (less than 
50 per cent) was able to secure a majority of seats in parliament (Heard, 1974; Kahn, 1960; Boulle, 
1984). 
The electoral system generated a two-party system and later a dominant party system. Two major 
parties composed the party system since 1910, the National Party (NP) and the South African Party 
(SAP)  (later  became the  United  Party).  The two-party  system has  been a  major  part  of  South 
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Africa’s electoral tradition. The 1915 election seemed to be a three or four party system — with the 
SAP, NP,  Unionists  and Labour Party — but  once a  merger  formed between the SAP and the 
Unionists in 1921, the three-party system disappeared (Kapp, 1987). Since then, the SAP and NP 
emerged as almost equal contenders for office. Alternation in power was between the two major 
parties;  however,  after  1948,  no  alternation  in  power  occurred  for  over  four  decades.  The 
explanation for this is associated with the presence of the dominant party. Although the dynamics in 
the post-1948 period was “largely unconnected with the electoral system”, it might have been the 
plurality system that bolstered the NP’s dominance in the first place (Boulle, 1984: 77).
The  demographic  composition  of  the  white  population  was  such  that  the  Afrikaners  were 
numerically dominant and Afrikaner support largely inclined toward the NP — especially in more 
rural  Afrikaner  communities  (Thompson,  2000).  Although  the  NP began  to  move  into  white 
English-speaking communities to attract support, its primary base was the Afrikaner group. Given 
the strong partisanship towards the NP, the party began to emerge as a dominant one and two party 
competition gradually vanished. Despite the legitimacy crisis the party faced, “with its electoral 
base  secure,  it  could,  in  dealing  with  non-white  opposition  and  overt  unrest,  rely  on  coercion 
without  the  necessity  of  moderating  its  efforts  for  fear  of  losing  office”  (Heard,  1974:  70). 
Moreover,  the NP’s support  base continued to  pledge allegiance to  the party,  rather  than more 
liberal democratic parties, despite repressive and brutal ways in which the NP-led government dealt 
with  the  ‘black  problem’.  The  party’s  commitment  to  represent  the  will  of  its  ‘extremist 
constituency’ (who largely supported apartheid and the philosophy of racial superiority) acted as 
one of the main contributors to continuous electoral succession of the NP in government. 
Since the late 1940s, the two party system witnessed change to a dominant system where the NP 
held almost unbroken political power. There was no room for a third party or a two party system to 
emerge. Functioning as “a single-party-dominant system” or a ‘one party system’, led to a big gap 
between  the  electoral  strength  of  the  NP and  its  opponents  (Welsh,  1987:  90;  Heard,  1974; 
Woodward, 1980; Kapp, 1987). Since 1948, the NP successively won office till its last electoral 
victory in the 1989 election. The party was the only party since the Union to win an electoral 
majority repeatedly for over four decades. 
Although Kapp (1987: 11) states that “[n]o serious challenge to the party’s power developed”, 
the  developments  in  the  1980s  proved  otherwise.  Parties  like  the  Republican  Party,  Herstigte 
Nasionale Party, and Conservative Party (CP) emerged during the dominance of the NP but it was 
mainly the latter party in the 1980s that presented itself as a threat to the NP. It proposed more 
systematic  and  rigorous  implementation  of  apartheid,  and  challenged  the  NP’s  reform  to 
accommodate a plural society. In fact, the CP took away support from the NP in 1989 election but 
although it was considered a ‘realigning election’, where a large proportion of Afrikaners switched 
allegiance to the CP, the party was not successful in displacing the NP (Van Vuuren et al, 1987; 
Rule, 1989; Bekker and Grobbelaar, 1987).  
5.2 The birth of democracy and a new electoral system 
This section discusses the shift from plurality to proportionality, and explores the origins of the 
proportional model in South Africa. The main purpose for this is to determine whether major parties 
(especially  the  ANC)  who  were  involved  in  taking  the  decision  to  adopt  a  PR system where 
articulating moderate or radical proposals. 
Ongoing deliberations during the early 1990s transition period not only sought to grant universal 
franchise but to fundamentally redesign the political system. By the end of these discussions, the 
system that emerged out of the political consensus, amongst both white and black representatives, 
established that all segments of the population participate in the national elective system, effectively 
conceding democratic rights to all  population groups. Overthrowing the restrictive franchise, an 
unrepresentative parliament, and whites-only inter-party competition, birthed a genuine democratic 
 60
party system in which parties were permitted to articulate the interests of any social group and, 
importantly, the interest of the majority of South African voters. Put differently, interest aggregation 
and political representation was legally open to all social groups. The consensus and the general 
election of 1994 opened the space for a truly competitive and representative political system. The 
majority were afforded the opportunity, for the first time, to support a political party of their choice 
and hence participate in establishing a democratic government.
As shown earlier,  a  strand of  the  1970s  apartheid  deliberations  focused on ensuring greater 
accommodation and pluralism for  blacks,  indians and coloureds within political  structures.  The 
point was advanced that it “would naturally be quite futile to impose Western European or Anglo-
American models [the plurality system] on the political system of South Africa” (Nieuwoudt, 1977: 
167). In other words, there was a need for a system that more fairly distributed power through 
consociationalism or other means. Similarly, a pertinent point during the deliberations to shift South 
Africa towards democracy centred upon ensuring whites were included in the system. This time, the 
need for pluralism came from white stakeholders — although not them alone. The issue of electoral 
system change was put on the table: the main proposal being to retreat from the plurality, winner-
takes-all system, and to cater for political representation of numerically non-dominant sections of 
the population, that is, minority groups. As such, new electoral structures formed its basis upon 
proportional representation (PR), as articulated in Section 46 (1) of the final Constitution of 1996 
(Constitution, 1996). 
This  rested  upon  fundamental  principles  of  consensus  to  ensure  wide  and  direct  political 
participation and representativity in a divided and multiracial society, affording electoral structures 
a strong sense of inclusiveness and accommodation. Thus, the core of electoral design was informed 
by consociational models of governance. “Consociationalism rests on the premise that in bitterly 
divided societies the stakes are too high for politics to be conducted as a zero-sum game” (Reilly 
and Reynolds, 2000: 447).
The democratic electoral system originated primarily from sensitivity and awareness to domestic 
socio-political realities; that is, the adoption of proportionalism was largely informed by “the salient 
and relevant aspects of the South African context” (ETT, 2003: 15). The origin of the proportional 
model can be found during the transition talks of the early 1990s which gave momentum and life to 
the notion of formally inclusive democratic mechanisms. “In…[a] bargaining process each party 
tries to maximise its gain and minimise its losses…whereas bargainers need to reach a settlement, 
they also prefer one that is most favourable to themselves” (Du Toit, 1989: 214). Stakeholders like 
the ANC, NP and others opted for proportional principles since it guaranteed prospective legislative 
parties net gains — although the FPTP mechanism would have advantaged the ANC (as will be 
later discussed). 
However, stakeholders did not simply express narrow self-interested concerns but demonstrated 
concerns for  broader matters  of  social  stability and democracy.  Juxtaposed with continuing the 
plurality model, which would have prevented the creation of an inclusive and representative society, 
the  1990s  deliberation  signified a  commitment  to  accommodate  the  diversity  of  South  African 
society.  The  Convention  for  a  Democratic  South  Africa  (CODESA),  which  commenced  in 
December 1991 and attended by some nineteen party groups, sought to investigate, amongst other 
matters, the setting up of a new electoral system. Negotiating parties, including the ANC and NP, 
commenced by signing a ‘Declaration of Intent’, acknowledging their solemn commitment to move 
the country beyond apartheid and pursue liberal values of equality, freedom and democracy. Parties 
pledged: 
…to bring about an undivided South Africa with one nation sharing a common citizenship…
pursuing amidst our diversity, freedom, equality and security for all irrespective of race, colour, 
sex or creed…and to establish a free and open society based on democratic values where the 
dignity, worth and rights of every South African are protected by law…
(CODESA, 1991a)
 61
On the one hand, the inclusion of various stakeholders and organisations, both black and white, 
sought to threaten consensus-based politics. On the other hand, the presence of multipartism during 
the negotiations reflected the foundations of inter-party dialogue that followed accommodative lines 
to be implemented in the new constitution. In Mandela’s address to CODESA, he observed that:
The strength of the CODESA initiative lies in the range of political parties and persuasions 
represented  here.  The  presence  of  so  many parties  augurs  well  for  the  future.  The  diverse 
interests represented, speak of the capacity to develop consensus across the spectrum and of the 
desire to maximise common purpose amongst South African. 
(CODESA, 1991b)
Going into the specifics of the framework of agreement, parties agreed that discussions at CODESA 
aimed to set in motion the establishment of: 
…a multi-party democracy with the right to form and join political parties and with regular 
elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage on a common voters roll; in general the basic 
electoral system, shall be that of proportional representation.
(CODESA, 1991a, emphasis added)
Though the Declaration did not have legally binding force, it established the contours of discussion. 
It  already  set  the  intention  to  discuss  the  PR model  and  located  the  model  in  the  context  of 
movement to accommodation and inclusion of all groups. This effectively narrowed the space for 
radical, non-centrist, and immoderate counterproposals. Given that the ANC itself articulated the 
desire to move ahead with a PR model testifies to the ‘moderate internal compass’ that existed with 
the party, and its role in fostering rather than inhibiting a spirit of compromise and inclusion. 
By the end of the negotiations, the PR model was encapsulated as one of the 34 constitutional 
principles, namely ‘principle VIII’. Moreover, it formed part of the Interim Constitution of 1993 
and  subsequently  went  on  to  structure  the  final  constitution.  The  negotiations  revealed  that 
“[r]epresentatives from the whole spectrum of South Africa’s politically, socially, racially, ethnically 
and religiously divided society agreed on this system” (ETT, 2003: 66). Principle XIV went on to 
state that  “[p]rovision shall  be made for participation of minority political  parties in legislative 
process in a manner consistent with democracy” (Act 200, 1993). Long prior to CODESA, it was 
clear  that  the NP had an interest  in  protecting minority interests,  especially those of  the white 
community. In an address, Prime Minister P. W. Botha stated:
If we ignore the existence of minorities; if we ignore the individual’s right to associate with 
others in the practice of his beliefs and the propagation of his values; if we deny this in favour 
of a simplistic “winner-takes-all” political system-then we will diminish and not increase the 
freedoms of our peoples. Then we would deny the right of each and everyone to share in the 
decisions which shape his destiny.
(Botha, 1991)
5.2.1 Political representation
Four  interrelated  reasons  fed  into  the  sharp  discontinuity  from  the  plurality  system:  political 
representation; reconciliation and stability; checks and balances; and best practice. Reducing one of 
the main adverse effects of the FPTP system, namely the disparity between seat and vote share, was 
far from a driving rationale behind the decision to espouse proportionality. This logic is rather likely 
to inform societies that are relatively homogenous. 
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Expressing,  representing  and  protecting  the  interests  of  salient  social  groups  constituted  the 
leading rationale in endorsing the proportional  model.  In essence,  it  can be succinctly put  that 
“[p]roportional  regimes  are  sensitive  to  proportions;  majoritarian  regimes  are  sensitive  to 
majorities” (Cohen, 1997: 610). In more homogenous societies, operating under a plurality electoral 
system, politics is associated with liberal values as emphasis is placed upon individual competition 
and most groups are likely to compete on an equal basis (Cohen, 1997). In stark contrast, playing 
out as a self-fulfilling prophecy, competitive dynamics in heterogeneous societies, operating under a 
plurality electoral system, implies that the numerically dominant social segment will almost always 
control government. With the application of a plurality, constituency-based system, the ANC, the 
most popular party amongst the black electorate, would emerge as unilateral holders of victory — 
creating virtually permanent party dominance and leading to unrepresentative electoral outcomes. In 
other words, the party representing the social majority gets most representation in the legislative 
assembly under situations of plurality. 
Given  this  pre-1994  imminent  reality,  the  way  votes  were  translated  into  seats  became  an 
important concern especially for minority parties. The special nature of societal divisions suddenly 
surfaced as a potent and priority issue. The apartheid government were fully cognisant that electoral 
strength and legislative power would inevitability be located with the newly enfranchised majority. 
Coming out of a system that gave exclusive power to a minority of whites, the NP concluded that 
the numerical preponderance of the black electorate would mean that under a constituency-based, 
plurality  system,  it  would effectively have no or  absolutely minimal  representation.  A delegate 
during  multiparty  transition  talks  and  leader  of  the  ACDP,  Kenneth  Meshoe,  stated  that  “the 
National Party…knew that when it came to numbers they were disadvantaged because of the size of 
white  people  in  South  Africa,  that  only  the  voices  of  the  black  majority  would  be 
accommodated” (Interview). The uncertainty surrounding minority political representation under 
plurality-based institutions, then, informed the bottom line of the NP’s interest in proportionalism. 
Under a proportional system, each party is allocated a number of legislative seats proportional to 
the votes it received in an election. The system aims to obtain some form of social equilibrium or 
social  representation,  depending  on  the  numerical  configuration  of  social  groups.  The  critical 
concern for the NP when it came to talks about changing the electoral system, was to push for a 
system which would make it  possible for  minority segments to acquire a stake in state power, 
increase direct access to political institutions, distribute policy-making power, and guarantee the 
representation of minority interests. Since the proportional model generally applies a low threshold 
for political representation — or in the South African case admits no legal threshold — disperses 
the points of victory, and increases the opportunities for power, “allowing for the maximum spread 
of party representation within national and provincial legislatures, offering full expression of racial, 
religious and political diversity”, it was evidently the most beneficial system for the NP and other 
parties who knew they would become small  or  minor parties given the popularity of  the ANC 
(Southall, 2009: 7; Mattes, 2014 and Cohen, 1997). The central rationale, then, for the adoption of 
the proportional system was to account for the numerical configuration and pluralism of society and 
cater for the representation of salient minorities. Indeed, a proportional system was believed to be 
the  most  representative  system  that  was  also  protective  of  minorities,  since  legislative  seats 
correspond closely  with  the  proportion  of  votes,  where  every  vote  counts,  is  equal  and  is  not 
wasted.
For Ken Andrew, a key representative for the DP during the Constitutional Assembly (CA), the 
system proves to be “fair and democratic…it ensures that if it is a substantial minority, of whatever 
thought that translates into a political minority, it gets fair representation” (Interview). According to 
then DP leader, Tony Leon, who also represented the party during the negotiations, puts it that it is 
unequivocal that the logic was motivated by minority empowerment:
…the most compelling reason for the PR system was really that it would empower minorities in 
this country and I think it was part of the package of the proposals — because obviously when 
the system changed and you had an empowered minority who were going to suddenly become a 
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very less of a [empowered] minority in the future…[T]he thinking was that this was a very fair 
way of dealing with giving equal franchise rights to everyone and giving everyone a stake in the 
system…
(Interview, 14 September 2016)
A chief of staff in office of F. W. de Klerk during the transition period, Dave Steward, also echoed 
this point from the perspective of the NP:
I think the main reason that contributed to the proportionality position was the perception that 
we needed an electoral system that would also give minority parties representation in parliament 
because South Africa’s population…[formed the starting] context. It was thought that a simple 
first-winner-past-the-post might lead to the exclusion of minorities from parliament altogether.
(Interview, 23 September 2016)
A former parliamentary leader of the DA, Lindiwe Mazibuko, puts it that: 
The origins of the decision to go with a proportional representation system in…[South Africa] 
are noble enough: proportionality was built into the Constitution as a means of securing the 
rights of minority groups and ensuring that elections would never again constitute a parliament 
made up of MPs from only a single racial or ethnic group. 
(Business Day, 7 July 2016)
Zero-sum perceptions of politics were avoided by bargainers at all costs, including parties such as 
Inkatha, ACDP, DP and FF, who desired at least some political representation in the new system 
than one popular party taking a large chunk of the electorate. Proportionalism is a system intended 
“to accommodate all parties…[it ensures] that even if you are small…you get your share in the 
legislature”  (Gumbi,  Interview).  “The  current  system,  where  even  the  smallest  party  can  gain 
representation  if  it  musters  enough  votes  for  a  single  seat,  provides  the  ultimate  in 
inclusivity” (ETT, 2003: 67). According to a key NP delegate during the negotiations, Roelf Meyer:
…the general conclusion by all parties was that, that [the proportional model] was a way to 
ensure  that  participation  in  the  elections  would  be  fairly  distributed  to  different  political 
participants.  In  other  words,  smaller  parties  would  also  have  the  opportunity  to  have 
representation in parliament and that would be the fairest way to create that objective.
(Interview, 19 October 2016)
It was not simply meant to consider racial minorities but all social groups, even those within the 
majority that held diverse preferences, and thus the aim was to provide for representation across the 
board. From the viewpoint of Bantu Holomisa, leader of the UDM, the adoption of “[PR] was to 
make sure that all sectors of our society are expressed…[it suited] the South African situation where 
you  have…rich  diversity”  (Interview).  Meshoe  underscored  the  models  output  of  broad 
representation by drawing upon a pertinent distinction between the popular and unpopular, saying 
that proportionalism:
…was [chosen] to accommodate smaller voices…[such as] smaller political parties…so that 
every opinion in South Africa would be taken on board when the new democratic dispensation 
was charted. So, everybody including the popular and unpopular had a contribution to make…If 
it was a constituency-based system from the beginning, you would have had a one dominating 
political party and smaller political parties would not have a voice, so it was the best thing to 
have done for the new South Africa. 
(Interview, 21 September 2016)
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Indeed,  parties  embraced  the  unique  situation  of  pluralism  that  existed  within  society.  Even 
organisations, such as Inkatha (later called the IFP), who initially refused to engage in transition 
talks acceded to it. An IFP representative, Alfred Mpontshane, said “[w]e [the IFP] realised that 
South Africa was a plural state” (Interview). Although the IFP was repulsive on certain issues, it 
often stressed pluralism. Jonathan Moakes, policy head at the DA, further highlighted the aspect of 
party pluralism, stating that:
The main purpose of advocating for a PR system was to ensure that in the new democratic 
dispensation we had a plurality of views in the new constitutional and national assembly…I 
think  experience  has  shown,  if  you  had  constituency…first-past-the-post-systems,  that  the 
voices of minority interests are often drowned out…[So] it was felt at the time that a plurality of 
voices and the ability of many voices in a parliament that was going to forge the new South 
Africa was important.
(Interview, 8 September 2016)
The electoral model was “an attempt to ensure that every voice, every vote gets a space…it was 
meant  to  create  a  system  that  encourages  inclusion,  that  encourages  participation”  (Godi, 
Interview). In sum, the adoption of the system went forward “because its the fairest reflection of the 
views  of  the  voters  and  it  means  that  parliament  therefore  is  constituted  in  a  way  that, 
proportionally,  all  the  voters  views are  represented in  parliament”  (Andrew,  Interview).  As the 
Electoral  Task  Team Report  — the  team was  setup  by  the  government  in  2002 to  investigate 
electoral reform — puts it, “[t]he present electoral system was introduced, primarily, to ensure the 
promotion of political diversity within our legislatures, and broad political representation” (ETT, 
2003: 73).
5.2.2 Reconciliation, stability and democratisation
Another reason for adopting proportionality were immediate concerns to create and foster national 
unity, peace, reconciliation, and fast-track democratisation. This impulse came particularly from the 
side of the ANC. At the societal level, “South Africa as a whole had to be reconciled, there had to be 
reconciliation between blacks and whites” (Mpontshane, Interview). Several interview respondents 
noted that the ANC was trying hard to avoid a situation of violence and civil war. It became clear 
that Mandela’s administration was premised on the principle of accommodating everyone on the 
basis that it would largely pave the way for securing peace. “[T]he ANC…wanted each and every 
race group…[to] feel at home in South Africa” and this was considered critical to social stability 
(Galo, Interview). 
At the political level, negotiating parties who held fast to contesting demands, and those engaged 
in inter-party fighting, had to be brought into a place of inclusion for democracy to move forward. 
Not only were organisations like Inkatha and conservative rightwing groups refusing to engage in 
transition talks, labelling the ANC ‘collaborators with the system’, there were episodes of political 
violence in 1992 (Mpontshane, Interview).  The agreement during the transition was that after a 2
general democratic election, the parties elected will form a constitutional writing body, known as 
the Constitutional Assembly (CA), to pass the final constitution. This particular agreement had an 
impact on delegates to opt for the proportional position. According to FF Plus leader, Pieter Mulder, 
who was part of the negotiation processes:
…the  argument  was  that  we  must  get  everybody  involved,  if  you  go  for  the  British 
constituency-system you’ll end up with only two or three strong parties and a lot of people will 
not  be part  of  it  [the CA] and would not  be part  of  writing the final  constitution.  So…the 
proportional  system…[made]  it  possible  for  almost  everybody  to  get  in…I  think  the  ANC 
realised that if they want to get a constitution that is accepted by the majority…they must get as 
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many  people  as  possible  in  parliament…whoever  then  is  in  that  body  [the  CA]  [it]  was 
important that they…represent everybody in South Africa and I think the ANC pushed that it 
must be as inclusive as possible and the proportional [system] would do that.
(Interview, 20 September 2016)
Indeed, in the ANC’s own perspective, inclusivity motivated the rationale behind the proportional 
model:
We  adopted  this  system during  negotiations  before  1994,  because  we  wanted  an  inclusive 
system and the representation of minority views, in the interest of an inclusive transition…The 
PR system is the most democratic in that no votes are wasted or lost…It ensures that the urban 
poor and rural voters participate fully and have a powerful impact on results…Minority parties 
also get fair representation and can express their needs as part of the democratic process. 
(ANC, 2002a)
Given  the  tension,  strife,  and  incidence  of  heavy  fighting  between  parties,  “proportional 
representation was meant to unite the warring factors which existed” (Mpontshane, Interview). The 
ANC strategically conceded to institutions fostering inclusiveness for the main purpose of securing 
peace and fast-tracking democratisation. Andrew stated that:
…in the spirit  of  inclusiveness and compromise,  epitomised by Nelson Mandela…they [the 
ANC] realised that if the country was going to succeed you needed to have wider support across 
all groupings in the country — racial, ethnic, hence, they [the ANC] went out of their way to get 
[for instance] Inkatha included…
(Interview, 26 September 2016)
Reconciling various stakeholders, choosing to adopt a proportional model, and putting a premium 
on gaining a fair portion of political power, amounted to a strategic political calculation. White 
parties in particular, as much as others, were not giving up unless they were guaranteed some sort of 
inclusive system. The imminent implication of “inadequate institutions [is that it] can leak, crack or 
overflow” (Taagepera, 1998: 68). From the perspective of Steward, “[i]t [that is, the failure to adopt 
proportionality] would cause much greater instability if small parties or small communities were not 
represented in parliament” (Interview). Even the ETT (2003: 12) noted that “[t]he current electoral 
system…has contributed greatly towards transitional stability”. It went on to say that:
By this is meant that, given the demographic, ethnic, racial and religious diversity of the South 
African voting population, every attempt should be made to allow the widest possible degree of 
participation  by  various  political  preferences  in  the  representative  legislatures.  An electoral 
system that inhibited inclusiveness could be a source of instability and conflict…the protection 
it [the system] provides for small parties…that are so necessary for stability, given our context.
(ETT, 2003: 16, 66)
In  other  words,  there  is  an  acknowledgement  that  faults  in  institutional  design  can  powerfully 
connect itself to broader dynamics of social stability. The shift to proportionalism and other crucial 
inclusive mechanisms such as the Government of National Unity, persuaded stakeholders that peace 
was on the horizon. Such strategic decisions significantly calmed tensions that would have escalated 
if minority racial groups were excluded from the precincts of political power.
In addition to peace-building concerns, the urgency to adopt a new constitution and the need for 
an immediate general election that was premised upon democratic principles and mechanisms, led 
to avoiding a constituency model. In other words, the adoption of proportionalism, especially the 
closed-list mechanism, was informed by the push for democratisation. Stakeholders easily conceded 
to the proportional model primarily because of the massive procedural undertaking required for the 
establishment of a constituency-based system. Krennerich and de Ville (1997: 31-2) and Gouws and 
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Mitchell (2005) were among the few scholars to point this aspect out.  Krennerich and de Ville 
stated, “[t]he adoption of this system was motivated by various factors, inter alia the fact that there 
was not  time enough to register  voters (which would be required if  representatives were to be 
elected  in  constituencies)”.  Previously  disenfranchised  people,  especially  the  majority  in  the 
homelands  and  those  returning  from  exile,  were  not  in  possession  of  identity  documents  and 
moreover,  were  not  registered  in  designated  geographical  districts.  The  latter  requirement,  in 
particular, was a major hurdle for stakeholders; in essence, districting the country, sectioning voters 
into relevant voting areas, and redrawing electoral boundaries would have significantly delayed the 
prospect of a general election. A closed-list proportional model implied that the electorate could 
vote anywhere across the country, without being subject to a particular district. Thus, “it was as 
simple  as  possible  to  be  able  to  get  a  representative  parliament  and  also  a  representative…
[CA]” (Andrew, Interview). According to Meyer:
…it would have been impossible for the first election to divide the country into constituencies 
for constituency-based elections. We could not even manage to get a voters roll ready for the 
first election let alone dividing the country into constituencies…[this] led our thinking…that 
was the thinking all-round amongst the different political parties at the time…All the parties, 
including the ANC conceded to that…One can’t underestimate…[this] because we would never 
have had the ability to have elections on the 27th of April  [1994] if  the country had to be 
divided into constituencies.
(Interview, 19 October 2016)
5.2.3 Checks and balances and best practice 
Aside from the two core reasons above, two further reasons informed proportionalism. One was the 
desire to have a mechanism of checks and balances. Some stakeholders believed that aside from 
particular liberal democratic institutions that assist in checking executive power, it was fundamental 
to  ensure  the  legislature  was  not  saturated  with  one  political  party  that  would  rubber-stamp 
executive preferences. This was of course an ‘indirect beneficial feature’ for smaller parties who, 
through entry first and foremost in the legislature, could exercise oversight. Nonetheless, facilitating 
meaningful inter-party competition would not be possible without the presence of legislative parties 
engaged in debating bills, policies and other matters, and scrutinising the executive. According to 
Mulder: 
But the second argument was just as strong [as the first argument of inclusivity] and that was for 
another check and balance [beside the two-third majority mechanism built into the system to 
change the constitution and other checks and balances]. As the parties were looking at each 
other all the time and trying to…make sure that no one has got so much power that he can 
dominate the other one…I would think the National Party…and other parties were more in 
favour of the second argument, the checks and balances…they argued…that surely that will 
protect and make sure that the ANC would not get such a big majority that you cannot have any 
check and balances on it.
(Interview, 20 September 2016)
This  liberal-based  argument  was  strategically  used  by  parties  like  the  DP during  subsequent 
elections where it  presented itself  as an opposition party with an eye on government,  guarding 
against the abuse of state power. It was from this viewpoint that parties looked with favourability on 
the proportional system. Despite knowledge of the ANC’s obvious electoral victory and dominance, 
parties  thought  it  worthwhile  to  see  its  core  function as  an  active  legislative  party  in  exerting 
pressure on the ANC in terms of keeping watch and having a critical eye to counterbalance the 
system, and ensuring that regulation of the state is not left unchecked.
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Another reason was the element of best practice. The ANC looked outside of the immediate 
domestic  context  to  determine  an  appropriate  electoral  system.  In  a  post-Second-World-War 
political environment, most countries in Western Europe adopted the element of proportionalism, 
whether purely PR or a mixed-system. The roots of proportionalism are not simply located in the 
quest  for  inclusion,  representation  and  other  domestic  political  issues,  the  new  institutional 
architecture and the switch in electoral formula modelled itself after many countries elsewhere — 
the  global  climate  was  one  that  was  increasingly  being  marked  by  systems  encouraging  party 
pluralism  rather  than  systems  fostering  one  or  two  party  patterns  of  competition.  In  general, 
institutions  perpetuating  individualistic  tendencies  were  sidelined  for  those  giving  a  place  for 
communal identities and group representation. Although other polities differ in terms of the level of 
social  inequality  and  heterogeneity,  law-makers  gradually  retreated  from  the  idea  that  liberal 
politics were satisfactory in securing fair representation as group politics gained ascendence. The 
ANC  considered  this  ‘best  practice’:  the  idea  of  proportionalism  was  aligned  to  international 
standards.  Andrew mentioned that this global phenomenon reverberated within the ranks of the 
ANC, he said:
The ANC was obviously looking after their own self-interest, as…[much] as any party would, 
but they generally had a mindset of ‘lets have the best system that we can find in the world’…
[The ANC] when we were looking at legislation on almost any issue…their guiding…thing was 
‘what is the best practice in the world’.
(Interview, 26 September 2016, emphasis added)
There  was  relatively  widespread  consensus  for  proportionalism  from  almost  all  stakeholders, 
especially on the point that the “electoral system should produce a high degree of proportionality 
and encourage cooperation and national integration by representing all social and political groups in 
parliament”  (Krennerich  and  de  Ville,  1997:  34).  “I  don’t  recall  this  [espousing  a  PR system] 
meeting with a great deal of resistance…I don’t think it was only the minority parties, I don’t recall 
particular resistance from the ANC” (Andrew, Interview). This was further echoed by Steward, who 
highlighted  that  “the  ANC…were  open  to  the  decision,  I  don’t  think  there  was  too  much 
disagreement which [was] really testified by the fact that it was accepted” (Interview). Leon, also 
added to the voices, he said the adoption of the electoral model:
…wasn’t  a  very  contentious  matter…  it  was  not  one  of  the  matters  that  caused…any 
breakdowns, any critical meetings…it…went through because very few people could see any 
disadvantages to the system…for the political parties, especially the smaller ones, it just seemed 
to be a net gain and it was not hugely contentious.
(Interview, 14 September 2016)
That the proportional model was satisfactory to almost all organisations involved in transition talks, 
was fast-tracked and underwent little contention is attributed to the concept that developed during 
the negotiations of ‘sufficient consensus’. This concept meant that if core stakeholders, that is the 
NP and the ANC, who were in a position to mobilise resources on their side, disagreed on any 
proposal, negotiations would be deadlocked; by contrast, once both sides “agreed…it was more or 
less a done deal” (Steward, Interview). Stakeholders accepted that if either party failed to consent to 
a proposal, it was not going forward. Thus, since the NP and the ANC agreed, proportionalism was 
accepted as a legitimate electoral  system. Moreover,  the aspect  of  political  leadership played a 
significant role in engineering the electoral system and maintaining an environment of consensus.
An interesting point is that pressure to adopt proportionality did not come primarily from smaller 
parties. One would suspect that pressure would have come from minority parties since a purely 
constituency-based,  majoritarian  model  would  have been even more  beneficial  for  the  ANC in 
government. And hence, the ANC would have been the main party to contemplate the adoption of a 
model — it would substantially increase its vote share, its presence in the legislature, and limit the 
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entry of smaller parties and their oversight role [as Gouws and Mitchell (2005) and Mattes (1994) 
also  state].  Contra  to  purely  power-based  and  narrow self-interested  party  concerns,  the  ANC 
demonstrated a predisposition to the proportional model. Meshoe, noted that “[i]f Mandela himself 
was opposed to that, the ANC would not have accepted the PR system…Because he wanted…the 
democratic dispensation to succeed, he knew that…the new democracy could be built by everybody 
and not only by people who supported the ruling party” (Interview). He further pointed out that:
…the presence of  Mr Mandela…made this  whole thing [the adoption of  PR] very possible 
because he was a very accommodative person who wanted national unity. When he spoke about 
nation-building and reconciliation, it was not just cheap talk for him or just saying what could 
have been construed to be good to ears of the international community, but it was something 
that came from his heart, he was a genuine man, an honest man, who truly wanted to see South 
Africa succeed going forward…So, the voices of the small minority parties was definitely a very 
important one but if we did not have a man like Mr Mandela it…could not have been as easy as 
it was…
(Interview, 21 September 2016)
From the part of the ANC, this inclination was motivated by the ‘spirit of the negotiation’ which 
was characterised by inclusion, accommodation and compromise. Given that parties such as Inkatha 
were outside the negotiation process and refused to participate, the ANC realised that all groups 
needed to  be united for  democratisation to  move forward.  In  fact,  “[t]he  first  argument  [about 
inclusivity] was coming mostly from the ANC that ‘we want to get everybody included’, [not from 
the minority parties]” (Mulder, Interview). Mandela’s administration were unequivocally strategic 
in favouring the idea of diverse participation in political life. Galo underscored the point that despite 
the decades of oppression of the black majority and the position of white people at the helms of 
power in society, the ANC’s approach reassured white sections of society that they would not be 
driven out of the country and also perpetuated particular reconciliatory doctrines to the oppressed 
black community to heal the wounds between the race groups (Interview). Themba Godi, African 
Peoples Congress (APC) President, mentioned that “the ANC was very, very accommodative in its 
approach to the negotiations and I don't think on…[the adoption of proportionalism] it would have 
required necessarily any pressure from anybody” (Interview). 
In addition, the system was advantageous for the ANC’s own operations. Thus, small parties 
were not articulating for a proportional model by themselves, the ANC welcomed it because of 
inherent  benefits  within  the  closed-list  mechanism [as  Gouws and  Mitchell  (2005)  and  Mattes 
(1994) also point out]. The particular context of the 1994 general election was one in which critical 
members of the ANC were released from prison and pro-democratic organisations were unbanned 
in the early 1990s. The expulsion of core individuals meant that not all members of the ANC were 
known to the South African public, both those in prison and exile, “including President Mandela 
[who] spent…many years in prison” (Lekota, Interview). The constituency system mandates that 
individual candidates instead of parties stand for elections, in an environment of public uncertainty 
and weak linkages between individual members and local communities, a plurality-FPTP, model 
would not have worked for the ANC. The ANC opted for a situation in which those who fought for 
freedom and those were were known inside of the party were not sidelined in the new government 
(Holomisa,  Interview).  It  was  clear  that  parties  were  better  known than  individuals.  Thus,  the 
proportional model was the ideal model since it allowed for the names of parties not individuals to 
appear on the ballot paper, effectively immunising the ANC from potential losses in national and 
provincial  elections.  Moreover,  the  control  that  parties  gain  from  a  closed-list  proportional 
mechanism to maintain discipline amongst members was another advantageous reason for the ANC 
to opt for it than the plurality model. According to Leon:
…the advantage from any party political point of view of proportional representation especially 
the system we went for [closed-party list] is that it gives the political party much greater control 
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over  the  members.  So,  I’m not  entirely  sure  that  the  ANC..was  that  keen  on…just  having 
individual-empowered  members  of  parliament,  I  think  the  idea  of  having  party  bosses  and 
leaders determining party lists and keeping members under control was attractive to them…I 
can’t  say  that  was  deeply  thought  through  but  that  would  have  certainly  been  part  of  the 
motivation.
(Interview, 14 September 2016)
In summary, the proportional representation electoral system is deeply rooted, first, in the concern 
to express and represent the interests of salient sectors of society, catering both for minority racial 
groups and  for preference-diversity within the majority. Second, it is rooted in the need to foster 
stability,  peace,  unity  and  reconciliation  between  societal  groups  and  belligerent  political 
organisations, and to accelerate democracy by opting for a system that did not require extensive 
redistricting which would have otherwise impeded the occurrence of a general election. Third, it 
allowed parties to check and balance government and counteract negative effects of imminent party 
dominance by providing vigorous debate and critical questioning. Fourth, it came from a desire to 
align with best practice electoral models in an international political climate that was gradually 
moving  away  from plurality-FPTP to  proportional  models.  For  these  reasons,  the  proportional 
model proved superior to its predecessor, the plurality, constituency-based electoral model, or any 
other alternative.  Important subsidiary and background factors facilitated the overall  absence of 
hostility toward proportionalism and the existence of ‘sufficient consensus’. This included, first, 
Mandela’s ability to mobilise a cohort of ANC members behind a peace-unity-reconciliation line 
and bring various segments into an environment that guaranteed inclusive arrangements. Second, 
the  inherent  advantage  of  the  closed-list  mechanism  that  incentivised  the  ANC  not  only 
strengthened the power of party leaders but catered for the deficit of minimal public knowledge of 
individual ANC members.
These  findings  fit  into  broader  literature  by  extending  the  motivating  framework  of  the  PR 
model.  Analysis  on  the  PR system is  often  unaccompanied  by  sufficient  systematic  theoretical 
discussion about the driving factors behind it. In fact, electoral reform debate, that surfaced soon 
after the 1994 election, subsumes much of this attention. The findings of this analysis ties with one 
of the main arguments presented in the literature that since PR admits no threshold for parties to 
enter the legislature, it allows for maximum representation of salient cleavage, creates incentives for 
small parties, and fosters a sense of political stability (Lodge, 2002; Southall, 2009; Mattes, 2014; 
Reynolds, 1995). As Krennerich and de Ville (1997: 31-2) succinctly puts it, a motivating factor 
was for “a composition that reflects as accurately as possible the number of votes cast for each party 
in the election”. While maximum diversity is regarded as a chief motivating factor, there are other 
equally  critical  factors.  This  includes  the  concern  for  political  stability  through  inclusion,  the 
acceleration of democratisation, a mechanism of oversight to curtail any negative effects of party 
dominance, and alignment to changing international standards of legislative representation. Thus, 
the  1991  -  1993  consensus  to  adopt  proportionalism  was  a  comprehensive  and  multifactorial 
political decision that goes beyond the single factor of maximum representation of social divisions. 
Pertaining  more  specifically  to  this  research,  the  driving  forces  behind  the  adoption  of 
proportionalism gives testimony to critical moderating elements within the major stakeholder: the 
ANC.  In  spite  of  the  obvious  fact  that  a  plurality  system  would  have  advantaged  the  ANC, 
consolidated its dominance, and limited the entry of other parties and minority social groups, rather 
than propagating this model during CODESA and MPNP deliberations, the ANC compromised and 
embraced proportionalism. The decision was motivated “by a mixture of principled, pragmatic, and 
self-interested reasons” (Gouws and Mitchell, 2005: 358). Although the acceleration of democracy 
was within the interest of the ANC, the manner in which the organisation dealt with the transition 
revealed important  moderate  element  that  constituted an ‘internal  compass’ within  the  ANC to 
weather the apartheid storm. Adopting proportionalism was not simply a grudging concession: the 
ANC demonstrated a deep understanding of political dynamics. It facilitated rather than inhibited 
consensus politics, inclusion and accommodation; and was concerned about political stability and 
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reconciliation.  By  being  sensitive  and  open  to  the  demands  from  minority  groups,  the  ANC 
demonstrated the capacity to compromise rather than stand by rigid and exclusive political positions 
— such as excluding minority groups or proposing plurality laws — and was guided by the ‘spirit 
of moderation’. 
5.3 Party system fragmentation, 1910 - 1989 and 1994 - 2014 
This section explores the patterns of fragmentation in both the apartheid and democratic period. 
One of theoretical claims it assesses is whether the electoral system affects the number of parties in 
the party system. The apartheid operated under the plurality system and the democratic operated 
under the proportional system. The first democratic election took place in 1994, and between that 
time to the 2014 national election, although minor parties consistently gained legislative seats, the 
party system was marked as a dominant one because of one party’s (the ANC) successive electoral 
victories. In this way, the contemporary South African party system is often characterised by the 
presence  of  a  dominant  party  that  exists  within  a  multiparty  environment  with  smaller  parties 
occupying the legislature. 
The ANC’s unbroken chain of electoral victories saw the party take, on average, over 65% of the 
popular vote but no more than 70%, although it almost came eye to eye with this in 2004.  The by-3
product of the ANC’s dominance is that other parties are left with a combined vote share of around 
35%. A clear demarcation between major and minor parties form the chief pattern of legislative 
party composition. In essence, one large party absorbs much of the electoral market. 
In the early years of democracy, in 1994 and 1999, the most electorally successful opposition 
parties were the New National Party (NNP) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), but by 2004 the 
vote share of these parties significantly decreased, as illustrated in Table 5.1. Not only were some of 
the loses accredited to the increase in the ANC’s support, especially since it grew the most in 1999 
and 2004, but it spread to other parties, namely the DA, ACDP, FFP, PAC and AZAPO (see Table 
5.2). Since then, opposition terrain came to be dominated by a growing political party, the DA, who 
from 1999 till 2014, became the official opposition party in the national legislature. As Table 5.2 
shows, it effectively planted itself as the only opposition party to consistently increase its voting 
base, in other terms, its electoral victories came without any negative growth over the past five 
elections.
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Despite  the ANC’s continuous dominance over  the past  five national  elections,  the electoral 
market and more importantly, the proportional representation electoral formula, has given room for 
a functioning multiparty system. Overall, the party system encompasses some 12 parties on average 
(see Figure 5.1). Especially since the election between 1999 and 2014, it appears that the general 
trend of parties occupying the legislature is around 12 to 13. The election of 1999 resulted in a 
significant expansion in the number of parties represented in the legislature, it almost doubled the 
number of parties that existed in 1994. The increased fragmentation of the party system, that is, the 
level of party representation in the legislature, sustained itself up till the 2014 election. Thus, by the 
end of the 2014 election, the party system appeared to be more fragmented than in 1994. 
Yet, however, if the notion of fragmentation is taken on its own, by a simple measure of counting 
parties, it  overlooks the association between party legislative representation and seat-vote share. 
Stated differently, the number of parties in the legislature does not necessarily say anything about 
large or small parties, or point to parties who obtain majorities over pluralities. Thus, it is important 
to examine the Effective Number of Parties (ENP). The ENP essentially weighs parties according to 
their  vote or  seat  share (I  use the latter  as  explained in the Methodology chapter),  in  order  to 
determine the ‘effective’ or ‘relevant’ number of competitors in the system — the final score allows 
one to focus on major rather than minor parties. 
Figure 5.2 and 5.3 show the ENP in the party system for the democratic and apartheid period, 
respectively. First, between 1994 and 2014, a period of five elections, the level of party system 
fragmentation mean stood at 2.14. This is very low compared to the bounded limit for the system 
which is 12. So, although there is in fact, on average, 12 competing parties, the actual ‘effective 
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*This table includes parties that were longstanding up till the 2014 national election; as such some parties were excluded. 
Since this table is based on comparative election data which requires a minimum of two elections, the growth of new parties 
as at the 2014 election cannot be calculated (that is for the EFF, NFP, AIC and AgangSA).
Table 5.2 Growth of parties from vote share, 1994 to 2014*
Party ANC NNP IFP FFP DA UDM ACDP UCDP COPE PAC AZAPO APC
1999 +3.7 -13.52 -1.96 -1.37 +7.83 +0.98 -0.54
2004 +3.34 -5.22 -1.61 +0.09 +2.81 -1.14 +0.17 +0.02 +0.08
2009 -3.79 -2.42 -0.06 +4.29 -1.43 -0.79 -0.03 -0.45 -0.03
2014 -3.75 -2.15 +0.07 +5.57 +0.15 -0.24 -0.38 -6.75 -0.06 -0.03
Figure 5.1 Number of seat-winning parties, 1994 to 2014
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number’ of parties is two or less than two. Second, by contrast, between 1910 and 1989, a period of 
twenty elections, the average level of fragmentation was 2.12. So, even under systems of plurality 
rule, the number of effective parties was low. 
The apartheid period of  winner-takes-all  elections produced more or  less  bipolar  patterns of 
competition in its very early years till  1953. However, this became less obvious since, in some 
cases, third parties were able to garner pluralities and government by majority was not possible 
without coalitions (see Table 5.3). The first phase of bipolarity since 1910 included competition 
between the South African Party and the Unionist Party, where the Labour Party and Independents 
took the place of third parties; and while the Unionist Party fell away, the National Party stood as 
the major competitor from 1921 to 1933. By phase two, effective competition was between the 
United Party and the Reunited National Party from 1938 to 1953; and phase three resulted in the 
demise of bipolar competition and the rise of party dominance for some three decades. The point 
here is that the dominant party under apartheid accounted for constraining fragmentation since it 
absorbed large pluralities. 
Third,  to  a  large  extent  this  affirms  ‘Duverger’s  law’ that  simple  plurality  systems  tend  to 
produce two-party systems. The plurality system contributed to the low entry of new parties and this 
allowed for the low degree of fragmentation to be maintained. Under proportionalism (1994 to 
2014), on average six parties were able to enter the legislative arena; by comparison, under plurality 
rules (1910 to 1989), on average two parties were able to come into parliament during an electoral 
cycle. This shows that proportional rules produce more permissible structures for the entry of new 
parties than plurality rules. The effects of proportionalism is not, however, far-reaching. 
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Figure 5.2 Party system fragmentation, 1994 - 2014
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There is a critical weakness with electoral system theory: it does not consider the presence of a 
dominant party that subsequently erodes a two-party system to produce a dominant one. Where the 
causal premise of plurality systems loses strength is the period following 1958 when the NP began 
to  muster  significant  majorities;  suddenly  the  party  system  began  to  give  room  for  one-party 
dominance  than  two-party  competition.  Thus,  it  was  not  the  institutional  structure  surrounding 
plurality rules that contributed to clear patterns of low fragmentation; the single dominant party that 
swallowed most of the votes had a significant role in maintaining low fragmentation. In this way, 
the plurality electoral formula, under the apartheid period, had little effect on the emergence of a 
two-party system and it did not necessarily preempt the emergence of a dominant system.
In  addition  to  this,  the  premise  that  proportional  systems,  more  often  than  not,  cause 
multipartism and is synonymous with high levels of fragmentation, is challenged when applied to 
the democratic period. It remains an anomaly why low fragmentation (mean = 2.14) is present in a 
proportional  system.  In  fact,  the  difference  between plurality  and proportionalism is  .02  and a 
correlation reveal an r = -.09. This means that, in the South African case, under different electoral 
systems there was no significant variance in the overall level of party system fragmentation; instead, 
it remained almost the same. Therefore, electoral systems do not have an overriding influence on 
fragmentation.  At  one point  the  highest  level  of  fragmentation (3.82)  (1920)  existed under  the 
plurality system whereas the highest point under proportionalism was less than this (2.26) (2014). 
According to classical theoretical predictions, more fragmentation is expected with proportional 
rules and less fragmentation is expected with plurality rules. However, for South Africa in 1920, 
there was some four competing parties; this means that plurality laws did not yield to the classically 
predicted two competing parties. In the case of 2014, only one party stood without any effective 
electoral competitors; this means that proportional laws did not yield to the classically predicted five 
or  more  competing  parties.  What  this  deduction  implies  is  inconsistencies  in  the  theoretically 
purported effects of electoral systems. It essentially ignores the presence of one major party. 
The South Africa case shows: contrary to theoretical expectations, an institutional shift  from 
plurality to proportional rules did not change the level of party system fragmentation from one of 
low to high; contextual factors matter and there is no simple relationship between electoral laws and 
party system fragmentation. Context matters, in that, the presence of a dominant party not only 
stabilises  the  party  system and creates  expected  patterns  of  government  alternation  but  largely 
contributes to low fragmentation of the party system. This was clear when the plurality system 
presided over the apartheid party system and was also observable when the proportional system 
presided  over  the  democratic  period.  In  both  periods,  there  was  no  considerable  diversity  or 
variance in the size of the party system and limited fragmentation was the defining feature. The 
common dominator in maintaining low party system fragmentation is more the existence of a single 
dominant party than any particular electoral design — this was especially seen by the failure of 
proportionalism to produce patterns of multipartism and high party system fragmentation. From this 
case study, the main argument is that electoral rules do not necessarily determine the number of 
parties in a party system. Thus, a tentative conclusion is that in polities with one dominant party that 
successively wins majorities, irrespective of the electoral system, whether plurality or proportional, 
low party system fragmentation is expected to follow and override patterns of bipolar or multipolar 
competition.
5.4 Party system polarisation, 1994 - 2014 
While the electoral system is frequently taken as a determinant of party system fragmentation, it is 
also said to cause polarisation. According to theoretical assumptions, given that a plurality electoral 
system leads to a small number of parties in the party system, parties are forced to compete for large 
pluralities and this competition in turn causes them to attract a wide spectrum of public opinion. In 
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so doing, parties come to the centre, jettison extremist positions, and the party system assumes a 
moderate nature. Meanwhile, proportional electoral rules apply less pressure for large pluralities, 
given that the system incentivises parties to obtain a small portion of the vote, parties go after 
sectarian interests. Consequently, parties in a proportional system are ideologically diverse, tend to 
take on extremist positions, are far less moderate or centrist, and the party system is polarised. 
In brief, electoral systems are commonly thought of as fostering the number of parties in the 
system which by extension affects  ideological  differentiation  between parties  — moderation  is 
symptomatic  of  small  parties  (usually  facilitated  by  plurality  systems)  and  polarisation  is 
symptomatic of large number (usually facilitated by proportionalism). All this is to point to a single 
premise:  the  number  of  parties  determined  by  electoral  systems  (party  system  fragmentation) 
determines party system left-right division (party system polarisation). 
This section critically assesses theoretical premises in relation to the South African case. First, it 
examines the subsidiary premise of whether proportionalism produces extremist party positioning 
by  measuring  party  left-right  positions  from  manifesto  data.  Second,  it  investigates  whether 
proportionalism produces polarisation by systematically measuring left-right polarisation.    
5.4.1 Party left-right positions 
In the following section I use the RILE index (or ideological index) to position parties on the left-
right scale (as explained in the Methodology chapter). To map ideological positions of parties, I use 
a scale of -1.00 (extreme left) to 1.00 (extreme right). The immediate impression from Figure 5.4 is 
that  during the period between 1994 and 2014,  the left-right  position of individual  parties was 
highly diversified. While major parties, more often than not, prefer moderate positions, both on the 
centre-left and centre-right, other parties opt for slightly more radicalised positions — although not 
completely radicalised positions because some parties who scored 1.00 or -1.00 concentrated on 
emphasising more left than right issues or more right than left issues. A deeper analysis reveals that 
the scattering of parties across the left-right is becoming less prominent especially for major parties. 
Instead, there has been a pull to the centre and centre-left in the post-2009 period. Major parties, 
including those within the opposition, prefer to articulate a mixture of policies, both supporting 
leftist  economic  concerns  and  enabling  the  market.  This  infers  that  preference  for  ideological 
margins are irrelevant since major parties are occupying the centre.
Three significant observations emerge from Figure 5.4. First, parties closer to the centre are less 
subject to arbitrary fluctuations to the extremities and usually stick to the centre, only swinging 
between the centre-left and centre-right. Whereas between 1994 and 2004 parties were more likely 
to disperse close to the edges of the spectrum, 2009 and 2014 witnessed the strongest concentration 
of parties at the centre. A careful analysis of party manifestos reveal that parties were particularly 
inclined to  adopt  more mixed than one-sided positions on the economic dimension during this 
period. Another notable point is in relation to new parties and the centre. When new parties emerge, 
especially within a context of pre-existing competitors who occupy a particular ideological position, 
they tend to base themselves on moderate doctrines, as seen with the ID, COPE, AgangSA and NFP. 
A frequently  argued  perspective  is  that  opposition  parties  in  South  Africa  are  peripheral, 
marginal and fragmented (Giliomee et al, 2001; Southall, 1998, 2014). Although marginality is self-
evident in terms of electoral strength, scholars argue that ideological fragmentation prohibits parties 
from ascending as an effective and viable challenger to the ANC; moreover this fragmentation is 
driven by “historical ideological differences” (Southall, 1998: 465). Yet, however, the analysis of 
party positional evolution indicates that since 2009, parties are far less ‘ideologically diverse’. In 
fact,  the  shift  to  the  centre  contradicts  the  argument  that  states  there  is  “no  obvious  glue  of 
commonality  to  bind  them  [opposition  parties]  together”  (Southall,  1998:  466;  1997:  11). 
Opposition parties are converging towards the policy space of the ANC (centre-left), and there may 
well be a new ideological glue being forged in the party system. 
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Second, unlike the relative stability of the centre bloc, parties on the right fringe showed signs of 
positional  volatility.  In  the  case  of  the  DA,  it  gradually  shifted  away  from placing  too  much 
emphasis  on  market  fundamentalist  principles  and  moved  to  the  centre  in  2004  and  more 
specifically to the centre-left in 2009 and 2014. Similarly, the ACDP and UDM settled for less far 
right or free-market principles and presented a centre-left agenda in their manifestos; focusing on 
social  welfare,  government  intervention,  trade  protectionism and a  mixed  economy as  tools  to 
alleviate  social  ills  and  foster  growth.  In  fact,  nearly  all  parties  that  prioritised  more  far  right 
socioeconomic positions, from 1994 to 2009 (DA, IFP, FFP, ACDP and UDM) actually moved to 
the centre by 2014, although some shifted by 2009 and maintained centrist terrain till 2014 (DA, 
IFP and ACDP).  This  movement  away from the right  fringe leaves  a  vacuum on the far  right 
especially since its decrease may be attributable to the unpopularity of rightwing policies amongst 
the electorate — such as less emphasis on social welfare, redistribution and affirmative action. 
Conventional views about one of the major opposition parties, the DA, suggest deficiencies in 
the party’s policy positions. One view is that the DA must “move towards the centre of the political 
stage and begin a genuine process of seeking to appeal to the African community” (Schrire, 2001: 
144). The other is that the party is in need of ideological change to the left (Southall, 2014b: 19). 
Both arguments are related since any attempt to attract the median voter,  the black majority in 
particular,  cannot  be  separated  from  social  democratic  policy  proposals.  Scholars  frequently 
propose that  the DA should focus on pro-poor issues and become a vehicle for  black interests 
(Nijzink, 2001; Kotze, 2001; Jolobe, 2009). While it is recognised that the party “moved towards 
the political centre [to attract black voters] to compete with the ANC”, it is less observed that it is 
undergoing policy redefinition on the economic dimension (especially to the left) (Southall, 2014b: 
14). 
During the party’s first step to centre occupation (2004), its policy proposals were contradictory; 
it was “overwhelmingly free-market [especially on accelerating privatisation], which constituted a 
policy environment that was essentially incompatible with the party’s proposal for a Basic Income 
Grant” of R110 per month (Booysen, 2005: 132). However, the party seems to have found a way to 
manoeuvre around these issues. While it still opposes affirmative action and racial quotas, it came 
to embrace black economic empowerment. It went as far as to say that its intention is to find a right 
balance between race and growth, and conceded to the need for some form of state intervention to 
uplift the middle class. Moreover, the party also spoke about speeding up land reform but especially 
said that  state-owned land should be distributed;  and it  further highlighted the need to balance 
labour flexibility and worker protection. Coming to terms with South African reality and pressures 
for party growth, the DA appears to be playing a very caution policy game, while some of its 
policies are leftist, others appear leftist with rightist conditions. For instance, some inconsistencies 
were evident, while the party supported bringing down costs, it called for working with the private 
sector to deliver services. The 2014 manifesto firmly placed the party on the centre-left, sold a clear 
leftist programme that unequivocally targeted the median and the growing black middle-class. It 
was supportive of the welfare state, social grants and spoke about the need for the youth wage and 
housing subsidy. Although neither specifying specific programmes and amounts like it did in 2004 
nor going into explicit conditions attached to its newfound leftist policies, the party has however 
began to prioritise issues that it traditionally evaded.
Essentially, the plausibility of the argument that the DA is “unviable because they do not offer 
policies that would enable them to attract a significant electoral constituency” and that it challenges 
the ANC on the centre-right, needs to be revisited to take stock of the party’s embrace of social 
democratic  and moderate  leftist  positions  (Habib  and Taylor,  2001:  216;  Booysen,  2005).  This 
finding is congruent with interview data. DA policy head, Jonathan Moakes, explained that there is 
a perpetuated notion that the DA is stringently rightist; meanwhile, the party is moving away from 
old-defined ideologies. Former DA leader, Tony Leon, said that in some circles people feel that the 
party is too much like the ANC on policy matters. Given that the party has shifted into the centre-
left space, which explains its embrace of social democratic platforms, this analysis advances the 
argument that the DA appears less committed to traditional rightwing economics and recognises 
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that positioning itself on the right bloc undermines its viability and growth. In a similar vein, Mattes 
(2014:  184)  argues  that  its  redefinition,  especially  in  supporting  black  empowerment  and  by 
extension, state intervention in the economy, is “a significant shift in DA ideology”. 
Third, a bleak picture emerges for the far left. Whereas the ANC was slightly further from the 
centre-left  in  2009,  although  it  was  not  far  left  (since  its  emphasis  was  still  within  a  centrist 
paradigm, it simply emphasised more left than right issues), it effectively reassumed centre ground 
by 2014. However, two well-known radical left parties, the PAC and APC, held steadfast to far left 
emphases and made no compromise to move to the centre-left. One party in particular, AZAPO, 
abandoned its far left anti-market rhetoric (such as its policy to reverse any form of privatisation of 
public services and state assets) of 1999 and 2004 and occupied centre-left ground in 2009. Less 
can be said about the ideological evolution of the new far left party, the EFF — since comparable 
information will  emerge in  forthcoming electoral  cycles.  What  can be said from observing the 
positional behaviour of the existing far left bloc is that it appears more resilient in occupying the left 
periphery, especially parties like the PAC and APC who from its origins formed itself on radical 
socioeconomic predispositions, rather than those parties that were positioned more towards market 
libertarianism and who admired free-market ideals. Parties on the far left tend to sidestep policy 
evolution; alternatively stated, whereas most within the far right bloc moved to the centre, the same 
change did not occur for the far left bloc. Similar to the recognition of the right bloc that seemed to 
resolve that greater preference for marketism appear unfavourable, the far left retains its position on 
the  left  margins  precisely  because  its  rhetoric  finds  relevance  in  an  electoral  market  where  a 
majority live in situations that provide a breeding ground for extreme leftism (poverty, inequality 
and unemployment). 
 In conclusion, at first glance the argument that the party system is ideologically diverse becomes 
erroneous when evolution is considered. By analysing party positions by year it becomes possible to 
deduce positional evolutions. The party system on the whole is less widely fragmented along the 
ideological  spectrum;  instead,  it  is  more  plausible  to  argue  that  ideological  fragmentation  or 
diversity exists more within the moderate, centre space, than across the whole spectrum. It follows 
from the analysis that parties evolve in the way they present policies predispositions. While Figure 
5.4 gives an initial impression that some two-fifths of party positions are located at the ideological 
margins, a deeper analysis of the evolution of party positions from 1994 to 2014 reveal that the 
party system is dominated by the umbra of moderation where a conglomeration of parties offer 
centrist packages to the median voter. This is characterised by parties consistently occupying the 
centre and others moving from left-right fringes to the centre. The right, however, is more sensitive 
to policy revision and adaption, in some cases moving from far right to centre-right and to the 
centre-left. But for the far left bloc, its lack of flexibility pulls it away from skipping from the left to 
the centre, let alone, to the right side of the fence.
5.4.2 Party system polarisation 
Despite  pertinent  findings  about  the  ideological  composition  of  the  party  system  along  the 
unidimensional  left-right  spectrum,  there  is  something  more  fundamental:  the  degree  of 
polarisation. As outlined in Chapter 2, polarisation refers to a division of opinion, and although a 
party may be internally divided amongst competing camps (individual party polarisation),  party 
system polarisation refers to the strength of inter-party ideological divisions (moderate or polarised) 
— it does not point to the direction of ideological division between parties (left-centre-right) which 
is  what  the  ideological  index  does.  The  polarisation  index  (PI)  is  a  measure  of  party  system 
polarisation. Its two main variables being the ideological index (party left-right scores) and vote or 
seat  share  (electoral  relevance).  The  PI  essentially  weighs  individual  party  left-right  scores 
according to their vote or seat share. Once a summation of the weighting is complete, a general 
picture of the degree of ideological division emerges. If the index is or is close to 0 it means that all 
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relevant parties occupy the same position on the left-right scale, and if it is or is close to 1 it means 
that all relevant parties are divided along the ideological extremes (Dalton, 2008). 
In the case of South Africa, despite ideological variance and spread in party positions and the 
occupation of left-right fringes, the system is not polarised. From Figure 5.5 it can be deduced that 
parties are on the same side of the spectrum, the index does not even reach moderately polarised 
(0.5), in fact, the system was extremely close to the 0 margin both in 1994 (0.02), after this period 
and even by 2014 (0.07). Although the highest level was seen in 2004 (0.20), this is only modest. 
The PI  for  South Africa not  only signifies the substantive degree of  moderation present  in  the 
system, it importantly points to the stability and unchanging nature of polarisation. The low score 
means that parties converge to the same side of the ideological bloc, whether centre or extremist. In 
the case of South Africa, parties have come to occupy the centre in recent years, and because of 
their electoral relevance and their occupation of the same bloc, there is no significant opposition on 
the other side of the ideological divide to challenge these parties, effectively making the system 
moderate. This is, however, not as straightforward because it is less a situation of ‘many parties’ 
occupying the centre, but one major party absorbing the space. An opposite case would be one in 
which parties are dispersed across the spectrum, occupying positions on contrastive ideological 
blocs, and so if electorally relevant parties are present who are on dissimilar blocs, the system is 
polarised.  According  to  the  polarisation  score,  the  classical  argument  about  the  ideologically 
fragmented  nature  of  the  South  African  party  system,  advanced  by  Giliomee  et  al  (2001)  and 
Southall (1998, 2014), may not hold. Mapping party positions on various points of the left-right 
spectrum reveals considerable levels of ideological diversity; however, low polarisation suggests 
that  actual  ideological  diversity  is  irrelevant  given  that  major  parties  are  occupying  the  same 
ideological  space.  Moreover,  it  is  the  dominance of  one party  that  inhibits  any significance of 
ideological distinctions. 
What the PI measure essentially means is that parties who have a large stake in the votes drive 
the level of polarisation in the party system. So, for the South African party system, it is clear that 
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Figure 5.5 Party system polarisation, 1994 to 2014
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party positions stretch across the left-right spectrum. Especially between 1994 and 2004, there were 
fundamental positional differences on socioeconomic issues given the clear presence of the far right 
and far  left  blocs.  Put  in  the negative,  during a  number of  electoral  cycles,  there has been no 
shortage  of  parties  taking  dichotomous  ideological  positions,  as  deduced  from  their  policy 
articulations in their  election manifestos.  Yet,  however,  herein lies the fundamental  issue:  these 
parties are not large enough to affect change in the level of polarisation, in other words, although 
parties  hold  distinct  positions  this  has  little  impact  on  overall  party  system  ideological 
differentiation. The system is largely moderate because the ANC absorbs some two-thirds of the 
vote share; it is one large party (as opposed to a few large parties) assuming a significant space in 
the party system, subsequently choking the emergence of  electorally  relevant  and ideologically 
distinct parties. That is the equivalent of saying even though the ruling party faces opposition on 
different sides of the ideological spectrum, the relevance of such opposition has to be factored in 
(weighted according to their vote share). And since extremist parties are not electorally large, they 
do not drive the degree of polarisation, hence, it follows that the ruling party as the largest party 
determines the level of polarisation in the entire party system. In brief, this result concurs with the 
perspective that there is limited polarisation in dominant party systems, although South Africa is not 
a one-party system where there “can be on left-right polarisation of parties” (Sigelman and Yough, 
1978:  368).  By  systematically  and  quantitatively  interrogating  the  feature  of  polarisation,  this 
argument also adds to the point that extremist parties have remained marginal in the party system 
(Schrire, 2001; Booysen, 2005; Sarakinsky, 2001; Southall, 1998; Lanegran, 2001). 
Considering that the PI does not mean parties are structured around some particular ideological 
bloc like the centre (since a number of relevant parties like the ANC could be on the far right or far 
left and there will still be low polarisation because major parties are not on opposite extremes), 
what it does say is that parties are, like in the case of South Africa, clustered on the same space. The 
PI  can however  be  associated with  the  RILE index.  In  this  case,  it  is  clear  that  the  ANC, by 
absorbing  large  pluralities  is  a  factor  behind  low  inter-party  ideological  competition,  and  is 
permitting the stability of a centrist party system; primarily because it holds mixed positions on the 
socioeconomic sphere and is the largest party in the system. 
Also, related to the latter point, since the ANC drives the level of party system polarisation, its 
ideology remains significant not for changing the nature of polarisation — because as long as the 
ANC as the largest party occupies any position, the system is still unpolarised — but for inducing 
change in the positions of the opposition. Given that it is a centrist party, it seems to be drawing 
other parties to a centrist and more particularly a centre-left policy space, especially those on the 
right bloc. This is producing convergence of parties on the centrist side. Scholars like Sartori (1976) 
and Nagel and Wlezien (2010) predict that centre occupation produces centre-fleeing tendencies and 
insinuates  extremist  party  positioning.  Similarly,  one  argument  presented  in  the  early  phase  of 
democracy stated that the PR’s low threshold would encourage parties [especially small ones] to 
target “a niche sector instead of making moderate and inclusive appeals”, whether on the political or 
economic dimension (Davies, 2004: 306). Powell (1982) also stresses the point that proportional 
rules are prime generators of ideological polarisation. The view was that the effect of PR to produce 
high representation, especially of social cleavages and the politicisation of nationalist issues, would 
lead to extremist party positioning and subsequently a highly polarised party system that would in 
turn challenge the emergence of political stability.  Contrary to this, the case of South Africa shows 4
that many parties within the opposition bloc are moving to the centre, especially on the economic 
cleavage, and this might be induced by the dominant party’s absorption of centre space. I hence 
concur with scholars like Green-Pedersen (2004), Daalder (1984) and Hazan (1997) who argue that 
occupation to the centre space, whether in PR or plurality systems, does not necessarily discourage 
moderation of the party system; and as long as there is a centrist electorate and general incentives to 
move to the centre, parties do so. Thus, the occupation of the centre by a major party, and the PR 
system, does not necessarily cause polarisation or extremist party position. 
A concern surfaced in the post-2014 period that questioned whether the presence of the radical 
left  opposition  party,  the  EFF,  was  likely  to  change  not  only  the  modest  level  of  ideological 
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polarisation in the party system but cause the ANC to move to the extreme as it responds to the new 
radical left challenge. Since the EFF is on the left bloc, the ANC needs to ward off criticism from 
the left and whereas it often faced such criticism from its internal structures, the space of intra-
parliamentary  and  inter-party  debate  might  intensify,  even  alter  the  ANC’s  position  and  hence 
potentially polarise the party system. And this might have obvious implications for “the [future] 
shape of the party system” (Southall, 2014b: 19; Southall and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014: 231). 
While this concern is justifiable,  there is  a deficiency in it.  The findings of low polarisation 
challenge the view of diversification of party positions, especially in terms of extremist positioning, 
and  the  imminence  of  significant  change.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  PR  gives  room for 
ideologically distinct parties and Figure 5.4 testifies to left-right variegation of the party system. 
Despite the incentive for exclusive appeals and extremist positions, the relevance of it is largely 
constrained. Moreover, although it remains an open matter since the EFF is a fairly young party to 
conclusively judge its effects but what can be said is that from the prior presence of the far left bloc, 
though such parties continued to remain ideological distinct, their influence remained negligible. 
The  argument  about  the  extremist  effects  of  proportionalism  and  the  presence  of  the  EFF 
overlooks two things. In the first place (a) because the dominant party absorbs the electoral space, 
there is limited room for opposition from the other side; and more importantly, (b) the party system 
has shown signs of centrist evolution and progression. The system has shown signs of centripetal 
conglomeration, thus contradicting the view that extremism is abundant and centrism is largely 
absent. Proportionalism failed to retard moderation and to create favourable grounds for extremist 
party positioning to mean something substantial for the party system — although this does not 
ignore  that  minor  parties  are  inclined  to  assume radical  positions  — primarily  because  of  the 
constraint the dominant party applies on the system. In relation to this, the ANC as a chief driver of 
polarisation implies that the significance of the EFF being the third largest party in the party system 
with a far left orientation is unlikely to change the structure of the party system from moderate to 
polarised — particularly since a large vote share is an essential requisite (coupled with a contrasting 
ideology) for such change to occur. In addition, even if the ANC evolves in its positional platforms 
to respond to left-right pressure, as long as it remains the largest party on the left bloc, with no 
subsequent electorally strong contender, party system polarisation will not increase. 
In sum, the South African party system has considerably low polarisation and this means parties 
occupy the same ideological space and are not poles apart in their ideology. In other terms, there is a 
small ideological distance amongst relevant parties. Thus, the South African party system exhibits 
substantially high levels of ‘ideological proximity’ (where major parties, in this case, the ANC, 
converges to the one side of the spectrum) rather than ‘ideological difference’ (Sartori, 2005: 111). 
The fragmented nature of party positions (that is, some parties occupying the centre, far left or far 
right)  does  not  automatically  translate  into  the  bifurcation  of  policy  or  ideological  positions 
amongst  parties  (polarisation),  especially considering  the presence of  the EFF. For ideological 
diversity to be translated into polarisation, parties have to fulfil the major prerequisite of vote share, 
such that  two or more parties equally share a large stake in the vote share,  if  so it  allows for 
potential polarisation to emerge. Yet this is not the only prerequisite, the other follows from the 
former that parties who have significant pluralities must also occupy opposed ideological positions. 
Instead, the presence of one or a few major parties determine whether this ideological bifurcation is 
politicised and made relevant in the party system; and as long as there are no major parties located 
on contrasting blocs, the system is moderate. Stated differently, a state of polarisation emerges when 
two or more electorally relevant parties occupy contending ideological platforms. These form  the 
conditions for polarisation to emerge in the South African case. 
This analysis also argued that extremism through centre occupation and proportionalism is not 
evident in South Africa. The ANC, the major centre party, not only causes the system to be largely 
moderate rather than polarisation, with acutely limited ideological differentiation (given the absence 
of electorally significant parties), it also makes the system centrist rather than extremist. With a 
large party at the centre, it tilts the whole system to chiefly reflect a centrist outlook. On top of this, 
there is a general level of ideological convergence to the centre taking place amongst opposition 
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parties.  Movement  to  converge  at  the  centre  signifies  that  opposition  parties  are  increasingly 
proposing similar mixed-model positions, leading to relative ideological homogeneity in the party 
system — especially between 2009 and 2014. While parties were more bifurcated and assumed 
dichotomous positions on fundamental policy areas in the early years of democracy, there appears 
to be convergence to the centre. 
5.5 Correlating fragmentation and polarisation
One of the objectives of this research was to test the applicability of electoral theory to South Africa 
and to determine whether it stands as a causal variable for low polarisation. It is found that the 
theoretical claim that multiparty systems, usually produced by proportional electoral systems, cause 
polarisation in the party system does not apply to the case of South Africa. Figure 5.6 indicates that 
the theory relative to PR systems is found in quadrant 3 but South Africa is placed in quadrant 1, 
which is obviously inconsistent with theoretical expectations. Quadrant 1 is applicable to plurality 
electoral systems that produce two-party competition, this means that South Africa stands as an 
anomaly to theory. 
The  institutionalist-electoral  side  of  the  fragmentation  argument  posits  that  proportionalism 
fosters dispersion across the ideological continuum and this produces polarisation in the form of 
high  levels  of  left-right  disagreement  and  a  large  ideological  distance  between  major  parties. 
Meanwhile, the South African electoral system is a PR one but the assumed effect on polarisation is 
not  evident.  In  fact,  the  PR  system  has  very  little  to  do  with  the  dynamics  of  ideological 
differentiation in the party system. Given prevalent tendencies of moderation under proportional 
rules, where there is no effective electoral competitors at opposite sides of the spectrum, there is 
something more that accounts for low polarisation in South Africa. Put differently, this analysis 
 85
dismisses the electoral system as a causal variable behind low polarisation and centrist position-
taking.
In contention with theory, PR rules are not incentivising major parties to take extremist positions 
and locate themselves on opposed left-right fringes. PR does appear, however, to be incentivising 
smaller parties like the FFP, ACDP, EFF and others who find space in the electoral market for 
Afrikaner  and  African  nationalism,  conservative  religious  doctrines,  and  socialist  economic 
policies. Thus, the argument becomes that inbuilt systemic incentives are less problematic than the 
presence of an electorally major party that skews the degree of ideological differentiation in the 
party system to itself. To recapitulate an earlier point, despite evidence of ideological fragmentation 
and dispersion across the left-centre-right space and that parties are finding distinct constituencies to 
represent, this has not translated into polarisation. Instead, that one major party is electorally strong, 
squeezes opportunities for the emergence of two or more parties to equally share in the voting 
market who could in turn potentially compete on contrasting ideological platforms. This implies 
that there is little that the electoral rules are doing on their own to incentivise major parties like the 
ANC to adopt particular positions. Gouws and Mitchell (2005: 365) echo this point, they state that 
dynamics in the party system “despite highly inclusive electoral rules, is primarily a function of the 
electoral dominance of the ANC, rather than an outcome of the electoral system per se.”
Not only is the electoral system an unconvincing causal variable, something can be said about 
the theory more broadly — not considering party dominance is precisely where electoral systems 
theory falls short. The case of South Africa leads me to concur with scholars who question the 
relationship between proportionality and polarisation (Ezrow, 2008; Dalton, 2008). Even though 
this research does not intend to make far-reaching generalisations, the single case study does add to 
a  growing  body  of  scholarship  around  this  matter,  it  shines  doubt  on  the  classical  linear  and 
universal connection between electoral systems and polarisation. Unlike the argument purported by 
Downs (1957),  Sartori  (1976),  Dow (2010),  Powell  (1982)  and Davies  (2004),  what  the South 
African case points to is provided there is a dominant party under proportionalism, polarisation is 
skewed to one side (parties seem to be on the same side of the spectrum). In other terms, there is 
little, if not no, significant ideological bipolarity (parties on opposed ends of the spectrum) in the 
ideological space under conditions of party dominance. If a dominant party is present, the type of 
electoral system does not matter because the dominant party appears to govern overriding patterns 
of polarisation. 
There is another point here altogether, that PR leads to ideological dispersion and not necessarily 
polarisation, on the extremes and centrist clustering, can be explained by the dominant party. For 
Downs  (1957:  126-7,  138),  parties  in  PR  systems  “will  strive  to  distinguish  themselves 
ideologically from each other and maintain the purity of their positions” and as such “differentiate 
their  platforms  more  sharply”.  However,  observations  from Figure  5.4  show that  parties  have 
largely moved to the centre despite the incentive from PR rules to move to the ends, parties seem to 
want  to  remain  in  the  centre  to  attract  the  median  voter  and  to  challenge  the  ANC from that 
position. While extremism was meant to increase under conditions of proportionality, the South 
African case shows that it actually decreased since parties on the right and some on the left moved 
from the outskirts to the centre. Thus, this case agrees with the thesis posited by Grofman (2004), 
Ezrow (2008) and Dalton (2008), that there appears to be no necessary connection between PR 
systems and extremist clustering. 
To conclude, whereas the hypothesis was to examine whether the PR system accounts for the low 
degree of ideological differentiation in the party system, the findings show that the PR system has 
little effect on low polarisation given the constraint the dominant party applies on the system. There 
are  incentives  under  a  PR system to  adopt  extremist  positions  and for  polarisation  to  emerge; 
however, this link is broken under conditions of centrist party dominance and absence of electorally 
strong ideological competitors. For the causal framework of this research, it is then not considered a 
significant factor in stimulating moderation. I find that the dominant party may reveal more about 
the causes behind moderation in the South African party system rather than electoral  rules and 
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institutions. This analysis has also shown that the case study joins itself to the growing argument 
that polarisation does not necessarily emerge or increase under a PR system.
5.6 Conclusion: The electoral system and party system moderation
The exploratory part of this analysis first looked at the transition from plurality to proportionalism 
and outlined some of the chief factors motivating the decision to adopt a PR electoral system. It 
found that while maximum representation is fundamental, other motivating factors have also fed 
into  the  decision.  This  includes  concerns  about  political  stability,  the  need  to  accelerate 
democratisation,  to  have  an  alternative  oversight  mechanism,  and  to  align  with  international 
political dynamics. Moreover, the ANC as one of the major stakeholders during the democratic 
transition talks, showed propensities towards moderate politics. This was because the organisation 
compromised  and  was  sensitive  to  the  demands  of  the  white  minority  who  preferred  a  more 
accommodative and inclusive system; however, the ANC was moved by its own internal concerns 
for political stability and social reconciliation. And these propensities were background forces that 
advanced moderation rather than exclusive, non-accommodative, and plurality FPTP proposals. 
The causation part of this analysis examined the nexus between fragmentation, electoral systems 
and polarisation. Three main things emerged. First, there appears to be no significant relationship 
between the PR electoral system and the level of party system polarisation. Whereas the PR system 
is  considered  fostering  ideological  differentiation  and  polarisation,  in  the  South  African  party 
system, despite the auspices of proportionalism, there is a substantially low degree of polarisation. 
Parties occupy the same side of the left-right spectrum. Much of this is attributable to the presence 
of the ANC as the major party driving low polarisation. 
Second,  theory  leads  us  to  expect  that  proportionalism  and  centre  occupation  generates 
centrifugal tendencies — both incentivise major parties and the opposition bloc to adopt distinct 
positions  to  capture  exclusive  and  non-centrist  voters  to  gain  legislative  representation,  and  to 
respond to centre occupation by fleeing outward to the ideological margins. This is questionable in 
relation to the findings of this research because many opposition parties have moved to the centre 
despite the ANC’s occupation of the centre (between 2009 and 2014) and the presence of PR laws. 
So while in previous years the opposition bloc was more diverse and bifurcated, this changed since 
the post-2009 period. The ANC’s centre-left position may well be pulling opposition parties to gain 
support by articulating similar positions. Parties that were on the right bloc have come to occupy the 
centre, especially the centre-left. The right side appears more sensitive to policy reconsideration and 
evolution whilst parties on the extreme left demonstrate little sign of moving to the centre-left. In 
fact, the party system has shown signs of centrist conglomeration, and this is fostering a common 
glue that is joining many opposition parties to challenge the ANC from similar platforms. This 
finding challenges the often perpetuated notion that the DA and opposition parties generally, are still 
challenging the ANC and appealing to voters from a rightwing rather than a centre-left platform. 
Moreover, it departs from the ‘fragmentation thesis’ that emphasises ideological diversity and the 
absence of a common ideological glue to bind parties together to challenge the ANC. In sum, centre 
occupation  of  the  ANC  even  under  conditions  of  proportionalism  is  actually  producing 
centripetalism of  the  party  system;  that  is,  an  overwhelming  centrist  outlook  and  centre-based 
competition.
Third, I critically interrogated the claim that the EFF is likely to change the ideological nature of 
the system. I found that the dominance of ANC constrains the relevance of extremist parties. Even if 
radical left parties are present, as long as they remain electorally small, they cannot polarise the 
system. Coupled with this, the ANC needs to undergo positional change to locate itself on the other 
pole. In general, this analysis argued that the PR thesis does not apply because of two conditions 
that make it unable to meaningfully give effect to extremist positioning and polarisation: (a) the 
presence  of  a  centrist  major  party  and  electoral  irrelevance  of  ideological  parties,  and  (b)  the 
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absence of positional change of the major party to arise as an ideological contender (far right) to an 
electorally strong ideological party (far left). 
The type of electoral system in South Africa does not account for centrist party position-taking, 
centrist  amalgamation,  and  low  polarisation.  Considering  the  South  African  party  system,  the 
common denominator in the weaknesses of electoral systems theory is the dominant party. The 
determinants of moderation in the party system is not connected to the PR system, the number of 
parties or a multiparty structure; instead, evidence points to the strength of a major party, the ANC, 
in driving moderation and the low degree of ideological differentiation in the party system. The 
ANC is both a centrist occupier and is pulling opposition parties to that position. Thus, for South 
Africa, much seems to be contained within the ANC rather than in outer institutional structures.
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Notes
 I use the terms ‘majoritarianism’ and ‘plurality’ interchangeably since it forms part of First-Past-The-Post 1
(FPTP) winner-takes-all electoral systems. The FPTP method is also called the ‘simple plurality method’. It 
is common to use either term to signify that both use the FPTPs electoral formula to convert seats into votes, 
which is that the candidate or party that gains the most votes wins elections regardless of their vote share. 
Simply put, the highest polling candidates fill seats. In this sense, both have the FPTP principle embedded 
within  them.  A clear  difference  begins  to  emerge in  the  way votes  are  obtained,  not  in  how votes  are 
calculated. The plurality system requires that a representative does not necessarily have to secure a majority 
(50+1 per cent of the vote) but obtain more votes than the competitors (less than a majority but the largest 
share of votes); majoritarian systems, on the other hand, require a representative to secure a clear majority to 
form a government.
 Particular instances of politically-related violence included the Boipatong and Bisho killings of June and 2
September 1992, respectively. 
 The ANC’s election results sit in the range of 60: the party’s lowest result was 62.15 per cent (2014) and its 3
highest was 69.69 per cent (2004). 
 Although the argument largely surrounded race-based matters and pertained less explicitly to policy or 4
ideological issues, an important point can be extracted from the debate. The contrasting argument was that 
since  “historical  patterns  of  polarisation”  especially  around  race  and  language  tend  to  “solidify  group 
identities”, given that proportionalism allows for diverse representation, it accommodates differences and 
this in turn reduces extremism and conflict (Muthien, 1999: 12; Norris, 2008; Lijphart, 1977). This belief 
extended itself to anticipate proportionalism as fostering moderation in the party system since it provided 
contentment  in   the  sharing  of  political  power  and  the  acknowledgement  that  group  distinctions  were 
represented in the legislature. 
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Chapter 6: The Left-Right Moderate-Polarised Distribution 
of the Electorate
This  chapter  analyses  left-right  polarisation  at  the  level  of  the  South  African  electorate.  The 
theoretical  assumption  is  that  voters  affect  party  system  polarisation.  When  there  is  a  large 
ideological distance within the electorate (division between the extremes of the left-right spectrum), 
the party system reflects high polarisation. When there is a small ideological distance within the 
electorate (occupy the same side of the spectrum), the party system reflects moderate tendencies. To 
examine the effects voters have on the party system one has to get an idea about the nature of social 
division. A comprehensive analysis of social polarisation is not the objective of this chapter nor is 
an examination of the non-ideological dimension (race-based, identity or other non-policy issues). 
Instead, this analysis is restricted to the nature of left-right polarisation at the voter level. In so 
doing, this chapter seeks to establish the presence or absence of ideological polarisation at the mass 
level by using a range of public opinion surveys between 1982 and 2016. It also corroborates this 
with interview data. The reasons for employing these methods were outlined in the Methodology 
chapter. 
Three  main  features  are  foundational  to  the  analysis:  determining  the  direction  of  voter 
preferences (left or right), the strength of such preferences (moderate or radical), and the distance 
between  voters  (polarisation).  This  chapter  first  examines  citizens  left-right  self-placement, 
positions on left-right economic issues, and attitudes toward social change. Second, it assesses the 
policy-based issue in party differences and party support. Third, it examines the implication of the 
findings as a cause for party system moderation and links it to the literature. The purpose of this 
chapter  in  doing  all  this  is  to  determine  whether  or  not  voters  are  a  causal  factor  behind  the 
moderate phenomenon of the party system. The primary finding is that voter preferences influence 
party positions but voters do not have an overriding influence on this since parties maintain a degree 
of independence in policy determination and there is sometimes a disjuncture between voter and 
party positions. Moreover, voters hardly affect moderation; in fact, while voters are polarised on 
general issues and salient economic issues, the party system has not mirrored this dynamic. Thus, 
the cause of moderation rests less with social dynamics but more with the dominant party that is 
constraining polarisation and stabilising the system in a centrist and moderate direction. 
6.1 General ideological predispositions  
The present section discusses two things. First, it establishes the median voter position by looking at 
citizen self-placement data (this is self-identification on the left-right ideological scale).  It  also 
encompasses citizen placement of major political parties. Second, it looks at the preferred nature of 
social change as an indication of general ideological inclinations at the social level. 
6.1.1 Citizen self-placement and placement of parties
Surveys  that  ask  citizens  to  place  themselves  on  the  left-right  political  scale  usually  pose  the 
question as follows, as in World Value Survey (WVS) waves: “[i]n political matters, people talk of 
‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?” The 
data presented below emerges from this question — although I use a many data sources, the survey 
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question remained the same with only slight terminological variations. The left–right scale ranges 
from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). 
Findings from nine time periods, between 1982 to 2013, indicate that the mean voter position is 
an overall average of 5.70. The mean voter position over the years fluctuates between 5 to 6.5, with 
1994’s result being the only outlier with a score of 3.6 (centre-left), as reflected in Figure 6.1. This 
overall mean score lies in the centre and centre-right range, thus left-right fluctuation is generally 
contained  within  this  parameter.  In  other  words,  the  average  citizen  locates  themselves  on  the 
centre, centre-right bloc. In terms of the relationship between the citizen and ideological extremism, 
self-placement data reveals that the median voter rarely thinks of himself or herself on or close to 
the far-left or far-right; instead, there is large preference for the centre political space.  
When considering changes between ideological blocs, and the portion of respondents who ‘don’t 
know/haven’t heard’ of the left-right or are ‘non-politically aligned’, four main deductions emerge 
from Figure 6.2.  First, the centre has been consistently higher (mean = 31%) than the right and left 1
bloc between 1982 and 1996 but the growth and stability of the centre was followed by significant 
fluctuation between 1997 and 2001. Centre partisans halved from 1996 to 1997 but increased by 
132% in  2001 (this  year  had the  highest  percentage of  people  identified with  the  centre);  and 
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between 2006 to 2013 centre identification relatively stabilised (mean = 35%). The latter situation 
resembles centre positioning in the 1982 - 1996 period. 
Second, not only was the left bloc slightly larger than the right in 1990 and 1994 but during 1990 
to 1996 there was close contestation between the left-right bloc. Nonetheless, the left space in the 
electorate seems largely unoccupied. By 2006 to 2013 left placement was lower (mean = 8%) than 
1982 to 2001 (mean = 17%). Moreover, what is occurring with the centre and right bloc seem more 
relevant than the left. While centre and right support ranges from between 30% to 45%,  on average, 
support for the left ranges from 10% to 20% — voter identification with the left bloc reached its 
lowest between 2001 to 2013. 
Third, while the left and right were proximate between 1990 to 1996, this subsequently changed. 
There appears to be more voter identification with the centre and the right. Since 1982 to 2013, 
mean results in Figure 6.3 indicate that the South African electorate is almost equally positioned on 
the centre (mean = 32%) and right (mean = 30%), with only less than half drawn to the left (mean = 
14%). On average, 62% of the public are distributed across the centre and the right. The consistent 
decrease in ‘don’t know’ caused a gain in the percentage of people identified with the centre (r = -.
55) and right (r = -.71) — meanwhile very little support went from the ‘don’t know’ to the left (r = 
-.05).
Fourth,  almost  one quarter  (mean = 24%) of  citizens  were  unsure  where  they stood on the 
political scale, had not heard of the ‘left-right’, were not politically aligned or simply refused to 
answer. Interpreted in the affirmative, large majorities, 76%, identify themselves on the left-right 
scale.  In  addition,  there  is  evident  decrease  in  the  percentage  of  ‘don’t  know’.  In  1982,  the 
percentage of ‘don’t know’ stood at 50% (the highest it ever reached), by 1997 it was 20% and by 
2013 it was 13% (decreasing by 281% from 1982). The decrease in the ‘don’t know’ reflects an 
increase in the proportion of newly politically-aligned citizens that choose to identify with politics 
in left-right terms. This implies there are increasingly more people locating themselves somewhere 
along the political spectrum. Although there is an obvious potential lack of citizen sophistication of 
the meaning of ‘left-right’, the low percentage who ‘don’t know’ compared to ideological partisans 
signify that there is high ideological self-positioning at the electoral level.  Without ignoring the 2
controversy around ideological orientations or lack of it  amongst voters,  it  is  clear that a large 
chunk of the South African public can position themselves on the political scale and this accords an 
important degree of validity to the left-right dimension at the social level. 
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Survey data that indicates the presence of a centrist electorate is congruent with interview data. 
Interview respondents, who mostly composed of party leaders and officials, were questioned about 
whether  they  thought  voters  were  centrist/moderate  or  radical/extremist  particularly  on 
socioeconomic  policy  preferences.  Most  respondents  were  of  the  same  opinion  and  expressed 
certainty and conviction in their views. They stated that voters were ‘broadly moderate’ and ‘not 
extreme’: “moderation is the normal trend” in South Africa (Madlalose, Interview). One respondent 
from the  DA said:  “most  definitely  the  South  African  electorate  is  moderate  in  terms  of  their 
wishes” (Andrew, Interview). Leader of the far left party, the APC, said: “the current position of the 
average South African voter is not extreme, whether left or right” (Godi, Interview). 
An extremist voter on economic issues would either be (a) completely communist or Stalinist, 
and  intolerant  of  any  capitalist  system;  or  (b)  completely  capitalist  and  believing  in  market 
fundamentalist principles, and opposed to socialism and state intervention. An IFP respondent stated 
that  there  is  no  extreme  of  one  or  the  other  type:  “[t]he  capitalistic-type  as  opposed  to  the 
communistic-type,  these  are  world  apart,  and  I  think  people  are  somewhere  in  between  the 
two” (Madlalose, Interview). This means that people feel that capitalist approaches are allowed in 
the  country  together  with  socialist  economic  values.  So,  according  to  parties,  voters  are  not 
extremist about a governing economic system whether capitalist or socialist, they prefer a relatively 
moderate, centrist and in-between system. 
Another portion of this analysis compares voter mean positions to voter placement of parties. In 
addition to asking individuals to locate themselves on the political scale, only a few surveys asked 
them to also place major parties on the left-right scale. According to Figure 6.4, respondents located 
themselves in the centre in 1994 and moved close to the centre-right in 1997 and 2009 — this is 
consistent with the findings above where the average individual tends to locate himself or herself 
within a relatively moderate range, especially close to the centre-right. When respondents place 
parties on the scale, they perceive major parties like the ANC and DA as in or close to the moderate 
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range. From the data it is observable that individuals never placed these parties on the extreme left 
or extreme right. In other words, the average citizen does not view major parties as extremist. 
It is interesting that the ANC in 1997 and 2009 was placed relatively close to the median voter 
position. In 1994, citizens placed the ANC near the centre-left but felt that the DA was very close to 
their position. In 2009, respondents placed the DA in the centre-left while they were on the centre-
right and placed the ANC in that position. It seems like in 2009 voters felt that the DA was further 
away from their position than the ANC. In fact, individuals perceived opposition parties as quite 
distant. Although little time-series data is available, it might be that citizens feel the ANC better 
reflects their ideological predispositions rather than the opposition bloc. Moreover, there is a degree 
of accuracy in voter placement of parties primarily because the placement of the DA on the centre-
left is consistent with the findings in Chapter 5 that show the party has been moving to the left. Yet, 
it is not clear why the ANC is often characterised as centre-right — in this case, citizens may be 
referring to some other dimension that is unrelated to the economic cleavage.  
In conclusion, it can be deduced that the left-right positions of citizens are clustered around the 
centre and centre-right of the spectrum. This also primarily implies that the average voter prefers 
less  extremist  positions  and  is  rarely  located  on  the  ideological  fringes.  Party  leaders  and 
representatives converged on the point that voters are relatively moderate and take up in-between 
positions. In relation to specific ideological blocs, the left bloc consistently lost appeal over the 
years as a preferred personal position for citizens. Also, when the median position of citizens are 
compared with their placement of major parties, results indicate that they locate the ANC closest to 
them, that is on the centre and centre-right, and feel that the opposition bloc is further away from 
their  preferences.  In  this  sense,  voters  think  the  ANC  better  represents  them  on  policy  and 
ideological issues rather than opposition parties — only in 1994 citizens placed the DA close to and 
the ANC further from them. In sum, citizens position themselves and major parties in the centre and 
centre-right rather than on the extremes.   
 6.1.2 Social change: Reform or fundamental transformation 
While  left-right  self-placement  provides  a  direct  measure  of  ideological  orientations  within  the 
electorate, other more indirect measures serve as additional indicators. One such measure includes 
what citizens think about social change. WVS waves asked respondents to choose between three 
kinds of attitudes about the mode of change in society. It is evident from Figure 6.5 that people have 
consistently  felt  that  valiant  defence and radical  change of  society is  much less  preferred than 
gradual reforms and improvements. Some 56% on average position themselves in a moderate space 
by opting for gradual improvements of society through reform. In stark contrast, only 15% opt for 
fundamental change and 16% for valiant defence. In the negative, a low proportion think the entire 
way society is organised must be radically changed through revolutionary action and actionable 
vanguardism against existing social structures — on the latter, WVS referred to ‘valiant defence’ as 
a brave defence of society against all subversive forces.
This  suggests  that  during  the  period  of  apartheid  (1980s)  and  particularly  in  the  political 
negotiation period (early 1990s), a majority of individuals surveyed preferred modest and gradual 
reform even under conditions of political unfreedom that seemed to demand radical transformation.  3
Such preferences seem to concord with the ANC’s, as the major liberation movement,  political 
approach in the early 1990s which was largely characterised by suspension of the armed struggle 
and the pursuit of negotiations as the preferred method for progress. However, this explanation does 
not suffice because suspension of military action only occurred in 1990. This means citizens were 
operating relatively independently of political dynamics by opting for moderate tendencies. 
In addition, given the levels of violence that occurred during this period and also post-apartheid 
protests, it does not necessarily signify that people are more radicalised in the their preference for 
change (Bond et al, 2013). It is more plausible to think about citizens as dissatisfied with the state of 
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progress. This means, for instance, that citizens expect accelerated and quality political output such 
as service delivery rather than some radical restructuring of the social makeup. 
On the  whole,  given  that  over  the  years,  from 1982 to  2001,  citizens  regularly  and  almost 
unchangingly assumed a modest and moderate approach to social change, it signifies the lack of 
appetite for radicalism in the general social structure, including the socioeconomic. This finding 
acts as another factor that provides evidence of moderation at the social level. Moreover, to be more 
specific,  this  kind  of  moderation  is  primarily  related  to  preferences  for  change  not  social 
mobilisation. 
6.2 Economic preferences 
Citizen preferences on economic policies provide an important indication about their position on the 
left-right economic cleavage. In this way, economic issues also serve as a measure to check the 
validity of citizen self-placement data. This section includes an examination of citizen preference on 
(a) control and management of the economy, (b) income inequality and government intervention, 
and (c) property rights and land redistribution.
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6.2.1 Control and management of the economy 
WVS and  Afrobarometer  surveys  asked  citizens  about  their  views  on  private  and  government 
ownership of business and industry — these were relatively similar questions. Results depicted in 
Figure 6.6 show that in 1990, a majority of citizens preferred private over government ownership of 
business but between 1996 to 2006, there was close competition between the two groups of citizens. 
By 2013, more citizens opted for government ownership, in direct comparison to the 1990 result. 
Moreover, two episodes of inconsistency appear in the data. First, while there was more stability 
of the pro-privatisation group between 1996 to 2006, the pro-government group showed greater 
signs of  flux between 1996 to 2001.  Second,  between 2006 to 2013 both groups diverged and 
preference for government ownership was on the increase matched by a decrease in support for 
private ownership. Given this inconsistency, observing the latter result alone may be unreliable; the 
mean result should be considered for a broader picture of the overall pattern of preferences. 
Mean  scores  reveal  close  contestation  between  pro-government,  37%,  and  pro-privatisation, 
38%, adherents. In addition, 20% of citizens are unsure about what they support. This means that 
75% of citizens, between 1990 and 2013, locate themselves somewhere in the privatisation debate. 
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Citizens,  in  addition,  are almost  equally divided on whether  they prefer  government  or  private 
ownership. On the latter, although from 2001 pro-government adherents increased, over the years 
there has been no clear majority to reflect preference for any one side — if citizens were regularly 
on one side they would not be divided. The balance could, however, be tipped by movement of the 
undecided or floating group becoming partisan to either economic side. 
In  addition,  although  there  appears  to  be  a  negative  linear  relationship  between  the  pro-
government and undecided group, there is a weak relationship. This means it cannot be said that 
when pro-government adherents increase this comes from a decrease in the undecided group (r = -.
17).  In fact, decreasing support for private ownership goes to an increase in the undecided group (r 4
=  -.65)  and  an  increase  in  pro-government  support  (r  =  -.62).  Thus,  former  pro-privatisation 
supporters  choose  to  sit  in  a  grey  area  of  indecision  and  some  choose  to  defect  to  the  pro-
government side. 
When citizens were asked about management of the economy, a 2002 Afrobarometer survey 
revealed  that  a  clear  majority  (62%)  strongly  approved/approved  that  individuals  decide  for 
themselves what to produce and what to buy and sell and a small proportion strongly disapproved/
disapproved (17%).  Also, citizens seem to prefer free-marketism when it comes to them being free 5
to earn as much as they can even if it leads to large differences in income (63%) rather than the 
government placing limits on how much rich people earn even if it discourages others from working 
hard (33%) (Afrobarometer, 2000).  This resembled much of the situation in 1994 when almost 6
50% strongly disagreed/disagreed that government ought to decide how much people earn, and 31% 
strongly agreed/agreed (IDASA, 1994).  People prefer to migrate from lower to middle and upper-7
class ladder; for them, the government should not limit this movement by controlling income. Thus, 
on production/distribution decided by the individual and free earnings, citizens seem to eschew 
interventionist tendencies on the economic structure of society.  
The observed movement to the left by opposition parties and even the dominant party embracing 
the left position may be associated with citizen decrease in support for the issues like privatisation, 
and the preference left issues. However, this is not straightforward since major parties are rarely 
articulating issues of nationalisation. In can, nonetheless, perhaps be said that voter preferences on 
economic issues affect the type of policy packages parties offer back to the electorate.
In summary, some 70% of citizens take a stand on who should control and manage the economy. 
Longitudinal data shows that in 1990 a majority wanted private ownership of the economy but in 
2013 more opted for government ownership — this locates citizens on the left bloc. However, the 
overall picture shows a public divided between pro-privatisation and pro-government adherents. In 
other words, there is no clear majority that consistently preferred either type of economic model. 
Some citizens are on the right and some are on the left. Moreover, it is not easy to place citizens on 
the left because (a) a clear majority approve that the individual should decide what to produce, buy 
and sell. In addition, (b) citizens in 1994 and 2000 consistently showed majority preference for the 
market  enabling  them to  earn  as  much  as  they  can  rather  than  the  government  limiting  their 
earnings. It can be concluded that citizens do not show absolute or unconditional preference for a 
government-run or free-market economy: they are located on the left and right on certain issues. It 
might be that citizens prefer an appropriate mix between the ideological blocs.
6.2.2 Income inequality and government intervention
Figure 6.7 shows the percentage of people who support income equality or income inequality. Mean 
scores show that over the years there has been close competition between the groups. In 1990 to 
2013, those who agreed that incomes should be made more equal constituted 40% of citizens, those 
who opted for income inequality and differential income structures formed 39% of citizen, and 19% 
were in-between these two categories. Citizens are largely divided on the matter. 
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Compared to 1990, a declining number of citizens think that income should be made more equal, 
as shown in Figure 6.7. By 2013, only 24% strongly agreed/agreed that there is a need for income 
equality, compared to 53% in 1990. This signifies that people are increasingly subscribing to the 
idea  that  large  income  differences  are  justifiable  and  that  those  who  work  hard,  demonstrate 
individual effort and take responsibility for their success deserve to be rewarded. Those who hold 
the view that incomes should be kept unequal and there is a need for larger income differences, 
consistently  increased since  1990.  In  addition,  whilst  most  citizens  took a  clear  stand in  1990 
whether to equalise income or not, by 2013 there was a 244% increase in those who were unable to 
clearly support a particular view. Any (a) increase in support for equalising incomes comes from a 
decrease in the number of indecisive citizens (r = -.96); and (b) further increases in support for 
income inequality comes from those fed-up with supporting income equalisation (r = -.93). Thus, it 
appears that citizens who were previously committed to the ideal of income equality are becoming 
dissuaded by it and are resorting to the grey area of indecision or are supporting income inequality. 
This tallies with the above finding that instead of some kind of ‘absolute equality’, citizens accept 
the feature of ‘relative equality’ in terms of income; and expect  to be rewarded for hard work 
irrespective if this reward produces income inequality. 
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Whilst there is usually a degree of division and an emerging divergence between those who 
support  income  equality  and  income  inequality,  on  average  43%  of  individuals  think  that 
government  should take more responsibility  for  the wellbeing of  the population;  35% feel  that 
individuals  should  carry  this  burden;  and 21% are  unable  to  place  themselves  in  any of  these 
categories (as shown in Figure 6.8). So in spite of decreasing support for government responsibility, 
on average support for it has been higher than individual responsibility. Compared to the time-series 
data, a 1999 EPOP survey revealed a similar finding, it found that 49% of individuals believe that 
government  should be more active in  the economy, while  37% said that  the market  should be 
active.  According to Figure 6.8, when there is an increase in the government-responsibility group, 8
there is a decrease in the individual-responsibility group and vice versa (r = -.95); and when support 
for the former increase/decrease, there is an decrease/increase in those who are undecided (r = -.77). 
This suggests in one sense that when citizens become frustrated with supporting the government, 
they are likely to turn to individual responsibility or are undecided.
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In terms of government intervention in creating jobs, one survey showed that 57% of citizens 
think that the government should help to provide employment for everyone who wants to work; 
while only 42% agreed that the best way to create jobs is to encourage people to start their own 
large or small businesses (Afrobarometer, 2000).  So, a majority feel that the public sector should 9
have a larger role in job creation — but also a considerable percentage feel that individuals should 
take responsibility in the job market. Also, as Table 6.1 shows, WVS waves in 2006 and 2013 asked 
citizens about their view on government taxation used for subsidisation. A majority of citizens, 
56%, felt that the state should tax the rich to subsidise the poor, which was considered an important 
feature of democracy. 
There  is  considerable  homogeneity  between  survey  and  interview data.  On  the  latter,  party 
leaders and officials converge on the notion that there are socialist tendencies within the electorate. 
While  on  social  matters  citizens  are  conservative,  on  economic  issues  they  are  more  leftist. 
According to interview respondents,  this  is  primarily evidenced (a)  through the perception that 
‘government should provide everything’. The poor, in particular, have been led to believe there are 
unlimited resources and the state is capable of using it to dispense social goods. UDM leader, Bantu 
Holomisa, explained that there is a strong ‘culture of dependency’ where citizens tend to depend too 
much on government support, in the form of grants or other state ‘handouts’. One IFP respondent 
said  that  this  culture  originates  from past  material  exclusion  and  economic  deprivation:  when 
citizens compare the democratic period to the apartheid era, they expect the elected government to 
deliver basic needs and sympathise with their poverty. For others, (b) electoral results and party 
support indicate leftist electorate tastes. Since the ANC is a left of centre party that gains popular 
support, it implies that there are strong leftist currents amongst the electorate. So, parties argue that 
there is a government-dependent citizenry who support a centre-left party. 
In conclusion, it seems that (a) public sentiments favour the left, that is state intervention in the 
economy and a higher role for the state (government responsibility, active state, job creation and 
taxation). However, this is not an overriding majority and sometimes there is no clear majority in 
the first  place.  Leftist  inclinations within the electorate  are  also observed by party  leaders  and 
officials, who interact with voters on the ground and hence provide a reliable source of information 
about  the  ideological  distribution  of  the  electorate.  They  state  that  citizens  seem  to  view  the 
government as an important part in alleviating social ills, and also choose to put a centre-left party 
in government. According to longitudinal and single-time period data, (b) a considerable portion of 
the citizenry also feel the market and individuals should play a role in the wellbeing of citizens and 
in job creation. In addition, the right element comes in because people prefer ‘relative equality’, 
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Table 6.1 Government tax rich and subsidise poor, 2006 and 2013*
2006 2013
Not an essential characteristic of democracy 20,7 20
An essential characteristic of democracy 56,6 55,3
Don’t agree with either/in-between 16,9 22,9
Don’t know 5,7 1,7
(n=) (2,816) (3,473)
*WVS waves  used  the  scale:  1  =  not  at  all  an  essential  characteristic  of  democracy,  10  =  it  definitely  is  an  essential 
characteristic of democracy. I assigned the following categories to the numerical hierarchy: 1, 2, 9, 10 = strongly agree; 3, 4, 
7, 8 = somewhat agree; 5 and 6 = don’t agree with either, in-between. I further merged strongly agree and somewhat agree. 
Source: WVS (2006, 2013)
accept income differences and want to be rewarded for work. Less people are endorsing the leftist 
ideal of income equality — effectively locating citizens on the right bloc on the income equality 
matter. Thus, although the government plays a critical role in citizen perception of responsibility, it 
is  not seen as the only transformative force for an individual’s success and wellbeing — since 
citizens also support individual initiatives. Citizens prefer left elements in the form of an active state 
(especially in job creation and taxation) and right elements on income difference.  
6.2.3 Property rights and land redistribution
Three surveys make it  possible  to  assess  citizen perception of  land redistribution and property 
rights, as Figure 6.9 depicts. In 1995, an IDASA survey found that when individuals were asked 
what they thought about government taking possession of someone’s land: 38% said never, 26% felt 
it  should  be  for  public  good,  29% mentioned  restitution  and  giving  land  back  to  people  who 
previously owned it or to those without land, and 1% said the state should possess land whenever it 
wants.10
On the issue of how land repossession should proceed, the following views were found. The first 
relates to confiscation, seizure and stealing of property. In 1994, when asked about government-led 
confiscation of land, 41% of citizens disagreed that the government should confiscate land and give 
it to the landless while 37% agreed (IDASA, 1994).  A 2013 WVS wave asked citizens whether it 11
is acceptable to steal property. Results show that 57% strongly agreed/agreed that stealing property 
was never justifiable, and 26% strongly agreed/agreed that it is always justifiable.  It is striking that 12
no significant change occurred from 1994 to 2013. There was an 11% drop in those who supported 
land confiscation, and a 16% rise in support for those who disagreed with it. Given that a large 
plurality supported confiscation, it signifies an extremist element within the electorate. However, it 
seems  that  respect  for  property  rights  is  increasing  and  radical  notions  of  land  possession  is 
decreasing. 
The second relates to the payment of repossessed land; that is, whether there should be market-
based compensation or no payment at all. In general, the public look favourably on property rights. 
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When asked how the  government  should  pay  for  repossessed  land,  72% said  it  should  follow 
current market value and 3% said the government does not have to pay (IDASA, 1995).  Similarly, 13
in 2002, an Afrobarometer survey It found that 68% of people mentioned that the government must 
abide by laws in acquiring property, including paying the owner; and 17% agreed that in order to 
develop  the  country,  the  government  should  have  the  power  to  seize  property  without 
compensation.  It seems that those who believe in no compensation and no payment have increased 14
by 14%, and those who support payment decreased by 4%. 
In summation, although 55% of citizens are of the view that government should repossess land 
for  public  good  or  for  redistribution,  there  is  no  overriding  majority  that  support  government 
repossession. But more importantly, there is a plurality that subscribe to stealing or confiscating 
property. However, this has decreased. Moreover, those who support property rights have always 
been higher than those who do not; in fact, there was majority support that stealing property is 
unacceptable.  And  any  state-led  repossession  should  follow  market  compensation  and  legal 
procedures.  This  shows  that  although  citizens  are  inclined  to  support  land  restitution  and 
redistribution, a considerable number tend to respect property rights, market-valued compensation 
and legal procedures for repossession. This effectively locates citizens in a mixed position. On the 
one hand they value some kind of government-led land repossession; on the other hand, they value 
respect for property rights. 
6.3 Mapping voter left-right positions and polarisation 
This section summarises much of the discussion. It locates the general trajectory of voter positions 
in terms of the left-right and the degree of polarisation at the electorate level. 
6.3.1 Citizen left-right positions
On the ideological nature of the electorate, in most cases there is no clear majority that adheres to a 
free-market or government-run economy but more prefer the latter. Since 2006 more citizens opted 
for government ownership of business and industry; and between 1996 to 2006 more supported 
government responsibility for citizen wellbeing. From individual time-period data, a clear majority 
supported  an  active  government  in  job  creation,  taxing  the  rich  to  subsidise  the  poor,  and 
government-led land repossession; yet these majorities are not overwhelming. This implies there is 
preference for the left side of the political spectrum. But from longitudinal data, given the absence 
of majority preference, it cannot be said that citizens skew the ideological balance at the social level 
in such a way that there is a unimodal left distribution (which would produce low polarisation since 
most voters would occupy the left side), but it can be said that citizens are in some occasional 
instances located on the left side more than they demonstrate preference for the right side (market-
run economy and privatisation) of the political spectrum.
It is important to consider bipolarity at the level of voters. Left preference is not observable in 
every instance: citizens are clearly on the right on some issues. This includes subscribing to the 
notion that individuals not the government should decide what they produce, buy and sell; and that 
the government should not limit an individual from earning as much as they want especially if they 
work hard. On the latter issue, longitudinal data shows that an increasing number of citizens are 
preferring differences in incomes for those who put more individual effort in their work; and are 
less supportive of equalising incomes. In addition, citizens who support redistribution of land, are 
also on the right side because they respect property rights, disapprove of stealing land, and are 
unsupportive  of  state-led  repossession  without  market-based  compensation  and  law-abiding 
procedures. 
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Mean results from longitudinal data on the economic cleavage reveal the overall strength of left-
right preferences. As Figure 6.10 shows, voters are located in the moderate range, either centre, 
centre-left or centre-right. The scale takes -1.00 to mean extreme left, -0.50 to mean centre-left, 0.0 
to mean centre, 0.50 to mean centre-right and 1.00 to mean extreme right. Citizens are dispersed on 
the left and right side of the political spectrum. However, consistent with the earlier analysis in this 
chapter, voters are more moderate than extremist — and consistent centre positioning attests to this. 
On the left, they do not hold the view that the government is the exclusive and absolute agent of 
economic change since no clear, let alone overwhelming, majorities are found on salient economic 
matters. Also, because citizens have preference for rightwing values, this prevents them from being 
on the extreme left; in effect characterising them as centre-left. On the right, while they opt for 
rightist ideals in certain cases, they are on the centre-right primarily because they have preference 
for leftist issues as well, meaning that citizens are not on the extreme right. 
Associating these results with the data from voter self-placement, as illustrated in Figure 6.1, it 
shows that voters are clustered in the centre, and this is the case for economic issues. So while the 
left-right self-placement pertains to general issues across a range of dimensions, on the economic 
dimension, it is clear that citizens are in the centre and this is either movement in the centre-left or 
centre-right. There is less appetite for the extremes. This infers that citizens accept some mixed 
position on economic issues, where they can merge leftist with rightist issues. 
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6.3.2 Citizen left-right polarisation
Longitudinal  data  reveals  that  voters  are  polarised  on  the  left-right  economic  cleavage.  As 
illustrated in Figure 6.11, the standard deviation (a measure voter polarisation) shows there is a 
large distance between those who support privatisation and government ownership of the economy, 
income equalisation and income differences,  and government and individual  responsibility.  The 
scale takes 0 to mean unpolarised (voters are all on the same side of the left-right spectrum) and 1 to 
mean polarised (voters are divided between the extremes). It is evident that as the years pass by, 
voters are approaching the range of moderate polarisation: there has been a consistent move in the 
direction of decreasing polarisation. 
Although results show that voters are not located in the extreme polarity range (0.9 to 1.0), they 
are highly polarised on specific economic issues. There is usually a large distance between voters on 
issues of the privatisation, equality and responsibility rather than a small distance between them. In 
other terms, citizens rarely occupy similar or one-sided positions on economic issues — such as 
when most are clearly located on the left,  centre or right side of the spectrum. On the issue of 
privatisation, polarisation ranged from 0.60 (2013) to 0.78 (1990); on equalising incomes, it varied 
between  0.64  (2013)  to  0.85  (1990);  and  on  government-individual  responsibility,  it  fluctuated 
between 0.64 (2013) to 0.81 (1990). The subsequent observation is that polarisation was particularly 
high in 1990 and significantly lowered by 2013.  
In brief, South African voters are (a) divided on salient socioeconomic issues; a portion assumes 
the  left  and  another  assumes  the  right,  thus  making  the  electorate  polarised.  Evidence  shows, 
however,  that  voters  are  (b)  consistently moving in the direction of  moderate  polarisation;  this 
suggests the more of the electorate are coming to occupy relatively similar left-right positions rather 
than choosing to be poles apart. Furthermore, it might be that parties have acknowledged the need 
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for a mix between these two preferences. The division at the electoral level, in other words, might 
be  aggregated  by  parties  who choose  to  merge  them into  some middle-of-the-ground position. 
Moreover, the absence of a clear majority on any side might be dissuading parties from adopting 
one-sided ideological  positions — although it  cannot automatically be assumed that  parties  are 
driven primarily by social influence. 
However, there is a limitation to this analysis. Given that the question in WVS waves did not 
directly pertain to the degree of leftness and rightness, that is whether citizens are moderate or 
radical on an issue, it cannot be clearly determined whether on the economic dimension, voters are 
highly polarised because one section is on the ‘extreme right’ and another on the ‘extreme left’. 
What nonetheless remains conclusive is that voters are divided on salient economic cleavages; both 
longitudinal  and  single  time-period  data  (from  economic  issues),  more  often  than  not,  show 
polarisation to be a constant social dynamic.  
When comparing voter polarisation on specific economic issues with voter polarisation from 
self-placement  results,  there  are  striking  similarities  between  the  two  datasets.  The  latter,  as 
depicted  in  Figure  6.12,  shows  that  in  1994  (0.77)  and  1997  (0.78)  there  was  high  levels  of 
polarisation. This was because almost equal amounts of citizens placed themselves on opposite 
ends, both on the far left and far right. From 1982 to 1990, 1990 to 1994, and 1994 to 1997, voters 
were becoming increasingly polarised and assuming opposite political preferences; but since 2001 
(0.58) voters began to move in the direction of low polarisation, so much so that by 2013 (0.47), 
voter firmly entered the space of moderate polarisation. 
Three specific phases of polarisation can be identified from voter left-right self-placement results 
(as summarised in Figure 6.13). The first phase is one of high polarisation between 1990 to 1997, 
where the same number of voters positioned themselves on opposite ends, mainly on the extreme 
left  (9%) and extreme right  (9%).  Meanwhile 7% were on the centre-left  and 5% were on the 
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centre-right. Considering this in terms of blocs, 16% supported the left, 14% supported the right and 
11% were in the centre. Given that dissimilar ideological blocs absorbed almost equal portions of 
support and there was not enough centre support or support for any one side over another,  the 
output was high polarisation. The shift to higher polarisation from 1990 (0.68) to 1994 (0.77) is 
attributed to an increase in support for the extreme left and extreme right. In addition, the move 
from 1994 to  1997 (0.78)  to  slightly  higher  polarisation  is  due  to  a  large  increase  in  extreme 
rightwing support and increases in extreme leftwing support. However, given that the centre was 
not absent or unoccupied and that slightly more preferred the left bloc over the right, it stopped 
polarisation from significantly increasing and moving into the 0.9 to 1 range. In this way, the centre 
seemed to hold the balance, inserting some moderation in the system — and if more individuals sat 
at the centre then polarisation would have abated (since it would be skewed to one side, the centre 
side). 
The second phase is  one of  semi-polarisation,  between 2001 and 2009 (including 1982 and 
1996).  It  involved  an  increasing  number  of  citizens  identifying  themselves  on  the  right;  this 
outweighed those on the left from inducing high polarisation. It also included a decreasing number 
of citizens placing themselves on the left. This period saw only 3% defining themselves as extreme 
left and 9% as extreme right; meanwhile 6% were on the centre-left and 11% on the centre-right. In 
terms of blocs, 9% were on the left bloc, 20% on the right and 15% in the centre. This clearly shows 
that opposing blocs, on the left and right, did not get equal support as in the period of 1990 to 1997. 
The movement to lower levels of polarisation from 2001 (0.58) to 2006 (0.54) was marked by a 
significant drop in the support for the extreme left and centre-left, even the centre; the decrease in 
polarisation  came  from  an  increase  in  support  for  the  centre-right  and  extreme  right.  Slight 
digression from 2006 to 2009 (0.58) was due to small increases in extreme left and right support. 
However, given that less were located on the opposite side, that is, the extreme left, it accounted for 
modest or semi-polarisation. Also, from 2001 to 2009, the scale titled more to one side, that is, to 
the centre and right where more citizens were located.
The third phase is one of moderate polarisation, this was particularly seen in 2013. The striking 
element in this year was that most citizens located themselves in the centre (34%) or centre-right 
(28%). Also, only 4% saw themselves as extreme left, 11% as extreme right, and 10% as centre-left. 
The support for particular ideological blocs give a clearer picture: only 14% were located on the 
left, meanwhile 39% were on the right and 34% on the centre. Since significantly more, two-fifths, 
placed themselves on the right,  and three-quarter  positioned themselves in the centre and right 
category,  it  implies  that  moderate  polarisation  is  due  to  citizens  occupying  similar  rather  than 
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opposed positions on the political spectrum, particularly the centre and centre-right. In other words, 
citizens are ascribing far less support for opposed and dissimilar ideological positions; rather they 
are supporting more similar positions. 
It is clear that there has been significant moves to the centre and occupation of right side of the 
political spectrum, and this has produced moderate levels of polarisation. By 2013, voters were less 
divided than between 1990 to 1997. This is due to relatively consistent movement to adopt similar 
rather than differing ideological positions, especially on the right bloc. Also, this might have some 
influence on opposition parties who adopt similar positions to the ANC — consistent moves to 
similarity at the voter level might match consistent moves to similarity amongst parties. However it 
is not easy to determine whether voters are influencing parties or vice versa, or whether this is a 
dynamic interaction. Evidence seems to be pointing to the dawn of low polarisation amongst the 
South  African  electorate  where  they  are  beginning  to  converge  to  one  side  of  the  left-right 
continuum; and more people are exhibiting growing preference for similar ideological orientations 
and  less  people  are  poles  apart  especially  in  defining  their  personal  political  orientation.  This 
suggests  that  voters  are  likely  perceiving  and  identifying  with  politics  and  salient  social  and 
economic issues from one particular ideological lens: the centre. 
There is notable correspondence with polarisation results obtained from voter self-placement and 
economic issues. A correlation, in respective relational years, for both data sets reveal a significant 
relation (r = .94). This importantly suggests that there is reliability in the polarisation scores that is 
derived from economic issues. Moreover, the way voters define themselves reveal high polarisation, 
similar to more indirect measures from the economic dimension. In addition, both results concur a 
similar and consistent directional movement, that is,  voters have been moving toward moderate 
polarisation. 
6.4 Policy voting: A critical analysis
This section examines the presence of policy voting and perceived most important issues.  This 
serves to provide a specific and direct sense of whether voters are policy-oriented and issues that 
occupy their attention. First,  I  discuss citizen perceptions about the difference between political 
parties and the presence of real policy choices. This is followed by a discussion of policy and non-
policy reasons for partisanship and voting. Second, the subsequent discussion is about perceived 
national priorities and most important issues. After this,  I  discuss the causes of non-ideological 
voting. Both sections rely on survey and interview data. 
 6.4.1 Party differences and policy voting
Existing data makes it possible to assess citizen perception about party difference and competitive 
policy  choice.  The  2004 SASAS wave asked respondents  whether  “political  parties  don’t  give 
voters real policy choices” (unfortunately, this element was not carried into subsequent waves, and 
other surveys rarely asked this question, so time-series data on this matter is largely unavailable; 
although one snapshot should not be excluded altogether since it  presents valuable information 
about  citizen  perceptions).  The  survey  result  indicates  that  more  individuals,  38.3%,  strongly 
agreed/agreed that  parties do not  present real  policy choices,  while 28.2% believed that  parties 
actually offer real policy-based choices to the average voter, and 21% supported neither option.  15
The 2009 CSES wave asked: “During the election campaign, would you say that there were 
major differences between the parties, minor differences or no differences at all?” Although this is a 
rather comprehensive and not a direct policy-based question, we can assume that citizen perception 
of overall party difference is inclusive of some notion of party policies and programmatic platforms 
— to be sure, perceptions of party difference may relate to a number of things, including campaign 
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strategies,  party  motivations  such  as  vote-seeking,  integrity  and  trust,  and  representation  and 
interest  articulation.  A majority  of  respondents,  50.3%,  held  that  there  were  major  differences 
between parties during the 2009 election campaign, only one-third, 33.8%, felt that parties occupy 
similar platforms and have only minor differences, and a small portion, 8.4%, believed that parties 
are exactly the same with no observable difference between them at all, whether ideological or non-
ideologically.  16
Although 92.5% of  the  public  have  an  opinion  about  the  similarity  and  difference  between 
parties, it is unlikely this constitutes policy-based reasons. It appears that the majority who felt there 
were major differences are locating these differences outside of a policy space. Since in 2004 only a 
handful  concurred that  parties  were  not  offering genuine policies  as  opposed to  2009 where  a 
majority  felt  differences  were  evident  between  parties,  this  suggests  that  perceptions  of  party 
difference may be unrelated to policy proposals. If it were in a policy sense, then those who said 
parties were offering genuine policy choices would have been in the majority which would tally 
with the majority that said there were major differences between parties. This is, however, a rather 
tentative  argument  because  circumstances  surrounding  voter  perceptions  might  have  changed 
between 2004 and 2009; so voters might have felt in 2004 that policy choices were lacking but by 
2009 felt that party difference were related to parties offering real policy or programmatic choices. 
Nonetheless, the non-policy reasons for party difference is more plausible given the data below. 
To be more specific on the nature of differences, a 2016 Afrobarometer survey asked individuals 
to state the most important difference between the ANC and opposition parties. Only 26.4% thought 
there were no differences but 68.6% felt that differences were evident, as displayed in Table 6.2 — 
this tallies with the majority in 2009 that also agreed there were differences. Of those who saw 
parties  as  distinct,  52.3%  highlighted  non-policy  reasons  such  as  party  integrity  or  honesty, 
experience and candidate personality (including religious, ethnic and regional affiliation); and only 
13.8% cited economic and development policies as a reason. This implies than only one in seven 
voters are likely to see party difference as related to socioeconomic developmental policies and 
programmes, while the vast majority perceive party differentials in terms of non-policy factors. So 
while  a  significant  number  of  citizens  have  consistently  held  opinions  about  party  differences, 
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Table 6.2 Most important difference between the ruling party and opposition parties
There is no difference 26,4
The honesty or integrity of party leaders 23,6
Their economic and development policies 13,8
The experience of party leaders 13,6
The personalities of party leaders 5,7
The religion of party leaders or members 5,1
The ethnicity of party leaders or members 3,0
The regional identity of party leaders or members 1,3
None of these 2,5
Don’t know 4,9
(n=) (2,390)
Source: Afrobarometer (2016)
evidence shows that they locate such differences in a non-policy space, although it is important not 
to eliminate the policy factor because of its low score.
However,  this  argument  can  be  questioned  in  light  of  partisan  dynamics.  Although  party 
differences  are  not  interpreted  in  overt  ideological  or  policy  terms,  voting  behaviour  and 
partisanship  is  based  upon  indirect  measures  of  programmatic  platforms  albeit  irregular  and 
occasional. Surveys specifically asking citizens to state reasons for party support reveal different 
results. On the one hand, there is little policy voting, while on the other side, voters are engaged in 
endorsing programmatic platforms. On two occasions voters were asked reasons why they voted for 
a particular party in the election. 
In 1994, results presented in Table 6.3 show that voters were largely preoccupied with issues that 
were outside of the conventional policy space. In fact, the non-policy dimension (58%) surpassed 
the  policy  dimension  (28%)  by  a  large  margin.  Party  performance  and  anticipation  of  future 
performance, party competence, candidate personality, partisanship, trust and integrity in the party, 
and party strength, subsumed more than half of the non-policy space (39% out of 58%). Specific 
identity issues like race, ethnicity and class took only one seventh (9%) of this.  Yet,  there is a 
considerable  fraction  within  the  electorate  that  assert  overt  ideological  responses  and  policy 
preferences  as  a  determinant  of  party  support.  It  is  interesting  that  as  early  as  1994,  the  first 
democratic  election,  voters  were  far  from  immune  to  programmatic  or  policy-based  voting 
behaviour, where some 28% highlighted ideological, policy and moral principles for voting. 
There was observable change in the 1999 survey. Voters specified more policy-based reasons for 
party  choice  (69%),  as  shown  in  Table  6.4.  This  included  a  number  of  specific  policy  and 
programmatic promises made by parties like improved material conditions, the delivery of jobs, 
housing, land distribution, subsidised education and crime prevention. The first three issues on its 
own represented 53%. This indicates the importance of the socioeconomic cleavage at the electoral 
level.  On more non-specific deliverables,  11% of respondents  endorsed general  party promises, 
policies  and  vision,  party  economic  policy  and  felt  that  their  preferred  party  represented  their 
interests  and needs.  Of the 19% who opted for  non-policy reasons for  party support,  only 4% 
located such reasons in racial terms (‘a party for blacks or whites’ or ‘gives blacks a chance to 
govern’),  and the remaining 15% mentioned trust in the party, an effective opposition party, an 
alternative party of government, and political stability. Voters clearly demonstrated preference for 
policies  parties  presented  to  address  social  problems  — although  it  may  not  necessarily  infer 
rigorous  engagement in programmatic approval or disapproval. 
While identified policy factors not directly relate to some ideological orientation, as interview 
respondents highlighted, promises made and messages presented cannot be easily separated from 
policy. For the party itself, policies and principles guide programmes and the message articulated to 
voters. A policy represents a message and a message is a function of policy. As former DA leader, 
Tony Leon, noted, the example of the DA in 1999 where the party proposed the need for oversight 
and checking political power, these ideas were embodied in a liberal philosophical outlook. Even 
policies by the EFF on nationalisation, land reform, and drastic increases in social welfare, are 
embodied in far leftism. So, there is an element of policy that indirectly influences voters who 
support certain messages, promises and programmes.
When assessing the 1999 election manifesto of the major party (where the ANC forms the main 
focus of this research project), much of the policy inclinations of individuals in the 1999 survey 
tallies with what the ANC presented to the electorate. It cannot, however, be assumed that all survey 
respondents voted for the ANC, what can be assumed from a nationally representative survey is that 
responses mimic partisanship patterns at the voter level. The ANC stated in its 1999 manifesto that 
it “has the policies in place for us to build a better life together” and was “determined to align all 
government policies and programmes to achieve our objective of sustainable jobs for all at a living 
wage”  (ANC,  1999).  The  party  largely  confronted  the  scourge  of  unemployment,  poverty  and 
inequality from a platform that it had the right policies in place. The ANC specifically asserted its 
commitment  to  the  RDP and  presented  its  campaign  under  the  slogan  ‘a  better  life  for  all’. 
Particular  areas  of  party  programme  included  improving  the  housing  subsidy  and  uplifting 
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conditions  of  the  urban  poor  in  informal  settlements,  speeding  up  job  creation  and  expanding 
economic opportunities for the poor and other groups, and racial empowerment policies. This seems 
to correspond with the issues citizens highlighted in the 1999 survey. 
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Table 6.3 Policy- and non-policy-related reasons for party support: 1994
Policy reasons
Ideological responses 14,0
Policy preferences 12,7
Moral principles 1,2
Policy reasons total 27,9
Non-policy reasons
Performance to date 12,8
Future performance 6,3
Competence 5,3
Personalities of candidates 4,3
Partisanship 4,0
Trust 3,4
Strength 2,7
Nature of the times 1,1
Group reference: Race 6,4
Group reference: South Africa 4,6
Group reference: Ethno-linguistic 2,1
Group reference: Me 1,0
Group reference: Class 0,1
Group reference: Minorities 0,1
Reference: Undefined 2,2
Reference: Family 1,4
Reference: Friends 0,2
Reference: race 0,1
Reference: Ethno-linguistic 0,1
Non-policy reasons 58,2
Other 
Confidential 6,5
Don’t like other parties (could be policy or non-policy reasons) 4,7
Don’t know 2,7
Others total 13,9
N (2,406)
Source: IDASA (1994)
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Table 6.4 Policy- and non-policy-related reasons for party support: 1999
Policy reasons
Party promises programmes that will create better life and improve material 
conditions
32,6
Party promises programmes that will deliver jobs (give me a job) 13,8
Party promises programmes that will deliver housing (to get a house) 6,6
Party makes good promises 4,4
Party policy, vision and solutions 2,9
Crime policy, parties promise to stop crime and violence and create a safer 
country
2,2
Party represents my interests and needs 1,8
Good economic policy 1,6
Party is democratic, liberal and non-discriminatory 1,4
Party promises not kept 0,7
Personal rights 0,5
Most realistic party 0,4
Supports land distribution (give me land) 0,3
School bursaries (subsidise education) 0,1
Policy reasons total 69,3
Non-policy reasons 
Trust or belief in party 9,5
Opposition party (good or only party in opposition) 3,2
A party for all blacks 1,9
Give blacks a chance to govern 1,0
To give government a chance 0,9
Increase pension 0,8
To give another party a chance 0,7
A party for the nation 0,7
A party for whites 0,4
For political stability 0,2
Non-policy reasons total 19,3
Other
Like the party (could be policy or non-policy reasons) 2,7
Party does the right thing (could be policy or non-policy reasons) 1,9
Better than other parties (could be policy or non-policy reasons) 1,5
For no reason 1,4
Party will make things right (could be policy or non-policy reasons) 0,9
Others 0,7
Don’t Know 0,2
Missing 2,1
Others total 11,4
(n=) (2,672)
Source: EPOP (1999)
In brief, the 1999 theme emphasised the government’s intent to speed up existing programmes of 
the party “to improve the quality of life of the people”. Although parties like the DP focused on 
economic policies, it particularly prioritised the government’s “[b]acksliding in respect of labour 
market flexibility, pubic sector downsizing and privatisation” and creating an efficient market-based 
economy, thereby giving reduced prominence to improving the quality of life (DP, 1999). It also 
focused on the ‘ugly face of race’ pursued through the government’s empowerment policies and the 
ANC ‘grabbing all levers of power’ — it was a campaign to ‘fight back for a better future’. 
Although voters were preoccupied with non-policy reasons for voting in 1994 (especially party 
performance, competence, candidate personality, partisanship, party trust and strength) and non-
policy  reasons  for  party  difference  in  2016,  a  handful  stated  ideological  responses,  policy 
preferences and economic policies for party support. This indicates that a portion of the electorate 
are receptive to and persuadable by party policy platforms. Moreover, the balance seemed to have 
tipped by the 1999 election where voters perceived parties as offering policies that were close to 
and supportive of their own preferences and needs, especially on the economic cleavage (quality of 
life, jobs and housing). Buttressing the idea that the electorate are actively engaged in policy-based 
inter-party  discrimination,  it  revealed  demonstrable  preference  for  programmes,  policies  and 
promises. 
Much of this might be explained by the ANC’s popularisation of the RDP in the post-1994 period 
and voter observation of party performance and trust. In other terms, voters were more concerned 
about party policies and programmes that would advance social progress and development, and they 
stood on this platform from the vantage point of prior performance where they trusted parties (their 
strength, competence and candidates) to perform. Put another way, there was an evident intermixing 
of reasons which seemed to undergird policy and programmatic preferences. In addition, the ANC 
as the major electoral party strongly put forward an issue-based agenda consistent with the RDP; 
and it could be that the politicisation of policy-based cleavages influenced voters to notice policies 
and  programmes.  In  fact,  a  survey  asked  voters  whether  they  heard  about  specific  economic 
policies, namely the RDP, and 89% responded ‘yes’ (IDASA, 1995).  Strikingly, much less, 13%, 17
were aware about the Structural Adjustment Programme, presumably included under the auspices of 
GEAR; and this might be attributable to the ANC’s avoidance of politicising the unpopular policy 
and  opting  to  present  the  RDP as  the  chief  programme  of  government  in  the  1999  election 
(Afrobarometer, 2000).  18
While there may be an ebb and flow in policy-voting, there certainly is no committed majority 
that consistently and discernibly engage in policy-based calculations. As seen in 2009 and 2016, 
party difference is not perceived in policy terms; and in 1994, the non-policy dimension dominated 
party  support  — only  1999 stood as  an  exception  for  policy  voting.  Since  subsequent  data  is 
unavailable, I rely on observations of parties. When relating the survey-based findings of both non-
policy  and  policy  voting,  interview  data  indicates  the  prevalence  of  the  former.  Almost  all 
respondents coalesced on the presence of the non-ideological/non-policy feature of the electorate. 
COPE leader, Mosiuoa Lekota said: “I think the rank-and-file voters are not so enlightened about 
ideologies” (Interview). Former DA policy head, Ken Andrew, puts it that “most people are not all 
that interested in the details of [party] policy” (Interview). Agreeing with this view, former DA 
leader, Tony Leon, said that “people vote on other concerns rather than strict ideology”; voting has 
“less to do with programme-specifics” (Interview).  UDM leader,  Bantu Holomisa,  emphatically 
posited that “[t]he politics of ideology is not in the vocabulary of the majority of voters in this 
country” (Interview). Added to this, former senior ANC member, Frank Chikane, said people are 
not ‘socialised’ in ideological terms — whether liberal, conservative, centrist, moderate, left or right 
(Interview). In other words, the average voter is not an ideologue; and voters are not so much driven 
by  specific  or  sharp  issues.  By  extension,  voters  hardly  think  ideologically  about  parties.  One 
respondent said that policy-based issues are mainly discussed at the party level (Gumbi, Interview). 
As APC leader, Themba Godi, conveyed, although parties subscribe to policies and programmes as 
expressed in manifestos, “the percentage of people who make their choices based on such rationale 
readings are…very few” (Interview). Thus, according to most party respondents, the majority of 
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voters are fundamentally not informed by specific policy choices;  choices voters make are less 
explained in purely policy terms or rational policy calculations. 
Parties, however, are cautious of over generalising. They concede that there is a section of the 
electorate that look at policies, especially those in business, the educated, professionals, and middle 
and upper class — although they remain a minority that is largely overshadowed by a non-policy-
oriented majority. Both the middle and upper-class are supportive of social democracy and look for 
favourable economic policies (Habib, 2013; Butler, 2009; Southall and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014; 
Ngoma, 2014; Lodge, 2004; Seekings, 2005). Thus, there is a small proportion that actually express 
an opinion and think in policy terms.
For almost all interview respondents there is more to voter decisions than mere statements of an 
ideological or policy line. Parties alluded to the driving factors that they believe constitute the non-
policy  dimension  of  voting.  This  included  history  and  loyalty,  party  performance  and  trust, 
candidate personality, party campaign and voter needs, media access and party funding, and race. 
(a) Parties mentioned that voters are inclined to vote for parties who freed them and thus vote 
according  to  old  party  lines  —  they  are  historically  retrospective  and  are  ‘loyal  to 
liberators’ (Chikane, Godi, Meshoe, Mpontshane, Mulder: Interviews). History was considered the 
prime determinant of partisanship. This is, for respondents, not relative to the African electorate 
alone but even observable in the Afrikaner electorate. For these respondents, what this means is that 
voters  demonstrate  tolerance  and  patience  towards  parties  like  ANC even  in  circumstances  of 
dissatisfaction. One respondent called this ‘simplified voting’ on loyalties. 
(b) Party respondents also expressed that voters believe in parties that will deliver; they look at 
party  performance  and  base  their  trust  on  that  (Andrew,  Gumbi,  Holomisa,  Lekota,  Moakes: 
Interviews).  In  other  words,  what  parties  actually  do  in  terms  of  political  output  and  their 
experience on the ground are important to voters. “[F]ar more than what your policies say on paper, 
what you actually do in practice is going to count to your benefit or to your detriment” (Andrew, 
Moakes: Interviews). (c) Some felt that people vote on personality factors — this particularly came 
from  an  IFP respondent.  This  relates  to  particular  characteristics,  experience  and  charisma  of 
individual leaders. Voters, in this sense, feel that their interests and preferences are encapsulated in a 
single leader. 
(d)  The  empathising  need-based  campaign  was  also  flagged  as  an  important  driving  factor 
behind voting and party support. Those parties who respond to the needs of voters get support; it is 
insufficient  to  extend  a  policy  line  to  voters  because,  according  to  respondents,  they  need  to 
‘experience’ the party. This ‘experience’ comes less from ‘selling’ policies but approaching voters 
“on the basis of the issues that they confront” (Godi, Interview). Respondents explained that the 
concern for parties is whether the message presented during the campaign resonates with voters. 
Voters are not interested in what ideological content that message is wrapped in but “vote where 
they think they will  be  helped”  and for  the  party  that  best  represents  their  interests  (Chikane, 
Gardee,  Gumbi,  Holomisa:  Interviews).  So  although  parties  appeal  to  public  perceptions  from 
particular  ideological  schools,  voters  are  not  concerned about  the  ideology but  whether  parties 
sympathise with their issues. 
When asked whether they thought radical left parties gain support because of ideological factors, 
respondents said that voters who vote for these parties do so “not because they are [ideologically] 
radical” but they feel radical parties offer “instantaneous resolution of their problems” (Lekota, 
Madlalose,  Mpontshane:  Interviews).  The rhetoric  appeals  particularly  to  the  poor  who believe 
exaggerations, unrealistic promises and unimplementable programmes. Even one EFF respondent 
recognised that party support derives less from ideological principles but from sympathising with 
the needs of the electorate. The leader of one radical left party, the PAC, said “most of the time what 
we tell people is what they want to hear” (Mbinda, Interview). In addition, some explained that it is 
dissatisfaction with the ANC. Parties like the EFF win support not on the grounds of ideological 
radicalism but  their  political  posturing  as  an  antidote  to  the  ANC;  some termed  this  ‘revenge 
politics’ against the ruling party for failing to deliver on their promises (Andrew, Godi, Moakes: 
Interviews).
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(e) Another factor was the perception of an alternative party constituting a strong opposition to 
the ANC. Former DA leader explained that during his time as party leader, “most people voted for 
the  DA…really  for  a  perception  that  the  party  was  a  strong  opposition…more  than  on  policy 
grounds” (Interview). (f) Parties also mentioned media access. Voters vote the way they do because 
of  poor  access  to  media or  when such access  is  controlled by the state  (such as  SABC).  This 
restrains  voter  access  to  alternative  sources  of  information,  especially  in  rural  areas  (Andrew, 
Mbinda, Mulder). One respondent alleged that opposition parties are often vilified in these news 
channels  and  are  presented  as  the  enemy  of  the  majority  — an  enemy  that  will  “bring  back 
apartheid”. Interviewees presume that openness to more sources of information will result in shifts 
in voting behaviour and party support. In addition, a respondent mentioned party funding as the 
reason why voters keep voting for particular parties.  The lack of campaign funding, that stems 
mainly from the proportional allocation of party funding, hinders parties from reaching voters and 
subsequently limits the vote share of small  parties.  If  a party cannot access funds,  they cannot 
access the electorate and there is no meaningful competition and little shifts/gains in party support. 
(g) Moreover, only two respondents gave a race-based approach to voting (Andrew, Steward: 
Interviews). Andrew said the vast majority of blacks identify more or less with the ANC, and whites 
identify more or less with the DA; this feature of “identity politics” is what he terms a “down-to-
earth thought process” occurring within the electorate (Interview). If a party leader is the same race 
as the party’s largest constituency, voters would feel that particular leader will more likely represent 
their views. According to race-based subscribers, everything else is irrelevant except one’s race.
It  is  striking that  many respondents  did not  mention the argument  that  people identify with 
parties in racial terms. Even though almost all agreed that South Africans vote according to factors 
other than the content of policies, they did not include race as a non-policy factor. On the non-
policy dimension, in fact, most respondents mentioned historical loyalty and material needs. For 
them, race has little to do with party support and voting behaviour; and partisanship and needs are 
not necessarily linked to race. So from a party angle, it appears that voters are not simply voting on 
racial considerations and race does not ‘magnetise’ the ordinary voter; voting is more historically 
embedded and needs-based rather than racially relevant.
What can be concluded from survey and interview findings is that (a) while citizens perceive 
party difference less in terms of policy platforms (that is, non-policy reasons constituting the chief 
difference between major  parties),  (b)  voting and party  support  is  associated with  instances  of 
policy  voting.  There  is  a  cohort  within  the  electorate  that  take  heed of  ideological  and policy 
proposals of parties; and in some cases the majority vote on the basis of party promises and specific 
deliverables  emanating  from party  programmes  (material  improvement,  jobs  and  housing).  (c) 
Although policy-based voting occurs, it is hardly a consistent and regular feature because voters are 
not ideologues or interested in policy-specifics of parties. Moreover, (d) given that the non-policy 
dimension takes prevalence within the electorate, it encompasses many issues and the race/ethnicity 
factor gains little support (both as a self-identified factor by voters and a factor flagged by parties). 
Non-policy  issues  include  party  integrity/trust/honesty,  performance,  competence,  experience, 
candidate  personality,  partisanship/historical  loyalty,  campaign/needs,  and  media  access/party 
funding. However, even though voters state that they do not identify themselves to parties through 
race and parties are of the opinion that race is less important than other factors, the dimension of 
race  is  an  important  part  of  voting  behaviour  in  South  Africa  which  cannot  be  ignored  or 
oversimplified. It may well be that the issue of race informs non-policy aspects, especially historical 
loyalty; however, more research needs to be done on the role of race and policy voting in South 
Africa.
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6.4.2 Most important problems and causes of non-policy voting
Perceptions about national priorities and problems provide important cues about what preoccupies 
voters and whether their concerns lie within a policy or non-policy space. Figure 6.14 shows that 
when citizens were asked what constituted the most important problems in the country that the 
government should address, from 1994 to 2016 (eleven time periods), a considerable plurality of 
citizens stated unemployment as a chief problem (mean = 51%); this includes job creation, poverty 
reduction, a stable economy and general economic management (finances, incomes and salaries). 
The second problem was crime and violence (in the early period of democracy it included concerns 
about political instability and unrest) (mean = 21%). The third group of concerns centred upon the 
provision of basic needs and services, including housing and shelter provision, education, water, 
electricity, health and HIV/AIDS prevention, and infrastructure (overall mean = 21%). Concerns 
over corruption,  discrimination and other issues constituted about one eighth (mean = 13%) of 
this.   19
Although this does not directly point to the absence of concerns over economic policies to tackle 
the  prevalence  of  the  unemployment  problem  at  the  social  level,  evidence  from  WVS  waves 
included an option of ‘ideas’ within the range of concerns, as illustrated in Table 6.5. Consistent 
with the previous result, a stable economy forms the first important issue that government should 
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address (mean = 46%) and the fight against crime forms the second (mean =  32%). Meanwhile, the 
conception that ‘ideas count more than money’ gained very little support (mean = 9%). 
Unemployment and crime are commonly perceived as problems for the majority of people. On 
the other side, the need for ideas in society above economic growth and social development counts 
far less as a chief problematic agenda for citizens. This shows that voters are more preoccupied with 
issues  of  unemployment,  crime  and  basic  needs  and  services  rather  than  debating  about  the 
relevance of particular policy proposals and ideological orientations that would best solve these 
problems. Voters seem less concerned about how social problems are resolved, that is, the means 
employed  and  political-ideological  path  taken  to  alter  material  circumstances  —  social  and 
economic deliverables override policy-based debate. This element constitutes an important cause 
behind non-ideological voting (as will be discussed below).
Related to the discussion about policy-based determinants of partisanship, it can be argued that 
the  electorate  support  parties  who  promise  output  and  tangible  material  outcomes  from  their 
installation  in  government  or  the  legislature.  Additionally,  it  can  be  argued that  party  policies, 
according to voters, are relevant at the social level only when they are linked to pertinent social 
problems that concern the majority within the electorate. This advances a perception emanating 
from the social that party policies, promises, visionary solutions and programmes must be linked to 
deliverables; that is, the imperative and proximate connection between policies and output. In other 
terms, evidence of pertinent social problems does not necessarily negate the preference for policy-
oriented and visionary solutions that target such problems. In the end, policies and party promises 
are intertwined, and this is what voters look at: whether parties articulate voter interests and needs.  
6.4.3 Causes of a moderate non-ideological electorate
What  contributes  to  the  lack  of  ideological  voting  and  the  presence  of  a  moderate  electorate? 
Interview respondents mentioned a number of causes that fed into the non-ideological/non-policy 
voter dynamic. One explanation put the cause on parties. “[T]he appetite for radical, either left or 
right, economic solutions is very limited” because major parties propagate relatively centrist and 
moderate rather than extremist policies (Andrew, Godi, Leon, Mulder, Steward: Interviews). Thus, 
voters tend to mirror this dynamic. On the role of parties, Lekota puts it: “leadership that is radical 
will tend to agitate their followers to a more radical position, but moderate parties will also tend to 
advocate  policies  more  inclined  towards  moderation  and  more  well-thought  out  processes  of 
resolving the crisis in society” (Interview). In this way, that major parties rarely advocate radical 
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Table 6.5 Most important issue: first choice, 1990 - 2013
1990 1996 2001 2006 2013 Mean
Stable economy 45,2 50,5 48,3 41,7 45,2 46,18
Fight against crime 23,3 31,6 37,2 42,3 26,0 32,08
Humane and less impersonal society 17,1 10,3 6,3 6,8 19,7 12,04
Ideas count more than money 13,4 6,4 6,6 8,3 9,1 8,76
No answer 1,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2
Don’t know 0,0 1,2 1,6 0,9 0,0 0,74
(N) (2,736) (2,935) (3,000) (2,988) (3,531)
Source: WVS (1990, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2013)
redistributive or revolutionary policies, contributes to the moderate umbra of the electorate. In other 
words, the nature of political representation and party formation influences social patterns; parties 
matter in the causal chain of voter moderation. 
However,  the  main  factors  that  emerged  from  the  interviews  related  not  so  much  to  non-
extremism  of  the  electorate  but  the  feature  of  non-policy/non-ideological  voting.  Two  main 
explanations were purported: (a) the lack of education, and (b) needs and material conditions. First, 
when literacy  and  education  is  low,  it  is  difficult  for  people  to  comprehend issues  and  policy 
proposals. As Meshoe puts it, “the more educated the voters, the more they are able to analyse the 
policies but the majority of South African voters are do not analyse policies” (Interview). This 
severely limits the element of debate and cross-questioning amongst the electorate. It implies that 
the ordinary voter  largely lacks capacity to interrogate policies and promise,  and are unable to 
‘punch holes’ in party manifestos. Parties made strong reference to voter characteristics in rural 
areas.  In  rural  areas,  where  a  large  percentage  of  people  are  uneducated  and  poverty-stricken, 
people are unable to explain and express what a party stands for, they merely believe at face-value 
what they are told and promised (Galo, Meshoe, Mulder: Interviews).
Respondents  also  made  a  distinction  between  the  poor/uneducated  and  the  more  affluent/
educated. While the poor are interested in ‘handouts’ and are unable to analyse policies, the more 
affluent are concerned about policies and understand the realism behind party promises — that is, 
the  limits  of  what  parties  can  and  cannot  do  (Holomisa,  Madlalose,  Mpontshane:  Interviews). 
Interviewees presume that the more educated and middle or upper class may be aware that radical 
promises  cannot  be implemented and that  extremist  parties  give false  impressions.  In  addition, 
while  the majority  of  uneducated people only listen to  party promises  (given illiteracy)  during 
election  campaigns,  in  between  electoral  cycles  they  cannot  engage  meaningfully  in  political 
debates and rigorously interrogate party performance (Mbinda, Galo: Interviews).  This hampers 
their  ability  to  make  correct  judgement  and  hinders  democratic  accountability  since  voters  are 
unable to decide whether parties adhered to promises. In other words, some of the positive effects 
associated  with  ideological  voting,  such  as  democratic  accountability,  is  constrained  with  the 
presence of an uneducated electorate. 
Second,  some  mentioned  that  deprivation  and  poverty  is  more  important  than  the  lack  of 
education. “Voters are not necessarily clued up with ideological issues, [because] its about bread 
and butter issues to them” (Gardee, Interview). In the face of dire socioeconomic conditions of the 
majority, parties cannot simply afford to harp on policy-based and ideological issues; people want 
practical  things,  not  policy-based  debate,  that  will  address  their  needs  (Lekota,  Mpontshane, 
Moakes: Interviews). The poor seek “immediate need satisfaction” from parties; thus, to them, it’s 
neither here nor there whether you’re in left politics or centre stage or centre to the left or centre to 
the right or a right-winger” (Madlalose, Gardee: Interviews). Mbinda posited that instead of policies 
and programmes, for ordinary people, elections and voting is about ‘stomach politics’. ‘If you are 
hungry you need food’; and it is in this manner that voters believe “things will drop on their table” 
if certain parties are put in power (Godi, Gumbi, Mbinda, Meshoe: Interviews). Leon said: “if you 
are  poor  you  driven  by  survivalist  impulses”  (Interview).  “[O]rdinary  people  get  on  with  the 
ordinary things of their life” — they are concerned about getting jobs, education, health care and so 
on (Andrew, Interview). According to some interviewees, parties tend to exploit hunger and poverty 
by providing food parcels to buy the vote. Thus, voters are concerned with immediate issues of 
poverty, they are service-inclined, are primarily motivated by need-satisfaction, and lay emphasis 
on deliverables. The immediate environment means more to them. In brief, party support is not 
driven by policy preference or ideology, it is driven by need. 
But there is also an interplay between poverty and the lack of education. This problem is more 
apparent in rural areas where it is not only the lack of education but people are voting for parties 
because  they  believe  they  will  provide  material  things.  For  instance,  some  party  respondents 
explained that the mantra in poor communities is that if people do not vote ANC, their social grant 
will be withdrawn (Gumbi, Holomisa, Meshoe: Interviews). This kind of intimidation targets the 
poor and uneducated. Moreover, the less educated “the less complex political arguments become”: 
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the poor tend to think in very basic ways about  what  a  party should do and can do (Moakes, 
Interview). This means that people not only care much less whether policies can be implemented in 
the first  place but  also how policies  are  implemented,  such as  the ideological  direction parties 
follows.  In  both  cases,  deliverables  are  more  important  rather  than  a  realistic  or  a  socialist-
capitalist-based policy. There is little “economic literacy out there in terms of [issues like] how jobs 
are created and what’s the difference between economic policies” (Moakes,  Andrew, Holomisa: 
Interviews). “[T]he majority of voters are not fuzzed about whether that’s created through the state, 
through private enterprise, through growth-led policies; they just simply want to make sure that jobs 
are created” (Moakes, Interview). Given that voters are fundamentally concerned about immediate 
issues of service delivery and job creation, if parties tell them the dominant policy approach to 
social problems, whether neoliberal or socialist policy, the majority are not sophisticated enough to 
engage in these matters. Thus, the interplay between the lack of education and poverty arises from 
the fact that the majority of people simply ‘want the basics’ given circumstances of poverty; and 
these people are unable to interrogate manifestos and engage in complex arguments given the lack 
of education.
Respondents  mention  that  as  voters  increasingly  develop  a  more  policy  aware  state,  parties 
themselves will be challenged to present more substantive, coherent and ‘believable’ policies. Some 
respondents correctly explained that as voters move up the class ladder, focus less on material needs 
and  immediate  circumstances,  and  become  literate  and  educated,  this  process  of  social 
modernisation is not only likely to produce a demise of voting based on old party lines but also 
affects policy understanding and awareness. Voters will test party representatives on policy matters; 
and this might consequently increase democratic accountability.
6.5 Implications of the findings 
6.5.1 The social influence on the party system
How does the left-right composition of the electorate affect party system polarisation? According to 
theoretical  claims  from the  sociological  school,  the  social  constitutes  a  pertinent  influence  for 
polarisation dynamics at the party system level. Preferences for moderation and modest division of 
opinion will mirror itself at the party level where vote-seeking parties will compete to match the 
median  ideological  distribution  of  the  electorate,  and  inter-party  left-right  polarisation  will  be 
moderate. Meanwhile, the opposite is the case for an extremist and polarised electorate: parties will 
subsequently take up positions on the radical fringes and intense divisions between parties will 
ensue,  all  because  parties  are  interested  in  reflecting  and  representing  public  opinion.  The 
implication of this argument is that both low or high polarisation are reflected in the party system. 
In the South African case, findings from voter self-placement data show that prior to 2001 (1990 
to 1997), voters were highly polarised, reaching a mean score of .74. Even though between 2001 
and 2009, polarisation decreased to .57 and by 2013 it stood at .47, this was much higher than actual 
polarisation at the party system level. Even voter polarisation on economic issues reveals a mean 
score of  .73,  although by 2013 it  reflected .62.  The party system prior  to  high levels  of  voter 
polarisation, both in 1994 and 1999, reflected a polarisation score of .02 and .15; and even after this 
period, between 2004 and 2014, it was lower than .20 (as shown in Figure 5.5 in Chapter 5). This 
suggests  that  there  is  a  significant  discrepancy  between  voter  and  party  system  polarisation. 
According  to  Figure  6.15,  the  correlation  between  voter  polarisation  (by  self-placement  and 
economic issues) and party system polarisation, reveal an insignificant negative correlation (r = -.13 
and -.08 respectively).  This implies that  voters do not  exert  an overriding influencing force on 
ideological differences in the party system. Moreover, the causes for low polarisation in the party 
system are largely located outside of the electorate — presumably with the dominant party. 
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A related deduction is that not even the decrease in party system polarisation can be explained by 
the  decrease  in  voter  polarisation;  precisely  because  the  gap  between  the  two  is  so  large  to 
constitute a potential causation. Although party system polarisation decreased from 2004 to 2014, it 
cannot be matched by the decrease occurring with voter polarisation because in 1994 the party 
system exhibited the lowest level of polarisation (0.02) yet voter polarisation in the same year stood 
at high levels (0.77). 
Although voters are beginning to occupy similar ideological positions both in self-placement and 
economic issues, this is not necessarily reflective of or induced by low polarisation at the party 
system level. This is because one party at the helm of power is absorbing the ideological space and 
constraining increases in polarisation; which it has been doing since 1994 when voter polarisation 
was high. In other terms, voters had the opportunity to decrease in differential platforms long prior 
to levels of moderate voter polarisation as at 2013. This means that while there is an absence of a 
forward sociological  effect,  that  is  voters  influencing party positional  platforms and ideological 
differences in the party system, there is also an absence of a backward party effect, that is parties 
and the party system influencing voter positions and difference of opinions. While scholars like 
Jacobson (2003) posit a dynamic and interdependent causal nature of polarisation, both the forward 
and backward element is lacking in South Africa. 
It  can  be  argued  that  the  presence  of  one  party  is  constraining  inter-party  ideological 
differentiation from becoming meaningful especially coupled with the lack of a competitive voter 
share in the opposition. So, it might be that much of the ideological contestation and dissimilarity at 
the social level is reflected within the ANC. While the party system is not absent of ideological 
differentiation and dispersion across the spectrum, opposition parties are unable to skew the balance 
of polarisation given their limited vote share, so party system based polarisation is far less of an 
influencing factor in social left-right differentiation. 
But it is implausible to say that voters do not have any influence at all on the party system: there 
may be far less influence on polarisation but there is observable influence on party positions. On the 
issue of positional platforms of parties, the major party, according to Figure 5.4 in Chapter 5, has 
been on the centre and centre-left.  Meanwhile, the opposition bloc reflected much more rightist 
positions like the DA, IFP, UDM, FFP and ACDP. However, (a) major opposition parties like the 
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DA are evidently moving to the centre-left. Implications follow that parties (centre-left) are moving 
to occupy left preference at the electorate level. Most interview respondents conceded to the idea 
that “politics [and policies] has to be guided by the needs of the voters” (Meshoe, Galo, Leon: 
Interviews). “In most cases parties adopt policies more because they seek to respond to what they 
see as the need in society” (Lekota). In other words, party manifestos are informed by social needs. 
Parties  acknowledge that  policy  choices  cannot  be  made independently  from the  reality  of  the 
country  — although  some  policies  may  be  unpopular  and  may  need  to  be  downplayed  to  be 
attractive to voters (Moakes, Andrew: Interviews). But there is a degree of independence because 
while voter are increasingly preferring issues like government ownership instead of privatisation, 
major  parties  are  hardly  articulating  proposals  for  nationalisation.  Thus,  there  is  a  disjuncture 
between party positions and voter preferences.
Moreover, (b) it can be deduced that parties are reflecting the public’s preferences for similar 
positions,  that  is,  the consistent  movement towards occupying similar  positions on general  and 
economic issues. Within the opposition bloc, parties are occupying similar positions (centre-left), 
and voters are also coming to occupy similar positions or vice versa. It is, however, a complex 
matter to determine whether voters are influencing parties or vice versa, or whether this is dynamic 
relationship. In addition, (c) mean scores show that the average voter sits in the centre for both 
general and economic issues, and major parties are also centrist. Thus, in terms of extremism at the 
voter and party level, both occupy centrist ground.  
However,  it  must  be  said  that  voters  do  not  have  an  overriding  influence  on  party  policy 
positions.  Correlation  coefficients  show that  when  mean  voter  positions  by  self-placement  are 
compared with the ideological positions of the two major parties in respective years between 1994 
to 2014, it indicates an r = -.77 for the ANC and an r = -.65 for the DA. When voter polarisation by 
economic issues are considered, it reveals an r = -.86 for the ANC and r = -.96 for the DA. As 
shown in Table 6.6, results suggest that there is a significant negative relationship between voter 
left-right positions and party positions. As voter positions increase in the direction of right, party 
positions move in the opposite direction and increase toward the centre-left, or sometimes decrease 
in leftist issue salience. In the case of the ANC, leftist emphasis increased since 2004 to 2009 and 
slightly decreased in 2014 but still remained centre-left, yet voter mean positions were in the centre-
right. In addition, the DA has been rightward in its issue salience but were more emphatic about 
rightwing issues than voters who positioned themselves on the right especially in 2001 to 2013; 
moreover, the party began to move in the opposite direction of mean voter self-placement positions, 
especially in 2009 and 2014. 
On economic issues, results infer that as voter positions decrease on the left, the ANC’s position 
actually  increased on the  left.  For  the  DA,  as  voter  positions  decrease  on  the  left,  the  party’s 
positions increase in the opposite direction like in 1994 to 2004, and by 2013 when mean voter 
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Table 6.6 Correlating voter mean positions with party positions
1994 1999-2001 2004-2006 2009 2013-2014
Voter mean position by left-right 
self-placement -0,07 0,06 0,28 0,25 0,19
Voter mean position by left-right 
economic issues -0,08 -0,06 -0,05 0,01
ANC ideological position -0,10 -0,07 -0,33 -0,69 -0,43
DA ideological position 0,71 0,77 0,50 -0,20 -0,03
positions on economic issues revealed a 0.01 score, the DA’s position was -0.03, which shows slight 
differences in positions. 
This implies that party positions, especially on the centre-left, are less influenced by voters. Even 
if  voters  are in the centre and slightly centre-left  like in the case of  economic issues — party 
positions often tend to be more leftist than voters. This is equivalent to saying that parties do not 
necessarily move in relation to moving voter positions. Although the median voter prefers similar 
positions on salient economic issues to party positions, there still remains a discrepancy within this 
result, that is, party positions tend to increase in leftist emphasis. Thus, in the South African case, 
parties are less dependent on social influence and less deeply rooted in representing median voter 
positions than theory suggests. Instead, parties including the ANC and the DA operate within a 
relatively independent space from voters in the determination of policy positions, although this may 
not necessarily mean opposite positions since in the case of economic issues both voters and parties 
are on the left. Briefly put, voters have some noticeable influence on party positions and polarisation 
but this is far from overriding. 
One of the contributing factors to the lack of extremism within the electorate is the presence of 
major centrist parties, the lack of education, and immediate concerns over poverty and needs. In 
addition,  moderation  is  largely  attributed  to  non-policy  voting.  The  majority  of  voters  are  not 
ideologues or sophisticated in analysing policy-specifics. By contrast, they focus on issues such as 
party  trust,  competence,  performance,  experience,  personality,  partisanship,  and  needs.  Race  is 
regarded as an irrelevant and minor element in determining party support. Voters tend to be non-
policy-oriented because the majority are poor and seek immediate resolution to their needs (material 
improvement, job creation and housing), and are also uneducated. In this way, voters are not driven 
by policy matters but parties who sympathise with their needs and articulate policies that encompass 
those needs. This particular character of the electorate implies that there is only negligible influence 
voters can put on the party system.  
In conclusion, first, polarisation and differential positions at the voter level is not concomitant 
with moderation at the party system level. This implies that reasons for low polarisation within the 
party system is located outside of the sociological explanation and linked more to the major party, 
the ANC — which is constraining the space for ideological dissimilarities in the system. Second, 
parties  are  relatively  independent  actors  in  the  determination  of  left-right  policy  platforms. 
Although  on  economic  issues  voters  are  on  the  left,  parties  generally  exemplify  more  leftist 
emphasis than voters. And on self-placement data, voters are on the centre-right while parties are on 
the  centre-left.  Moreover,  the  unique  factors  that  characterise  voters  largely  on  a  non-policy 
platform,  constrains  left-right  policy  voting  and  extremism.  Thus,  voters  are  far  from being  a 
pertinent influencing force or a cause behind the adoption of party positions or the direction of party 
system polarisation. 
6.5.2 The findings in relation to the study of the electorate
The findings presented in this research challenges some scholarly perspectives and also concurs 
with some previous arguments. First, the predominant view, particularly amongst those who support 
the racial approach to electoral analysis, that the left-right means very little in the South African 
context loses substance in relation to the findings of this research. According to scholars, the left-
right ideological spectrum makes little sense, is simplistic and misleading when applied to the South 
African context. The view is that left, right and centre are not useful terms when analysing South 
African politics — some say ideology does not play a role because identity is prime (Friedman, 
2015; Schrire, 2001; Butler, 2004; Petlane, 2009). While there are two issues in this argument, that 
is  voter  left-right  and  party  system  left-right,  scholars  tend  to  perceive  of  the  entire  political 
landscape as one painfully afar from such dynamics. Parties are often talked about as detached from 
inter-party policy debate, it is even more rare to talk about voters as being inclined to policies. This 
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means that the social is considered in a way that is much further away from analysis of party left-
right positions. 
The propensity of citizen left-right self-placement, the consistent position of the median voter as 
centre and centre-right, the substantial decrease in the rate of unawareness of or inability to engage 
in self-defined left-right positions, voter engagement with left-right economic issues, and varying 
levels of voter polarisation, testifies to the presence of a left-right dimension at the social level. 
There  are  observable  ideological  differences  at  the  social  level  and  demonstrable,  albeit  non-
sophisticated, engagement with salient national economic debates. Moreover, there is a considerable 
degree of validity in voter placement of parties. In particular, voters saw the DA as a centre-left 
party in 2009, and this is consistent with the finding in Chapter 5 that shows the DA’s progressive 
movement leftward. It is unclear however along what dimension (it might be the non-economic 
dimension) citizens are placing parties and why the ANC is often placed in the centre-right. But 
what remains plausible is that voters regard major parties as moderate, which is consistent with the 
findings that parties are indeed occupying a centrist terrain. 
Second,  although  left-right  identification  and  polarised  opinions  does  not  directly  or 
automatically imply policy-based voting, evidence discussed reveals a resident feature of indirect 
and direct ideological and policy factors as a determinant of party support from as early as 1994. 
On the other hand, there is evidence that this is not a regular feature within the electorate; instead, 
voters are largely non-policy oriented. Yet, at the same time, it is important not to overgeneralise 
given  that  a  minority  within  the  electorate  focus  on  policies.  Scholars  who  posit  that  party 
alignments are a rubberstamp for racial demographics and reflects a racial bifurcation of popular 
support, over exaggerate the connection between identity and voting (Hoeane, 2009; Johnson, 1996; 
Ferree, 2006; Schrire, 2001; Piper, 2004). The race-based argument has concerning methodological 
problems that indicate a spurious connection between race and voting behaviour — especially given 
that the racial composition of a party’s support base cannot simply emerge as a causal factor of 
racial  voting.  Evidence presented in this  study for  the determinants of  party support  show that 
voters themselves assign such an insignificant amount of support for identity issues. 
It  has  been  consistently  seen  that  when  voters  subscribe  to  non-policy  reasons  but  specific 
identity reasons such as voting because the party supported is a party for blacks or whites or voting 
to give blacks a chance to govern, gain less than 10%, and in some cases, less than 5% of popular 
support. This implies that citizens themselves are discrediting the notion that their individual party 
support is dependent on identity. Moreover, party interview respondents barely highlighted race as a 
factor  in  voting.  While  scholars  promoting  the  race-based  view  say  that  race  alone  does  not 
determine party support and non-identity factors should also be included, this study shows that the 
(a)  non-prevalence  of  the  identity  element  emerging  from  citizen  self-defined  reasons  for 
partisanship must be dealt with, including (b) the evidence of policy-based inclinations. Given that 
voters are influenced by non-policy issues (such as trust,  competence, performance, experience, 
personality, partisanship, and needs) that have very little to do with allegiance to racial identity, it 
may well be a challenge to the methodologically spurious and misleading argument that race is the 
dominant factor, an enduring cleavage that is capable of decisively influencing electoral behaviour 
(Ramutsindela, 2002; Anyangwe, 2012; Friedman, 2005; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009). Instead, voters 
seem decisively influenced by factors outside the racial space, even more, when they indicate their 
support  for  parties are based on policy,  they still  intermix and undergird this  with non-identity 
factors like trust and performance. Also, the idea that voters “are still locked into different racial/
ethnic compartments”, is contrary to the evidence of the 1999 survey that shows an electorate that 
asserts  the  preeminence  of  party  programmes,  visions  and  policies  (Ramutsindela,  2002:  54, 
emphasis added). The ascendance of and shift to policy-based voting over non-policy factors in that 
year  signifies  an  electorate  that  is  sensitive  and  responsive  to  party  programmatic  platforms. 
Moreover, the very shift from 1994 to 1999 implies that voters are not ‘locked’ away in a racial 
chamber, they are willing to evolve, shift and adopt in their reasons for party support. 
I  am not  arguing  that  race  is  not  at  all  significant  in  the  South  African  context,  race  does 
importantly feature in politics and society, sometimes as an explicit or latent conflict dimension.  It 
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might  also  be  that  race  feeds  into  non-policy  factors  such as  historical  loyalty  — while  more 
methodologically rigorous research needs to show this. What I am putting forward is that other 
factors should also be considered in the matrix of possibilities when dealing with voting behaviour 
in  South  Africa,  and  while  one  should  not  oversimplify  complex  dynamics  in  the  electoral 
landscape, one should also avoid overgeneralising and boxing voting behaviour under the ‘race’ 
label. 
In this way, the findings concur with the opposite group of scholarly opinion that argues first that 
voters are not blindly loyal to parties or simply vote because of racial demographics; instead, voters 
are  far  from  being  immune  to  or  non-sympathisers  of  party  programmatic  platforms.  This  is 
reflective of the rational voter aspect that Eldridge and Seekings (1996), Mattes et al (1999b), Habib 
and Taylor (2001) and Ndletyana (2010) argue. In brief, this research shows not only that voters are 
disassociating themselves from identity-based reasons for party support and connect with other non-
policy factors,  but  that  they are actively engaged in endorsing party policy platforms — albeit 
indirect from party promises. Yet, this is so provided that the nexus between partisanship and policy 
is undergirded by promises of tangible output and relates to pertinent social problems.
Third,  the  results  question the  view that  voters  are  social  democratic  and leftist.  Rightwing 
policies are considered “unviable because they do not offer policies that would enable them to 
attract a significant electoral constituency”, this obviously implies that leftist policies favour the 
electorate especially given pertinent social problems (Habib and Taylor, 2001: 216; Booysen, 2005). 
Since 1982, mean voter positions reveal that voters have constantly positioned themselves more on 
the  centre  and  right  bloc.  Moreover,  although  there  is  leftist  self-placement,  citizens  show 
preference for rightwing ideals in the economic sphere and are not clearly placed on the left on 
issues of privatisation, income equality and responsibility. Thus, a unimodal leftist,  and rightist, 
distribution is not a feature within the electorate. Instead, there is a moderately polarised dynamic of 
division along the left and right.
6.6 Conclusion: Voters and party system moderation
The guiding purpose of this chapter was to examine the preference distribution of the electorate on 
the left-right political continuum, the centrist or extremist nature of such preferences, and the degree 
of  left-right  polarisation  at  the  voter  level.  This  chapter  achieved  this  by  discussing  general 
ideological predispositions,  including median voter positions from self-placement and economic 
issues data, and perceptions about the nature of social change. It also dealt with the polarisation of 
voter opinions on general and economic issues. 
It is clear that on general issues, the centre and centre-right constitute a highly saturated space 
and a much referred locale for the majority of citizens. The results presented here suggest that the 
left side of the continuum falls out of favour as a preferred political position amongst citizens on 
general issues. To be sure, the average citizen does not locate themselves on the centre-left, extreme 
left or extreme right. Average left-right volatility occurs within centre and centre-right parameters 
instead of the extremes. It is almost as if voters have cornered themselves in this space and marked 
off  a  clear  ideological  boundary.  Thus,  mean citizen positions are  characterised by a  unimodal 
distribution along the moderate range. 
On  salient  economic  issues  there  is  evident  preference  for  the  left  bloc;  especially  for  a 
government-run economy, government ownership, government responsibility for citizen wellbeing, 
government intervention in job creation, government action in taxing the rich to subsidise the poor, 
and government-led land redistribution. The embrace of such issues is noticeable in the major party 
but also in the DA. The DA seems to have evolved consistent with median voter preferences: it is 
articulating  less  preference  for  rightward  economic  issues  and  exhibiting  left  preferences  as 
expressed by voters. Voter preferences, however, may not be highly influential since major parties 
are hardly expressing nationalist proposals — but public sentiments may be influential to some 
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extent given that voters are increasingly preferring government ownership of business and industry. 
While parties may in some, indirect or direct, way be influenced by voters, there is an important 
degree of independence in party policy determination and a disjuncture between voter and party 
positions.  
Centre-right  self-placement  is  consistent  with  citizen  self-placement  results,  a  considerable 
cohort  of  citizens  are  also  sympathisers  of  the  right.  They  prefer  that  the  individual  not  the 
government should determine what an individual produces, buys and sells; support market-based 
rather  than  state-dictated  income  determination;  back  the  liberal  meritocratic  philosophy  that 
justifies individual effort and hard work as a factor in incentivising higher incomes; and respects 
property rights  even in the process of  land repossession by the government  (including market-
valued compensation and legal procedures). In a related way, a majority of citizens consistently feel 
that society should not be changed by fundamental or radical reforms but ally with the idea of 
gradual improvement. This implies that even issues of land redistribution may not be interpreted as 
radical left or in any other politically radical manner. This importantly signifies the moderate or 
centrist nature of citizens; and the presence of left and right preferences on economic issues. 
In  addition,  it  is  difficult  to  maintain  the  scholarly  argument  that  the  left-right  has  little 
prevalence in the South African context, especially at the social level. Given that seven in ten South 
Africans position themselves on the left-right and see themselves as aligned to some orientation 
within the political scale, a significant amount of validity attaches to the left-right dimension at the 
social level, albeit the potential absence of expert voter understanding of the scale. Recognising that 
citizens were regularly vying between the centre and centre-right between 1982 and 2013, and the 
substantial reduction in the rate of don’t know, signifies an important and almost undeniable feature 
within  the  electorate:  they  seem to  have  a  general  predisposition  to  the  centre  and  the  right. 
Moreover, the relatively unchanging nature of this implies that citizens seem clear about where they 
are located. Added to left-right validity is the ‘accurate’ positioning of the DA by voters as a centre-
left party, consistent with the findings in Chapter 5 that shows the party moved gradually to the left. 
Although, it is less clear why the ANC is positioned as centre-right; it may mean voters are using a 
non-economic dimension or simply equating the ANC to where voters themselves sit. Moreover, 
citizens engage in positioning themselves on salient left-right economic issues. In other words, the 
left-right is not only a valid social phenomenon but may well also qualify as a credible one. 
On the issue of  left-right  polarisation,  first,  citizens are  largely divided on salient  economic 
issues such as privatisation, equality and responsibility; in another way, citizens assume opposed 
ideological  positions  on  the  economic  nexus  between  the  government,  the  individual  and  the 
market. However, standard deviation results show there is movement toward moderate polarisation; 
by  2013  voters  firmly  entered  this  space.  Second,  citizen  self-placement  results  indicate  that 
polarisation within the electorate was particularly high where a number of citizens were poles apart 
on the left-right; but since 2001 and by 2013, self-definition on dissimilar ideological blocs were 
gaining less support. In both cases, citizens were showing preference more for one side, particularly 
the  centre.  This  implies  that  individuals  are  beginning  to  take  up  more  similar  positions  on 
economic issues and seeing themselves in similar ways on the left-right. In all, there is far less left-
right sectarianism than in the 1990s and citizen are mostly centre partisans. This seems to influence 
the movement of parties where the opposition bloc is occupying similar positions (centre-left) or 
possibly vice versa. Also, major parties might be articulating a mixed position instead of reflecting 
the  polarisation  at  the  social  level  — however,  the  dominant  party  is  constraining  ideological 
differences form becoming meaningful. 
The overriding finding is that voters are more centre and centre-right on general issues, and left 
and right on economic issues; moreover, voters are polarised about general and economic issues — 
some prefer a left stance while others a right stance on salient matters. What is also important for 
the analysis is that voters regard themselves as centrist  and moderate on generic and economic 
issues, and on the nature of social change; they also perceive of major parties as moderate. Most 
interview participants conceded to the idea that the electorate can best be characterised as moderate 
rather than extremist on the left-right. They however saw voters as having more preference for left 
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issues such as an active government and subsequently  inducing a ‘culture of dependency’ in the 
electorate. However, the deficiency in this conclusion is that it ignores rightward  tendencies in the 
electorate, both in voters defining themselves as centre-right and having clear preference on certain 
economic issues that are to the right. Thus, while it is more plausible and conclusive to state that the 
electorate is relatively moderate and centrist, it is less accurate to think of voter left-right preference 
as a unimodal left distribution. This feature is evident in the polarisation level that show voters are 
divided on the left  and right on generic and salient economic issues. This hence concluded the 
engagement with the general and more specific nature of the ideological predispositions within the 
electorate. 
Another  portion  of  this  analysis  dealt  with  the  presence  of  ideological  and  non-ideological 
voting. This incorporated citizen perceptions of party difference, policy choices and policy-based 
voting, and opinions about pertinent social problems. Although there is evident citizen left-right 
self-placement and left-right polarisation, this not concomitant with consistent or high levels of 
issue-based,  programmatic  identification  or  policy-centred  partisanship.  In  other  words,  while 
citizens position themselves on the political scale and express opinions about left-right economic 
issues, they are hardly policy-motivated voters. However, evidence presented here suggest modest 
levels of such voting. Although voters are largely not ideologues or concerned about the specifics of 
programmes,  voters  are  not  exempt  from or  completely  void  of  supporting  parties  because  of 
programmatic platforms and promises. In the first place, there is an evident tug of war between 
policy and non-policy reasons for party support and party differences, voters are not stuck on any 
one side; there are observable shifts from the non-policy to the policy side. However, the non-policy 
dimension is more dominant. 
The  rational  and  policy-oriented  nature  of  the  electorate  largely  challenges  the  race-based 
argument about partisanship and voting behaviour. Moreover, in times of majority support for the 
policy dimension, the game plan of parties endorsed by voters are undergirded by non-policy issues 
such as party integrity, competence, performance and candidate personality — yet not racial identity 
elements. Still, when voting is plainly non-policy oriented, race features as a less prominent factor 
than is often argued. The argument of this chapter is that while race is an important factor in the 
electoral  and political  landscape,  overgeneralisation should  be  avoided,  precisely  because  more 
complex dynamics,  such as the evident cohort  of  policy-oriented voters,  are being ignored and 
sidelined. 
The presence and progressive movement of policy-based voting is conditional on politicisation 
of  party  programmes  (like  in  the  case  of  the  RDP),  the  matching  of  policy  to  pertinent 
socioeconomic problems, and the guarantee and promise of tangible political outcomes emanating 
from proposed programmes. Moreover, the lack of education and poverty are factors that constrain 
policy-based voting. In the end, there is less of a dead policy space at the social level than is often 
argued in the literature. The ideological-policy-based architecture of the South African electorate is 
more evident than what is usually presented; and although this is not prevalent, there is a section of 
the electorate that are motivated by policies and those who are motivated by non-policy issues are 
guided by non-race-based factors. While race might be feeding into issues such as historical loyalty, 
more rigorous research needs to be conducted until one can discard the idea that voters are engaged 
in non-race-based voting. 
Some of the causes for non-extremism and non-policy voting were discussed. This included the 
presence of major centre parties, the lack of education, and poverty and needs. Lastly, this research 
shows that voters are rarely an influencing factor in the party system. First, while there is high to 
moderate polarisation at the voter level, the party system demonstrates low polarisation, there is 
little  association  between  the  two.  Second,  party  positions  are  also  less  influenced  by  voter 
positions, although there is some influence; and parties are relatively independent actors in policy 
determination. Importantly, the causal dynamics of low polarisation in the party system are related 
to factors outside of the sociological. 
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Notes
 For the ‘left bloc’, I take the mean position of the scores deemed on the left side of the scale, that is, from 1 1
to 3 (on a ten-point scale) or 1 and 2 (on a six-point scale). For the ‘right bloc’, I take the mean position of 
scores on the right side of the scale, that is, from 6 to 10 (on a ten-point scale) or 5 and 6 (on a six-point 
scale). For the ‘centre bloc’, I take 4 to 6 (on a ten-point scale) which is centre-left (4), centre (5), and centre-
right (6), or 3 and 4 (on a six-point scale) which signifies centre positions relative to the left and right. 
 76.3 is obtained from adding the left, right and centre mean scores. 2
 Such preferences seem to concord with the ANC’s, as the major liberation movement, political approach at 3
the  time  which  was  largely  characterised  by  the  suspension  of  the  armed  struggle  and  the  pursuit  of 
negotiations as the preferred method. However, this explanation is not suffice because suspension of military 
action  only  occurred  in  1990,  this  means  citizens  were  operating  relatively  independently  of  political 
dynamics by opting for moderate tendencies. 
 In  1990  and  1996,  pro-government  supporters  increased  and  the  amount  of  undecided  citizens  also 4
increased, in 2000 the increase in the former was matched by a decrease in the latter, 2001 was followed by a 
decrease in the pro-government and an increase in the undecided,  finally in 2006 and 2013,  when pro-
government support increased, the undecided bunch decreased and then increased. Actually, between 2001 
and 2013 when preference for government ownership increased, support for privatisation decreased, similar 
to the 1990 and 1996 dynamic, so it might be that those who previously opted for privatisation were opting 
for government ownership. 
 ‘Neither approve nor disapprove’: 15.1; ’Don’t know’: 6.5; N = 2,400 (Government plans production and 5
distribution of goods and services). ‘Neither approve nor disapprove’: 17.1; ’Don’t know’: 3.4; N = 2,400 
(Individuals decide for themselves what to produce and what to buy and sell).
 ‘Don’t agree with either’: 2.5; ‘Don’t know: 1.7; N = 2,200. 6
 Other data: ‘In-between’: 10.3; ‘Don’t know’: 9.3 ; N = 2,516.7
 From EPOP (1999), Evaluation of Public Opinion Programme, in Rule, S. (ed.) (2000), Public opinion on 8
national priority issues, HSRC: Pretoria.  N = 2, 672
 Other data: ‘Don't agree with either’: 0.6; ’Don’t know’: 0.7; N = 2, 200. 9
 Other data: ‘Don’t know’: 6.1; N = 2, 671.   10
 ‘In-between’: 13.7; ‘Don’t know’: 7.9; N = 2,51711
 The survey included a category of  1 = ‘never justifiable’ and 10 = always justifiable.  I  assigned the 12
following categories to the numerical hierarchy: 1, 2, 9, 10 = strongly agree; 3, 4, 7, 8 = somewhat agree; 5 
and 6 = don’t agree with either/in-between. I further merged strongly agree and somewhat agree. Other data: 
’Don’t know’: 1.2; ‘In-between’: 15.7; N = 3,488. 
 Other data: ‘What the owner originally paid for the land’: 14.5; ‘Don’t know’: 3.0; N = 2,673. 13
 Statement A: The government must abide by the law in acquiring any property,  including paying the 14
owner. B: In order to develop the country, the government should have the power to seize property without 
compensation. 
Data reflects ‘strongly agree/agree’. Other data: ‘In between’: 6.9; ‘Don’t know’: 7.9; N = 2.400.
 The ‘missing’ or ‘unknown’ value was 12.5%, and N = 2,756. 15
 The ‘Don’t know’ is 7.4%, and N = 1,20016
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 ‘No’ score: 10.9, ‘don’t know’: 0, N = 2,64217
 ‘No’ score: 79.8, ‘don’t know’: 7.3, N = 2,20018
 The category ‘discrimination’ included race relations, inequality, affirmative action and minorities. 19
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Chapter 7: The Dominant Party and the resilience of the 
centre
This chapter examines the presence of moderation within the dominant party:  the ANC. A few 
months after the historic election in 1994, some sections held that the transition was a harbinger of 
“radical directional change” that would luridly include the “wholesale takeover of white houses and 
farms” (The Natal Witness, 14 July 1994). Those who adopted the prognosis of imminent economic 
radicalisation  (nationalisation  and  state-takeover  of  private  property)  were  hardly  expecting  an 
ideologically moderate government led by the most popular party, the ANC. Yet there was largely 
no ‘crash, boom, bang’ in the new South Africa (despite ‘black-on-black’ violence that occurred in 
the transition period). The absence of both radical behaviour and doctrines on the part of the ANC 
gave the embryonic democratic state a character of moderation. This chapter seeks to describe and 
critically discuss the moderate trajectory of the ANC.  
The main purpose of this chapter is to establish whether the dominant party is left or right and 
centrist (moderate) or radical (extremist). It also seeks to understand the ANC’s effect on the party 
system. This is undergirded by a critical examination of macroeconomic policy from 1994 to 2012. 
Useful  analysis  of  South Africa’s  economic policy evolution or  particular  periods  of  economic 
policy has been conducted by a number of scholars (Habib,  2013; Marais,  2011; Seekings and 
Nattrass, 2006; Bond, 2000; Desai, 2003; Satgar, 2008; Terreblanche, 2012). Although their work 
importantly  feds  into  this  analysis,  I  specifically  examine economic policies  from the angle  of 
deducing the left-right, centrist-extremist and pragmatic-ideological backbone of the ANC. 
This  chapter  first  discusses  the role  of  the state  in  dealing with social  and economic issues 
(poverty,  unemployment  and  inequality).  Second,  it  assesses  the  shift  from RDP to  GEAR to 
ascertain  the  left-right  and  moderate-radical  direction  of  the  movement.  Here,  I  assert  that 
overemphasising the change in left and right policy risks overlooking the variability that largely 
occurs within a centrist space. Third, this chapter seeks to explain the centrist position of the ANC 
by examining the social  partnership and mixed economy environment;  and the character of the 
ANC-SACP’s association in the pre- and post-1994 period. Fourth, I critically assess the causes of 
left-right moderation and the absence of left extremism. Here, I argue that the ANC’s own position 
and its active stance in ideological discourse are causes behind its centrism in addition to other 
causes. Lastly, I conclude by discussing the overall position of the ANC and its influence on the 
party system — I essentially argue that the ANC is the main cause of moderation in the party 
system. 
7.1 The State: Poverty, Unemployment and Inequality
An  enduring  feature  of  macroeconomic  policy  is  concern  about  poverty,  unemployment  and 
inequality.  All  policies since 1994 took into account patterns of poverty and joblessness.  South 
Africa’s social and economic policy framework followed five policies, namely the: Reconstruction 
and Development  Programme (RDP) (1994);  Growth,  Employment  and Redistribution (GEAR) 
(1996); Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) (2006); New Growth 
Path  (NGP)  (2010);  and  the  National  Development  Plan  (NDP)  (2012).  Although  not  all 
macroeconomic  policies  strictly  treaded  the  same  ideological  line,  there  are  significant 
commonalities that undergird it — which this chapter will broadly discuss. One common feature is 
the ANC-led government’s approach to social problems. 
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After holding the first democratic election in 1994, the purpose of the ANC government was to 
restructure, transform and democratise the economic sector. According to the RDP White Paper 
(1994), no political democracy flourishes if the majority are victims of poverty: “[a]ttacking poverty 
and deprivation will therefore be the first priority of the democratic Government.” Sixteen years 
into democracy,  and the government,  through the NGP (2010),  put  social  problems rather  than 
market prerogatives or budgetary constraints at the centre of economic policy. ASGISA (2006) best 
captures the government’s resolve: although the policy set an ambitious target, it planned to halve 
unemployment by 2014 from 28 to 14 per cent. The NDP (2012) further encapsulated this in ‘vision 
2030’. It presented a visionary outlook for the country; amongst many things, it included a vision 
for an efficient, healthy and developed population; and a population with access basic to quality 
services  and  needs  (water,  toilets,  food,  shelter,  security,  quality  health  services,  and  good 
education).  To  borrow  RDP’s  vocabulary,  economic  policies  constituted  a  ‘people-centred’ 
programme for social transformation.
In this sense, the government often followed a developmental line, as embodied in the ANC 
embrace of a ‘developmental state’. For the party this refers to a democratic and transformative 
state.  The  ANC  elucidates  on  the  requirement  to  associate  political  freedom  with  economic 
freedom, and explicitly links the developmental state to a pro-poor agenda. Joel Netshitenzhe, a 
member of the ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC), said that “[t]he state does not exist for 
its own sake, but as a critical instrument in ensuring the realisation of the strategic objective of the 
liberation movement [that is, to deal with poverty]” (ANC, 2010a). Given the social conditions of 
the vast majority, “[t]o accelerate progress, deepen democracy and build a more inclusive society, 
South Africa must translate political emancipation into economic wellbeing for all” (NDP, 2012: 
14). Differently stated: the developmental state “tackles the root causes of poverty and inequality” 
and intervenes “to support and guide development so that benefits accrue across society” (NDP, 
2012:  44).  This  entire  model  is  encapsulated  in  social  democracy.  The  ANC  views  the 
developmental agenda as reflective of “the best traditions of social democracy”, that is, a system 
which places the needs of the poor and social issues (such as health care, education and a social 
safety net) at the top of the national agenda (ANC, 2007a). 
One of the means the state uses to tackle poverty is redistribution. The RDP recognised the 
interrelated nature of economic growth and social development. It posited that through prioritising 
redistribution of income, wealth and resources, the government would create a “strong, dynamic 
and  balanced  economy”  (RDP,  1994).  This  philosophy  became  know  as  “growth  through 
redistribution”  (Terreblance,  2003:  89).  The  redistributive  regime particularly  pertains  to  social 
welfare — which includes social grants. The RDP’s conception of redistribution implied that market 
forces were not capable on their own of social development; instead, the active role of the state 
through economic redistribution was to stimulate development. The policy allowed the government 
to operationalise the idea of the developmental state — the mantra was that state intervention would 
alleviate poverty more than reliance on market forces alone. For the ANC, “[r]econstruction and 
development will  be achieved through the leading  and enabling  role of the State” (RDP, 1994, 
emphasis added). Although this arguably changed during the phase of GEAR, I argue in subsequent 
sections that the state retained redistributive social welfare.
The government’s intention of redistribution is not meant to force the poor into a culture of 
dependency on the state. Another way the government seeks to reduce poverty is by being active in 
creating an environment for job creation. It also, however, importantly includes the private sector in 
this matrix. According to the NGP (2010: 11), “[c]reating more and better jobs must lie at the heart 
of any strategy to fight poverty, reduce inequalities and address rural underdevelopment”. Following 
the NGP, economic policy went a little further. The government’s presentation of the NDP spoke a 
stronger language of individual responsibility. It challenged an inactive citizenry, and encouraged 
the population to recede from the “sit back and the state will deliver” approach (NDP, 2012: 27). It 
put  forward  the  need  for  citizens  to  be  active  in  their  own  development,  making  an  implicit 
summons for active job-seekers and more hard-workers than reliance on direct cash payments from 
the government.
 129
7.2 The State and Market: RDP and GEAR
7.2.1 From left to right
The manner in which social ills were addressed were not always through the enabling role of the 
state. After the government initiated GEAR in 1996, market forces were given greater emphasis in 
addressing the country’s development challenges. The conception of the state’s role in the economy 
differed from what RDP espoused. In analysing the change from RDP to GEAR, two different 
arguments are presented. The first one is that GEAR embodied a rightwing shift: it was a departure 
from social democracy and the initial developmental vision of the ANC. The second, in contrast to 
the first, argues that GEAR exemplified an important element of leftist continuity.
Solving structural  inequalities  under GEAR relied on the idea of  trickle-down economics to 
boost market-led growth and development. Creating institutional space for accelerated economic 
growth  was  associated  with  progress  toward  stronger  employment  creation,  equitable  income 
distribution,  and improved living standards.  GEAR purported that  growth will  have favourable 
redistributive effects. A distinction emerged between ‘growth through redistribution’ (this means 
‘first  develop  then  grow’);  and  ‘redistribution  through  growth’ (this  means  ‘first  grow  then 
develop’) (Visser, 2004; Terreblance, 2003: 89; Habib, 2013). GEAR resembled the latter and RDP 
the former.
Policies promoting higher economic growth as first priority are often followed by laissez-faire 
economics  that  support  minimal  or  no  government  interference  in  the  market  to  enable  and 
stimulate growth and development. GEAR concentrated on what any rightwing policy would: fiscal 
deficit reduction, low inflation, a strong exchange rate, increased investment and competitiveness, 
trade  liberalisation,  capital  and  labour  market  deregulation,  and  privatisation  of  state  assets. 
Burgeoning social  ills  and financial  and economic constraints  pushed the  government  to  adopt 
GEAR. The policy was meant to compensate for exchange rate depreciation, counter resurgence in 
inflation, free up resources for investment, and establish a favourable investment climate to attract 
foreign capital, thereby accelerating economic growth, reducing unemployment/poverty/inequality, 
and permitting resources to settle the fiscal deficit. All in all, GEAR advocated a tight monetary 
policy and market liberalisation: a clear rightwing policy.
For  the  right,  it  was  success  and  triumph  of  the  market.  Business  saw  it  as  a  “complete 
reorientation in ANC policy perspectives” (ANC, 1996a). Yet on the other side, this was no policy 
achievement  to  celebrate.  This  ‘reorientation’ was  fiercely  challenged  by  those  on  left.  The 
argument was that GEAR stood for explicit neoliberal economics that favoured business, investors 
and the market; and sidelined workers and the poor (Desai, 2002; Hart, 2002; Habib, 2013; Marais, 
2011). It was openly Thatcherite and reflected the neoliberal policy heterodoxy that was dominating 
the world (Terreblanche, 2003; Calland, 1999; Habib and Padayachee, 2000). GEAR represented ‘a 
momentous shift’ or a ‘substantive rupture’ for a party that was allied to working-class and socialist 
organisations (Visser, 2004: 10; Habib, 2013: 75). Mbeki, then deputy president, who pioneered the 
policy, was criticised for his lack of sympathy for the poor. He retreated from accepting the dire 
situation  of  poor  service  delivery  and  downplayed  salient  social  problems.  His  personal 
predispositions exposed the vision of a “caring and socially responsive democratic society” as a 
mere fallacy (Habib, 2013: 10).
Beside discussion in academic circles, the policy was denounced by the ANC’s alliance partners 
—  especially  COSATU  who  was  more  vocal  and  critical  about  GEAR  than  the  SACP.  For 
COSATU, the RDP had been ‘diluted and abandoned’; the ANC was hijacked by ‘international and 
local  business  interests’ (Sunday  Tribune,  1  December  1996).  COSATU’s  then  president,  John 
Gomomo, said the policy was “the reverse gear of our society” and a ‘get rich quick’ policy that 
benefited the elite (COSATU, 1997; ANC, 2006). The trade union distanced itself from towing the 
market line; for COSATU, global realities needed to be interpreted through a left lens — one that 
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put  primacy  on  social  problems  and  the  weak  and  vulnerable  through  emphasising  the 
developmental role of the state. Gomomo emphatically said: 
For us “global realities” are not about a set of tired arguments of why we should cut social 
spending, remove exchange controls, reduce company tax to even lower levels, privatise state 
assets, retrench public sector workers and deregulate the labour market. 
(COSATU, 1997)
Even though COSATU gradually came to accept the policy and failed to unilaterally affect policy 
change (since GEAR continued), it continued to present its dissatisfaction with GEAR, Moreover, it 
did  not  withdraw from its  non-subservient  posture  towards  capital  and globalisation.  For  these 
critics, the RDP and GEAR treaded two different ideological lines: whereas the RDP was more 
leftist and socialist-oriented, GEAR was more rightist and capitalist-oriented. 
7.2.2 The retention of the left
The second argument advanced here about the transition from RDP to GEAR is that the latter had 
an important element of continuity from the former. The view presented by scholars from the first 
argument  was  that  “GEAR’s  agenda  cannot  even  be  seen  as  self-contained  or  reformist.  It 
represented  a  regression  in  social  terms  for  South  African  society”  (Habib,  2013:  86).  This, 
however, seems to bypass the point that the developmental agenda continued in certain areas; the 
market was not the sole proprietor of government attention, the poor importantly featured as well 
(albeit to a lesser extent). This alternative argument does not deny that GEAR moved to the right. 
Rather, it attacks the overemphasis on the rightist direction of the policy and the lack of recognition 
of the leftist element that continued during the GEAR phase. From my reading of economic policies 
and analysis  of  GEAR, I  concur  with this  argument.  GEAR represented a  watered-down,  non-
radical kind of conservative market doctrine. A hardline (radical) rightist government would (a) 
severely  limit  the  intervening  role  of  the  state;  and  (b)  strictly  and  enthusiastically  apply 
overarching rightward economic prescriptions. Yet, these two things failed to occur: there was a 
degree of ambiguity and lethargy that encircled the life of GEAR. 
It is important to consider both what GEAR stood for and the ambiguity/lethargy that surrounded 
it. Coupled with “a faster fiscal deficit reduction programme to contain debt service obligations” 
and cuts  in  government  expenditure,  GEAR (1996:  2-6)  was set  to  increase economic growth, 
exports and investments, and create a favourable market climate. Deregulation of the financial and 
labour market, and trade liberalisation, were two critical elements pursued by the state. Government 
explained  that  where  regulations  raise  the  costs  of  job  creation,  employers  tend  to  turn  to 
unregulated  forms  of  employment  —  and  irregular,  sub-contracted,  out-sourced  or  part-time 
employment is a preferred source of labour for many employers (GEAR, 1996: 17). It is in this 
context that the GEAR policy called for greater labour market flexibility especially through ‘flexible 
bargaining’. It spoke of the need for “structured flexibility within the collective bargaining system 
to support a competitive and more labour-intensive growth path”; this included reduced minimum 
wages for young trainees, reduced indirect wage costs and wage moderation (GEAR, 1996: 5). It 
clearly supported the market, demonstrated more sensitivity to market ‘needs’, and addressed the 
need for organised labour to avoid rigid positions.
It  also  scored  high  points  for  the  right  because  of  its  espousal  and  pursuance  of  trade 
liberalisation through tariff  reduction and lowering of  trade barriers  in many economic sectors. 
GEAR aligned itself to the clauses of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and General Agreement 
on Tariffs  and Trade (GATT) agreements.  According to a  policy statement by the government 1
released to the WTO (1998: 6): it was committed  to the “reduction of tariffs and phasing out of 
[export] subsidies” — these measures were considered ‘compatible’ with the rules of the WTO. 
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In the midst of clear rightward prescripts, ambiguity surfaced in the space accorded to the state in 
the economy. State interventionism for the ANC-led government referred to the palpable hand of 
the state through redistribution. Some believe that the ‘human face’, advanced through the activist 
state,  behind  GEAR’s  neoliberalism  came  after  the  government  realised  the  policy’s  negative 
impact (Habib, 2013: 88; Glaser, 2010). Social expenditure increased in the form of social grants, 
the state also intervened by embarking on infrastructure investment and a public works initiative. 
This is, however, open to question: I argue that it is important to consider that although GEAR was 
argued to have exacerbated poverty and inequality [see Seekings and Nattrass (2006) and Habib 
(2013)] which consequently pushed for and consolidated a more active state, there were also initial 
commitments on the redistributive front.  The government decided in the same year GEAR was 
adopted that  “it  will  not  cut  down on spending for  essential  services,  but  it  will  cut  down on 
wasteful expenditure” (ANC, 1996a). Moreover, the policy itself succinctly put it that the economic 
trajectory was one of strengthening rather than weakening the redistributive role of the state: 
The budget is the primary vehicle through which access to social services is assured. Nearly half 
of  all  government  spending  is  devoted  to  education,  health,  welfare,  housing  and  related 
services. Strengthening of the redistributive thrust of these expenditures remains a fundamental 
objective  of  economic  policy.  Reprioritisation  within  the  health  and  education  budgets,  a 
municipal  infrastructure programme, restructuring of  the welfare system, land reform and a 
review of training and small business support policies are amongst the initiatives which aim to 
address the claims of the poor to a fair package of basic needs. 
(GEAR, 1996: 10, emphasis added)
Redistribution,  the  social  welfare  system,  land  reform  and  small  business  development  were 
considered pro-poor initiatives in the midst of a market-oriented strategy. Also, ‘reprioritisation’ 
was not meant to involve a decrease in social spending on welfare. So, the government held an 
initial commitment to redistribution and this was consolidated during the GEAR phase. 
From assessing the social impact of GEAR, a downsizing of the redistributive role of the state 
failed to occur. GEAR’s espousal of tight monetarism and deficit reduction did not imply that the 
government  pulled  out  of  existing  redistributive  commitments.  Even  though  many  distinguish 
between  the  RDP’s  ‘growth  through  redistribution’ and  GEAR’s  ‘growth  with  redistribution’, 
redistribution was a resilient feature (Habib, 2013: 78). One of GEAR’s main pillars was the social 
support regime. Progressive tax was expanded and this was subsequently used to finance extended 
social provisions. The increase was such that the government did not spend less on social welfare; 
rather, public expenditure on the welfare budget increased during the period of GEAR (Seekings, 
2005; Habib 2013; Glaser, 2010). Despite GEAR’s rightwing position: a remarkable feature was 
“the retention and expansion of the state’s commitment to welfare” (Lodge, 2004: 171). So, whilst 
GEAR seemed to interfere in trade liberalisation and labour deregulation, the state did not roll back 
social welfare. 
A less ambiguous and more lethargic position was evidenced through the government’s almost 
stagnant and inactive stance on privatisation. The policy held that public sector assets needed to be 
restructured; this included the “sale of non-strategic assets” (GEAR, 1996: 2-6). While portions of 
state-assets were sold to the private sector, which lead to service fee increases for ordinary citizens, 
the entire privatisation clause was slowly followed in the initial phase and later dropped. Some 
scholars, who perhaps focus less on the neoliberal front of GEAR, observe that privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises was a less pursued objective. In the early to mid-2000s out went the idea of 
large-scale  privatisation;  but  to  be  sure,  from  the  beginning  it  was  “never  vigorously 
pursued” (Glaser, 2010: 29). The state seemed to be in the centre (especially its indecisiveness to 
apply privatisation) and also moved to the centre-left (it focused state-owned enterprises). If one 
starts first with the ANC’s early 1990s nationalisation stance (as soon as Mandela was released from 
prison he publicly declared the ANC’s intention to nationalise), the eschewal of it and even the 
SACP’s  acceptance  of  a  mixed  environment  did  not  translate  into  the  opposite:  privatisation. 
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Compared to GEAR’s privatisation proposal, the government was actually lethargic in opening up 
state-owned enterprises to the private sector. The DA, a party traditionally viewed as on the right, 
lashed out  at  the  ANC in  its  1999 campaign.  Appealing to  its  rightwing constituency,  the  DA 
critiqued the ANC’s ‘failure to privatise’ and its inability to ‘speed up privatisation’. This suggests 
that the ANC failed to nationalise in the 1990s and also failed to privatise in the 2000s. A degree of 
hesitancy is noticeable within macroeconomic policy implementation: an indecision to move left or 
right on issues of privatisation and nationalisation — the government seems unwilling to embrace 
either side.
The post-GEAR, and, more particularly, the post-Polokwane environment signalled a shift more 
to the left. ASGISA, GEAR’s successor, was less rightist in tone and arguably managed to appease 
leftist  critics.  By connecting  ‘accelerated  growth’ (growth)  and  ‘shared  growth’ (redistribution) 
(where the latter meant the fruits of economic growth were to be shared to eliminate poverty and 
inequalities) it reflected an economic policy that stripped itself of previous conservative neoliberal 
jargon. As Habib (2013: 11) point out, the post-GEAR environment “deepened the economic shift 
to the left”. This was because, in one sense, the state positioned itself to be at the forefront of sector-
led growth — such as investing public capital in education, energy and telecommunications. The 
ASGISA (2006: 11) policy spoke of leveraging “increased levels of public expenditure” to stimulate 
programmatic  sector-led  growth  —  especially  in  the  provinces.  Striking  a  cord  with  the  first 
macroeconomic policy, ASGISA plainly said ‘state intervention was first’ as a means to forerun 
growth:  “[w]ithout  interventions  directly  addressed  at  reducing  South  Africa’s  historical 
inequalities, growth is unsustainable” (ASGISA, 2006: 11). The leftist element continued during the 
NGP (2010: 55) which spoke of an ‘inclusive economy’ and ‘inclusive growth’: there was a need to 
create “decent work and inclusive and balanced growth”. The policy envisioned a role for the state 
in facilitating job creation in the public sector and offering a stimulus for ‘job driving’ sectors, trade 
protectionism and mechanisms to protect workers, and the expansion of the social wage in the form 
of a national health insurance.2
7.2.3 Left-right placement: What about the centre?
The main contention of this section relates to the presentation of discourse. My position is that (a) 
GEAR was rightist on many fronts and that it (b) retained leftist elements even under rightwing 
prescriptions; and (c) the post-GEAR, post-Polokwane context represented a deepening of the left 
agenda. However this characterisation must be qualified. Although I myself engage in left-right 
placement, I suggest that it is important to emphasise the centre as well. 
First, the presentation of GEAR as a neoliberal agenda often comes with connotations of radical 
rightism.  Those  who advance  the  right-side  of  the  policy  describe  it  as  inaugurating  a  market 
fundamentalist, Thatcherite state. But this ignores the centrist element: as seen by the government’s 
holding onto the welfare state and opening space for the market. In some areas clear distinctions 
could be identified but in other equally salient areas it was rather blurred. No ‘leftist cleansing’ 
occurred  during  the  phase  of  GEAR  —  as  argued  above:  the  redistributive  element  was  not 
sidelined, the social democratic element of the 1990s continued through to the end of GEAR. There 
might have been a watered down version of social democracy but not a closure of the development 
chapter: GEAR involved progressive policies in some areas and conservative policies in others. 
It is in this light that I argue that the movement from RDP to GEAR was not of a fundamentally 
different order. Which rightist government would advance some rightist policies and keep/pursue 
leftist policies? It is in all probability a centre-right government. On the other hand, an extremist 
rightwing  government  would  do-away  with  all  leftist/socialist  elements  —  which  would  be 
considered the  most  constraining element  in  the  market  operating unbridledly.  It  is  hard  to  be 
persuaded by the view that GEAR resembled a complete shift to Thatcherite thinking. Thus, what 
appeared  to  be  a  radical  rightwing  policy  by  the  left,  was  a  rather  moderate,  centre-right 
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macroeconomic  framework.  The  neoliberal  view  risks  downplaying  the  moderation  that  the 
rightwing policy was encircled in. Given this, it is difficult to characterise the GEAR period as a 
neoliberal one since there were important continuities with the RDP. It may be more accurate to 
categorise  it  as  the  government’s  struggle  to  find  an  appropriate  alternative  for  growth  and 
development within a centrist makeup.
Second, and related to the above argument, seeing economic policies as either left or right makes 
the  mixed,  centrist  and  moderate  position  of  the  ANC less  important  than  it  seems.  Also,  by 
emphasising (a) change from left to right and back to left, and (b) continuity of the left agenda, both 
bypass the stability of the centre. I advance an argument of broad centrism in the government’s 
economic policy trajectory — this challenges the tendency to compartmentalise the ANC as either 
left or right. 
Thinking of the ANC too much in terms of whether it is more to the right or more to the left, 
although highly important in deducing distinctions and similarity in policy, is deficient in some 
respect because it fails to recognise the in-between element of centrism and policy variability within 
a centrist terrain. An important feature that persistently prevails in the broad economic setup of 
South  Africa  is  centrism.  From the  RDP to  NDP,  policy  has  variably  shifted  within  a  centrist 
environment. By this I mean that while RDP was centre-left, GEAR centre-right, and from ASGISA 
to NDP policy seems to be centre-left. Put differently, economic policy has swayed between the 
centre-left to centre-right and back to the centre-left. In brief, any left-right movement falls within 
the centre: macroeconomic policy eschews economic radicalism or fundamentalist conceptions of 
both state and market. In the following sections I demonstrate the centrism within the ANC by 
examining the ‘social pact’ and the party’s relationship with the SACP. 
7.3 State or market? Corporatism, the social pact and a mixed model 
7.3.1 The private sector and developmental objectives 
While embracing the developmental interventionist state, the ANC also recognises the limits of the 
state.  Essentially,  the  party  abjures  exclusive  state-led  intervention.  Given  the  uniqueness  of 
structural  socioeconomic  problems  in  the  country  and  a  hostile  global  environment,  statist 
approaches are, according to the party, unlikely to attract investment and increase growth. Rather, it 
is the market that would enable the government to tackle fiscal and budgetary issues. The ANC 
strongly believes that by and large the South African government depends on the private sector for 
revenue to finance policies. 
While GEAR took this approach further, since 1994 the government held an open approach to 
capital. In the RDP (1994) the government was quick to add the need for “a thriving private sector 
and active involvement by all  sectors of civil  society”. It  recognised that “both the private and 
public sector [must]  create productive employment opportunities at  a living wage for all  South 
Africans” (RDP, 1994). It is in this context that a central goal of government was to “integrate into 
the world economy utilising the growing home base in a manner that sustains a viable and efficient 
domestic  manufacturing  capacity,  and  increases  the  country’s  potential  to  export  manufactured 
products” (RDP, 1994). The ANC-led government also welcomed foreign capital investment and 
trade liberalisation. 
On the one side the government accorded a place for the private sector in the new state to join an 
economically globalised society and engage in capitalist-based initiatives, on the other side its belief 
was for the private sector to carry the weight of the government’s social development agenda and to 
economically empower the poor. The RDP (1994) stated: “[w]hile both business and labour have 
the freedom in a democratic South Africa to protect and promote their immediate interests, it is the 
Government’s  fervent  hope  that  they  will  jointly  pursue  the  broader  challenges  of  extending 
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opportunity to the millions of adult South Africans who can currently find no place in the formal 
economy”.  Herein  lay  the  resolve  to  form ‘constructive  relationships’ and ‘active  partnerships’ 
between government, unions, organised business, and “the workings of the market” (RDP, 1994). 
Some  refer  to  this  as  the  ‘social  pact’ that  testified  to  the  corporatist  state  that  South  Africa 
constructed (Habib, 2013). 
This led the ANC at one point to infer that: we “can also not over-stress that our success depends 
on  the  partnership  between  the  public  and  private  sectors  on  the  basis  of  mutually  beneficial 
interests”  (ANC,  2001a).  Hence,  the  ANC sees  itself  in  a  “transformational  engagement”  with 
capitalism, that is, a relationship for social development (ANC, 1997b). Saki Macozama, president 
of Business Leadership South Africa, puts it that: “[b]usiness does not see itself as a counter lever 
which is supposed to swing government one way or the other…[but wants] to make business good 
for  South  Africa  and  South  Africa  good  for  business”  (Interview).  Herbert  Mhkize,  former 
NEDLAC executive director, succinctly describes government-business interactions as a ‘symbiotic 
relationship’ predicated on social development (Interview).
7.3.2 NEDLAC and Government’s relationship with business and labour
When interview respondents were asked about how they perceived government’s relationship with 
business and attitude toward capital and the free-market, Phillip Dexter, former executive director 
of NEDLAC, said “generally, it’s not antagonistic towards private capital (Interview). He said the 
government  even  has  cordial  relations  with  certain  sections  of  white  business.  The  current 
NEDLAC director, Madoda Vilakazi held the same opinion; he said “government is very open and 
supportive to capitalism”; it “understands and accepts the important role of the private sector in the 
economy” (Interview). Government-business interaction is evident in non-statutory structures, as 
interviews alluded to, like the forum of more than 90 CEO’s that regularly meet at the level of the 
president to discuss issues of economic growth and development.  By the time of the NGP, the 
government conceded that “[k]ey to the implementation of the new growth path is the development 
of more constructive and collaborative relations between the state and business” (NGP, 2010: 63-4, 
emphasis added). So, not only was there a collaborative framework in place but the government 
calls for increased collaboration.
The inclusion of all relevant stakeholders in development objectives of the government can be 
observed  through  NEDLAC  —  a  statutory  institution  setup  in  1995  embodying  the  social 
partnership.  NEDLAC  is  based  on  the  politics  of  consultation  and  dialogue  where  salient 
stakeholders meet to determine economic policy. This set up includes government, business, labour 
and  civil  society.  For  the  ANC,  all  relevant  groups  “must  cooperate  in  formulating  economic 
policy” (RDP, 1994). The establishment of the statutory body sought to prevent policy discussions 
that were either on the radical left or neoliberal right. This is because the inclusion of contending 
groups  (especially  business  and  labour)  in  the  determination  of  policy,  moves,  although  not 
necessarily, stakeholders toward a mixed economic architecture — they are pushed to compromise 
and jettison radical orientations. 
Of course this  relationship is  not  static  or  unproblematic;  it  varies  and depending on issues 
discussed; there are less polarised or highly tense dynamics.  The nature of social dialogue is a 
negotiation and like any negotiation there is inherent conflict. Mhkize describes the relationship 
between various constituencies as an “adversarial-type relationship” (Interview). Each group seeks 
to defend and expand their turf. For instance, labour pushes for more leftist issues like banning 
labour brokering or increasing wealth or capital gains tax. Vilakazi and Mhkize make an interesting 
point about business: instead of moving more right, business is prone to push for more centrist 
policies. In fact, they tend to be largely “on the defensive mode” instead of moving more to the 
neoliberal side (Vilakazi, Interview). According to Dexter’s observation, “there are some hardline 
market fundamentalists in the business world, but there’re a minority; the consensus in our country 
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is that some kind of a mixed system is the best way to go” — certain things are delivered by the free 
market  and  others  that  are  delivered  by  the  government  (Interview).  Hence,  the  private  sector 
generally  feels  accommodated  in  this  arrangement.  Even  some  quarters  of  business  that  feel 
government  goes  too  far  with  some  economic  policies,  “still  finds  government  policies  to  be 
reasonably accommodating” (Mhkize, Interview). 
The RDP (1994) teased out these competing interests. On the one hand, basic to consultative 
discussions  were  the  protection  of  worker  rights  and  labour  standards;  on  the  other  hand, 
discussions were inherently stamped with private sector interests (RDP White Paper, 1994). Here, 
the ANC was describing the need to move discussion both to a labour-friendly and market-friendly 
place. The mixed approach was succinctly summed as follows: the government “is committed to 
creating an enabling environment that will encourage private investment by facilitating efficient 
markets and by redressing the distortions of the past” (RDP, 1994). Part of creating a supportive 
environment for business included gradual trade liberalisation; yet, this was balanced out, although 
rather  ambiguously,  with  the  government’s  intention  to  protect  local  manufactures  from unfair 
international  competition  (RDP,  1994).  Even  the  GEAR  policy  emphasised  an  “appropriate 
balance” between market-led job creation and protection of workers (GEAR, 1996: 18). Although 
the latter was given less priority, the policy testified to the government’s push toward some mix. 
The  NGP,  for  instance,  encouraged  stronger  investment  by  the  private  sector  to  grow 
employment-creating activities. More specifically it said: “[m]ost of the projected new jobs will 
come from the private sector…In a mixed economy, private business is a core driver of jobs and 
economic growth” (NGP, 2010: 23, 62, emphasis added). At the same time, ‘state-led’ economic 
policies  that  informed  the  developmental  state  were  to  “articulate  well  with  market 
institutions” (NGP, 2010: 61). What the NGP was plainly stating was that even though the state 
identified job-driving sectors and set out to advance a pro-worker, pro-redress agenda, such social 
developmental initiatives were not at the expense of the private sector. Compared to ASGISA, the 
NGP appeared to accommodate the business community in a fresh new way. An objective of the 
policy was to create a favourable climate for business, particularly through minimising costs for 
business — unnecessary economic costs such as regulatory requirements and poor infrastructure. 
While GEAR sought to minimise cost through providing business with space to use the deregulated 
labour market (but given that the government operated under the Labour Regulations Act of 1995, 
such deregulation was not overriding), the NGP’s strategy was less rightist; yet, it did not debar the 
right.
Since the early 1990s the ANC demonstrated its committed for a mixed approach but this was 
consolidated in the 1960s (as will be discussed later). In its Ready to Govern document, it set out 
the economic model it envisaged for the country: “a mixed economy [that] will foster a new and 
constructive relationship between the people, the state, the trade union movement, the private sector 
and the market” (ANC, 1992, emphasis added). Trevor Manuel, the first finance minister in the new 
government,  alluded  that  the  ANC  came  to  drop  more  leftist  clauses  like  nationalisation  and 
accepted a mixed economy (Financial Mail, 13-18 December 2013). This feature embedded itself 
in the fabric of the state, it continues till the present. The party said in 2010, its aims is to “promote 
a mixed economy, where the state, private capital, cooperative and other forms of social ownership 
complement  each  other  in  an  integrated  way  to  eliminate  poverty  and  foster  shared  economic 
growth” (ANC, 2010b).
7.3.3 Government: the centrist arbiter ‘walking a tight rope’
The government partnership includes three critical economic players: the state, market and labour. 
The  government  acts  as  a  ‘centrist  arbiter’:  it  engages  in  mediating  between  and  petitioning 
contending groups. Although (a) persuading business to join the developmental agenda of the state, 
the government also seeks to (b) influence labour to put aside unreasonable demands and work with 
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business. Labour, like capital, is at the centre of the ANC’s concerns. According to the party, there is 
an important role that labour plays in a capitalist  context:  “the working class together with the 
democratic state and capital complete the proverbial golden triangle necessary for the development 
and transformation of society” (ANC, 1996b).  Yet the ANC recognises a critical  challenge: for 
organised  labour  to  support  employment  creation  and  equity  concomitantly  with  policies  that 
support the needs of the business sector (NGP, 2010). This arbitration role of the ANC was seen in 
the  early  1990s.  Trevor  Manuel  emphasised  how Mandela  played a  critical  role  in  getting  the 
leftwing to acquiesce in the idea of a mixed economy “run along essentially market-based lines”; 
and this “was invaluable in holding the centre” and maintaining political stability (Financial Mail, 
13-18 December 2013: 34). 
Government  has  consistently  committed  to  collaborating  with  both  organised  business  and 
labour. The NDP (2012: 28) characterised the role of the state as one that focuses on “[b]uilding 
partnerships  between  the  public  sector,  business  and  labour  to  facilitate,  direct  and  promote 
investment  in  labour-intensive  areas”.  In  other  words,  while  the  government  is  encouraging 
cooperation, all social partners are meant to work inclusively in an accommodative environment to 
promote growth and development. Despite these sentiments from government, on a more critical 
level, when interview respondents were asked whether they observe the government as being in 
favour of any particular interest (labour or business), they denounced this idea. Government tries to 
“find a delicate balance on the various interests”; “it would not be outright business, likewise it 
would not be outright in favour or organised labour: its a balance” (Mhkize, Interview). As Mhkize 
notes, there are times when the relationship gravitates more to labour or more to business, whether 
on labour market or monetary policy; yet this does not constitute fundamental shifts to either side 
(Interview).  If  the government does move more left  or right,  it  still  maintains some balance to 
ensure the interests of the other side are catered for. Macozama shared this view; he explained that 
the relationship between government and business is fraught with contradictions but still radical 
leftist remedies in favour of social transformation have not been pursued (Interview). 
On the issue of  tax,  for  instance,  “government  is  very careful  to  say we can’t  increase this 
[wealth or capital gains] tax in a manner that suggests its a sin to be wealthy or its a sin to earn more 
than  one  and  a  half  million  rands”  (Vilakazi,  Interview).  So,  despite  pressure  from  labour, 
government considers the interests of business to ensure that as an arbiter, government is not pushed 
too far left or isolates business. Thus, it is in this sense Mhkize argues that no group can levy the 
criticism that government social and economic policies as either socialist or purely capitalist in 
character: its very much fixed with elements of both (Interview). Vilakazi made the point more 
emphatically: “government is not in favour of any of the two parties [business and labour], I think 
they are trying to walk a very tight rope…I think they are just being moderate and in the middle-of-
the-road” (Interview). 
Although  each  constituency  seeks  to  inherently  advance  their  interests,  there  is  a  general 
understanding of the ‘social developmental consensus’ that requires both a conducive environment 
for economic growth and pro-poor policies. This understanding that the two are indispensable and 
should work together seems to constitute ‘pulling ground’ that causes parties to gravitate to the 
middle-of-the-road. According to the Dexter, “that we have social dialogue in our country…and a 
very strong bargaining culture means that the relationship between the social partners, generally 
speaking, is a good one” (Interview). Dexter calls this institutional arrangement an “advanced and 
mature” system of social  dialogue (Interview).  As he correctly elucidates:  without a bargaining 
culture and a system that fosters convergence of interests, whether at a statutory or informal level, 
“the alternative really is all out conflict”. In other terms, polarisation would almost be a regular 
feature of politics (Interview). 
Moreover, the government recognises that the push for an environment of constructive social 
dialogue and broad consensus is not only to shape the country’s developmental economic policies 
but to achieve “requisite policy stability and coherence” (NGP, 2010: 18). Here, the government is 
making an important link between consensus politics and policy stability. Thus, it is accommodative 
to both labour and business; it perceives itself as spawning ‘necessary’ tradeoffs and sacrifices, on 
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the side of business, to ensure a visibly “fair distribution of the benefits from growth” (NGP, 2010: 
18).
In this sense, the government makes note of its own limitations, advances the need for business, 
recognises the importance of labour, and builds on a corporatist platform as a centrist arbiter. The 
‘focused partnership’/‘social pact’ setup constrains capitalist and socialist policies from maximally 
prevailing. The ANC is a moderate party of government that encourages these tendencies to agree 
on a mixed position. Thus, its embrace of collaborative politics shows that the ANC is less of an 
ideologically rigid, clear-cut left-right party; rather, it positions itself as a pragmatic party, that sits 
in the centre and is willing to consider and arbitrate ideological tussles. 
7.4 Radical leftism? The ANC and the SACP: The non-ideological alliance 
It is not the purpose of this research to embark on a rigorous assessment of the entire left bloc — 
especially given practical concerns. I focus mainly on the most ideologically-inclined left partner: 
the  SACP — initially  named the  Communist  Party  of  South  Africa  until  1953  (CPSA).  Also, 
COSATU is  based  upon  practical  organisation  of  the  working  class  and  improvement  in  their 
material condition; and this is not always connected to some ideological orientation. However, I do 
not completely exclude COSATU, especially since the interview process included COSATU as an 
important element. This section critically assesses the nature of the relationship between the SACP 
and ANC. It begins by assessing (a) the ANC’s position on the ideology of socialism; (b) how the 
party defines its relationship with the left, both in the liberation (pre-1994) and democratic phase 
(post-1994); and (c) assesses the moderation of the SACP and the causes behind it.
7.4.1 The historical relationship
The ANC’s relationship with the leftist SACP is one that evolved over time. It started from a place 
of  discrediting the  communist  party  and later  moved to  joint  cooperation with  it.  This  section 
critically assesses the ANC’s perception of communism and cooperation with the SACP. First, the 
liberation movement expressed very little intention to radically overhaul the country’s economic 
system  and  replace  it  with  something  fundamentally  different.  The  movement  emphatically 
detached itself from ‘imposed’ communist definitions that associated it with economic radicalism 
(the ANC was banned under the ‘Suppression of Communism Act’ in the 1960s). During the 1960s 
the ANC took an assertive position on ideological issues. It stated: “[the ANC] is not and was never 
a  communist  movement”  (Mandela,  1964).  Rejection  of  socialist  labels  began  to  emerge  in 3
response to varied interpretations that surrounded the ANC’s core policy document: the Freedom 
Charter of 1955. Assertively clarifying its ideological position on the Charter, Mandela (1964) said: 
the policy was “by no means a blueprint for a socialist state...The ANC has never at any period of 
its history advocated a revolutionary change in the economic structure of the country, nor has it…
ever condemned capitalist society”. 
The ANC expressed reservations about unconditionally following communist footprints precisely 
because it had an interest in and saw the benefit of the capitalist system. In one instance as Mandela 
explained in his autobiography, in the 1980s he described the Freedom Charter as “a blueprint for 
capitalism”: it “does not even purport to want to destroy the capitalist system” (Mandela, 2010: 
250). This was because an ANC government wanted Africans to have the opportunity “which they 
have  never  had  before,  of  owning  property  wherever  they  want,  and  capitalism  will  flourish 
amongst  them  as  never  before”  (Mandela,  2010:  250).  Similarly,  when  the  party  assumed 
government in 1994, it said: “the ANC cannot bar blacks from becoming and being capitalists, any 
more  than  it  could  debar  them from becoming  lawyers,  doctors,  accountants,  engineers,  [and] 
skilled workers” (ANC, 2007b). In addition, the ANC did not concede to the idea of worker power 
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(proletarian democracy), worker ownership, and production for use. Instead, its position was one 
that supported a “unification of various classes”, the transfer of state power “not to any single social 
class but to all” (workers, professionals and bourgeoisie alike), and profit-accumulation (Mandela, 
1956). 
It, however, recognised the need for “some form of socialism” to enable people “to catch up with 
the advanced countries of this world and to overcome their legacy of extreme poverty” (Mandela, 
1964). Mandela was pointing to the non-radical nature of the left element in the party: “this does not 
mean we are Marxists”, we are influenced by “both West and East” (Mandela, 1964). The ANC’s 
position was anything but rigid and dogmatic. Economic policy determination proceeded from an 
all-rounded, comprehensive approach, that took “everything into account” (Tambo, 1980). Oliver 
Tambo, former ANC president, highlighted that the search for an economic model followed “purely 
from a pragmatic point of view” (Tambo, 1985a). Policy positions factored in the unique history of 
the  country,  the  needs  of  the  poor  and  deprived,  and  economic  growth.  What  the  ANC  was 
advancing was a mixed and flexible framework. In the 1980s the movement defined this ‘mixed 
model’ as one where “some of the industries, would be controlled, owned, by the State (as happens 
in many countries), and the rest by private ownership — a mixed economy”; it went further to add 
that the driving motive behind it was to ensure “a more equitable distribution of the wealth of the 
country” (Tambo, 1985a). 
The  moderate  stance  of  the  ANC  was  challenged  by  more  radicalised  elements  in  the 
organisation. Although individuals and groups coalesced around the ideals of the Freedom Charter, 
which, for the ANC, stood for a socialist-capitalist blueprint for a future economic setup, a cohort 
were however not persuaded by the mixed approach. One of the major splits from the movement 
resulted in a defection led by Robert Sobukwe who formed the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in 
1959. Those who defected not only resisted the ANC’s accommodation of inter-racial unity but also 
the movement’s partial embrace of communist policies. 
Consistently, especially since the 1960s, not only did the ANC seize the opportunity to reshape 
public narratives about what the movement stood for — particularly given that the world order 
surrounding  such  developments  were  fierce  competition  between  two  ideological  strongholds: 
communism and capitalism — but it made the left bloc understand the ‘boundaries’ it drew for 
itself. The ANC’s self-proclamation of economic positions gave no illusion to those around it that it 
was a movement that endorsed economic radicalism; the movement did not straddle one or another 
ideological fence. By defining its own stance, it avoided living in an ideological void. Since the 
1960s the ANC occupied a clear stance on left-right issues: a moderate and mixed position between 
West-East ideologies — it neither supported revolutionary change in the economic structure nor 
condemned a capitalist society. The model it was advancing for the country had a role for both the 
state  and capital.  This  importantly  demonstrates  manifestations  of  economic centrism since the 
1960s in the ANC. It reflected an impetus to draw upon the two competing ideological strands, and 
pull the benefits from each side to reach some positional convergence; and by extension, it sidelined 
a unimodal dogmatic position.
Second was the ANC’s association with the SACP and the non-ideological  grounds for  this 
connection.  Although  presumably  more  capitalist  admirers  like  Mandela  initially  perceived 
communism as a ‘foreign ideology’ and supported the expulsion of communist subscribers from the 
movement, ANC members grew in tolerance towards the communists. In the first place the ANC did 
not deny but recognised the existence of diverse ideological strands; it knew that it differed with 
some sections on ideological and political questions (Tambo, 1985a). Tolerance was defended on 
grounds of inclusivity: the moderate opinionated leaders of the ANC promoted accommodation of 
‘various political convictions’ for the prime purpose of national liberation (Mandela, 1964). The 
movement  saw  itself  as  a  uniting  force  of  a  multiplicity  of  ideological  strands  —  including 
Christian, Muslim, communist, bourgeois and others. By and large, the ANC pursued the position: 
“whatever  we  differ  about,  let  us  be  united  in  defeating  and  destroying  the  apartheid 
regime” (Tambo, 1985b). Theoretical differences amongst those fighting against oppression was a 
luxury the ANC could not afford (Mandela, 1964). It was this purpose that led the ANC’s NEC to 
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declare that commitment to principles of unity over other affiliations (both ideological and other) 
should enable different groups to “find a place in its ranks” (ANC, 1989). Proceeding from this 
context came the association between the ANC and SACP: partnership forged itself not on the basis 
of economic freedom but political  liberation.  In fact,  cooperation with communists  was merely 
proof of a common goal (the removal of white supremacy) and “not proof of a complete community 
of interests”  (Mandela, 1964). No economic ideological glue that based itself on radical leftism 
joined  the  ANC  to  SACP.  Cooperation,  inclusivity  and  accommodation  faired  better  than 
ideological  polemic  and  hardline  dogmatic  separatism;  and  the  need  for  immediate  self-
determination superseded narrow economic preoccupations. 
Despite  this  cooperation  both  the  ANC and the  communist  party  advanced distinct  political 
missions. On the one hand, the ANC’s was a political mission; it was striving to win liberation, 
political rights and democracy. On the other hand, the SACP’s was an ideological mission; it was 
aspiring to dismantle capitalism and replace it with communism and proletarian democracy. This 
distinction was evident; in one instance the ANC asserted that Marxist tendencies were confusing 
the  working  class  about  the  ANC’s  positions  and  what  it  stood  for  (ANC,  1985).  Dissimilar 
missions produced ‘respect’ and recognition for organisational distinctions and boundaries. Each 
one  had  their  distinct  role  and  “respect  for  their  boundaries  has  ensured  the  survival  and 
consolidation of our cooperation and unity” (Tambo, 1981). Here the ANC was secluding itself in a 
predefined shell: one that said it was not for communism but for political freedom. It was as if there 
was no negotiation on whether it supported economic radicalism: the boundary lines were drawn. 
The ANC also firmly pointed out that it was not controlled by the SACP; in fact, it clearly stated 
that  it  was  very  well  capable  of  influencing  it.  But  since  the  prime purpose  of  the  ANC was 
liberation, it did not want to be too polemical against the SACP. And as such, the ANC said the 
relationship  between  it  and  the  SACP is  not  a  one-way  process  but  the  “two  influence  each 
other” (Tambo, 1981). 
Essentially, reinforcing popular action through unity, pluralism and accommodation within the 
context of liberation allowed the ANC to transcend minor and major ideological differences. Policy-
based animosities were labelled petty and unsubstantive for a progressive political and social order. 
This suggests that the economic dimension was less emphasised (although it nonetheless constituted 
an important concern), it was political liberation that formed the main agenda. Here I concur with 
scholars who state that the ANC “studiously avoided adopting rigid ideological stances”; it was less 
occupied with ‘ideological rectitude’ but more interested in the politics of activism, resistance and 
strategy (Maylam, 2001: 111-2; Marx, 1992). In the end, the history between the ANC and the 
SACP was one where the two barely influenced each other on matters of ideology (Maloka, 2013). 
Perhaps, however, it  may be more plausible to say that while the ANC may be contributing to 
moderation  of  the  SACP (as  will  be  later  discussed),  the  latter’s  radical  leftist  seed,  although 
embedded  in  the  ANC,  failed  to  germinate  anything  close  to  fundamentalist  doctrines.  It  was 
essentially a non-ideological alliance predicated less on economic radicalism than political freedom.  
7.4.2 The contemporary relationship
In  the  democratic  phase  the  alliance  between  the  two  evolved  but  not  towards  an  ideological 
direction.  The  connection  in  the  post-apartheid  period  rested  on  two  main  things:  history  and 
development. The ANC welcomed the SACP as a strategic partner in the first instance because of 
shared  historical  connection.  “The  Alliance  between  the  ANC and  the  SACP is  one  based  on 
principles and trust, derived from practical experiences of sharing trenches” (ANC, 2013). In this 
statement  by  the  ANC’s  secretary  general,  Gwede  Mantashe,  ideology  featured  nowhere.  In 
addition, both entities recognised that it shared economic objectives to eradicate poverty, inequality 
and unemployment. Partnership in the contemporary period moved from the political dimension, 
away  from  self-determination  and  political  freedom,  to  the  economic  dimension.  Both  saw 
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themselves as extinguishing the association between race and class: we are “fighting basically two 
features of the same monster” (capitalism and race) (ANC, 2013). Although the purpose shifted, this 
was still  only weakly ideologically-grounded in economic radicalism. Yet, distinct missions still 
prevail to some important extent. As a former senior ANC member puts it when he alluded to the 
tripartite alliance: labour deals with labour issues, government deals with government issues, and 
the communist party deals with their own programmes (Chikane, Interview). 
A  guiding  conceptual  model  of  both  the  SACP  and  ANC  is  the  ‘national  democratic 
revolution’ (NDR) which is joined to the ‘development state’, which is subsequently joined to social 
democracy.  The  NDR  is  primarily  constructed  upon  state-based  interventionism.  It  is  clear, 
however, that both entities hold different ideas about what the NDR constitutes. The ANC espouses 
the  NDR’s socialist  values:  “[t]he  national  democratic  society  is  meant  to  be  based on human 
solidarity and the spirit of caring for the most vulnerable in society” (ANC, 2015). “Whilst not 
rejecting the role of the market, the new government has positioned the state such that it is able to 
drive  economic  growth  and  development,  to  intervene  in  the  economy  whenever  this  became 
necessary and to manage the economy” (ANC, 2010a). As a result, the ANC’s take on the NDR 
reflects the ‘some form of socialism’ approach that the party articulated in the 1960s. Rather than 
the dogmatism some on the left attach to the NDR, the ANC displays fondness for realistic and 
pragmatic approaches to social and economic problems. While the ANC uses Marxist language to 
describe its position (such as ‘bourgeoisie’), the party embraces the concept of ‘nation’ as a multi-
class structure with both elements of capitalism and socialism:  
A nation is  a  multi-class  entity.  Under  a  system of  capitalism,  it  will  have its  bourgeoisie, 
middle strata, rural communities - rich and poor. The objective of the NDR is not the creation of 
a socialist or communist society…Among the central tasks of the NDR is the improvement of 
the quality of life of especially the poor, and also to ensure that in the medium- to long-term, the 
place that individuals occupy in society is not defined by race…An important part of this is that 
the  NDR  also  entails  the  building  of  a  black  bourgeoisie.  The  tendering  conditions  that 
government has introduced, and its encouragement of the private sector to promote all kinds of 
“empowerment”, aptly illustrates this…At the same time, the unfolding NDR has also meant the 
fast growth of a black middle strata. This process will speed up even more as opportunities open 
up in various areas of life. 
(ANC, 2007b, emphasis added)
As the ANC described its own  middle-ground, mixed economic model in 1990s: choosing one over 
another is one-sided and amounts to ‘[f]ailure to appreciate both the ‘with and against’. The reality 
that capitalist corporations own and control enormous resources is a reality that “cannot just be 
wished away”; however, “the capitalist accumulation process, left to itself, everywhere promotes 
inequality and underdevelopment”—thus, it is a struggle with and against capitalism (ANC, 1997a, 
emphasis added). 
For  the  ANC,  the  NDR  was  more  to  be  interpreted  as  a  centrist  position  that  induced  an 
appropriate mix between contending positions; rather than through narrow pigeon-holes of left-right 
or  socialist-capitalist.  In  other  words,  “[t]he  NDR  should  not  be  seen  in  narrow  ideological 
terms” (ANC, 1997b). To use the party’s 1969 description: “[t]he revolutionary-sounding phrase 
does not always reflect revolutionary policy, and revolutionary-sounding policy is not always the 
spring-board for revolutionary advance” (ANC, 1969).  The ‘revolutionary’ element in the NDR 
should not straightforwardly be associated with leftist economic revolutionary advance. 
Some in the SACP accuse the ANC of betraying the NDR. In response, the governing party 
unapologetically  asserts  that  competing  with  the  far  left  on  ‘revolutionary  rhetoric’  and 
ideologically  rigidity  must  be  consciously  avoided  (ANC,  2015).  For  the  ANC,  the  NDR’s 
conception of ‘revolution’ is not socialist in nature: it is not a ‘mechanical stage’ (like the two-stage 
theory of revolution articulated by the SACP) that develops ‘capitalist conditions’ to move into 
socialism (ANC, 1997b). It plainly elucidated that it was far from a socialist party: the ANC “is, 
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inherently  and  by  definition,  not  a  movement  whose  mission  is  to  fight  for  the  victory  of 
socialism” (ANC, 2002b). Like its defence of the Freedom Charter, the ANC proclaimed that the 
NDR is not a programme hijacked by socialists who are “hitching a ride, with a separate agenda up 
their sleeves” (ANC, 1997a). In analysing the ANC’s relationship with Marxism, some scholars 
consequently describe the party as ‘denuded of radical impulses’ (Jara, 2013: 261). 
Related to the debate surrounding the socialist character of the NDR: whilst the ANC considers 
the right as inimical to social transformation and unsupportive of the redistributive role of the state 
(especially  in  inter-party  competition),  the  ultra-left  purports  unrealistic  doctrines  and  an 
‘adventuristic struggle’ against global relations (ANC, 2002d). In the 1980s the ultra-left stood for 
black  communism which  combined  black  consciousness  with  the  rhetoric  of  socialism (ANC, 
1985).  In  the  contemporary  period  the  extreme  left  has  become  increasingly  associated  with 
‘excessive subjectivism’ that confuses what is desirable with what is objectively possible (ANC, 
2007a). According to the party, the far left idea of a linear reversal of the capitalist market and the 
state  as  the  owner  of  production,  advances  the  ‘impossible’ and  takes  ‘dangerous  great  leaps 
forward’.  It  essentially “reflects a systematic inability to understand the dynamic complexity of 
objective factors” (ANC, 2002c). It is in this sense that the ANC equates the ultra left challenge as 
infantilism (ANC, 2013). Moreover, having postulated itself as having a “bias towards the poor”, 
the party hastened to add that it was, however, a “disciplined force of the left” (ANC, 2010a) What 
this does is draw the boundary line that the ANC was not crossing: it was uninterested in moving to 
the extreme left. 
The critique of the far left was advanced particularly under the administration of Mbeki who 
polarised the left-right divide in the ANC. During this time major ANC publications, including NEC 
statements, national conference reports and Umrabulo, constantly made mention of the ultra-left. 
While the party may be less able to quell extremism and unrealistic dogmatism (since important 
dividing lines exist between the ANC and its internal left bloc), its accommodative position is not 
valued on the basis of ideological orientations or similarities but some agreement on a common 
purpose in the contemporary phase. In fact, in the alliance “members are valued on the basis of their 
allegiance and commitment to the values, vision and program of the movement, not on the basis of 
their  ideological  orientation” (ANC, 2010a).  The ANC, in  other  words,  expects  that  the SACP 
consider it  as the guiding mother body and work within its umbra of pragmatism. If economic 
similarities were fundamental, any senior representative of the ANC would make first mention of 
this before any other determining factor. Since historical connections and development objectives 
take precedence, it continues to give the impression that the contemporary alliance is not forged on 
ideological  similarities.  Moreover,  the  discourse  of  ultra-leftism,  as  some  objectionable  and 
unwanted ingredient, crafted a very articulate critique of the transition from capitalism to socialism. 
Even  though  Mbeki  spawned  ideological  divisions  within  the  party,  during  his  time  the  ANC 
consolidated its position against radical leftism — it  was regarded as a leftism that showed no 
understanding of global realities and little acceptance for the ANC’s mixed model. 
7.4.3 Moderation and the SACP
One side of the picture is that socialism forms an important part of the relationship between the 
SACP and ANC, given that the NDR still lives on despite the collapse of communism (Filatova, 
2012). This argument, however, neglects engaging with the other side which is that the SACP seems 
to  have  ‘moderated’ its  position.  The  evolution  of  the  SACP to  relatively  pragmatic  or  less 
ideological positions is evident in the comments made by Jeremy Cronin, deputy secretary general 
in the SACP and deputy minister in government. Even though the SACP would not openly, let alone 
assertively, articulate that they have moderated or watered-down their position, in reality this is the 
case. Cronin conceded that the SACP reviewed what they mean by socialism: “what we understand 
as a communist party…by the kind of socialism [we are proposing]…is not a return to the era of…
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the Soviet Union…but a socialism of the 21st century” (Interview). Accordingly, he perceives of 
radical  left  parties  (like  the  EFF)  as  promoting  economic  proposals  that  lack  “realism  and 
practicality” (Interview). For SACP, social democracy is a temporary phase that meets the needs of 
the poor under a capitalist system (Mashilo, Interview). Obviously, there are deep divisions between 
more pragmatic and ideological sections within the SACP, and its documents ostensibly assert its 
commitment to an ultimate socialist future. But by and large, the SACP seems to be following a less 
dogmatic position. 
What  are  the  driving factors  behind this  moderation?  First,  some argue that  the  SACP was 
influenced by the global and domestic context where capitalism constituted a dominant force. The 
Party began to realise that it is “impelled by material reality rather than ideas” (Glaser, 2013: 189). 
Pragmatic economic perspectives surfaced when SACP leaders like Joe Slovo reckoned that under 
new global circumstances, sacrifice was needed ‘on all sides’ (Adams, 1997). Even prior to this, in 
1991 Chris Hani, another SACP leader, accepted social democracy even though it was regarded as a 
‘gradualist  vision’ or a temporary phase in the SACP’s two-stage theory of revolution (Adams, 
1997). Both SACP and COSATU interview respondents said that “we do need to be realistic about 
the  objective conditions,  global  as  well  as  domestic,  so  we’re  not  saying that  some great  leap 
forward  is  possible  in  some  easy  way,  there  are  many  difficulties  including  a  hostile  global 
reality” (Cronin, Zakhele Cele: Interviews). One SACP respondent emphasised this point, he said 
that what happens in South Africa is not determined by the ANC or SACP alone but by the balance 
of  forces  both  internally  and  internationally.  “[W]e  [the  SACP]  acknowledge  the  limitations 
imposed on our struggle by objective realities,  we do not overemphasise subjective factors and 
ignore objective reality” (Mashilo, Interview). Policy, in other words, “is not determined simply by 
the mind and brains of the people who are leading the alliance formations but it is determined by the 
material condition and the balance of forces on the ground” (Cele, Interview). Respondents agreed 
that the ANC could not ignore reality.
Second, others argue that the SACP’s loss of autonomy given its alliance with the ANC largely 
accounts for the watering-down of radical leftism. The SACP has become “tempered and moderated 
by its unwavering commitment to the ANC” (Thomas, 2007: 135). McKinley (2001: 186) describes 
this as the ‘historic compromise’ that bargained away radical leftism and acquiesced to work in the 
moderate, pro-capitalist and multi-class framework of the ANC. There is a general understanding 
within the ANC and even in the alliance (ironically though, given the alliance launches criticisms 
against the ANC) that the ANC is not for socialism. The ANC cannot be pushed into the direction of 
socialism primarily  because  “it’s  not  a  socialist  party  but  it’s  a  pro-poor  party”;  “it’s  a  social 
democratic party…not a socialist organisation (Chikane, Dexter: Interviews). As Dexter puts it: it is 
a  “national  liberation  movement  and  it  doesn’t  see  building  socialism  as  part  of  its 
mandate” (Interview). Interview respondents from both COSATU and the SACP underscored that it 
accepts the broadness of the ANC. A senior COSATU representative said the union “accepts the 
contradictions in the alliance”, it recognises that the alliance is not an organisation of one class 
(Cele, Interview). “The ANC is a multi-class organisation: in the ANC there are capitalists and 
socialists; so we would not expect the ANC to openly advance the struggle for socialism” (Cele, 
Interview). 
Mashilo explained that the historical mission of the SACP to overthrow capitalism and replace it 
with socialism, belongs primarily to the SACP; instead, the ANC is a mass party that seeks to cater 
for everyone (Interview). Thus, “[t]he SACP is not interested in changing the nature and character 
of the ANC” (Mashilo, Interview). Cronin strongly shared this perspective. He said “we sought as a 
communist party to influence its [the ANC’s] politics but also to respect its broadness”; in this 
context, “it’s not necessarily difficult [to advance radical socialism], obviously we need to respect 
there is a range of different views and not everyone would agree with a radical socialist perspective 
in the ANC” (Interview). Thus, there is striking correspondence rather than juxtaposed views within 
the alliance that the ANC is not advancing an extreme left agenda; instead, the governing party is a 
broadly representative entity that caters for all class interests. This ostensibly places boundaries on 
the SACP and COSATU, and determines what they perceive as their ‘mission’ within the alliance. 
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Moreover, both left partners do not approach the ANC with the exclusive purpose to influence it and 
push forward its agenda. As Mashilo notes: “[w]hen you engage in an alliance, you not only seek to 
influence  but  you  must  be  readily  open  to  be  persuaded  by  the  people  you  work  with  as 
well”  (Interview).  This  characterises  the  SACP  as  a  Party  that  supports  an  open  dialogue 
relationship to persuade and be persuaded. 
Third, there seems to be a shortfall in both causal explanations: both ignore the position of the 
ANC as a potential cause. Although the two stated causes are fundamental, I argue that we should 
add another  factor  to  the  explanation for  why the SACP moderated its  position.  Although this 
position may not stand alone or independently but may relate to the above positions, it is important 
to explicitly give credence to it. Both arguments recognise that material/objective factors and the 
alliance  with  the  ANC  are  important  (facilitating  the  lose  of  autonomy),  yet,  the  ANC  is  an 
important agent in contributing to SACP’s adoption of such positions in the first place. Not only 
was  the  ANC  since  the  1960s  constantly  asserting  its  own  pragmatic  non-ideologically  rigid 
position and also discrediting the dogmatism of the communist party, it tried to persuade the SACP 
to be less ideological and more pragmatic. This became evident in the democratic period. More 
specifically, the ANC was seeking to stimulate a culture of pragmatism within intra-organisational 
debate.  The party recognised that  a  major  source of  strength was in consensus,  agreement and 
pragmatism. While it encourages enquiring minds and wide-ranging internal debates on ideological 
questions, this is within a context of discouraging dogmatism (ANC, 2002d). Fostering open debate 
was  not  inimical  to  eschewing dogma and the  disjuncture  between theory  and practice  (ANC, 
2011b). In brief, a vibrant alliance based on progressive policy platforms can succeed on condition 
is operates “without the imprisonment of dogma” (ANC, 1997d).
Picking from the social pact analysis of this chapter, the ANC views itself more than a ‘centrist 
arbiter’ between the extremes but a dynamic party spawning new positions rather than consuming 
predetermined ones, both on the left and right. It said: “[t]he ANC has a responsibility to contribute 
to  the  renewal  of  progressive  ideas  and  policy  alternatives”;  we  “must  refuse  to  be  passive 
consumers of ideas and policies” (ANC, 2011). This began presumably when the balance of forces 
in the domestic and global environment led the ANC to describe the challenge for the alliance as: 
“how to take forward, intelligently and in a sustainable manner, a transformation struggle” (ANC, 
1997a).  It  was  necessary  to  “learn  from  the  accumulated  experience”  “to  construct  its  own 
policies…[by accepting] to think in a bold and innovative manner” (ANC, 1996b). Reconciling the 
global environment with domestic challenges took on a posture of creative manoeuvring — which 
was primarily based on avoiding rigid dogmatic formula (ANC, 2002d). But this push for policy 
redefinition is not limited to understanding the dominance of capitalism. The party still maintains 
the position of an alliance that is “capable rationally and logically of dealing with substantive issues 
and lifting the refinement of public discourse” (ANC, 2015). So, in other words, it can be inferred 
that the ANC’s call for elements of rationality, logic and creativity in search for policy alternatives 
assists the push for the alliance to move into accepting a mixed position. In this sense, the ANC 
plays a critical role in actively stimulating pragmatism in the left bloc. 
Succumbing to the dominance of capitalism, losing autonomy, or persuasion by the ANC all 
contribute to changes in the SACP’s ideology. But whatever the cause, the effect of this moderation 
is obvious and noticeable. The SACP’s capacity to exercise counter-hegemony is constrained (Saul, 
2013: 215; Thomas, 2012). This is often evidenced by the removal of the proverbial ‘socialist hat’ 
when SACP members occupy the senior positions in government; “dozens of SACP members are in 
government,  but are incapable of articulating [Communist] Party positions within those sites of 
power” (Thomas, 2012: 120; Madisha, Interview). This was evident in the case of GEAR when the 
left was unable to deter the government’s position. So in spite of what Charles Nqakula, then SACP 
general secretary, describes as the watchdog role of the SACP — “to ensure that the ANC in the first 
instance  does  not  go  astray  in  terms  of  the  policies”  — its  leftist  influence  seems  negligible 
(Maloka, 2013: 156).  
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7.5 Polarisation and the resurgence of the centre
7.5.1 Points of polarisation
The ANC is not a homogenous ideological party, let alone a consistent centrist party, but at the same 
time it is not a socialist party. As evident from the above analysis, the socialist character of the ANC 
has always been repudiated by the party itself. Yet since its inception, evident lines of left-right 
division and even periods of polarisation emerged within the ANC. Together with capitalism and 
other ideological adherents, there has been an ebb and flow of communism in the organisation. Here 
I discuss four noticeable instances: Gumede’s links with the CPSA (1930s), ANC-Soviet relations 
(1960s to late-1980s), Mbeki’s communist background and government administration (mid-1990s 
to mid-2000s), and Zuma’s left-backed camp (late-2000s to present). 
Josiah Gumede, president of ANC, visited the Soviet Union in 1927, accompanied by James la 
Guma of  the CPSA, to commemorate the decade anniversary of  the Bolshevik Revolution.  He 
supported the CPSA’s socialist orientation and the socialist project in the Soviet bloc. In his address 
at the International Congress Against Imperialism in Brussels, Gumede called for “the complete 
overthrow of capitalist and imperialist domination” (ANC, 1927). He also described the situation in 
South Africa’s mines as black worker exploitation for capitalist profit; he said, “[t]hey [the miners] 
have to go down the bowels of the earth to bring up gold to enrich the capitalist, but the capitalist 
gives them two shillings a day and puts them in dirty compounds” (ANC, 1927). After visiting the 
Soviet Union Gumede began to advocate for connections between the ANC and CPSA. He strongly 
believed that the Communist’s had a role to play in defeating imperialism and worker exploitation. 
More  particularly,  Gumede  was  swayed  by  the  economic  element  where  he  admired  that  the 
working class were at the forefront of change in Russia. However, his pro-communist inclination 
did not sit  favourably within upper echelons of the movement. During his leadership there was 
heightened  difference  of  opinion  in  the  movement  and  in  1930  Gumede  lost  his  position  as 
president general. His successor, Pixley Seme, stood more as a vanguard of the ANC’s moderate 
wing that was suspicious of the radicalism of communist ideas. Seme resuscitated the moderate 
element in the ANC that Gumede was challenging. In the post-Gumede period, the ANC’s 1939 
conference  asserted  how  “[c]ommunism  threatened  to  seize  the  reins  of  Congress 
leadership”  (Furlong,  1997).  This  period  teased  out  the  moderate-radical  division  inside  the 
organisation  (Dubow,  2000;  Jordan  and  Ndebele,  2010).  In  this  case  radical  orientations  were 
outflanked by moderates. 
In the late-1940s there was a transition in the ANC from peaceful offensive to mass and militant 
resistance. A radical regrouping occurred within the structures of the ANC in 1949; the ANC Youth 
League (ANCYL) advanced a Programme of Action that called for mass action to defy and resist 
separatist policies (Glaser, 2012; Butler, 2012).  It seemed that for “the first time in its history the 4
organisation  [the  ANC] was  able  to  plan,  lead  and  execute  a  systematic  national  campaign  of 
political action” (Dubow, 2000: 34). One influential ANC official, Z. K. Matthews, described the 
evolution away from orthodox reformism by saying that “the ANC is an action group, not a study 
circle” — indicating the withering of persuasive intellectual professionalism that defined the 1912 
to 1949 ANC (ANC, 1955b, emphasis added). 
In the 1950s the ANC entered into an informal alliance with the banned SACP. In this period the 
‘Congress Alliance’ came into being through a formation of political pacts between the ANC and 
other entities — such as the Coloured African People’s Organisation, the Indian Congress, and the 
White South African Congress of Democrats. Matthews described the Congress Alliance and the 
Freedom Charter by saying that, “for the first time was a Congress which brought together people 
drawn from all sections of the population” (ANC, 1955b, emphasis added). In fact, this joining of 
people  of  various  convictions  and  classes  resulted  in  core  policy  documents  like  the  Freedom 
Charter being subject to heterogeneous ideological interpretations. The ANC acknowledged that 
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from their friends and supporters among other racial groups were also “outstanding examples of 
individuals who…[were] devoted to the cause of freedom for all” (ANC, 1955b). In this period a 
broad  centrist  organisation  was  being  formed that  was  committed  to  eradicate  racial  prejudice 
through a “great deal of unity in action” (Turok, 2010: 5).  Similarly, Dlamini-Zuma and Turok 
(2010: 75) stress that “a new unity was [being] built across racial lines”. Therefore, it cannot clearly 
be said that during the 1940s and 1950s the ANC was leftist or preoccupied with the economic 
structure of society. Instead, the ANC during this period stressed mass mobilisation and resistance 
politics. Mass mobilisation together with the ANC’s concern to rally a broad cross-class and cross-
racial alliance in itself inhibited the ascendence of clearly formulated radical economic doctrines. 
During the ANC’s exile period since the 1960s formal alliances were forged with anti-apartheid 
groups like the SACP. The ANC’s Morogoro conference of 1969 endorsed the SACP’s theoretical 
interpretation of the South African situation. This included radical reform of political and economic 
structures. The ANC was also engaging directly with the Soviet Union between the 1960s and late 
1980s. Prominent ANC officials like Oliver Tambo, Yusuf Dadoo and Moses Kotane visited Russia 
in the 1960s. Moscow agreed to provide arms, financial resources and military training to support 
ANC’s uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) operation. During this period an ANC delegation led by Oliver 
Tambo made annual visits to Moscow and senior members would meet Soviet representatives to 
discuss policies of the organisation. Communist influence in the ANC was reflected in the 1969 
Strategy and Tactics document that said the “struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa is 
taking place within an international  context  of  transition to the socialist  system” (ANC, 1969). 
Senior leaders like Tambo openly supported socialism in his address in 1975; he said the struggle is 
not just political but economic: “the struggle [is] against the entire system of national and class 
oppression” (ANC, 1975). As Filatova (2012: 533) notes, in 1976 Tokyo Sexwale, an MK operative, 
said that the ANC works hand-in-hand with the SACP since both were “ideological allies” who 
believed in nationalisation of the means of production. According to Shubin (1999), senior ANC 
leaders during this period made Moscow understand that the intention went beyond the eradication 
of apartheid. In the late 1970s there was less direct and regular relations with Moscow. In this 
period it was agreed that military training would occur in Angola rather than in the USSR; and 
emphasis was placed on the armed struggle and immediate liberation.
The mid-1980s was a unique period because of profound changes that occurred in the USSR. 
Mikhail  Gorbachev,  general  secretary  of  the  Communist  Party  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  later 
president  of  the Union,  adopted a programme of economic restructuring.  While the USSR was 
experiencing  political  liberalisation,  Gorbachev  said  in  1985  that  there  was  a  “reasonable  and 
realistic alternative to bloodshed, tension and confrontation in Southern Africa” — dialogue and 
peace (Shubin and Traikova, 2008: 1038). In that same year Tambo and other delegates met with 
Gorbachev to discuss the possibility of a political settlement. According to Shubin and Traikova 
(2008: 1040) this meeting was “a pinnacle in Moscow’s relations with the ANC”. In 1987, the ANC 
met with Russia again to discuss alternative to violence — this delegation included Oliver Tambo, 
Joe Modise, Joe Slovo, Alfred Nzo and Thabo Mbeki. Moreover on the economic front Gorbachev 
admitted to the failure of the ‘Great October Socialist Revolution’ and his successor, Boris Yeltsin, 
sought investment, capital and trade flows into Russia. The end of the Cold War and the dissolving 
of the Soviet Union largely contributed to the demise of socialism as an ultimate state of mankind 
and this caused a drop in revolutionary left rhetoric in the ANC and SACP (Prevost, 2006). Since 
Gorbachev the USSR’s successor states have pursued pro-western policies to reconstruct, reform 
and renew the economic system. The collapse of communism deprived the far left “of a viable 
developmental model and a meta-narrative alternative to neoliberal capitalism” (March, 2011: 568).
Marxism-Leninism failed to cause fundamental change in the ANC between the 1960s and late 
1980s and in  the  democratic  period the same pattern emerged.  Mbeki  is  a  different  case  from 
Gumede. He had a clear communist background: he was brought up in the SACP from the 1960s to 
early 1990s, served in its leadership structures, received ideological training in Russia (between 
1969-71),  and  was  thought  of  as  a  potential  SACP leader  (Glaser,  2010:  10;  Gevisser,  2007; 
Pottinger, 2009; Gumede, 2005). Yet, Mbeki was a “free-market convert”: he abandoned decades of 
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leftist  ideological indoctrination and unapologetically regarded himself as a Thatcherite (Glaser, 
2010: 4). Mbeki, even before his appointment as deputy president, ostensibly pronounced in the 
1980’s that the ANC was not a socialist party, never pretended to be one, and will never please its 
left  critics  (Saul,  2013).  This  period consolidated Mbeki’s  liberal  approach to  economic policy 
(Gevisser, 2007).
What is  perplexing is  not only shift  from his left  to right position but perhaps also that  his 
rightward  embrace  did  not  constitute  a  radical  move.  Mbeki’s  government,  although  widely 
recognised as rightwing, was correctly characterised as one that was absent of a radical right policy 
break (Glaser, 2010: 35). Glaser (2010: 4) makes the point that Mbeki passed the baton of a “mixed 
economy”  to  Zuma;  in  addition,  Mbeki’s  personality  and  ideological  character  was  rather 
multifaceted — he was both a “free-market convert and development-statist” (the latter especially 
pertains to his support of the black middle and capitalist  class).  This characterisation of Mbeki 
meant that his openly Thatcherite position was contained within a centrist space: he was essentially 
espousing  many  kinds  of  ideological  tastes.  Glaser  (2010:  9)  demonstrates  the  difficulty  of 
separating  Mbeki’s  tendencies;  he  argues  that  he  can  best  be  characterised  as  a  ‘pragmatic 
ideologue’. So while Mbeki was pragmatic in some cases, he was dogmatic in others: a dogmatic 
politicians of a neoliberal kind; and hence, he was not so much a “post-ideological figure” (Glaser, 
2010: 9). While Mbeki showed little interest in economic radicalism and far leftism, it appears that 
his  ideological  orientation  to  the  right  was  caught  in  pragmatism  and  this  is  what  arguably 
prevented the veering to more far rightist terrain.
Zuma’s rise to power in Polokwane 2007 was preceded by an environment of dissatisfaction with 
Mbeki’s rightist inclinations, and support from the left-backed camp in the ANC, especially the 
ANCYL.  While  scholars  like  Habib  (2013)  discuss  the  deepening  of  the  left  agenda  after 
Polokwane and the growth of leftist influence in the ANC; it is acknowledged that the outcome of 
Zuma’s  installation did  not  cause a  fundamental  shift  to  the  far  left.  The SACP,  together  with 
COSATU, always hoped to pull the ANC further to the left (Thomas, 2012). It is this leftist element 
that concerned the business sector; and the tug-of-war between Mbeki and Zuma flared-up fears that 
the ANC was on the brink of a radical policy shift to the left. Under Zuma, however, there was a 
shift to a more equitable position and a slight weakening of the market position (Habib, 2013: 95). 
These policies amounted to “no radical changes in economic and social policy” (Habib, 2013: 93; 
Bond, 2008; Satgar, 2008). Even the changes that occurred in the structures of the alliance, resulting 
in  it  being regarded as  the  political  centre  for  policy  determination,  failed  to  spark  radicalism 
(Pillay, 2008). Others like Marais (2011) acknowledge the element of policy continuity between 
Zuma and Mbeki — but perhaps less concedes to subtle leftist change. ANC leaders like Gwede 
Mantashe, Kgalema Motlanthe and Trevor Manuel affirmed the ANC’s commitment to orthodox 
economic trajectory (Pillay, 2008). In so doing they sent a message to the business sector that the 
ANC was not veering into radical left terrain. 
7.5.2 Unravelling the ANC’s centrism: Neither left nor right
What explains Gumede’s inability to push a radical left line; the failure of ANC-Soviet relations to 
induce Marxism; Mbeki’s disinterest in moving to the far right; Zuma’s reluctance to tread far left 
ground; and that in spite of a poor majority who are the core of the ANC’s support base, “the ANC 
has  never  agreed  to  pursue  a  socialist  programme or  to  implement  socialist  policies”  (Dexter, 
Interview). It is the presence of moderates and centrists in and outside the ANC that articulated 
preference for less extremist doctrines. Many features undergirded this including the heterogeneous 
nature of the ANC and emphasis on political liberation and unity over economic transformation and 
ideological sectarianism.  
There is the view that if the ANC came to power through a military victory in the 1960s and 
1970s  with  Soviet  support  followed  by  white  regime  collapse,  it  would  have  implemented 
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radicalised policies. However, some like Filatova (2012) believe that the reason for moderation lies 
in the absence of capitalist conditions that give rise to socialism. But it was not simply this, the 
process was rather complicated. The argument about a radicalised ANC government of the 1960s - 
1970s ignores three main things. 
First, the ANC was forging inter-racial and broad international support to end apartheid and this 
prevented it from becoming a staunch and coherent Marxist-Leninist party. In addition, senior ANC 
members were inclined to capitalism; since the inception of the ANC in 1912, the presence of the 
petty bourgeoisie was evident in the ranks of the organisation (Dubow, 2000). The ANC grew as a 
heterogeneous  and  internally  divided  entity.  This  dates  back  to  the  1920s  when  multiracial 
delegations  were  sent  on  diplomatic  missions  to  Britain  and  inter-racial  cooperation  was 
consolidated in the 1950s. After the 1986 meeting with Moscow, Tambo said that both “East and 
West, North and South can and must act together in a decisive manner for the triumph of democracy 
in South Africa” (Tambo, 1986). The push for liberation not only forged consensus in South Africa’s 
racially diverse anti-apartheid community but managed to transcend political ideologies that placed 
people and groups poles apart. The integration of people suggested that the ANC could not simply 
be persuaded to follow one direction. Radical left rhetoric was not simply confined to communists 
within the ANC, the organisation was a “complicated ideological recipe” that contained a mixture 
individual ideological identities, combining Western Marxism, communistic Eastern philosophies, 
and Christian liberalism and the protestant ethic (Lodge, 1987, 24; Dubow, 2000). The ANC’s own 
forging of unity meant that compromises in ideological positions would reduce the effectiveness of 
radical policy implementation. Following an ideological line was not the guiding feature of the 
ANC-Soviet relations. The ANC acknowledged that its relationships with communists was based on 
their generosity and willingness to assist to defeat the white government rather than supporting a 
radical economic ideological agenda. 
Second, there was no overriding support for socialism amongst those parties being aided by the 
USSR and Moscow was not pushing a radical agenda in Africa. Even though the Soviet Union was 
supporting Southern African countries like Frelimo in Mozambique, MPLA in Angola, SWAPO in 
Namibia, there was no coherent interpretation of what constituted ‘scientific socialism’ amongst 
these parties and they also supported non-socialist ideals. In Mozambique and Angola, for instance, 
in spite of the USSR’s financial and military aid and the presence of Marxist-Leninist parties, there 
was differences about economic policy (Nolutshungu, 1985). They pursued “harmonious relations 
with western capitalist states” (Somerville, 1984: 90). In addition, Moscow’s interest in Southern 
Africa was political independence in revolt to the West. The Soviet Union was not interested in 
spurring economic revolution in other countries, strategic considerations (to ‘breakdown’ the West) 
rather than ideological imperatives motivated Moscow’s involvement in Africa (Nolutshungu, 1985; 
Kempton,  1990).  According  to  Nolutshungu  (1985:142),  Moscow  “did  not  favour  a  break  in 
economic relations with the West” or the establishment of a stage to bring about socialism. This 
suggests that the ideological position of liberation movements in Southern Africa “are the result of a 
process of evolution which has been entirely indigenous rather than imposed or transplanted from 
abroad” (Somerville, 1984: 90). 
Third, emphasising ANC-Soviet relations neglects the dynamics of the ANC in exile that was 
exposed to alternative economic models. In spite of the ANC’s relations with the USSR and support 
of  socialism,  it  “has  never  been  a  client  organisation  and  has  maintained  good  relations  with 
Scandinavian  governments,  with  some  western  states,  and  with  the  non-aligned 
movement” (Somerville, 1984: 100). It did not take an anti-western and pro-Soviet stance. In fact 
the ANC understood that that placing the principles of socialism and ideological separation at the 
forefront of the liberation struggle would hinder the effective forging of unity to end apartheid 
amongst non-socialist countries (Kempton, 1990). In this sense allies of the ANC were not just 
those of Soviet Union. Given that the ANC was neither pro-Soviet nor pro-western, the moderation 
in the mid-1980s was due to ANC’s “principled beliefs” in a mixed economy and its exposure to 
social democratic models (Lodge, 1987: 21).
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There was a complex relationship between the Soviets and ANC since the 1960s. And the SACP 
accompanied the ANC to meetings with Soviet representatives and was tightly involved with the 
ANC during the exile period.  Yet liberation and political  freedom seemed to surpass Marxism-
Leninism — although it was very much existent. While one cannot argue that there has been an 
uninterrupted feature of moderation and centrism within the ANC given the involvement of Soviet 
and other radical voices, the ANC’s forging of political and diplomatic consensus to end apartheid 
contributed to its diversity-rich feature. In addition, the USSR was not pushing the ANC toward an 
economic  restructuring  and  the  ANC’s  own  counterparts  in  Southern  Africa  were  not  wholly 
commitment  to  socialism.  It  was  not  simply  global  events  like  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  and 
profound changes in the USSR that caused a departure from radical leftism. The undercurrents of 
radicalism was constrained by the ANC’s cross-cutting engagement and ideological heterogeneity; 
its priority on political liberation; and its exposure to Scandinavian economic models. Similar to 
Somerville’s (1984: 100) argument, it  has never been proved that the ANC is controlled by the 
SACP nor that it was acting on Soviet dictates. Thus, there has been an ambivalence in the ANC, a 
vying  toward  socialism and  a  liking  for  capitalism.  But  there  was  no  straightforward  road  to 
adopting and implementing socialism in spite of the ANC’s relations with the Soviet Union and the 
SACP.
When considering the democratic period some like Dexter argue that left forces are the main 
cause for the absence of the emergence and implementation of a radical left agenda (Interview). 
Socialist forces are not strong and coherent enough to advance a socialist agenda; this is because 
they lack organisational capacities, are divided on what socialism means, and are constrained by the 
balance  of  forces  which  are  not  in  their  favour.  Although he  argues  the  balance  of  forces  are 
important, he is more inclined to the view that when the forces necessary to drive socialism are 
strong enough then a radical left agenda will prevail. Vilakazi, on the other hand, posits that the lack 
of economic growth and revenue is one of the reasons why the government is not aggressive in 
implementing radical policies (Interview). The main argument perhaps for the cause of left-right 
moderation and the lack of left extremism in the ANC, points less to the strength of socialist forces 
and economic growth. Instead, many argue that it is a capitalist environment both domestic and 
international that constitute the chief cause. 
First, some maintain that the global dominance of capitalism is too constraining and powerful to 
advance a more leftist agenda, let alone an extremist one (Seekings and Nattrass, 2006; Bond et al, 
2013; Adams, 1997; Pillay, 2008). The ANC, according to this view, operates under the mantra 
‘globalisation made me do it’ as seen by its acquiesce to the Washington Consensus; and as such the 
ANC  embraces  a  “hardline  capitalist  position”  and  “lost  a  great  deal  of  its  earlier  focus  on 
fundamental transformation” (Saul, 2013: 197-9; Turok, 2008: 264-5). According to Saul (2013: 
200, 214), the ANC is “stranded in a sea of capitalist globalisation” and it is “primarily a ‘taker’ of 
economic signals from the global corporate world”. The ANC, in the midst of capitalist dominance, 
stood as a ‘mature pragmatic’ party; the context meant that it had to consider rightwing elements 
and  this  by  extension  implied  that  the  party  could  not  move  more  leftist.  Even  prior  to  its 
assumption  of  power,  the  party  regularly  said  that  it  could  not  run  away  from  the  changed 
international landscape (ANC, 1997c). “[T]he democratic movement must take into account the fact 
that the world is witness to the globalisation, centralisation and concentration of capital” (ANC, 
1996b). According to Chikane, the ANC was “constrained by the international class” as “ideological 
perspectives in the world shifted”; the party made a decision to be “strategic” (Interview).
Second,  others  propose  that  domestic  capital,  and  the  ANC’s  own  business-oriented  and 
heterogenous  organisation  (some emphatically  assert  that  the  ANC is  controlled  by  bourgeois-
nationalist class interests), constrains movement leftward (Marais, 2011; Satgar, 2008; Andreasson, 
2006; Saul, 2013; Pillay, 2008). On the issue of the ANC’s bourgeois character, Dexter explained 
that  there  are  business  people  in  the  ANC  who  “are  not  going  to  pursue  a  socialist 
agenda” (Interview). Patrick Craven, former senior member in COSATU said “[t]he main reason 
[for the lack of socialist advance] has to be that ANC leaders, not all of them but the majority, are 
themselves increasingly becoming part of the capitalist, free-market economy” (Interview). Craven 
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proposes that there is a direct link and actual involvement not just an ideological capitulation to the 
ideas of capitalism in the ANC. William Madisha, former president of COSATU, also shares this 
opinion that the ANC has become more right; according to him, SACP leaders inside the ANC like 
“Blade Nzimande have become ultra-rightist” (Interview). 
In fact, there was a noticeable divergence in the views of interview respondents: while some 
strongly believe that the ANC supports a mixed environment for both business and labour, others 
assert that the ANC is more corporatist rather than leftist. According to more leftist subscribers, they 
dispute that there is a mixed economy or a social democratic government. Craven in particular said 
that South Africa has one of the most monopolised private sector economies where even state-
owned enterprises  are  run  for  maximum profit  (Interview).  Given this,  the  economic  model  is 
“nothing  remotely  resembling  socialism  or  even  what  you  call  social  democracy”  (Craven, 
Interview). Even Dexter and Macozama felt that the relationship has tilted in favour of business and 
the  corporate  world  (Interviews).  Thus,  together  with  domestic  business  interests,  the  internal 
structure of interests in the ANC are important factors abating left extremism.
Both  perspectives  argue  that  business  interests,  whether  globally,  domestically  or  inside  the 
ANC,  cause  the  absence  of  radicalism and  in  some  cases  the  vitiation  of  the  left  agenda.  In 
contention with these views some like Habib (2013) argue that presenting the ANC as subservient 
to capitalism and a junior partner in relation to contending forces is not incorrect but overplayed. 
The capitalist agenda is not the only inevitable and reasonable option. For him the left, in the post-
Polokwane environment, has become a major influencing force despite institutional and structural 
constraints. The left’s influence resulted in a “human-oriented development trajectory” occurring in 
the ANC (Habib, 2013: 21). Similarly, Maloka (2013) and Thomas (2012) argue that in contrast to 
what is usually thought, there is dynamism in the relationship between the left and the ANC, and 
opposition to capital hegemony is strong; thus, neoliberalism is not an inescapable final state. The 
government,  in  other  words,  is  less  crippled  by  rightwing  forces.  There  has  been  important 
developments  within  the  ANC. The party  has  showed increasing dissatisfaction with  rightwing 
prescriptions. The NGP policy that was drafted in the aftermath of the 2008/9 global economic 
downturn,  noted  that  the  opportunity  presented  by  BRICS  “opened  up  new  policy  space  for 
developing economies to go beyond conventional policy prescriptions” (NGP, 2010: 12). The policy 
was critical about radical free-marketism; it stated: “[a] developmental state is not simply hostage to 
market  forces  and  vested  interests”  (NGP,  2010:  62).  Implicitly  adducing  the  Washington 
Consensus that prioritised the role of the market over the state, the NGP articulated an alternative: 
the government’s embrace of the developmental state — a state that played a role in accelerating 
social and economic development. In essence, the ANC was discrediting strict ideologically-based 
dogmatism that characterised Washington-Consensus-styled prescriptions. COSATU believes that 
under Zuma the ANC has moved more left; Cele said in the post-2007 period there is a shared 
determination that development proceeds from the minimum platform of the Freedom Charter, and 
this includes that the working class be at  the centre of government policy (Interview). He also 
acknowledged that the government is trying to find alternatives especially given its association with 
BRICS; but while BRICS may not be predicated on socialism, it is founded on the belief that there a 
need for an alternative path. Open denunciation of rightwing positions, however, did not translate 
into a radical left agenda. In fact, the NGP did not challenge the era of globalised capital from an 
exclusive left platform: it recognised the significance of capitals’ input in the economy especially 
through propelling social development initiatives. Given that it renounced neoliberalism and did not 
purport socialist dogmatism, it is indicative of a mixed economic approach. It can be deduced that 
the ANC-led government is of the view that any kind of strict adherence to ideology is unattainable 
for the country’s developmental agenda. 
However, to conclude that the ANC in the current period is more leftist is not easy. From the 
interview data it is clear that respondents observe that the ANC is more supportive of capitalist 
interests and shows greater propensity toward the right at the detriment of the left. While COSATU 
and the SACP may have deepened the left agenda under Zuma, the right still influences the ANC. 
Thus, given the debate between the ‘deepening of the right’ group and the ‘deepening of the left’, it 
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is perhaps best to say that evidence is contradictory and less straightforward that we would like to 
believe. 
Yet this is also problematic because the ANC seems open to both sides: it  is simultaneously 
deepening a left agenda and supporting a right agenda. In fact, according to Cronin’s observation, it 
is rather difficult to disentangle and clearly put the ANC in either a left or right box (Interview). 
Within the ANC no two armies or brands exist, and as such there is no clearcut division between 
pro-capitalists and pro-socialists. Cronin is not only pointing to the broad ideological nature of the 
party but  also importantly inferring that  the ANC is  willing to converge to a  centre  point:  the 
merging of some right and left elements rather than rigidly sticking to one approach. It is in this 
context  that  perhaps  a  more  plausible  argument  would  be  that  the  ANC is  more  centrist  and 
convergent  rather  than a clearcut  left  or  right  party.  Moreover,  since most  of  causes pertain to 
explaining left moderation, what can serve as an explanation for right moderation is not only the 
presence of socialist and labour interests in the ANC but the very centrism that the ANC propagates. 
This refers to the ANC’s ability to take ‘everything into account’, as Tambo articulated in the 1980s. 
Such causal propositions are highly illuminating and important. There is, however, a limit to the 
analysis. While some emphasise the right (domestic and global capital) and others the left (SACP-
COSATU), they perhaps neglect underscoring the ANC’s own position in relation to all these forces 
that seek to influence it. What prevented the ANC from veering too rightward and too leftward is 
also its own position. Since before it assumed government in 1994, as my analysis has consistently 
shown, the party has defined itself as pragmatic, non-ideological and multi-class. In 1997 the party 
said it “does not seek to define itself in exclusivist, or narrow ideological terms” (ANC, 1997c). 
While arguments outlined above present the ANC as at the mercy of either the right or left, I am of 
the view that part of what has kept the ANC from moving to the ideological fringes and maintaining 
a stable centrist position is its own character and style — largely emerging from its self-definition 
and shaping of alliance discourse. Other causes for left-right policy change are important but the 
ANC’s individual position is as equally pertinent in the causal matrix. The ANC is an active agent 
in determining not only policy change but stability. 
The converging approach of the ANC is found in its moderate leadership that recognised the 
relevance for a mixed model. While leaders like Tambo were exposed to the neo-Keynesian and 
social democratic model in Scandinavian and Western European countries, their own openness to 
such models allowed for such exposure to become meaningful. In other words, political agency has 
an important role to play in endorsing or refuting certain positions; political elite may well make 
their own individual choices about the most appropriate model. 
The ANC cannot be described as a party that is forced into a place where it has no incentive to 
occupy a preferred ideological position. Its belittling of ideological dogmatism may be less the 
SACP’s and COSATU’s influence but  the ANC’s long-held position of centrism: the West-East 
balance, considering ‘everything’, working ‘with and against’ capitalism, and the mixed economic 
model.  Equally,  its  embrace  of  market  doctrines  emanates  not  only  from  its  own  interest  in 
capitalism but its recognition that an appropriate mix is essential for growth and development, and 
for the general advancement of the African population. Moreover, the ANC positioned itself in a 
space that  eschews rigidity and dogmatism; for the party,  this chokes creativity,  rationality and 
logic, and ultimately distorts the emergence of policy alternatives.  
Also, as argued in this analysis, the party chooses to assume the position of a ‘centrist arbiter’ 
facilitating convergence amongst various stakeholders. It emphatically stated, for instance, in 2010 
that the alliance “is not a museum, and therefore not static, but it is a strategic point of convergence 
of these forces of change” (ANC, 2010a). It is the party that actively calls against dogmatic, rigid 
and static perspectives whether on the side of labour or business. In so doing, it unilaterally and by 
its own choice pushes its partners to transcend the fault-lines of political convictions. Because the 
ANC itself holds onto the centre, it enables much of the operating structures and environment to 
take on a moderate feature; including the social pact and the general atmosphere of bargaining 
politics. 
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Reading too much into the ‘either or’ cause may ignore the centrism of the ANC, where such 
centrism originates from its own perceptions of the political economy. To be pushed or pulled in a 
direction  is  one  thing  but  to  have  a  position  on  these  matters  is  another.  The  ANC is  not  an 
amorphous entity that is subject to variability whether by inside-outside or left-right forces. There 
are crucial centrist ideological currents within the ANC that have largely prevented a move to any 
radical  side.  And  having  a  stance  on  policy  allows  the  party  to  navigate  through  difficult 
circumstances; yet this stance is not rigid or dogmatic which means that the degree of flexibility 
inherent within the ANC allows it to better navigate challenging circumstances. The inverse is more 
concerning for policy stability: a rigid ideologically-inclined party. The degree of versatility and 
flexibility that exists within the ANC in terms of policy positions is perhaps best seen in the GEAR 
period.  At  the time of  tremendous restructuring of  the global  economic environment,  the ANC 
proved that  it  could capacitate  itself  to  pause at  any given historically  significant  juncture and 
review policy positions. Yet, GEAR was not too far right nor did it amount to a ‘left cleansing’ — 
signifying the ANC’s centre space to consider both sides. This flexibility that was associated with 
the centre party came principally because the party resolved that ideology is historically specific and 
changes as societies change (ANC, 2001b). According to the party:
In the midst of our own rapid, negotiated transition, the international forces were changing around us. 
The Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc. This has introduced new dynamics, and new 
possibilities into our continent. We need to review and partly redefine what is meant, relative to these 
new realities, by the national democratic project. 
(ANC, 1997c)
As the party aptly captured its own position:  
The ANC has never  been a  dogmatic  organisation.  In  fact,  it  eschews dogma and encourages its 
members to be critical  thinkers.  In its  approach to policy review, evidence informs its  attitude to 
whether  a  particular  policy  should  be  adopted,  not  ideological  obsession.  It  neither  subscribes  to 
neoliberalism’s “primacy of the market” paradigm or the ultra-left's “omnipotence of the state”. 
(ANC, 2011)
7.6 Conclusion: The dominant party and party system moderation 
In the economic dimension, the guiding principles behind macroeconomic policy, from 1994 to 
2012, reveal a pattern of moderate state intervention, cooperation with the private sector and a space 
for capitalism, and a shared sense of policy determination amongst government-labour-business. 
While the ANC is neither an absolute defender of free enterprise nor proponents of absolute state 
control, it renounces ideologically-based interpretations to socioeconomic issues. Policy direction 
more often not, follows a mixed direction and a balance between statism and marketism; even the 
exceptional  centre-right  policy,  GEAR,  while  ascribing  more  space  for  deregulation  and 
liberalisation, maintained the welfare and redistributive role of the state — thus enabling it to stay 
on moderate ground than move to the far right. The social bargaining environment encompassing 
statutory institutions like NEDLAC encourages compromise and consensus rather than attachment 
to radical economic prescriptions. The post-1994 ANC, in essence, successfully embraced social 
democracy and bargaining politics as the chief hybrid economic model and guiding principle for 
growth and development. 
Its relationship with a major left formation, the SACP, both in the liberation and democratic 
phase, assumed a largely non-ideological form; association primarily based itself on historical unity 
and  a  shared  commitment  to  social  transformation.  The  ANC discredited  communist  forms  of 
politics and economics; held preferences for ‘West and East’ ideals and a comprehensive approach 
to socio-economic issues; preferred capitalism together with socialism; worked ‘with and against’ 
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capitalism,  put  forward that  the  NDR is  not  a  socialist  policy  nor  to  be  interpreted  in  narrow 
ideological  terms,  made  reference  to  ultra-left  tendencies  as  adventuristic  and  unrealistic;  and 
emphatically perceives itself as a ‘centrist arbiter’ and a ‘converger’ amongst contending poles. In 
addition, the ANC pushes for pragmatism, realism and creativity within the alliance. By proactively 
defining its ideological position, the ANC shows itself as a major actor in policy determination. Its 
consistent  centrist  and  moderate  approach  to  economics  indicates  that  the  ANC is  far  from a 
rudderless  ship  travelling  the  ideological  sea  and  straying  contending  terrain.  I  argued  in  this 
chapter that the ANC is not simply subject to ‘push pull’ dynamics where it is at the mercy to 
contending forces; instead, it takes clear positions that embrace some sought of mix. 
This chapter showed that the weakness of socialist  forces,  the lack of economic growth and 
revenue, the dominance of global capitalism, the presence of domestic capital, and internal ANC 
business interests, all serve as pertinent and crucial causes for the absence of the ANC’s pursuit of 
left-based economic radicalism. However, I argued that the ANC’s own articulation of centrism and 
an appropriate mix between polarised interests equally constitute a cause for the ANC’s moderation 
and explains the ANC’s centre-left centre-right movement. Moreover, I argued that the ANC cannot 
be  easily  placed  in  a  left  or  right  box.  As  shown  above,  the  party  ostensibly  propagates  a 
simultaneous embrace of left and right interests. It is neither a clear-cut left or right party; similarly, 
it does not pursue an overtly left or right agenda. It is perhaps best characterised in a centrist sense. 
Between  the  1950s  and  1970s  the  ANC  emphasised  political  liberation.  This  emphasis 
encouraged unity amongst people and groups of various political convictions and because of this the 
ANC grew as a heterogeneous entity.  In this period ANC-Soviet  relations were unable to push 
forward radical left-style transformation like that pursued in the USSR. While the ANC regularly 
engaged with and relied upon Moscow, it was clear that key policy positions of the movement, as 
outlined  in  the  Freedom  Charter  of  1955,  were  fiercely  debated.  This  debate  saw  the  ANC 
emphasising that the policy was not socialist and the ANC never condemned a capitalist society. 
Moreover,  Moscow’s interest  in Southern Africa was much less about stimulating an economic 
revolution  but  was  more  strategic  and  focused  on  supporting  African  liberation  movements  in 
defiance of Western imperialism. The Soviet’s aid to countries like Mozambique and Angola did not 
result  in  unconditional  support  of  socialism.  Instead,  there  was  no  coherent  interpretation  of 
socialism and there was harmonious relations between Soviet-backed Southern African states and 
capitalist nations. And so there was no straightforward road to say the 1960s-1970s would have 
resulted in the implementation of radical policies if the ANC militarily seized power with Soviet 
assistance  nor  was  it  simply  a  matter  of  missing  perquisite  conditions  for  the  emergence  of 
socialism. Economic restructuring in the USSR under Gorbachev in the mid-1980s and the end of 
the Cold War were not the only causal determinants behind the demise of radical undercurrents in 
the ANC and SACP. The movement’s own exposure and openness to alternative economic models 
like  those  in  Scandinavian  countries  moved the  ANC to  adopt  a  principled  stance  of  a  mixed 
economy. 
This  period  revealed  the  willingness  of  the  ANC to  respond  in  a  pragmatic,  flexible,  non-
ideological and non-dogmatic manner to changing situations. The presence of moderates within the 
ANC  from  Gumede  to  Zuma  accounted  for  the  stability  of  the  centre  and  constrained  the 
ascendence of polarising and radical elements. While the ANC is not a homogenous political entity 
that seamlessly followed an uninterrupted moderate direction, since there were evident points of 
polarisation,  the  organisation  has  successfully  managed  to  find  a  balance  between  contending 
ideologies and avoided adopting extremist positions on the economic front.   
From this analysis, the dominant party shows more moderate and centrist propensities rather than 
hardline ideological extremism. Given this reality, the ANC’s own stability in the centre even in the 
midst of radical elements, and variability within centrist terrain (from centre-left to centre-right), 
gives the party system a largely moderate character.  The ANC’s centripetal drives,  eschewal of 
extremism, and strong preference for mixed positions between left-right poles may well account for 
the ideological feature of low polarisation in the South African party system.
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Notes
 South Africa was signatory to WTO, which replaced GATT, since January 1995. 1
 Social wage refers to amenities provided to society through public funds. These include social grants, 2
retirement savings and pensions, risk benefits such as unemployment or death benefits, subsidised services 
like electricity and water, subsided housing and transport, no-fee schooling, and subsided basic and tertiary 
education.
 The definition of ‘communism’ under the Act, adopted by the apartheid regime, was designed to be as 3
widespread as possible to curb any political view that challenged white supremacy. Thus, liberals fighting for 
political freedom and who said nothing about a classless, Marxist, USSR-style society, were jailed under the 
Act.
 The youth brach influenced the ANC’s 1949 conference by replacing Alfred Xuma with James Moroka and 4
called for mass action in the form of strikes and boycotts. Early leaders of the ANCYL included Nelson 
Mandela,  Anton  Lembede,  Walter  Sisulu,  A.P.  Mda  and  Robert  Sobukwe.  Mandela  was  one  of  the 
participants who became increasingly radicalised toward mass action, defiance and resistance politics during 
this period. 
 154
Chapter 8: Conclusion - Causes of Moderation in the South 
African Party System 
This chapter constitutes the culmination of this research. First, I restate the purpose of this analysis; 
this includes reiterating the research problem, the aims and objectives of the study, its significance, 
and the methodological approach employed. Second, this is followed by a systematic and holistic 
discussion about the main findings of the study. This is grouped thematically and pertains to the 
proportional system, the voters and the dominant party. Third, I outline the central argument of this 
study. Last, but certainly not least, I outline the implication of the findings for both theory and 
practice. The value and relevance of the findings in relation to the area of study this analysis fits into 
will be discussed. Here I mainly state the contributions that the study makes to previous research; 
and how I build on this and also, in some cases, position the findings against scholarly debate. The 
main argument of this research is that it is less the institutional and social perspectives that win out 
in the case of South Africa; rather, the party-centric view is particularly strong in explaining party 
system moderation. The dominant party is the chief cause of the moderate dynamic.  
8.1 Overview of the research project 
This study set out to ascertain the determinants or causes of the phenomenon of ideological (left-
right) moderation in the South African party system. The guiding research question is: What are the 
determinants  of  ideological  moderation  (low left-right  polarisation)  in  the  South  African party 
system, in the democratic period (1994 to present)? The objective of this research is to identify 
major causes of moderation by linking the investigation to major theoretical schools that argue for 
the relevance of certain causes; applying selected hypotheses to the case; systematically measuring 
and correlating variables; and constructing a causal framework from the findings.
The main problem motivating the research is the insufficient and unsystematic explanation for 
factors and forces driving systemic moderation. The background informing the problem is one in 
which there is essentially imbalanced scholarly analysis on the ideological dynamics of the South 
African party system. Although a lot of attention is concentrated on parties and the party system, 
much of this focuses on the nature of the ANC’s electoral dominance and the persistence of the 
racial and non-policy based cleavage (both at the party and voter level). Previous research broadly 
concedes that major parties (ANC and the DA) are centrist, and radical parties (left or right) are 
marginal in electoral terms and hence are unable to affect the degree of polarisation in the system. 
Yet, little explanation is given to why this state of affairs prevails in the first place.
This study is particularly important because moderate party systems are considered facilitators of 
government and general political stability. The presence of major centrist/non-radical parties and 
limited  ideological  differentiation  in  the  party  system  encourages  consensus  politics,  non-
ideological and flexible political positions, mediation between opposed positions, and moderates 
social  opinions.  Meanwhile,  highly  polarised  system  are  often  associated  with  negative 
consequences  such  as  democratic  collapse  and  government  breakdown  (Sartori,  1976;  Downs, 
1957; Valenzuela, 1978; Sani and Sartori, 1983; Powell, 1982; Mainwaring, 1999; Dalton, 2008). In 
the end, much of the dynamics in political systems hinges on the level of ideological difference in 
the party system, and the centrist-extremist and pragmatic-ideological nature of major parties.
Locating  itself  within  the  study  of  party  system  polarisation,  this  research  worked  with  a 
definition  of  the  concept  ‘polarisation’ (particularly  party  system  not  political  polarisation  in 
general) as: the degree of ideological differentiation between major parties in the system (Sartori, 
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1976; Downs, 1957; Dalton, 2008). The causal framework for the South African case emanates 
from three theoretical schools that provide distinct explanations for the causes of moderation. Such 
theories refer to the state of party system fragmentation (the number of parties: low or high) and the 
type  of  electoral  system  (plurality  or  proportional);  the  ideological  character  and  nature  of 
polarisation at the social level (moderate or extremist electorate); and the role of political parties (a 
pivotal/major/dominant centrist or extremist party). 
Each theoretical school proposes two main effects of the presence of any causal variable(s): a 
moderate  or  polarised  party  system.  The  former  is  considered  a  state  of  low  temperature  of 
‘ideologism’, while the latter is a state of high temperature of ‘ideologism’ (Sartori, 2005: 199). In 
other words, the predominant pattern in either of these systems is low/poor or high/rich ideological 
competition amongst  major  parties.  When major  parties  engage with  contending ideologies  the 
system is polarised, and when they lack this feature the system is moderate or unpolarised. 
To state each causal school more specifically: the (a) party system fragmentation and electoral 
systems perspective argues that when there is a plurality system (where the outcome tends to a low 
number of parties—usually less than five), the system is usually moderate (major parties compete 
on  similar  ideological  platforms  to  attract  the  median  voter).  In  contrast,  in  the  presence  of 
proportional  electoral laws (where the outcome tends to be a high number of parties—usually more 
than five),  the system usually reflects  polarisation (major  parties  compete on distinct  platforms 
which are ideologically-based to differentiate themselves from their numerous counterparts to win 
voters). The (b) sociological school puts forward a similar causal logic but the difference is the 
cause emanates from non-institutional setups. It essentially places emphasis on the electorate or the 
median voter, meaning that it emphasises the societal influence on party positions and party system 
polarisation. On one hand, when voters are distributed almost equally along the ideological poles 
(extreme left and extreme right), the party system is polarised (major parties mirror voter extremism 
and  parties  are  poles  apart).  On the  other  hand,  when  voters  are  clustered  in  one  spot  of  the 
ideological continuum (either left, right or centre), the system is moderate (major parties take on the 
dominant ideological position of the average voter and parties reflect similar positions). The final 
school of thought focuses on the (c) major political party, whether a pivotal or dominant party. It 
advances a perspective of party system moderation as facilitated by the presence of a major centrist 
party; conversely, systemic polarisation is induced by the absence of centrism and the presence of 
an extremist electorally strong party. 
The choice of the South African case rested on the presence of moderation in the party system as 
the dependent variable or outcome — that is, the motivation for this study is based on the effect or 
phenomenon of low left-right  polarisation amongst  major parties.  Previous research argues that 
there is justifiability in selecting a case on the outcome of interest, especially if the outcome may be 
a known phenomenon. In addition, selection on the effect emanates from a puzzling issue that a 
researcher seeks to explain. In my case the paradox is: despite sufficient social grounds (intense 
class divisions, poverty, unemployment and inequality; incentives for extremism under proportional 
rules;  radicalised  public  rhetoric;  and  social  protests)  for  adopting  economic  radicalism  and 
extremist party positioning, social and institutional conditions have not influenced major parties in 
this direction. Instead, the system is one where major parties assume centrist positions either to the 
left or to the right. A major weakness, however, is that when there is exclusive concentration on the 
outcome (the dependent variable),  one is likely to ignore important alternative factors that may 
account for moderation. And it is in this light that I also base case selection on three identified 
causal variables that are claimed as theoretically relevant for the phenomenon of moderation (those 
derived from the schools of thought outlined above). 
This study rests on a causal logic that seeks to examine both cause-effect and causal mechanisms 
behind correlations. This includes both establishing correlations and explaining why and how it 
exists. Contingent generalisations are of interest to this study. I seek to use the findings to add to the 
knowledge  of  certain  theoretical  causal  connections  — although  this  research  is  limited  in  its 
generalising  capacity,  it  can  add  to  the  accumulation  of  knowledge.  Interviews,  surveys  and 
documents constitute the main data collection method (since it is a multi-method approach, it helps 
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to corroborate the findings and ensure reliability and validity).  Analysis  of  the data followed a 
mixed approach of qualitative and quantitative. I also applied established methods (which are, in 
some  instances,  not  uncontroversial)  for  quantitatively  measuring  party  and  voter  left-right 
positions,  party  system  fragmentation,  and  party  system  and  voter  polarisation.  The  main 
assumption this research makes is that both parties and voters can be identified on a unidimensional 
left-right political scale. I also delimit this study to focus primarily on (a) the economic dimension 
rather than a comprehensive analysis of political/social polarisation, and (b) the dominant party (the 
ANC) who is a major agent capable of influencing the dynamics in the party system. 
8.2 Main findings 
8.2.1 Party system fragmentation and electoral laws
In understanding whether the electoral system constitutes a cause, I began by outlining the plurality 
British-style single-member constituency electoral system that was in place since the Union and 
came to an end when white minority rule ended. After this, I critically examined the rationale for 
adopting the proportional system in the democratic period. In this section I found that a number of 
integral concerns drove the adoption of proportionalism: political representation and empowerment 
especially  of  minority  groups;  racial  reconciliation,  political  stability  and  acceleration  of  the 
democratic transition; oversight mechanisms; and ‘best practice’ standards. In addition, it was the 
ANC as one of the major stakeholders in the process that facilitated moderation by compromising 
and being sensitive to minority demands rather than advocating radical proposals like the FPTP that 
would have limited representation and fostered political deadlock. A second major finding is that by 
comparing the level of party system fragmentation in the apartheid and democratic period, what is 
clear is that despite differing electoral systems, a closely similar score prevailed (mean: 2.14, 2.12 
respectively). What this means is that the presence of party dominance seems to affect the number 
of parties more than the prevailing statutory electoral system. In the democratic period although the 
general pattern is twelve parties occupying the legislature, the ‘effective number’ (party relevance) 
of parties is very low. Given the presence of one major party, the possibility of effective competition 
amongst two or more parties is squeezed out. Although the expectation is that proportional rules 
should increase fragmentation, the ANC as the dominant party seems to apply a constraining effect 
on the system. Simply put, the electoral system has a weak influence on determining the number of 
parties in the South African party system — it is unsuccessful in inducing more parties since there is 
electoral  dominance  by  one  party.  This  implies  that  even  under  the  presence  of  many  parties 
(multipartism), effective competition amongst more than two parties is low. Small parties, however, 
who find a place in the party system may influence left-right dynamics but, as will be discussed 
below, proportionalism also has a limited effect on making left-right party positions relevant. 
The third finding directly pertaining to the hypothesis is that from a quantitative measure of party 
positions,  parties  are  scattered  across  the  ideological  spectrum where  they  take  on  a  range  of 
positions across the left-right space. A deeper chronological assessment, however, challenges the 
‘fragmentation thesis’, it shows that parties have been moving to occupy centre terrain (especially 
the centre-left). It is more plausible to say that major parties are clustered in the centre and offer a 
centrist policy package to the median voter. While the ANC has been almost consistently positioned 
on the centre-left (though in 2009 it emphasised more leftist issues yet not radical leftism), the main 
opposition party (the DA) has been moving away from the right to the centre-left. Given that this 
analysis relied on manifesto data and was delimited to socioeconomic emphasis of parties, major 
parties are predisposed to a mixed position between the extremes on salient  economic matters. 
Meanwhile, some parties that are electorally small relative to the dominant party move to occupy 
one-sided positions. This means that they find some incentive under the PR to diversify across the 
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spectrum; yet, this diversification is not seen amongst major parties like the ANC and DA. In fact, 
the latter  two are  beginning to  occupy the same terrain (centre-left).  Moreover,  smaller  parties 
within the opposition moved to the centre since 2009. It appears that the ANC, as the main centrist 
party,  is  causing  centrist  clustering  within  the  opposition  rather  than  inducing  these  parties  to 
occupy extremist positions. 
Also  those  parties  in  the  centre  (mainly  major  parties  and  also  smaller  ones)  exhibit  less 
fluctuation from this position. They tend to be resilient in occupying the centre instead of moving 
closer to the extremes of left or right. Meanwhile, those parties that previously occupied rightist 
positions are more sensitive to positional evolution (since most moved to the centre); however, the 
left bloc (including centre- and extreme-left) are sturdily leftist and seem less sensitive to changing 
ideological positions. The result of this is that there seems to be a growing vacuum on the right 
bloc, whereby parties who were rightist seem to have abandoned conservative market doctrines on 
social and economic prescriptions. 
Fourth, and in relation to party positions: the party system is unpolarised. This means that major 
parties are not poles apart along the left-right spectrum but are instead clustered in the same space 
(from the above, it is the centrist space). In essence, the South African party system is one of low 
ideologism and the temperature of ideological differentiation amongst major parties is particularly 
low. Major parties prefer to cluster in one spot than to spread. However the major/dominant party 
seems to be a highly constraining factor in assigning worth to ideological differences. This suggests 
that because it occupies most of the vote share, those parties who are ideological distinct from each 
other lack electoral strength to cause a shift in the degree of polarisation in the party system. In the 
case  of  the  EFF,  as  the  third  largest  party  in  electoral  terms,  it  will  be  unable  to  change  the 
ideological  composition  of  the  party  system  from  one  of  moderate  to  polarised.  In  addition, 
ideologically-based parties can only affect change if there is an electorally relevant competitor on 
the other side of the pole (in other words, while parties like the EFF are on the far left, the major 
challenger would have to be far right). Recent concerns about the polarising element that comes 
from the EFF is not relevant for the party system (Southall, 2014; Southall and Schulz-Herzenberg, 
2014). In brief, what inhibits movement to polarisation is: (a) the similarity of positions adopted by 
the ANC and opposition parties like the DA (centre-left), (b) the absence of electoral strength of 
ideological parties (especially the far left),  and (c) the unlikelihood of major parties contending 
along the ideological fringes (since they show propensity for centrism). 
In  sum,  from this  analysis  it  appears  that  the  major  party  drives  polarisation.  The  centrist 
character of the system and the state of low polarisation seem to depend much on the ANC. The 
polarisation score is affected both by ideological direction and electoral strength; and since the ANC 
is a centrist party and the most electorally relevant party, the polarisation index (as a measure of 
standard deviation) shifts to the ANC. It also seems to be permitting the stability of the state of 
centrism and moderation of the party system, and is preventing a state of polarisation along the 
extremes. By extension, whatever ideological position the dominant party takes on becomes highly 
relevant for the general state of party system affairs. 
Lastly,  does  proportionalism  produce  polarisation?  From  this  case  study  the  answer  is  no. 
According to theoretical claims, PR laws induce extremist party positioning and polarisation. For 
South  Africa,  major  parties  seem  to  unilaterally  adopt  overwhelmingly  centrist  positions 
independent of institutional incentives.  Major parties are not ‘striving to distinguish themselves 
ideologically  from  each  other’;  there  is  little  ‘sharp  differentiation’ amongst  relevant  parties 
(Downs, 1957: 126-7, 138). Parties like the ANC and DA (and many others in the opposition bloc) 
are more engaged in appealing to a broad spectrum of the population and adopting centrist (centre-
left) ideologically similar positions (conveying ‘centripetal’ drives), rather than carving out a niche 
constituency  or  taking  on  one-sided  ideological  orientations  to  maintain  ‘ideological 
purity’ (Downs, 1957; Sartori, 1976; Davies, 2004). There is no compelling reason why the PR 
would  automatically  persuade  major  parties  to  move  to  the  extremes.  Concerning  the  causal 
framework of this research, it seems that the institutionalist perspective is weak in accounting for 
moderation. 
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8.2.2 The sociological influence
The first portion of the analysis of voter positions and polarisation discusses the general ideological 
predisposition of citizens along the left-right dimension. This primarily relies upon citizen self-
placement and interview data. Survey results from between 1982 to 2013 reveal that the median 
voter  is  positioned  in  the  centre,  more  specifically  the  centre-right.  The  median  voter  rarely 
identifies with ideological extremities, whether left or right. There seems to be poor identification 
with the left bloc — over the years self-definition as ‘leftist’ decreased significantly; voters think of 
themselves as either a ‘centrist’ or ‘moderate rightist’. In addition, the percentage of people who 
‘don’t  know’,  ‘haven’t  heard’  of  left-right  or  are  non-politically  aligned,  consistently  and 
significantly decreased — in 1982 50% were in this category but in 2013 this was only 13%. This 
means that a large portion of the South African public identify with the left-right scale. 
Also, when voters are asked to place major parties on the scale, they place themselves in the 
centre and centre-right, and place major parties in the centre range. Although they placed the ANC 
in the centre-left in 1994, voters did not equate themselves to this same position; but in 1997 and 
2009, they placed the ANC closer to them. Voters think of the ANC as centre-right, as a moderate 
party on salient issues in society. They feel that the party better represents their ideological position 
than opposition parties (including the DA). On the latter, voters placed the DA in the centre-left 
category in 2009 — which echoes with the finding in the aforementioned section that identified the 
DA as centre-left. Voters, however, consistently think of the ANC as centre-right. This raises issues 
about voter understanding of the scale. Since the scale pertains to any social cleavage, voters may 
not necessarily exhibit poor understanding of it  but might consider themselves and the ANC as 
rightist  on  non-economic  issues  (such  as  political,  social  or  cultural  issues).  Beside  this,  the 
essential point here is that voters rarely think of major parties like the ANC and DA as extremist; 
instead,  the  average  voter  considers  them moderate.  While  voters  prefer  some  mixed  position 
between  the  extremes,  they  feel  that  major  parties  are  proclaiming  this  ideological  fusion  and 
adopting middle-ground positions in dealing with varied issues.
In assessing whether voters are centrist or fundamentalist on social change, this study shows that 
on  a  number  of  occasions  a  majority  of  citizens  consistently  felt  that  social  change  (whether 
economic  or  not)  should  follow  gradual  and  progressive  reform  rather  than  fundamental 
restructuring. The average voter gives far less credence to the notion of revolutionary change or 
vanguardist defence of society; rather, citizens take on more moderate attitudes towards change. 
This further indicates moderation in terms of ideas and attitudes to social change at the voter level. 
As stated in Chapter 6, this may not necessarily imply moderation in terms of social mobilisation, 
but  at  the  same  social  protest  and  expression  of  dissatisfaction  do  not  necessarily  imply  a 
radicalised citizenry that are supportive of fundamental restructuring of the entire social system — 
whether political, social or economic. Moreover, almost all interview participants conceded to the 
non-extremist character of the electorate on ideological issues. The appetite for extremism is limited 
because  of  the  presence  of  major  centrist  parties.  Parties  and  leadership  seems  to  constitute 
important factors in moderating social opinions. If major parties articulate radicalised notions of 
social change or economic transformation, voters are likely to move in this direction. 
A second major portion of this analysis examined additional data that helps to ascertain the left-
right position of citizens on the economic policy dimension. These issues include privatisation and 
government  ownership  and  control  of  the  economy,  income  equality,  and  state  or  individual 
responsibility for peoples wellbeing. There is an absence of a large chunk who side with either 
privatisation or government ownership of business and industry — citizens are actually divided on 
this issue. While those who prefer privatisation have been steadily and sharply decreasing, more 
citizens  are  coming to  prefer  government  ownership.  This  strikes  a  chord  with  former  rightist 
parties who have been similarly decreasing on the right; and while citizens are showing more leftist 
preference, previous rightwing parties have moved left. It is a separate point, however, whether 
parties are actually articulating a nationalisation stance as opposed to some mixed or moderate 
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position.  But  it  can  be  added  that  citizen  preferences  might  determine  the  kind  of  economic 
proposals parties embrace. 
In addition to increasing support for government ownership, other single time-period surveys 
show that citizens mention that the government should be active in the economy, take responsibility 
for peoples’ wellbeing, redistribute land, create jobs and tax the rich to subsidise the poor. It seems 
that there is a more leftist group within the electorate who support an active and interventionist 
government. Most interview respondents felt that because the majority of citizens are poor, they 
exhibit leftist tendencies and a ‘culture of dependency’ on the government. And that citizens have 
been led to believe that the state can provide everything because there are unlimited resources. 
However, it cannot be simply concluded that citizens are leftist: there are critical rightist tendencies 
too.  Citizens prefer  that  the individual  be able to decide what  is  produced and distributed;  the 
market determine how much an individual earns; people should be free to earn as much as they 
want even if it results in income inequality; more income differences to incentivise hard work rather 
than income equality; stealing property is never justifiable; and compensation of redistributed land 
at  market  value  and  following  legal  procedures.  Thus  on  certain  issues,  people  prefer  a  less 
interventionist state and are not of the opinion that the government should decide upon every issue. 
Nor are they of the opinion that the market should provide for their needs. 
There is no majority that has consistently been on one side of the left-right economic divide — 
thus a unimodal distribution of voters is largely non-existent. Citizens seem to move between the 
blocs and do not follow one side unconditionally. Mean scores from the economic dimension, from 
between 1990 to 2013, reveal that when issues are translated in left-right terms citizens are scattered 
in  the moderate  range.  Similarly,  according to  some interview respondents,  citizens are  neither 
totally capitalistic nor totally socialistic, instead, they prefer a moderate mixed position — a system 
that incorporates both sides. It seems that parties have acknowledged the need for a mix between 
these two preferences.
The data on citizen self-placement and economic issues suggests that voters are polarised on the 
left-right dimension. Even though self-placement data did not pertain to a particular cleavage line, 
when it was correlated with economic issues (which is reducible to a left-right scale), it revealed an 
r = .94; this suggests that the two measures are not entirely different but closely related. Citizens are 
largely divided on issues of privatisation, income equality and responsibility.  Differently stated, 
they do not occupy similar positions but have opposed preferences on social and economic issues. 
However,  compared  to  1990,  citizens  are  becoming  moderately  polarised;  they  are  coming  to 
occupy similar positions on the economy. Similarly, while self-placement data reveals that citizens 
were highly and semi-polarised, by 2013 they firmly entered the moderate space, thus occupying 
less opposed positions. In general, from both data sets voters show movement to occupying similar 
ideological positions.  
Are  voters  causing  moderation  of  the  party  system?  The  answer  is  likely  no  but  is  not 
straightforward to arrive at a conclusion on the matter. While voters are polarised on the general 
left-right dimension and on specific economic issues, party system polarisation has not followed the 
same trajectory;  rather  it  has  been significantly  lower  than voter  polarisation.  This  importantly 
suggests that voters are not influencing the direction of party polarisation — this is particularly 
because one major electoral party is constraining ideological differences from becoming meaningful 
in the party system. 
Some indicators show that there might be social influence especially on party positions but this is 
not overriding. The case of (a) the DA is noticeable: the party’s shift from the right to the left seems 
to reflect voter preference for more leftist rather than rightist economic issues (such as government 
ownership). But voter preference for left issues like government ownership shows there is a degree 
of  independence  in  party  policy  determination  because  major  parties  are  hardly  advancing  a 
program of nationalisation. Also, (b) consistent moves by the voters to the direction of decreasing 
polarisation,  might  be  associated  with  the  party  system since  opposition  parties  are  coming to 
increasingly reflect similar positions (centre-left). But it is less easy to determine whether this is a 
dynamic relationship (whether both parties and voters are influencing each other) or a one-way 
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interaction  (where  voters  are  influencing  parties  or  vice  versa).  Moreover,  (c)  the  centrist  or 
moderate position of the average voter seems to reflect the moderation of major parties who are 
centrist. But what is more important is that major parties are not assuming the same polarisation at 
the voter level; instead, they are clearly opting for more mixed positions such as in the case of the 
ANC. In all, voters might have an influence on the left-right policy package parties offer but they 
certainly do not possess overriding influence on parties. 
A third portion of the analysis looked at policy-based voting. One of the reasons for a moderate 
electorate is because of non-policy/non-ideological voting — although this is not automatic, it is 
present in the South African case. There is a general prevalence of non-policy voting within the 
electorate.  The majority  of  voters  are  generally  not  ideologues or  interested in  the specifics of 
policy. They are less inclined to think about policies in purely left-right terms. In the first place, 
voters are not inclined to see differences between parties in policy terms. Second, although there 
has been indirect policy voting given that voters cite party promises and deliverables arising from 
party  programmes  (and  in  some  cases  direct  policy  voting  because  voters  state  ideology  and 
socioeconomic policy as reasons), this is not a regular or uniform occurrence. Instead, non-policy 
factors account for much of voting behaviour and party support. It is, however, not an overarching 
phenomenon;  a  segment  of  the electorate  do vote  in  policy terms;  they look at  socioeconomic 
developmental policies, and are ideologically-inclined. This most plausibly refers to the middle and 
upper-class who tend to support issues like social democracy and favourable economic policies 
(Habib, 2013; Butler, 2009; Southall and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014; Ngoma, 2014; Lodge, 2004; 
Seekings, 2005). Thus, the non-policy dimension cannot be overgeneralised to extend to the entire 
electorate. 
Third,  when  voters  themselves  point  to  specific  reasons  for  party  support,  and  from  the 
observations of party respondents, it is clear that within the non-policy dimension, race is a less 
dominant factor. Less than 10% cite race-based identity factors. Moreover, from interviewing party 
respondents, most did not explain voting behaviour in blunt racial terms. Instead, issues like party 
trust,  performance,  competence,  experience,  personality,  campaign  and  needs,  history  and 
partisanship,  and  media  access  and  party  funding,  are  specified  as  more  apparent.  There  is  a 
possibility that race feeds into these elements, however more rigours research needs to be done to 
confirm or reject this assumption. In fact respondents emphasised loyalty to the ANC, that historical 
experience of the liberation movement undergirds partisanship and this is not necessarily based on 
race. They also stressed the needs-based approach to voting. Given the poverty situation of the 
majority of voters,  they are more interested in voting for those parties who promise immediate 
resolution to their problems and deliverables when in office. This is congruent with survey data that 
shows  the  main  concern  of  voters  centres  around  the  economic  cleavage.  On  a  regular  basis, 
between 1994 to 2016, citizens mentioned job creation, poverty reduction and a stable economy as 
top priorities that government should address. 
Citizens are much less interested in debating the ideological-pragmatic path used to solve social 
problems  —  such  as  whether  party  programmes  are  based  on  socialist,  mixed  or  capitalist 
platforms. However, party policies, promises and programmes must be connected to salient social 
issues since voters look for those parties who sympathise with their immediate circumstances. As 
party respondents stressed, party messages and the general package parties present to voters cannot 
be disconnected from policies — since parties take clear policy positions on how they will resolve 
social issues. So there is an indirect level of policy identification and approval-disapproval at the 
voter level. 
The  causes  of  non-policy  voting  was  also  interrogated  in  this  analysis.  Given  the  lack  of 
education and low levels of literary, voters are unable to meaningfully interact with party policies, 
they are unable to cross-question issues, and cannot determine whether promises are realistic and 
implementation.  Another  hinderance  to  policy  voting  is  the  prevalence  of  poverty.  Voters  are 
concerned about basic needs and immediate needs-based satisfaction. The average voter is simply 
trying to get by and survive, they are less interested in left-right politics. By contrast, more affluent 
and  educated  sections  are  able  to  critically  engage  with  policies  and  look  for  whether  their 
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preferences are reflected in party manifestos. There is, however, an interplay between poverty and 
education, both affect each other. In more rural communities whether people are both uneducated 
and poor,  they  are  simultaneously  needs-oriented  and policy-inept.  The  presence  of  a  poverty-
stricken and uneducated citizenry severely dilutes the ability of ordinary voters to understand the 
complexity of political arguments and engage meaningfully in policy-based voting. An increase in 
an issue-based policy-oriented citizenry depends on the politicisation of programmes and policies 
(like  in  the  case  of  the  RDP where  voters  were  largely  aware  of  it  compared  to  GEAR),  the 
alleviation  of  poverty  and  social  modernisation  of  society  into  a  more  middle  and  upper-class 
composition, and the increase in education and literacy. The presence of these factors are likely to 
strengthen democratic accountability and push parties to offer more reasonable and realistic policy 
positions.  
8.2.3 The dominant party
This section examined the ideological character of the ANC, its left-right and moderate-extremist 
position. First, the ANC takes a strong stance on poverty, unemployment and inequality. It sees 
itself as leading an intervening and activist state. This position, however, is encapsulated in the idea 
of a developmental state, social democracy and a mixed economic model. Second, the ANC pursues 
a transformational and strategic engagement with capitalism for social development. Moreover, it is 
open to bargaining with both labour and business. While labour is pushing a more left agenda, 
business is pushing a more centrist agenda instead of a neoliberal one. Business also largely accepts 
the mixed economic environment  and the social  development  objectives  of  the government.  In 
general,  both  labour  and  business  feel  accommodated  in  South  Africa’s  socioeconomic  policy 
environment  —  despite  contention  and  polarisation  within  social  bargaining  structures  like 
NEDLAC. 
When analysing the mixed economy model and the social partnership, a significant finding was 
that (a) the ANC tries to pursue a balanced position that is open to both sides and not overtly in 
favour or either. Also, (b) the ANC-led government acts as a ‘centrist arbiter’ between contending 
groups; it encourages divided groups to adopt some common understanding. And in so doing, the 
ANC maintains the stability of the centre and fosters ideological moderation rather than policy 
extremism and instability. It importantly champions a ‘convergence approach’; and even though 
there  may  be  some  fundamentalists  in  the  ANC  and  in  labour  and  business,  the  general 
understanding is that a middle-ground between conflicting interests is necessary for social progress. 
Given this analysis, South Africa is an accommodative policy environment that operates largely 
under a centrist milieu, and the ANC plays a very important role in holding this structure together. 
Third, this section also examined the ANC’s position on socialism and its relationship with the 
SACP. It found that (a) the ANC long prior to 1994, especially in the 1960s, expressed no real 
desire to fundamentally overhaul the economic system. It  renounced socialist  definitions of  the 
organisation. In fact, the ANC rejected neither capitalism nor socialism; rather, it advocated for a 
mixed not a unimodal approach. The party believed that those marginalised under apartheid would 
prosper under a capitalist system (especially owning land and making profit); it detached itself from 
the idea of  working class  democracy or  worker  ownership of  production.  In spite  of  the party 
embracing social elements to assist the poor, it quickly added that this did not equate to the party 
being Marxist; rather, the ANC said it supported a ‘West-East mix’. In the 1980s, Oliver Tambo 
clearly defined the ‘mixed model’ the ANC was pursuing. The party positioned itself as one that was 
not set on one particular ideological orientation, instead, it  took ‘everything into account’.  This 
importantly attests to early signs of flexible ideological positioning of the ANC. In all, the way the 
ANC defined its own positions in relation to the left-right debate since the 1960s attributed a sense 
of dynamism to it. The liberation entity took on an active role in making clear its own stance. And 
in so doing, the organisation gave no illusion that it supported economic radicalism. In other words, 
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the  party  more  often  than  not  made  clear  its  stance  on  left-right  economic  matters  and  such 
positions were largely in the centre. 
It  also  found that  (b)  the  ANC’s  historical  alliance  with  the  SACP based itself  on  political 
liberation not ideological radicalism. The ANC accommodated groups like the SACP on grounds of 
defeating  white  supremacy  not  on  a  common  agreement  on  economic  positions.  In  the 
contemporary period, the alliance is still not strongly based upon ideological similarities. History is 
an important  connection,  and the  relationship has  shifted from focusing on the  political  to  the 
economic. Even the NDR model that joins the ANC and SACP is interpreted differently by each 
party. The ANC articulates a moderate view of the policy; the party on numerous occasions asserted 
that the NDR is not a path to socialism. Moreover, the ANC states that it does not regard itself as a 
socialist party. During the time of Mbeki, the ANC skilfully launched ‘pragmatic missiles’ against 
the ultra-left; and it consolidated its position as a party that is non-dogmatic. The SACP, in contrast, 
sees  the  NDR as  a  two-stage  phase  for  the  attainment  of  socialism.  Ironically,  the  SACP and 
COSATU seem to  have  moderated  their  position  give  that  they  accept  objective  domestic  and 
international realities, and that the ANC is a broad mass-based party that caters for a multiplicity of 
classes and is clearly not a socialist party (contributing to the loss of autonomy and opening the left 
to persuade and be persuaded). Added to this, the way in which the ANC responded to the collapse 
of  communism  and  the  restoration  of  capitalism  in  the  Soviet  Union  revealed  elements  of 
sophistication,  flexibility  and  pragmatism.  This  has  caused  moderation  of  its  radical  leftism. 
However, I argue that another factor is equally important, that is, the ANC’s role in this process. 
The ANC has actively been pushing for non-dogmatism in the SACP; for the ANC, open debate 
within the context of flexibility and pragmatism forms an important feature in securing a stable and 
vibrant alliance. In essence, the ANC expects the alliance to function as a rational, logical, creative 
and non-dogmatic body capable of participating in policy redefinition and policy alternatives. 
Fourth, this section discussed observable periods of polarisation and the failure to move to the 
left or right fringe. Under Gumede in the 1930s the ANC did not assume a radical left character; 
ANC-Soviet  relations failed to promote fundamentalist  doctrines in the ANC; under Mbeki the 
party did not move to the far right; under Zuma the ANC were unable to advance radical leftism; 
and despite  the party’s  overwhelmingly poor support  base,  it  has not  shifted to the left  fringe. 
Overall, no radical policy shifts occurred in the ANC either to the left or right. Even though the 
ANC is argued to have moved more left under Zuma, this has not been radical leftism. The ‘more 
left, more right’ debate is problematic in the face of contradictory evidence that shows the ANC is 
more right and yet others attest it is more leftist; I argue that it may be less easy to box the ANC 
neatly as more left or more right, the party can best be described as a centre one that simultaneously 
gives space to both interests. Given that the party is on both sides of the fence, it is important to 
consider the moderation that it espouses where if it is more left it still includes right elements, and if 
it is more right, it still includes left elements. This means that overall left-right movement occurs 
within a centrist terrain. So while there has been evident polarising and radical voices in the ANC 
since its inception, the moderate element within the party — coming from its emphasis on political 
liberation  rather  than  economic  restructuring,  its  forging  of  unity  amongst  diverse  political 
convictions, its heterogeneous internal composition of interests, and its own predispositions towards 
capitalism and some form of socialism — has effectively kept it from veering into extremist terrain. 
While  the  presence  of  moderates  does  not  necessarily  outflank  extremists,  it  contributes  by 
inhibiting the ANC from following in a unimodal radical economic direction. 
Even though the 1980s introduced moderation in the ANC because of Gorbachev’s economic 
reforms and the collapse of  communism, Moscow was unable  to  push the movement  to  adopt 
fundamentalist  policies.  This  was  because  the  USSR’s  prime  focus  was  less  economic 
transformation in Southern Africa but strategic engagement to challenge Western imperialism. Also 
Soviet-aided  Southern  African  countries  like  Angola  and  Mozambique  were  not  steadfastly 
following a socialist line but were also engaged with capitalist countries. In addition to this was the 
ANC’s  own role  in  accepting  alternative  economic  models  like  in  Scandinavian  countries  that 
pursued social  democracy  and a  mixed position.  Thus  it  was  not  simply  a  matter  of  adopting 
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radicalism or not, not even the notion that South Africa lacked certain prerequisites for socialism, it 
was both a complicated mix of the USSR’s interests and the ANC’s heterogeneous nature. 
Lastly,  I  critically  examined  the  causes  of  this  moderation  in  the  democratic  period  which 
explains the lack of left extremism: the weakness of left forces to coherently advance socialism, the 
lack of economic growth and government revenue, the dominance of global capitalism, domestic 
capitalist interests, and the business-oriented character of the ANC. I argue that (a) what can explain 
the absence of movement to the far right is not only the left’s presence in the ANC but the latter’s 
own centrism where it considers both right together with left interests. I also importantly posit that 
(b) while it is commonly presented that the ANC is moved by forces to the left and to the right of it, 
the  ANC’s  own occupation  of  the  centre  and  its  active  self-definition  of  pragmatic-ideological 
positions  eschews  both  left-right  radicalism.  In  essence,  the  party  demonstrates  an  important 
character of being willing and open to all sides and this internal facet contributes to the stability of 
the centre. The ANC must be considered as an important actor in this causal framework. It is not a 
undefined amorphous entity that is simply at the mercy of contending forces; rather, it holds onto a 
specific conception of  approaching social  and economic issues  — a conception that  converges 
contending tendencies rather than a staunch attachment to any particular side.
8.3 The argument - The cause of moderation in the party system
The  main  determinant  of  ideological  moderation  in  the  South  African  party  system  in  the 
democratic period is the dominant party. The ANC constitutes a univariate cause of moderation. 
Left-right movement in the party occurs in centrist rather than extremist terrain. Despite radical 
elements, to the left and right, inside and outside the party, the ANC’s dynamism in defining its own 
position,  its  embrace  of  pragmatism  and  flexibility,  and  its  own  acknowledgement  for  a  mix 
between contending poles,  has allowed the party to adopt  a  position as  a  ‘centrist  arbiter’ and 
‘converger’ — this  largely maintains the balance of  the centre.  Even the decision to adopt  the 
proportional system was from an internal desire in the ANC for political stability and compromise 
politics, which largely facilitated moderation and evaded political deadlock. Low left-right party 
system polarisation is less influenced by the electoral system and the electorate. And therefore the 
cause is not multivariate. 
Proportionality and centre occupation does not induce extremist positioning and polarisation. 
The reason for this is that the ANC is constraining extremism, stabilising the centre, and attracting 
opposition parties to the centre. Although the PR model incentivises parties to disperse across the 
spectrum,  this  feature  is  becoming  less  evident  in  South  Africa  since  opposition  parties  are 
conglomerating to occupy similar positions on the centre and centre-left. And even when there are 
extremist  parties,  their  influence is  constrained by the dominance of  the ANC. Thus,  extremist 
parties are not relevant in affecting the dynamics of polarisation. As long as the ANC is dominant 
and there is an absence of electorally relevant ideological contenders, the party system remains 
moderate. The ANC drives the ideological nature and the degree of polarisation of the party system. 
This  means  its  centrist  position  together  with  its  electoral  strength  are  what  account  for  low 
polarisation. For polarisation to emerge the ANC would have to positionally change to the right if it 
is faced with an electorally strong leftwing contender and vice versa. By extension, the ideological 
position of the dominant party, whatever it is, becomes highly relevant for the general state of party 
system  affairs.  Therefore,  there  is  an  insignificant  relationship  between  proportionalism  and 
moderation. 
The left-right distribution of the electorate is hardly affecting moderation. Even though voters are 
polarised on general  and specific economic issues,  this  dynamic is  not  concomitant  with  party 
system polarisation. Rather, the latter has been significantly lower than voter polarisation. Voter 
movement to occupy similar positions, voter preference for centre-left issues (although also centre-
right  issues)  and a decrease in voter  polarisation,  influence the movement of  parties to occupy 
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similar positions and left stances on the economy. However, there is a disjuncture between voter and 
party positions and party system polarisation because major parties are not articulating issues like 
more government ownership of the economy and are not reflecting voter polarisation. This means 
that the ANC is constraining voter polarisation from becoming pertinent in the party system. Also, 
given that voters are far from being ideologues and rigorous left-right policy engagers, parties are 
more independent in policy formulation and position-taking rather than simply being at the mercy 
of sociological forces. This importantly suggests that voters are not influencing the direction of 
party polarisation. Therefore, there is a weak relationship between the electorate and party system 
moderation. 
8.4 Implications of the findings
8.4.1 Implications for literature on the South African party system 
The main contribution of this research is the development of a framework to analyse the causes of 
party system moderation. While existing research lays great emphasis on political and democratic 
issues surrounding the main party and the preeminence of the racial cleavage, this study importantly 
contributes to understanding the left-right, moderate-radical ideological composition of both voters 
and the ANC. The findings are  important  because they provide an indication of  the  influential 
factors in the political system — whether it is institutional factors, the electorate or the dominant 
party — which both academics and politicians alike would have an interest in (to assess current 
dynamics  and  predict  policy  change  or  change  in  the  degree  of  left-right  polarisation).  It  is 
particularly important  because it  shows that  much of  the party system dynamics rests  with the 
dominant  party  and  what  ideological  feature  the  party  takes  on  has  implications  for  political 
consensus and democratic stability. Moreover, moderate party systems, less intense left-right  inter-
party  divisions  and  pivotal  centre  parties  are  crucial  for  political  consensus,  the  stability  of 
democracy and general social stability. 
In  the  first  place,  this  study  adds  a  degree  of  quantitativeness  to  existing  literature  on 
fragmentation, party positions and polarisation in South Africa. It amalgamates and reconstitutes 
data sets and places it in a particular theoretical context from which a range of statistical findings 
are deduced. Second, this study concurs with scholars who argue that moderation and centrism is a 
primary feature in the party system and that radical parties have remained marginal (Schrire, 2001; 
Booysen,  2005;  Southall,  2014).  Third,  in  contention  with  existing  literature  that  argues  that 
opposition parties are too ideologically fragmented to present a coherent and viable alternative to 
the ANC (Giliomee et al, 2001; Southall, 1998, 2014), I argue that many within the opposition bloc, 
including the DA, actually occupy similar ideological terrain as the governing party. For instance, in 
2004 the DA emphasised less one-sided rightwing positions and seemed to advocate for some kind 
of mix between the left and right. However, by 2009 the party moved to the centre-left (laying 
emphasis  on  more  leftwing  economic  prescriptions  for  social  development  and  economic 
transformation) and this position was sustained by the 2014 election. Even parties like the ACDP, 
FFP, IFP and UDM (all traditionally regarded as right-wingers on the economy) have moved to the 
centre. It is from this changed position that they emphasise social welfare, government intervention, 
a mixed economy and trade protectionism, rather than market fundamentalist principles. It appears 
that  growing  economic  inequality,  increasing  social  problems  and  the  failure  of  the  market  to 
transform the social setup, moved parties to sympathise with citizens’ social demands — which 
include  demands  for  the  hand of  the  state  in  enabling  growth  and  development.  Not  only  the 
unpopularity of rightward principles but the recognition of an appropriate mix and an emphasis on a 
moderate leftist model by parties themselves seem to have spawned the shift from the right to the 
centre-left. 
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Fourth, and relatedly, I disagree with the view that the DA is competing with the ANC from a 
rightward position and needs  to  opt  a  social  democratic  model  (Schrire,  2001;  Southall,  2014; 
Nijzink, 2001; Kotze, 2001; Jolobe, 2009). While many acknowledge that the DA has shifted on the 
political front and moved to the centre (placing less emphasis on minorities and more on the back 
majority), it is less often noted that the party has undergone equivalent policy redefinition on the 
economic front. Social welfare including grants, the housing and youth subsidises, land distribution, 
and worker protection were formative leftist issues dominating the 2009 and 2014 DA manifesto. 
Given the DA’s movement to the left, albeit some differences may be evident between its position 
on leftist issues and the ANC’s take on those issues, it is presenting itself as an ideologically similar 
alternative to the ANC for the ordinary voter.  This does not mean that the DA is ideologically 
coherent  but  like  other  parties  it  seems  to  be  working  on  representing  both  left  and  right 
constituencies and resolving possible policy contradictions. The party is less ‘in need of ideological 
change to the left’; it may well be already in this place. Moreover, it is from this platform that the 
opposition party is appealing to the lowest stratum of society (the poor black majority). 
Fifth, I contend with the perception that the left-right makes little sense especially at the voter 
level. Scholars argue that the ideological dimension cannot be used in South African politics to 
analyse dynamics between parties, expressing an implicit doubt in the ability of this dimension to 
gain any meaning at the voter level (Friedman, 2015; Schrire, 2001; Butler, 2004; Petlane, 2009). 
This study shows that not only (a) large chunk from between 1982 to 2013 (76%) see themselves as 
able to place their positions on this scale (whether they interpret the scale as dealing with single 
issues: political, cultural or economic); also, (b) citizens take a stand on salient economic issues that 
can be identified on a left-right spectrum. Given this feature, we cannot perpetuate simplistic views 
about the electorate, such as they are void of reasoning or engaging in left-right terms because they 
directly and indirectly do so. In a related manner, I depart from the view that tends to present the 
electorate as unimodally leftist (Booysen, 2005; Habib and Taylor, 2001). I find that voters together 
with left preferences also have rightist tendencies. Although on matters of voter choice and party 
support and differences there are important elements of non-policy voting, this study shows voters 
have  clear  left-right  preferences  —  whether  or  not  they  engage  directly  or  indirectly  with 
ideological issues. Moreover, left-right dynamics are fundamental to general politics, especially in 
the party system, because highly polarised systems affect a range of things including democratic 
stability, while more moderate systems are highly beneficial. Thus, the left-right position voters and 
parties take are important for broader dynamics. 
In addition, I argue that it is weak to advance a race-based view of the electorate. I depart from 
those who argue that race is primary and fundamental (Johnson, 1996; Hoeane, 2009; Anyangwe, 
2012; Friedman, 2005). I find that even though voters are more non-policy than policy inclined, 
when  they  specifically  state  the  reasons  for  party  support,  they  do  not  equate  it  with  race  or 
ethnicity. In some cases they vote on policy matters and when non-policy voting occurs this is 
undergirded by non-race-based factors (trust, performance, competence, partisanship, personality, 
and needs).  The crux of my argument is  that the element of race,  although important in South 
African society and politics, should not be used to overgeneralise complex dynamics — there are 
important elements of policy-based voting within a section of the electorate. In brief, while race 
should not be downplayed, it should also not be overplayed. Although the lack of education and 
poverty are obstacles to policy voting, voters are sensitive to party promises and look for parties 
whose programmes are commensurate with voter needs — they are neither completely non-policy 
oriented  nor  vote  on  purely  rational  terms.  This  cannot  be  disconnected  from  broader  policy 
platforms which means that there is a level of indirect policy involvement at the voter level. This 
finding  builds  on  the  work  of  those  who  criticise  the  race-based  approach,  either  arguing  for 
important dimensions of an issue-centred electorate or non-policy yet non-race-based approaches 
(Eldridge and Seekings, 1996; Mattes et al, 1999b; Habib and Taylor, 2001; Ndletyana and Maaba, 
2010; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009).
Lastly, from my analysis of the dominant party, (a) I disagree with the presentation of policy 
change. Most scholars tend to describe economic policy movement in a left-right setup (much of 
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this is contained in the RDP to GEAR shift). One group perceives the RDP as leftist and GEAR as 
rightist, and some further describe the shift in the post-GEAR post-Polokwane era as leftist (Desai, 
2002;  Hart,  2002;  Habib,  2013;  Marais,  2011).  The  other  group  argues  that  GEAR  retained 
important socialist elements (Seekings, 2005; Lodge, 2004). Although I do not disagree with this 
categorisation and concede it is important, I agree that GEAR had right elements but argue that it 
had important socialist elements, and the Zuma period reflects a move to the left. However, this 
presentation has a deficiency: it presents overall policy in oversimplified left-right categories and 
neglects the presence of the centre. I argue that it is not easy to place the ANC in any two categories 
because the party simultaneously embraces a mix between the poles. It is important to look at the 
centre because overall policy fluctuation can be interpreted in terms of centre-left to centre-right and 
back to centre-left (this ‘backward’ turn is argued to have occurred under Zuma’s administration). 
This analysis places emphasis on the flexible, non-dogmatic and pragmatic character of the ANC — 
looking at the left-right alone risks neglecting these features and overemphasising movement as 
ideologically driven. 
In addition, (b) I depart from presentations of the causes of moderation. Those explaining why 
the ANC has not pursued a radical left agenda cite the weakness of socialist forces, the lack of 
economic growth and revenue, the global dominance of capitalism, domestic business interests, and 
business interests in the ANC. All are salient causes; however, I argue that the ANC’s own position 
in  relation  to  these  forces  is  an  additional  causal  factor.  Although the  party  is  not  ideological 
homogenous or completely centrist (given polarising and radical elements), it plays an active role in 
policy determination and this helps to explain why the ANC remains resiliently centrist. The party 
has consistently, especially since the 1960s, held onto more cross-cutting and mixed rather than 
clear-cut positions. This argument does not avoid radical elements in the party but states that by and 
large, the ANC has held onto the centre. In addition, (c) presenting the ANC within a matrix of 
contending forces pulled and pushed in any direction ignores the definition the ANC ascribes to 
itself. Perceptions about whether the ANC is influenced by the left or right are prone to presenting 
the party as an undefined entity that is subject to varying social forces. It confers the impression that 
the ANC cannot dare to be an independent agent but  remains a passive entity subject to contending 
whims.  However,  I  argue that  the  ANC has its  own beliefs  about  socioeconomic issues  and it 
responds to changes from this platform. It is not an amorphous or client entity. This suggests that 
the strength of capitalism would not necessarily push the ANC to the far right, and the growth of the 
left would not necessarily push it to the far left. It is the party’s own adherence and keeping with a 
centrist terrain that eschews extremism and fundamentalist doctrines.
In  brief,  I  add  to  the  literature  by  (a)  establishing  a  framework  to  ascertain  the  causes  of 
moderation;  and  (b)  adding  a  quantitative  measurement  for  party  positions  and  systemic 
polarisation. I also build on (c) the centrist feature of major parties and negligible role of extremist 
parties.  This  study  adds  by  (d)  advancing  the  argument  that  major  parties  are  less  ideological 
diverse that is usually purported, and that the DA occupies a leftist than rightist position; and (e) 
presenting the view that the electorate engage in left-right terms even though they do not engage 
rigorously with the policy dimension in politics. Concurring with scholarly arguments that argue for 
the presence of policy positions at the voter level, I state that there is indirect policy involvement. In 
addition, I extend the literature by (f) arguing that the ANC is a largely centrist, pragmatic and non-
dogmatic party; average left-right policy volatility in relation to government macroeconomic policy 
occurs within a centrist terrain; and the ANC is not an amorphous entity but an actively defined one.
From this study, two main things seem to constitute important aspects for future research: (a) a 
critical  analysis  of  the  DA’s,  or  opposition parties  in  general,  policy evolution to  the  left;  and 
whether the ANC’s occupation of the left space or social needs are influencing these parties to move 
leftward. In addition, (b) it may be important to examine what voters mean by the centre and centre-
right since they consistently position themselves in these categories since 1982. And also what 
dimension or cleavage line is being used by the median voter to position parties on the centre-left. 
Another  important  matter  concerns  (c)  broadening  understanding  about  the  significance  and 
shortfalls of ideological moderation at the social level. For the South African electorate it means 
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assessing  whether  the  evidence  of  direct  and  indirect  policy-based  competition  might  increase 
ideological voting and contribute to democratic accountability (Lachat, 2008; Hetherington, 2001; 
Dalton and Tanaka, 2007). While the pitfalls of non-policy based voting may be acknowledged in 
South Africa, it may be necessary to assess the effects of a policy-centred electorate. 
8.4.2 Implications for broader literature
While the single case approach adopted in this study limits the capacity for broad generalisations, 
the findings speak back to broader political science literature in ways that are deterministic and 
suggestive.  First,  in  contention  with  the  classical  view  that  proportionalism  correlates  with 
polarisation, I argue that the South African case shows that this link is not universally applicable, 
since  the  party  system  is  unpolarised  and  overwhelmingly  moderate.  Unlike  the  argument 
(presented by Downs, 1957; Sartori, 1976; Dow, 2010; Powell, 1982; Davies, 2004) that the number 
of  parties  in  the  system produces  extremism and  polarisation,  the  South  African  party  system 
exhibits centrist conglomeration despite operating under conditions of proportionalism. In addition, 
the argument that centre occupation induces polarisation — as argued by Sartori (1976) and Nagel 
and Wlezien (2010) — is not the case in South Africa, opposition parties occupy centre positions 
similar  to  the  dominant  party.  I  concur  with  scholars  who argue that  proportionalism does  not 
necessarily retard moderation (Ezrow, 2010; Dalton, 2008; Grofman, 2004) and that centre-induced 
polarisation is a necessary outcome especially when there are reasonable grounds to move to the 
centre (Green-Pedersen, 2004; Daalder, 1984; Hazan, 1997). To use Sartori’s (2005: 111) term: the 
South African case shows more ‘ideological proximity’ than ‘ideological difference’. I suggest that 
the traditional argument ignores two things: (a) the presence of an electorally strong party (like a 
dominant party) that has the potential to stabilise patterns of moderation and constrain polarisation 
(since it is electoral strength that enables an ideological party on the opposite pole to polarise the 
system). And (b) the role of party agency or social influence (or even global factors) in influencing 
adoption  of  and  movement  toward  centrism (since  parties  can  unilaterally  decide,  based  on  a 
number of reasons independent of the electoral system, to adopt either centre-left or centre-right 
positions). 
Second, the South African case shows that while there is division at the electoral level, especially 
on economic matters, the party system has not reflected such polarisation. Much seems to rest with 
the dominant party who seems to be constraining the ability of voters to affect party positions and 
cause meaningful  representation of social  cleavages.  Even though there are semblance between 
voter positions and party positions (especially given the move to the centre-left by parties and the 
leftist preference at the social level), social influence on polarisation is much less connected. While 
scholars purport a straightforward or dynamic influence between voter preference distribution, party 
position-taking and party system polarisation (Jacobson, 2003; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), I concur 
with those who argue that the social affects systemic polarisation less than we think (Layman et al, 
2006; Hetherington, 2009; Dalton and Tanaka, 2007; Seferiades, 1986). I advance the view that 
parties are not simply at the mercy of the voter, but there are other factors such as individual party 
agency, where parties decide what position to take on, and an important degree of independence 
from voters. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Interview questions for political parties
1. The proportional electoral system
A. What do you think were the main reasons for South Africa adopting the electoral system of 
proportional representation? What motivated the shift from a plurality to a proportional system?
B. Was this decision motivated by minority groups? If so, why? Do you think major stakeholders 
were in broad agreement? What do you think were the points of contention during the CODESA 
and MPNP (if applicable) on this matter?
2. Establishing voter left-right preference distribution and moderate-extremist character
A.  From  your  interactions  and  experience  with  voters,  how  would  you  describe  voter  policy 
preferences, especially in terms of socioeconomic positions? Though there are sectional groups, in 
the main how would you describe the electorate? Are the kind of policy preferences voters inclined 
towards leftist, rightist, centrist or neither? Do you think voters think about social and economic 
issues in a left-right manner?
B.  Would  you  describe  voters  as  moderate  or  extremist  in  their  policy  likings?  This  involves 
socioeconomic tastes, such as preference for a capitalist, socialist or mixed system. Or do you feel 
the average voter cannot be squarely placed in any ideological category?
3. Policy and non-policy voting
A. In your opinion, do you think the support base of your party actually prefer and make decisions 
on the basis of the policies offered by your party? Or do you feel that voters are non-policy oriented 
and vote for parties on some ofter non-ideological basis? 
B. Would you describe the electorate as motivated by race? What do you think are some of the main 
factors that drive voting decisions and party support? Also, do you think we have a ‘sophisticated’ 
electorate in South Africa, that does not ‘blindly’ vote for parties but clearly knows what issues they 
support, whether ideologically- or performance-based?
C. Voters point out some of their key concerns (such as jobs, housing, water and electricity), do you 
think voters vote for parties that best represent their preference on these issues? What would you 
say the electorate is mainly concerned about? In addition, from your analysis of the concerns of the 
electorate,  do  you  think  it  matters  to  the  ordinary  voter  what  ideological  or  policy  stance  is 
employed to meet voter concerns?
D.  In  general,  do you think the  ideological  or  policy positions  parties  take on issues,  whether 
centrist or extremist on the left-right, matters much less for voters than whether parties actually 
deliver on their promises? Or would you say voters are interested in party policy and programmes?
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E. Do you think that because the majority of citizens are poor and uneducated, it makes them non-
ideological or non-policy focused, that is, they care less about policy positions than more affluent 
social groups?  In other words, do you believe social conditions are behind the lack of ideological 
voting? 
4. Underlying explanations for voter preference distribution 
A. If you think the electorate is moderate and not extremist or radical on policy preferences, why do 
you think this is the case? If you think the electorate is extremist, what do you think contributes to 
this? 
B. One puzzling issue is that there was an expectation that South Africa would break into civil war 
and  social  unrest  during  the  democratic  transition,  but  this  did  not  occur.  What  do  you  think 
contributed to the general state of moderation in society?
5. Uncovering the party-voter causal dilemma: voter influence on parties
A.  Do  you  think  parties  choose  policy  positions  because  voters  prefer  a  certain  intensity  and 
direction such as moderate or radical, left or right? In other words, do you believe that voters have 
an influence on the policy or ideological positions that parties decide to adopt?
B. Does your party engage in making policy-based, programmatic decisions independent of voters? 
Or does social factors contribute a great deal in policy-formulation?
C. Do you think there is a disjuncture between party policy positions and voter preoccupations, or is 
there a correlation where party policies and voter concerns coincide?
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Appendix B: Interview questions for the SACP and COSATU
1. SACP
A. What motivated the SACP to enter  into an alliance with the ANC? Was this  related to any 
ideological or policy-seeking motivations to implement socialist policies? 
B.  The ANC is  characterised as  a  centre-left  party,  does  the  SACP prefer  to  work within  this 
framework? Does it  mean the SACP is not interested in advancing far left policies? Or does it 
believe that it can do so through its alliance with the ANC?
C. Why do you think the SACP has not been able to advance radical socialism as a governing 
policy?  Does  the  ANC factor  in  this  process?  If  so,  how? Can  you  explain  other  factors  that 
contribute to the continuation of non-radical leftist policies in the country?
D. Why does the SACP still support working with the ANC? Is socialism still a longterm ambition 
for the SACP? 
2. COSATU 
A. What motivated COSATU into an alliance with the ANC? Was this related to any ideological or 
policy-seeking motivations to implement worker-centred leftist policies? 
B.  The  ANC is  characterised  as  a  centre-left  party,  does  COSATU prefer  to  work  within  this 
framework? Does it mean COSATU is not interested in advancing labour-friendly, anti-neoliberal 
policies? Is COSATU content to advance worker interest through its alliance with the ANC?
C.  Why  do  you  think  COSATU has  not  been  able  to  advance  radical  socialist,  worker-based 
policies? Does the ANC factor in this  process? If  so,  how? Can you explain other factors that 
contribute to the continuation of non-radical  leftist  policies,  and even in some cases to rightist 
economic policies, in the country?
D. Why is COSATU still in support of the ANC?
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Appendix C: Interview questions for the ANC
1. The proportional electoral system
A. During the CODESA negotiations, the ANC agreed to adopt a proportional electoral system, can 
you give a background for why the ANC decided to go with a PR than a majoritarian, winner-takes-
all electoral system? Also, was a PR system the most preferred electoral system for the ANC?
B. Was the ANC pressured by minority groups to adopt a system that would give more room for 
representativity and inclusiveness in the emerging democratic dispensation?
2. Establishing voter left-right preference distribution and moderate-extremist character
A.  From  your  interactions  and  experience  with  voters,  how  would  you  describe  voter  policy 
preferences, especially in terms of socioeconomic positions? Though there are sectional groups, in 
the main how would you describe the electorate? Are the kind of policy preferences voters inclined 
towards leftist, rightist, centrist or neither? Do you think voters think about social and economic 
issues in a left-right manner?
B.  Would  you  describe  voters  as  moderate  or  extremist  in  their  policy  likings?  This  involves 
socioeconomic tastes, such as preference for a capitalist, socialist or mixed system. Or do you feel 
the average voter cannot be squarely placed in any ideological category?
3. Policy and non-policy voting
A. In your opinion, do you think the support base of the ANC actually prefer and make decisions on 
the basis of the policies offered by the party? Or do you feel that voters are non-policy oriented and 
vote for parties on some ofter non-ideological basis? 
B. Would you describe the electorate as motivated by race? What do you think are some of the main 
factors that drive voting decisions and party support? Also, do you think we have a ‘sophisticated’ 
electorate in South Africa, that does not ‘blindly’ vote for parties but clearly knows what issues they 
support, whether ideologically- or performance-based?
C. Voters point out some of their key concerns (such as jobs, housing, water and electricity), do you 
think voters vote for parties that best represent their preference on these issues? What would you 
say the electorate is mainly concerned about? In addition, from your analysis of the concerns of the 
electorate,  do  you  think  it  matters  to  the  ordinary  voter  what  ideological  or  policy  stance  is 
employed to meet voter concerns?
D.  In  general,  do you think the  ideological  or  policy positions  parties  take on issues,  whether 
centrist or extremist on the left-right, matters much less for voters than whether parties actually 
deliver on their promises? Or would you say voters are interested in party policy and programmes?
E. Do you think that because the majority of citizens are poor and uneducated, it makes them non-
ideological or non-policy focused, that is, they care less about policy positions than more affluent 
social groups?  In other words, do you believe social conditions are behind the lack of ideological 
voting? 
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4. Underlying explanations for voter preference distribution 
A. If you think the electorate is moderate and not extremist or radical on policy preferences, why do 
you think this is the case? If you think the electorate is extremist, what do you think contributes to 
this? 
B. One puzzling issue is that there was an expectation that South Africa would break into civil war 
and  social  unrest  during  the  democratic  transition,  but  this  did  not  occur.  What  do  you  think 
contributed to the general state of moderation in society?
5. Uncovering the party-voter causal dilemma: voter influence on parties
A. Does the ANC choose policy positions because voters prefer a certain intensity and direction 
such as  moderate  or  radical,  left  or  right?  In  other  words,  do you believe that  voters  have an 
influence on the policy or ideological positions that the party decides to adopt?
B. Does the ANC engage in making policy-based, programmatic decisions independent of voters? 
Or do social factors contribute a great deal in policy-formulation?
C.  Do  you  think  there  is  a  disjuncture  between  the  party’s  policy  positions  and  voter 
preoccupations, or is there a correlation where the ANC’s policies and voter concerns coincide?
6. Explanations for the ANC’s centre-leftism
A. The ANC is a centre-left party that supports pro-poor and pro-business policies, what do you 
think led or  caused the ANC to adopt  these policies? Do you think the global  shift  towards a 
capitalist, free-market era contributed to the ANC’s non-embrace of radical leftism?
7. The ANC relationship with the left 
A. What motivated the ANC to work with the SACP and COSATU? Is this based on ideological 
grounds?
B.  Even  though  the  ANC  includes  socialist  organisations  like  the  SACP,  why  has  these 
organisations not pressurised the party to move toward the far left, close up the market, reduce pro-
capitalist policies, and favour radical nationalisation and redistribution? 
8. The ANC relationship with the right 
A.  How  would  you  describe  the  party’s  view  of  the  business  sector  and  its  attitude  towards 
capitalism and the free-market? 
B. What motivated the decision to include the business community within the policies of the ANC? 
Was  this  a  longstanding  commitment  within  the  ANC  prior  to  1994?  Why  did  the  party  not 
articulate  ideological  lines  that  were  anti-capitalist,  anti-business;  and  what  contributed  to  the 
‘mixed model’? 
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Appendix D: Interview questions for NEDLAC and business
1. The attitude of business towards the ANC 
A. How would you describe government’s (where the ANC is the party-of-government) relationship 
with  and attitude  towards  the  private  sector,  capitalism and the  free-market?  How open is  the 
government towards negotiating, bargaining and compromising with business? 
B. Do you perceive government as working in favour of any particular interest, such as labour or 
business? Is government balanced in advancing a pro-poor and pro-business agenda?
C. Would you say that  the business sector is  largely satisfied to work within the government’s 
moderate,  centre-left  and  mixed-market  economic  model?  Or  do  you  think  this  model  is  non-
existent? 
D. Do you think business feels accommodated and included in South Africa’s socioeconomic policy 
environment?
2. Understanding the dynamics in NEDLAC (if applicable)
A. Overall, how would you describe the nature of interactions and dialogue between government, 
business and labour? Do you think NEDLAC is an effective channel for constituencies to share 
their views?  
B. From your observation, how would you describe government’s relationship with labour? How 
open is the government towards the proposals coming from the left? Does labour try to influence 
government to adopt radical socioeconomic policies? If so, what is government’s response? Do you 
think the government is willing to move into a radical leftist direction?
C. How would you describe government’s relationship with business? How open is the government 
towards  pro-business  proposals?  Does  business  try  to  influence  government  in  a  neoliberal 
direction? If so, what is government’s response? Do you think the government is willing to move 
into a radical rightist direction?
D. Do you think both groups understand the overall socioeconomic model espoused by the ANC 
government? In general, does labour and business feel they are given sufficient space to contribute 
to socioeconomic policy determination?
3. Explaining the ANC’s centre-leftism 
A. Do you think the presence of business influenced the ANC’s moderate leftism? What would you 
say is the cause of the ANC taking a moderate than radical position on socioeconomic policy? Do 
you think the global dominance of capitalism has anything to do with this?
B. Why do you think the ANC hasn’t managed to be influenced by radical socialism (through SACP 
and COSATU)?
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Appendix E: Participant information sheet
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Appendix F: Consent form
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Appendix G: Ethics clearance certificate
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